Are snipers and recon still valid in infantry battalions?

[William F. Owen]

Or are you proposing DM type snipers, 2 per platoon, whose 'Primary' job is to support Rifle Plt movements?

Nothing wrong w/the latter just want to be on the same page.

This is closer to what I am proposing, but equipped with bolt-action 8.59mm/300 WinMAG, and course qualified by virtue of 2 weeks training. All the training is focussed at the long range (qualification 800m+, training 1000m) application of fire, and the skills needed to do it.
- alternatively there could be an 8-10 Sniper section at the company level.

Now this has to held relevant to the standard of infantry training I am proposing, which is far more focussed on Patrol/Surveillance type skills.

[William F. Owen]

Why I say that, beyond the obvious, is b/c the US Army (I know ur Brit) & the USMC's idea of Sniper Employment is different. This discussion seems more Army centric in the Ideas of sniper/recon employment.

THis might explain the difference between the UK and US approach to a lot of stuff

[Kiwigrunt]

THis might explain the difference between the UK and US approach to a lot of stuff

I don't understand

[krsna]

Technology may complement reconnaissance, but it will not replace it. The sterile videos footage cannot replace those that creep through the night.

Although the article and technology you cite is new to those stykers, the reporter, and yourself, it is not new. Under the blessing of then MG William Caldwell, my squadron tested the same technology in 2005 and employed it in 2006 and 2007 in Iraq.

The technology provided us enhanced capabilities, but it could not replace the paratrooper burrowed deep in an observation post. For example,

- we observed that when UAVs flew overhead, everyone hid. We could HEAR the UAVs from a mile or two away. The picture shown in the videos did not reflect the picture on the ground. The enemy was smart enough to counter this notion of alternative coverage.

- Video footage and UAVs could not pick up the difference in Arabaic dialogue that we could. In one instance, one of my scouts managed to get close enough to a stronghold to determine that the dialogue spoken was not Iraqi but Egyptian. This intel helped confirm the presence of foreign fighters.

- Video footage is deceiving. I cannot tell you the amount of hours that I spent trying to explain to CAS, NTISR, and the command group that the footage they were watching was dogs running around and not insurgents.



v/r

Mike

Precisely! In an operation of recent vintage we flew a UAV for two days over an area and got zilch. That very night we had a contact and killed two in the same area at close range. Basic skills and hunch never fail an Infantarian.

[120mm]

Of course, it could also be that I don't see it as an all pervading problem because I've been lucky enough to have been in more good units that bad ones.

But it's not a "good unit, bad unit" thing. It's a micro-culture thing. Even the best units get to the point where they don't see their own micro-cultural bias. Personally, based on working at the CTCs plus a couple of deployments, I disagree with the assertion that more units use their low-density specialties correctly. It certainly seems like more units misuse them than not.

Then why would they stick around a culture they don't like, respect or agree with? No one today is drafted. Makes no sense to me that folks come in the Army, decide they hate it for this or that reason and stay.

I don't see why a guy who isn't suited to the infantry "mindset" (which is what we're discussing here... See the OP; WILF is asserting that specialized recon and snipers are not necessary. I'm attempting to rebut that assertion.) has to leave the army. All God's critters got a place in the choir, etc., when it comes to this here Army, which means we're discussing something we probably agree about. My point is that really good infantry guys probably won't make really good recon or sniper guys. It takes a different mindset, imo.

[quote} Why would one do that...Yes, there are -- and while there are Infantry (and other branch) guys who are way too doctrinaire, there are also all sorts of guys in the Army who don't have the problem you attempt to tack onto them -- unless the Army has changed a whole lot more than it seems to have from my day...[/QUOTE]

Well, post 1991, upon the dissolution of the Cavalry Regiments, Divisional CAV became a mini-regiment, and absorbed the kinetic missions. This resulted in much less recon capability, imo, and a tendency to use them as a mini-regiment, as witnessed by 3ID's sending 3-7 CAV into Baghdad. Watching several CTC rotations, I saw Brigade and Battalion Scouts doing more fighting, and less recon missions. LRS has been disbanded, so there really isn't a persistent direct observation capable force in the current force mix.

Add to this the current state of the art, over-taxonomied and over-specialized S-2 shop at the BCT level, you have a perfect storm.

I don't disagree with WILF's or your assertions, but in tangential degrees.

[Ken White]

But it's not a "good unit, bad unit" thing. It's a micro-culture thing.

Which exists -- and I'm not sure it's micro; all I contend is that good units can override that and the few really good ones do so.I'm basing my thought they still do on my son's experience as a Scout Dude in good and not so good units in recent years.

Even the best units get to the point where they don't see their own micro-cultural bias.

Best units, good people, most everyone falls into that trap on occasion.

Personally, based on working at the CTCs plus a couple of deployments, I disagree with the assertion that more units use their low-density specialties correctly. It certainly seems like more units misuse them than not.

I don't think I said that they did (though someone else may have). Even good units frequently fail on that depending on human variables. A bad S3 can destroy all the work of a good Commander and god Co Cdrs. FWIW from 1950 until I left troops in 1984, most Commanders did not know how to use their reconnaissance units. Specialty platoons and sections were very much dependent on their leaders; the good ones produced good people and good performance, the mediocre ones did not. I don't expect that's changed...

I don't see why a guy who isn't suited to the infantry "mindset" ...has to leave the army. All God's critters got a place in the choir, etc., when it comes to this here Army, which means we're discussing something we probably agree about. My point is that really good infantry guys probably won't make really good recon or sniper guys. It takes a different mindset, imo.

On staying or leaving, given a war, that becomes moot, in peacetime my point was that if it annoys someone, I can't see why they'd keep beating their head against the wall. However, people differ. He sure doesn't have to leave but if it irritates him for whatever reason (say more than three days a week ) then I don't see why he'd put up with it...

FWIW, LRS hasn't been disbanded, they're still in being, are being used and are doing some good stuff. They do have the problem of risk averse folks being afraid to use them properly but that's not an Infantry mindset, that's an Army mindset.

I don't really disagree on the mindset but my WAG is that about a third can do both jobs with obvious ranking from great to good (and not necessarily for most the same ranking in all three jobs), about a third are suited for either one or the other but not both with the Scout obviously being more demanding and the remaining third probably should have another job somewhere -- but are likely to be tolerated in the Infantry if there's a war on.[quote]Well, post 1991, upon the dissolution of the Cavalry Regiments, Divisional CAV became a mini-regiment, and absorbed the kinetic missions. This resulted in much less recon capability, ... so there really isn't a persistent direct observation capable force in the current force mix.[quote]Agree on that based on what I've seen -- we have lost the track on scouting and reconnaissance. Sadly, that trend goes all the way back to Viet Nam -- we did not properly use the assets and skills we had in that war; we took a lot of good Cav and Recon units who were not bad prior to going to Viet Nam and totally misused them. The skills got lost. We picked up a lot of really bad habits in that war, including micro management. In the reinvention of the Army post VN, Reconnaissance got passed over for going out Armored and looking for bear. Bad answer. Commanders also, as a result of the CTCs and their time compression lost the ability to be patient enough for the Recon elements to do their jobs. That's why the CTC OpFor always out-reconned the Rotation. That and knowing and using the terrain.

I don't disagree with WILF's or your assertions, but in tangential degrees.

Nor do I really disagree with your points as amplified but my initial point was, "I hear what you're saying but it ain't THAT bad." Which I can't say, really, now that I think about it. I can say it wasn't that bad 30 plus years ago but today's not in my vision block FOV...

I'm pretty sure it shouldn't be and sorta sure it doesn't need to be that bad, tho'

[MikeF]

Well, post 1991, upon the dissolution of the Cavalry Regiments, Divisional CAV became a mini-regiment, and absorbed the kinetic missions. This resulted in much less recon capability, imo, and a tendency to use them as a mini-regiment, as witnessed by 3ID's sending 3-7 CAV into Baghdad. Watching several CTC rotations, I saw Brigade and Battalion Scouts doing more fighting, and less recon missions. LRS has been disbanded, so there really isn't a persistent direct observation capable force in the current force mix.

Add to this the current state of the art, over-taxonomied and over-specialized S-2 shop at the BCT level, you have a perfect storm.

I don't disagree with WILF's or your assertions, but in tangential degrees.

120mm,

I appreciate your posts. I'll add some thoughts that may add to y'all's discussion.

First, the CTC's. They are 3 weeks long. Most true recon missions (FIND FUNCTION) take much longer than that. There is a game-manship that must be played by EVERY commander there in order to "Pass" or at least not get fired.

Second, 3/7 CAV went into Baghdad. So what? The original OPORD ended south of Baghdad. They, and the rest of us, conducted a movement to contact. The DIV CAV is capable of taking limited objectives. 3/7 seized the airfield in leau of (or to the angst) of an airborne seizure by the 82nd with support from 1st BCT. The rest of the Division and the Marines (a couple of days behind us ) took the city. I don't see anything wrong with that. It flowed with the doctrine. Additionally, the initial attack into Baghdad (i.e. the first Thunder Runs) was led by A company, 1-64 AR as directed by then COL Perkins to "see what was going on ." A more interesting study is what the rest of 3ID's recon assets did. It differs by brigade. 2nd BCT BRT assumed a traditional role of advanced guard leading the brigade from Kuwait to Najaf then fell back into a guard/cover role. 3rd BCT BRT assumed a guard role from the beginning. I'm not sure about 1st BCT BRT. As a tank platoon leader, I was attached to TF 1-15 IN. I led my batallion, and the scouts were divided up within my company. I actually had my own little regiment of tanks, scouts and engineers which was fun. So, I would argue that MG Blount employed his scouts in traditional roles thoughout the initial invasion. Moreover, there were many "other" units conducting strategic and long-range recon throughout.

Third, I have to cide with Ken on the issues and capabilities of traditional 19D's. Yes, as a commander, I had some growing pains as I explained over and over that we would have to go past our traditional roles of FIND and continue on towards FIX, and FINISH, but once we entered theatre, I continued to be impressed by the basic skill sets of scouts (LZ/PZ operations, demolitions, communications, and reporting). Working with both heavy and light scouts, tankers, engineers, and infantry, I have never observed any animosity towards scouts or snipers.

v/r

Mike

[Steve Blair]

Second, 3/7 CAV went into Baghdad. So what? The original OPORD ended south of Baghdad. They, and the rest of us, conducted a movement to contact. The DIV CAV is capable of taking limited objectives. 3/7 seized the airfield in leau of (or to the angst) of an airborne seizure by the 82nd with support from 1st BCT. The rest of the Division and the Marines (a couple of days behind us ) took the city. I don't see anything wrong with that. It flowed with the doctrine. Additionally, the initial attack into Baghdad (i.e. the first Thunder Runs) was led by A company, 1-64 AR as directed by then COL Perkins to "see what was going on ." A more interesting study is what the rest of 3ID's recon assets did. It differs by brigade. 2nd BCT BRT assumed a traditional role of advanced guard leading the brigade from Kuwait to Najaf then fell back into a guard/cover role. 3rd BCT BRT assumed a guard role from the beginning. I'm not sure about 1st BCT BRT. As a tank platoon leader, I was attached to TF 1-15 IN. I led my batallion, and the scouts were divided up within my company. I actually had my own little regiment of tanks, scouts and engineers which was fun. So, I would argue that MG Blount employed his scouts in traditional roles thoughout the initial invasion. Moreover, there were many "other" units conducting strategic and long-range recon throughout.

I second the "so what?" comment, but for more historical reasons. Cavalry in the American Army has never really been a reconnaissance asset, at least not in traditional terms (no matter what doctrinal discussions might say). In times of conflict it's typically been used in ways similar to what we saw with 3/7 and in Vietnam...and this goes back to before the Civil War. I'd argue that recon and scouting has often been left to either outside contractors or specialized, ad hoc units formed and disbanded as needed by field commanders (again, something like the development of the LRRP units in Vietnam). But I digress and wander down historical paths again....

[tankersteve]

Just want to stir the pot here with a question about scouts in general.

In the old Force XXI heavy brigade, the infantry battalions fed their own scout platoon from the infantry soldiers in the battalion. The tank battalions had 19Ds assigned directly to the platoon. I am not 100% on how they deal with this in the combined arms battalions now.

My thesis is, since I never heard anyone specifically say that the infantry scouts were better/worse than the 19Ds, maybe the job is easier to train a scout from the GP force than some might think. While I always loved the 19Ds attached to my company, they always had that 1% dud guy who had to be chaptered out. He sucked up a slot in the platoon until he was gone. Meanwhile, the infantry battalion kicked the same type of loser back to his original unit and got another stud who was standing by, eager to get into arguably the 'most desirable' platoon in the battalion.

Tankersteve

[Ken White]

Steve Blair

Cavalry in the American Army has never really been a reconnaissance asset...I'd argue that recon and scouting has often been left to either outside contractors or specialized, ad hoc units formed and disbanded as needed by field commanders (again, something like the development of the LRRP units in Vietnam).

True on both counts I believe -- with one caveat; a few commanders have been reconnaissance fans and have allowed and / or pushed their Recon elements to do their job but that has certainly been the exception rather than the rule.

At one point in the early 1960s of 12 Cav or Recon Platoons in the 82d Airpocket Division, it was generally acknowledged that only three of those -- and none of them Cav -- were into recon work as opposed to economy of force, escort and palace guard missions.

In both Brigades in which I served in Viet Nam, only one Bn used their Recon Platoon as Scouts, the other two combined them with their AT Platoons and used them as mini-rifle companies (probably on the rationale that they had six M-60s...). Needless to say, the mini-Cos had high casualty rates. Dumb way to do business IMO. In my estimation, of the max of 60 plus Inf Bns in Viet Nam, an average of only about 6 to 8 did Recon work and that varied over time. All the Cav Units I saw were pure combat elements.

I'm also convinced that the LRRPs were invented to fill that shortfall in reconnaissance assets caused by most Infantry Bns converting their Recon Platoons into economy of force units with a commensurate loss of capabilities -- and skills and the Cav units doing econ of force stuff (or major combat ops in the case of the 11th ACR). The LRRPs did some heroic stuff -- they also did some really dumb stuff because few Cdrs/S2/S3 knew how to employ them...

Tanker Steve:

You're right in my experience and observation. Saw both sides as a 19D in two Cav units and an 11F Infantry Scout in a couple of more back in the day when everyone in the Infantry was not an 11B (the troops in the Inf BG / Bn Recon Platoons were 11Bs, the NCOs were 11Fs, there were, thankfully, no 11Ms). I'd say more Inf Bn platoons played fall out one as you say than did not but some units were loth to allow that desirable unit syndrome.

Having been trained as a 19D at Knox (1950s) and having much later (1970s) helped train them there and having been through the old Infantry Intel and Recon course at Benning, I think you're correct. I'll also say that I learned more about reconnaissance (and the Intel side of things) at the Benning I&R School than I did -- or saw taught -- at Knox where there was IMO, excessive emphasis on the combat missions at the expense of the Recon missions. In their defense and as Steve Blair said, that's what the Cav units do more so than any recon work...

I mentioned before that a Cav COL recently told my son when he complained about the lack of stealthy recon skills in the US Army and the Armor heavy Cavalry Troops in the BCTs that "We don't have the patience to do that. We just go out looking for trouble and to do that, you have to have Armor."

I think there's great accuracy and acceptance of current reality in that statement. I do not think there's much merit in it -- or the philosophy that underpins it.

I've always wondered how much of the current 'Cavalry' is a grasping for more Armor Branch force structure based on historic unit designations as opposed to a real desire for reconnaissance trained units. That sounds like a smack at Armor but it is not -- it is question that occurs to me often because I don't think we've really thought through much of our force structure, it's just sort of evolved and not always logically. Nor do I think we really have an appreciation for ground reconnaissance as a force multiplier.

[tankersteve]

Ken,

Totally agree about the 'cavalry' units being an effort by Armor branch to have a finger in the pie. Right now we are using the 'cavalry' units as economy of force maneuver units, almost exclusively. And I agree that we probably don't have any patience for real stealthy reconnaissance work.

One example that I remember - as a 2LT newly arrived in my first battalion, we were training up for NTC and I found myself as the night battle captain. The battalion commander, a great leader who commanded a brigade in OIF1, used the scout platoon as guides for the tank companies. It was much more important to get his combat forces to their AOs/LDs, rather than knowing much about the enemy. The scout platoon, call sign 'Snake', soon was nicknamed 'Sheppard'. This was despite the fact that every tank had an IVIS and GPS. And this was back in the day of a 10-truck scout platoon and a 4 line company battalion.

But why don't we get it? Is it because real recon work is not readily quantifiable, compared to a tank gunnery? It is hard to train well, or even know if we are training it well, so why bother?

All these RSTA squadrons need to be revamped as infantry/combined arms battalions, with a single, robust RSTA troop in the BSTB. However, it would take more troops than you think as a single robust troop would probably require 2/3ds of the RSTA squadron, with their tiny formations.

Tankersteve

[COMMAR]

This is closer to what I am proposing, but equipped with bolt-action 8.59mm/300 WinMAG, and course qualified by virtue of 2 weeks training. All the training is focussed at the long range (qualification 800m+, training 1000m) application of fire, and the skills needed to do it.
- alternatively there could be an 8-10 Sniper section at the company level.

Now this has to held relevant to the standard of infantry training I am proposing, which is far more focussed on Patrol/Surveillance type skills.

2 questions:

1) Are these "snipers" attached to the Rifle Plts in direct support as in, their movement are tied to the RPs or are they semi-autonomous operating under Company Guidance but are available to support the RPs.

2) Is the "standard of Inf training your proposing" similar to present day Line Inf. tactics or more like True Light Inf tactics, more along the lines of what Distributed Ops is proposing w/the Observation/Surveillance package of Combat Hunter.


It sounds like you might be proposing something the Marines wrestling w/the last few yrs. DO now called ECO, you probably know, is a few yrs out.

Combat Hunter which deals with teaching Advanced Observation/Surveillance techniques along w/Man Tracking & subject Profiling, is what the Corps has now moved to in the teaching Infantry tactics.

[Ken White]

And I agree that we probably don't have any patience for real stealthy reconnaissance work.

I agree as well but do believe that's partly a poor quality training induced habit that can be corrected. That does not mean I think we will correct it...

One example that I remember...This was despite the fact that every tank had an IVIS and GPS. And this was back in the day of a 10-truck scout platoon and a 4 line company battalion.

That mirrors far more of my observations than I'd like. Distrust of subordinates due too rapid turnover and known marginal training leads to ad hoc solutions like that -- most of which have about an equal chance of producing bad results as not applying them in the first place.

But why don't we get it? Is it because real recon work is not readily quantifiable, compared to a tank gunnery? It is hard to train well, or even know if we are training it well, so why bother?

My belief is that you've nailed it. In trying to push tactical training in my Cav and Mech days, I continually pointed out that I'd seen very few if any US vehicles outperformed and destroyed by enemy gunnery but a bunch destroyed by poor US tactics.

Armor, Cavalry and Mech Infantry Gunnery and Maintenance are tremendously important -- to HRC. They provide concrete numbers, 'metrics,' to promotion and command slate boards. Congress continually pings DoD for 'unfairness' in promotions; Congress insists on 'objective' data (read: numbers -- no matter if they're flaky as long as they look good and can be backed up with 'data.). Thus those units who do gunnery and have OR Rates for something more than small arms and VS 17 panels are loved by HRC because the boards can have 'data.' Thus mounted units emphasize gunnery and maintenance over tactical training even though the latter is IMO more important to success and survival.

For the real Recon effort and for most infantry stuff, it's tactical application that counts and judging that in peacetime is -- and always will be -- subjective. A lot of people hate that, they are uncomfortable telling others they aren't competent based only on skills and knowledge with no hard numbers for backup -- it's easier to let the numbers be tha bad guy.

One of the designers of the ARTEP back in the early 70s told me that one goal was to eliminate having to do that, to force the unit commander to 'self assess.' This primarily to save senior officers the need to 'grade' subordinates or penalize them for failure but the sales rationale was to be 'making the Commander master of his own training.' Dumbbb with three 'b's...

I've seen half a dozen attempts to provide 'objective' analysis of training and tactical evolutions -- all simply traded macro subjectivity for micro subjectivity, all failed to convince anyone of note of their value.

Good Recon work is not hard to train but it is quite hard to evaluate (in that it is a lot of work to properly evaluate, it's not difficult to do it on a 'Go-No go' basis). It also entails trusting low ranking people doing things when and where they cannot be properly supervised. It is more risky than traveling in large armored herds...

The patience factor also contributes, as does time and space -- bottom line is we do not do it well.

All these RSTA squadrons need to be revamped... 2/3ds of the RSTA squadron, with their tiny formations.

Totally agree; my sensing is that TOE was not well thought out. My Son was in one Sqn at Bragg and they had some major training and employment problems; it was getting sorted by the time they deployed but that showed other flaws.

I think the entire Recon and Surveillance (two separate functions requiring two different sets of training and concentration) functional area needs an in depth look.

[William F. Owen]

1) Are these "snipers" attached to the Rifle Plts in direct support as in, their movement are tied to the RPs or are they semi-autonomous operating under Company Guidance but are available to support the RPs.

I see platoons as either operating as platoons or generating mission tailored groups which would allow semi-autonomous fireteam multiples to conduct a wide range of reconnaissance and surveillance missions. - so if I need 6 x 4-man Sniper teams, the Company can generate them - 2 from each platoon.

2) Is the "standard of Inf training your proposing" similar to present day Line Inf. tactics or more like True Light Inf tactics, more along the lines of what Distributed Ops is proposing w/the Observation/Surveillance package of Combat Hunter.

I don't agree with Distributed Ops, but yes the training (still working on it) is focussed on a lot of individual skills training, and lots of Patrol types Recon and Surveillance skills for Fireteams either operating as multiples or part of a platoon/Company.

[Ken White]

I said in this post (LINK) I'd order Spicer's book. However, my son who lurks here occasionally, called me and said he had that one and one other by Spicer and told me he'd send them for me to read and suggested that I could buy the one Spicer book he did not have. So I ordered "Sniper: The techniques and equipment of the deadly marksman." In the event, that arrived before the other two. Since Spicer probably makes pretty much the same points in all the books, I can comment on the one I have.

Not a bad book, allowing for the differences between the British and US armies, he seems to have it all down pretty accurately and reasonably. His wording is only occasionally hyperbolic -- but then, he's writing for a mass audience so that's okay.

The real problem is that unless one is careful on can absorb myths from his approach with phrases like this:

"The sniper has for many years been the most feared man on the battlefield...it can be understood why he is often credited with mystical powers...if this man(leader) is taken out, the morale of the group can be seriously affected, if not destroyed. (all pp 112-3)

I dispute all those comments; never seen the fear, any delusion of power or a loss of morale if a leader is taken out in US or allied forces with whom I've worked. I have seen folks get annoyed but little more. So those are myths IMO.

He then discusses the ability of Snipers to slow or even stop both helicopters and Armor and follows that with

Many reconnaissance soldiers resent the sniper...(pg 115)

He had earlier said that Snipers were feared and looked upon as assassins by fellow soldiers. I suppose if he said that those things occurred somewhere -- but I have never seen those reactions other than jokingly or semi-derisively and I think suggesting that potential to drop helicopters and stop Armor by Snipers is possibly a dangerous idea. More myths, I believe...

He provides a Sniper's Creed., Item 2: "Respect all Soldiers and use your own knowledge to assist and aid without fostering needless elitism." The Creed is sensible, Item 2 is really good and he mostly follows it -- but he does have a book to sell...

So, good effort but I wouldn't base any war planning on the book. In his defense, he does pay adequate attention to METT-TC and he does provide numerous cautionaries throughout the book. The problem may be that folks tend to home in the sensational and not the humdrum.

Nothing in this book refutes any of my experience. In fact it generally reinforces it so he didn't change my mind on anything.

However, some of the "I'm selling Sniping as a golden bullet (or trying to sell this book)..." verbiage is dangerously misleading if taken out of context.

[Infanteer]

The skills got lost. We picked up a lot of really bad habits in that war, including micro management. In the reinvention of the Army post VN, Reconnaissance got passed over for going out Armored and looking for bear. Bad answer. Commanders also, as a result of the CTCs and their time compression lost the ability to be patient enough for the Recon elements to do their jobs. That's why the CTC OpFor always out-reconned the Rotation. That and knowing and using the terrain.

Interesting points and discussion on Recon (or, more properly, Recce...).

We are seeing a similar debate in our Army with Armoured Recconaissance units being slated to lose their Coyotes (LAV-25s) for the forthcoming JLTV. Issues with losing a fighting vehicle for a tough truck and debates as to what Recce really is.

As I mentioned before, we have a new manual on this which is pretty good at encapsulating all arms recce.

I find the argument of "saber or stealth" to be interesting - is recce "scouting" or "cavalry"? I caught this at an AUSA presentation a while back and found it interesting.

http://www3.ausa.org/pdfdocs/lwp_53.pdf

We had a long debate about it on a forum here, if anyone is interested.

http://forums.army.ca/forums/index.p...c,35526.0.html

I'll take the time to read through this thread again and try and offer more.

Cheers,
Infanteer

[jcustis]

The bit that resonates with me from the saber vs. stealth work is the part about every fight being a movement to contact.

With the exception of the attack across the berm (and even that suffered from poor targeting and templating) into the Safwan Hill region, I felt I had very little information to work with, and even as our LAV-25s led the 1st Marine Division, we spent more time almost stumbling into contact than confirming the presence of enemy forces. Confirmation came at times through leading with our chin.

Follow-on forces benefited to some degree, but the snoop-and-poop techniques did not support the tempo that was required by CFLCC, and we spent more time dashing forward than was probably doctrinally prudent.

[Ken White]

Follow-on forces benefited to some degree, but the snoop-and-poop techniques did not support the tempo that was required by CFLCC, and we spent more time dashing forward than was probably doctrinally prudent. (emphasis added /kw)

Against a reasonably competent peer enemy; yep...

There's a time and place for both types of 'recon / recce' and the good leader or commander will use the correct one -- sometimes bad staff officers who forget they are not commanders 'require' speed that the Commander isn't even aware of because they think that'll please the commander. Staff types should just do their job and stop trying to impress the Commandante.

The old saw "There's never enough time to do it right but there's always time to do it twice" sort of applies. Some times you just have to trade bodies for progress or forward movement -- usually you do not but our impatience often leads us to do it when it is ill advised and totally unnecessary.

[William F. Owen]

There is some compelling sets of data that show, except in open desert, average rates of advance since 1918 are < 2km per hour, and often substantially less. 30km per day is considered good.

[Fuchs]

There is some compelling sets of data that show, except in open desert, average rates of advance since 1918 are < 2km per hour, and often substantially less. 30km per day is considered good.

Average and median are really of little interest.

A WW2 armoured corps with 40 km/h tanks* advanced 400 km in quite exactly four days- against the opposition of several conventional divisions in suboptimal tank terrain (Manstein's Corps to Vilnius).


Advance through defence is of little interest today in general. There are enough gaps for advance, and no continuous line of defence. You don't need to advance through deep defensive positions in most conventional warfare scenarios.
You can - if you prepare well for it - rather go back to an extremely accelerated version of Central European 18th century army maneuvers (Wars of Silesia as examples).
Speed of advanced in defended terrain was irrelevant then and it is (almost) today.



*: (that needed maintenance every hour of driving in order to prevent excessive breakdowns)