Are snipers and recon still valid in infantry battalions?

[reed11b]

Update. Just returned from RSLC at Benning and have some infantry recon observations. One, the infantry recon community is tiny. Two, we are endangered by SF expansion into the traditional LRS mission. Three, there is a huge disconnect between the larger Cav scout community and the infantry scout community. There is a push to better train infantry scouts on TA/TI and Urban recce and an opposing push to eliminate infantry scouts all together and replace them with cav scouts. I say that the latter idea is a really bad one. This would transfer many of the missions that we do over to SF, not Cav, and our SF community is already A) over tasked (often a self created problem) and B) using less experienced and trained soldiers to a meet this over tasking. Much of the Urban and long range recce missions can be performed by infantry given time and training, freeing up SF to do other missions.
Reed

[Ken White]

As one who has been all three -- SF, Inf Recon and Cav -- I wholeheartedly agree with what you say. The SF intrusion into the reconnaissance and surveillance business was all about funding and mission turf expansion (and it hit at a low point in the fortunes of the US Army when McNamara's project 100,000 was in full bloom and training was being dumbed down). Spaces and budget slices.

The Inf problem is partly that too many Inf Cdrs do not have a clue how to use their Recon capability and our 1980-2005 poor, dumbed-down training didn't help-- Armor branch is taking advantage of that to garner spaces...

The Cav problem is that they lost the bubble on Reconnaissance and became an 'economy of force' element and due to bad equipping decisions (and the aforementioned poor training system), Armor heavy and 'Hi diddle diddle right down' the middle oriented.

Much of our problem with recon is impatience -- some staff squirrel is afraid his Boss will ask a question he cannot answer so they drive their Recon elements into dumb situations and thus the perception that Recon is (a) too slow and (b) too dangerous to employ properly is thoroughly embedded in the heads of too many.

There are some exceptions to all the above but they are far too few.

[Fuchs]

The Inf problem is partly that too many Inf Cdrs do not have a clue how to use their Recon capability and our 1980-2005 poor, dumbed-down training didn't help-- Armor branch is taking advantage of that to garner spaces...

The Cav problem is that they lost the bubble on Reconnaissance and became an 'economy of force' element (...)

Question:
Wasn't 1980-1992 supposed to be the great period of the U.S. Army resurrection after Vietnam and pot, before the bad, bad peace dividend a.k.a. Clinton??


Remark:
Cav Scouting should include some readiness for combat, even for the initiation of combat. It should just be restricted to OPFOR recce and unready targets of opportunity.
It's possible to go too far in either direction.
Armored 4wd cars with 40mm AGL and sensor mast such as Fennek are too passive, a Cav force of Abrams and Bradley is too much on the combat side.

[reed11b]

Remark:
Cav Scouting should include some readiness for combat, even for the initiation of combat. It should just be restricted to OPFOR recce and unready targets of opportunity.
It's possible to go too far in either direction.
Armored 4wd cars with 40mm AGL and sensor mast such as Fennek are too passive, a Cav force of Abrams and Bradley is too much on the combat side.

Cavalry mission and R&S teams missions are not the same either. There is overlap in route recon and some area and zone recon but surveillance and urban recce are a pure infantry R&S team mission.
Reed

[Ken White]

Wasn't 1980-1992 supposed to be the great period of the U.S. Army resurrection after Vietnam and pot, before the bad, bad peace dividend a.k.a. Clinton??

personnel intake was concerned. Some very sharp enlisted and officer acquisitions as opposed to the 1970s dreg problem; thus my mention of McNamara's Project 100,00 (LINK), (LINK).

Aside from the problems that fiasco caused directly in the 70s and early 80s, many of those folks stuck around for 20 or 30 years and thus screwed things up far longer than they should have, they were also the real reason for the Army electing to adopt that dumbed-down Task, Condition and Standard training system. The 20 to 30 year dwell time of the 100K (actually, the total number recruited was greater) was the main reason that flawed system was allowed to stay -- it was all many could handle and in later years, they were senior NCOs...

By the late 90s, that problem was gone, the training system was flawed and everyone knew it but too much was invested to change it even though it was not only an inadequate training process, it was virtually insulting to the really sharp and well educated enlisted and officer accessions from the mid 90s on.

Clinton wasn't responsible for the 'peace dividend' problem, George H.W. Bush did that. Clinton didn't know anything about the Armed Forces so he left them pretty much alone other than to misuse them in places like Somalia (which GHWB started but Clinton screwed up) and Bosnia.

Agree with you on the vehicles, problem is that to develop and field the ideal Recon vehicle would be an extremely expensive proposition and the fear that Recon assets are 'high risk' permeates the acquisition community. Their solution to low quantities with high risk is to not buy them.

Thus we have the M3 Bradley purchased as part of a deal between the then Chief of Armor and then Chief of Infantry, so we ended up with the Bradley and the Abrams because that deal killed off the M8 armored Gun system (just as well, that was poor vehicle also...)...

There are lots of options but Recon is not considered a vital skill in the US Army today so we likely will not pursue any of them. We were sort of going to but backed off (LINK). That will be regretted as soon as we have mid size or larger war.

[Fuchs]

There are lots of options but Recon is not considered a vital skill in the US Army today so we likely will not pursue any of them. We were sort of going to but backed off (LINK). That will be regretted as soon as we have mid size or larger war.

I thought the NTC mock battles were rigged to overemphasize recce & counter-recce by adding a static early phase for recce (till sometime around 2005)?

I personally tend to favour a mix for the heavy scouting / skirmish role; normal combat vehicles of around 40 tons for the combat-leaning recce and French-like ~10-20 ton 6wd vehicles for deep missions.
The mix of Bradley/Abrams + HMWV was too far beyond both extremes.

[Ken White]

I thought the NTC mock battles were rigged to overemphasize recce & counter-recce by adding a static early phase for recce (till sometime around 2005)?

That due to the fact that early NTC experience showed the OPFOR's good recon (USSR like) techniques versus the Blue force poor techniques showed that the US Army had a serious problem. That was pretty obvious by the late 80s but it took Desert Storm to drive an impetus to change and that was just getting embedded when 9/11 came. Then it was Change 2 time...

Sigh.

I personally tend to favour a mix for the heavy scouting ...
The mix of Bradley/Abrams + HMWV was too far beyond both extremes.

True on both counts IMO.

[Rifleman]

One, the infantry recon community is tiny.

What is tiny these days? When I was active every battalion had a scout platoon. There was no LRS at divison or brigade level. LRS started to appear during my time in service.

Two, we are endangered by SF expansion into the traditional LRS mission.

Meaning they are doing tactical recon and not strategic?

There is a push to better train infantry scouts on TA/TI and Urban recce and an opposing push to eliminate infantry scouts all together and replace them with cav scouts.

The battalion scout platoons didn't have any formal training program in my day; OJT was it. XVIII Airborne Corps did run a Recondo School that had some application but it was really more like a mini-Ranger School than a recon specific course. In fact, the All American Airplane Gang considered the XVIII Recondo School as a pre-Ranger course.

[reed11b]

What is tiny these days? When I was active every battalion had a scout platoon. There was no LRS at divison or brigade level. LRS started to appear during my time in service.

LRS was nearly killed after Desert Storm and again after 9/11. We were down to 82nd's, and maybe 10th Mountains on the active duty side (101st was killed 2005ish I think) and maybe 3-4 LRSD/LRSC units in the Guard. They have just started to form new LRS units in the BsFBs and there is a push to expand them into higher echelons (of course there is still a push to kill them outright as well). As far as Battalion scouts, some IBCTs seem to still have them and some only have a Plt at Brigade level. Some SBCTs and HBCTs seem to only have Cav scouts. Mixed bag, but everyone at RSLC seemed to know the same people. Even the Marine Force Recon guys knew a lot of the same people.

Meaning they are doing tactical recon and not strategic?

Bingo, got it in one.

The battalion scout platoons didn't have any formal training program in my day; OJT was it. XVIII Airborne Corps did run a Recondo School that had some application but it was really more like a mini-Ranger School than a recon specific course. In fact, the All American Airplane Gang considered the XVIII Recondo School as a pre-Ranger course.

They still don't, though there is a push that all Scout NCO's need to go to RSLC.

[82redleg]

LRS was nearly killed after Desert Storm and again after 9/11. We were down to 82nd's, and maybe 10th Mountains on the active duty side (101st was killed 2005ish I think) and maybe 3-4 LRSD/LRSC units in the Guard. They have just started to form new LRS units in the BsFBs and there is a push to expand them into higher echelons (of course there is still a push to kill them outright as well). As far as Battalion scouts, some IBCTs seem to still have them and some only have a Plt at Brigade level. Some SBCTs and HBCTs seem to only have Cav scouts. Mixed bag, but everyone at RSLC seemed to know the same people. Even the Marine Force Recon guys knew a lot of the same people.

Each IBCT rifle battalion has a scout platoon, authorized 22 pax, 3 x 6-man "squads" plus PL, PSG and 2 x RTO. Additionally, there is a 10-man sniper squad, which is administratively a separate squad in the HHC, but usually attached to the scout platoon.

Each IBCT recon squadron has a dismounted recon company, authorized 2 x platoons of 28, 3 x 8-man "sections" plus PL, PSG and 2 x RTOs. In addition, the company has a 7-man sniper squad, a 6-man 60mm mortar section and a company HQ, but they aren't really involved in scouting, except for the maybe the snipers.

Each SBCT rifle battalion has a scout platoon, authorized 24 pax, 3 x 5-man "squads", 4 x 2-man vehicle crews (including the PSG) and a PL. Additionally, there is a 7-man sniper squad, administratively separate in the HHC. I've never been Stryker, so I'm not sure if they are lumped in with the scouts or not. I'm also not sure how often 11Bs fill these 11B slots, vs how often 19Ds are used.

Regarding the LRS units, on the active side, the division LRSDs are no more, AFAIK. I know that 82nd LRSD went to the CAB and became a Pathfinder Company, although they still call themselves LRS. The Corps LRS-C still exists, but has been rolled into the 1-38 CAV in 525 BfSB. I've heard that they have stood up a new LRS-C in the BfSB at FT Hood, but I don't know for sure.

[Ken White]

Each IBCT recon squadron has a dismounted recon company, authorized 2 x platoons of 28, 3 x 8-man "sections" plus PL, PSG and 2 x RTOs. In addition, the company has a 7-man sniper squad, a 6-man 60mm mortar section and a company HQ, but they aren't really involved in scouting, except for the maybe the snipers.

He was and is a minor force of nature, so while he was there, that Squadron's C Troop was totally, emphatically and positively into scouting. Period. When he left, it became a junior rifle Company...

That they are not involved in Scouting is in part a function of the type of war we're in, in part due to lack of competent training, in part due to Infantry folks not being real sure what to do about reconnaissance (also a training shortfall) and lastly in part due to risk avoidance in not wanting to kick Squads and Platoons out on independent missions where someone might get hurt. The capability is there, it was designed to be there but is simply not being used. Hopefully we'll get smarter and train it for use when it is required.

Regarding the LRS units, on the active side, the division LRSDs are no more, AFAIK. I know that 82nd LRSD went to the CAB and became a Pathfinder Company, although they still call themselves LRS. The Corps LRS-C still exists, but has been rolled into the 1-38 CAV in 525 BfSB. I've heard that they have stood up a new LRS-C in the BfSB at FT Hood, but I don't know for sure.

One of the ongoing turf battles which will likely destroy the US Army long before any enemy does...

The LRS mission is not a SOF mission and it is emphatically not a SF mission --yet the SOF folks think the LRS mission should go to them. The MI folks are not comfortable with a bunch of rowdy parachute types who aren't really "intelligence trained (read; the right branch...). Yet, the LRS Cos have long been associated with and / or asgd to MI Bns and Bdes.

The LRS mission and units(Infantry, not SOF or MI people) to do it have been around since WW II with only a short hiatus in the late 40s. The concept fluctuates in popularity with senior leaders. That shouldn't be the criteria. The criteria should be what is required and who can best do it.

Using SF to do it is waste of expensive skills not required for the mission...

[E6TLS0369]

Forgive my ignorance, but, does Army Recon and Marine Recon have the same mission ? "If" so, being a Marine Reconman myself, the mission of Intel gathering forward of the FEMA is of the utmost importance to a Unit Commander in planning tomorrows or next weeks offensive movements. 90% of Marine Recon missions are "Keyhole" missions, Intel gartering, the five (5) W's. 10% are "Stinger" missions, pin point demolition, prisoner snatch, military target elimination (at times from long range). Having specialized, highly motivated, highly dedicated, highly trained individuals capable of moving undetected behind forward lines is a craft that will be sourly missed if left to wilt on the vine. The repercussions of one well placed round, in a time of need, will be felt long after the body hits the ground. Semper Fi.

[reed11b]

Could probably give a better answer if I knew what FEMA stood for. The short answer is "no". Army and Marines use there "recon" elements in differnt ways. A lot is alike and I will try to go deeper into this later, unless Ken chooses to make it clear before I do (hint, hint)
Reed

[Pete]

It's probably FEBA, Forward Edge of Battle Area, sort of like a front line or a FLOT.

[E6TLS0369]

Excuse my typo, yes FEBA.

[GI Zhou]

The translation is mine and I take responsibility for any errors:
Sniping by PLA forces in the Korean War started in early 1952 when the 230th Communist Youth League Regiment brought with them some ‘special grade shooters’. These were sharpshooters and not specially trained snipers but as the Chinese People’s Volunteers referred to them as snipers that is what I will call them in this article. They employed captured United States M-1 Garand semi-automatic rifles and Soviet Mosin-Nagant 1891-30 bolt-action rifles without telescopic sights. The maximum engagement range was between 400 and 500 metres with the average engagement range around 100 metres. Spread along the front and operating in teams of one to two men, one acting as an observer and the other the shooter, they killed or wounded 14 enemy soldiers for the expenditure of 29 rounds according to Chinese sources. Special ranges were built for their use, utilizing both fixed and disappearing targets.


In the First World War British Army, snipers and Vickers medium machine gunners, were loathed by front line soldiers. After they did their mission they went back behind the lines and the British infantry recieved heavy Minenwerfer fire in return - no good deed goes unpunished.

[Ken White]

to China after WW II and which they captured or obtained when the Nationalists were defeated in '49. Their Snipers weren't bad, weren't terribly good, either (up through late fall '52; don't know about later). They also had some dedicated marksmen, not snipers, in most units.

[reed11b]

Forgive my ignorance, but, does Army Recon and Marine Recon have the same mission ? "If" so, being a Marine Reconman myself, the mission of Intel gathering forward of the FEBA is of the utmost importance to a Unit Commander in planning tomorrows or next weeks offensive movements. 90% of Marine Recon missions are "Keyhole" missions, Intel gartering, the five (5) W's. 10% are "Stinger" missions, pin point demolition, prisoner snatch, military target elimination (at times from long range). Having specialized, highly motivated, highly dedicated, highly trained individuals capable of moving undetected behind forward lines is a craft that will be sourly missed if left to wilt on the vine. The repercussions of one well placed round, in a time of need, will be felt long after the body hits the ground. Semper Fi.

Battalion Scouts have very simalier mission statements, minus any actual training (other then some OTJT) to accomplish the specialized missions. LRS is guided by MI and upper echelon commanders requests for intel and lacks any DA mission. Having met Marine Recon guys at RSLC, I am fairly impressed with them and have been looking to see if they run any schools that Army soldiers can attend (BRC seems to be more like an AIT then a skill school). Army recon is in "transition".
Reed
I have made a mess of this one. Ken, feel free to step in anytime now....

[GI Zhou]

to China after WW II and which they captured or obtained when the Nationalists were defeated in '49. Their Snipers weren't bad, weren't terribly good, either (up through late fall '52; don't know about later). They also had some dedicated marksmen, not snipers, in most units.

Ken,

Have you got a reference for the M1Cs going to the Nationalsts I couldn't find a reference. Was it the US Marine's after the end of their tour in China post-Second World War?

[Ken White]

(or possibly M1Ds, hard to tell from a distance) from the Army Depot on Guam loaded along with many more plain M1s, many BARs and Browning MGs (both .30 cal models) plus much other surplus equipment on the blue and yellow LSTs of the Nationalists in 1946-7 for transfer to mainland China. Chepaer to give it to them than send it home. Also a better deal, I guess, than dropping it into the Mariana Trench -- the fate a lot stuff left in the Pacific at the end of the war.

Doesn't mean the PLA ever got hold of 'em so I should have been more explicit and put a perhaps in there. Apologies for not doing so.

The Marines never used the M1C or D to my knowledge (other than those few traded or lifted from the Army ). In China, 1945-49 they had the USMC M1941 Sniper rifle (a star gauged '03 with a 7.8 power Unertl scope). Late in Korea, they had the USMC Model 1952 Sniper rifle which looked like but was not an M1C/D. It mounted, IIRC, a Square D (Kollmorgen) scope. It was not well liked.

I do know 5th Marines captured at least one M1C/D from the Chinese in mid 1952 but how it got there is not known to me.

Reed:

You don't need any help, you're doing just fine...

I'd add that Viet Nam totally wrecked Army recon at Battalion level, it still hasn't recovered. The concentration on the NTC and north German Plain in the 70-90 period didn't help. Iraq and Afghanistan will further erode that level unless someone gets smart. In the 50s and early 60s, most Divisions ran a recon school and had a Recon platoon competition annually.

There is an LRS leaders course at Benning (or there was) plus, LRS guys in Germany get to go to the NATO International LRS School at Weingarten. There are some who get to attend other nation's recon courses and also to USMC courses.