Dealing with Haditha

[jcustis]

It seems apparent to me that the ROE are causing US deaths. Our troops are being killed for the sake of PR -that's the bottom line and subsequently intelligent people are wringing their hands over why Iraq is becoming a quagmire. The ROE serve no purpose except to increase the visceral loathing jihadis have for us and our way of life.

I think you will find that the great majority of members here hold a completely different view, and that your observations on the rules of engagement are in fact incorrect.

Are you speaking from the experience of having actually served under the CENTCOM Standing ROE, in Iraq?

[JKM4767]

JC is right. I have never felt the ROE hindered any operation or mission. If you are shot at, shoot back, just hit what you aim at. During two tours, I have never seen a chain of command question the decision of a leader during any type of engagement. Never.
Also, ground troops are pretty much given the OK to fire in many non-standard cases, i.e., someone is laying in an IED. More often than not, units sometimes use too much force that wasn't necessary.

[goesh]

Jcustis, my time was in Nam, not Iraq. JKM: "..pretty much given the OK to fire in many non-standard cases" "..just hit what you aim at". That's a large gray administrative discretionary gap there if you ask me and it's what I thought it pretty much was over there - social workers directing the grunts. ROE are at the fire team, squad, platoon level, not with D.C. suits who step on bona fide career men and make them toe the political line. I'm not questioning or doubting the balls and adrenalin and committment of the grunts and career officers but it seems it's time to pull the plug and bring you all home. I don't see where that hot-shot Pretareus (sp) is going to make much difference either being the CO of it all. He is tethered to D.C. and you can't tell me any different.You're supposed to fight but not hate, kill but be nice and politically correct about it. I bet there are rules against taking souvenirs off dead jihadis too, aren't there? It isn't working with jihadis this war and we all know it. Either fight to win or come home, you bear no shame.

[Steve Blair]

JC is right. I have never felt the ROE hindered any operation or mission. If you are shot at, shoot back, just hit what you aim at. During two tours, I have never seen a chain of command question the decision of a leader during any type of engagement. Never.
Also, ground troops are pretty much given the OK to fire in many non-standard cases, i.e., someone is laying in an IED. More often than not, units sometimes use too much force that wasn't necessary.

ROEs change and mature over time, and this is most likely what we're seeing now. I think you get to the heart of it, JKM, when you talk about using too much force. Or using that force in the wrong location or against the wrong target. This has been a constant throughout historical COIN efforts. The wise commanders figured it out, the less gifted stuck with "more of the same." But it's also become clear (and did historically as well) that ROE are necessary in this sort of conflict. Even if they are not formally spelled out (as was the case during the Indian Wars), they are needed and have existed.

[jcustis]

But it's also become clear (and did historically as well) that ROE are necessary in this sort of conflict. Even if they are not formally spelled out (as was the case during the Indian Wars), they are needed and have existed.

And that's a perfect point to support the issue that Rules Of Interaction (on the non-kinetic side) may be more important at times.

[Steve Blair]

And that's a perfect point to support the issue that Rules Of Interaction (on the non-kinetic side) may be more important at times.

Exactly. This sort of thing did exist within the Frontier Army, although in a very rough and undocumented form. The majority of the Army's interactions with Indians were of a peaceful nature, as opposed to combat operations. Some commanders (typically at the company level but sometimes at regimental level) did come out with more or less official guidance, but that was rare.

It should be mentioned, though, that the Frontier Army had a huge experience and knowledge pool to draw from. We're only now starting to create that.

[JKM4767]

ROEs change and mature over time, and this is most likely what we're seeing now. I think you get to the heart of it, JKM, when you talk about using too much force. Or using that force in the wrong location or against the wrong target. This has been a constant throughout historical COIN efforts. The wise commanders figured it out, the less gifted stuck with "more of the same." But it's also become clear (and did historically as well) that ROE are necessary in this sort of conflict. Even if they are not formally spelled out (as was the case during the Indian Wars), they are needed and have existed.

You wouldn't believe what I have seen units do. One support unit running a logistics patrol at night shot up a vehicle with a .50 CAL for "driving at them". The irony is that the Patrol was driving on the wrong side of the road.
Maturity and situational awareness are paramount to effectively operating in COIN and unfortunately, so many leaders lack that. Then again, in many cases, we are asking very junior guys to take an extrordinary amount of responsibility. I've also seen units use a rediculous amount of force during operations. Simple searches and guys are breaking people #### in their house, etc. Just unecessary actions that are so detrimental to building relations. Once again, that is leaders lacking maturity and control, thus undoing any progress they've made. What many people don't understand the about ROE is that it only takes one person, one leader, one situation to cause a ton of irreversible damage. Not to mention Arabs are extremely sensitive people and are easily offended, especially by the big, bad Coalition.

[tequila]

This article written awhile back from Samarra has stuck with me regarding ROE in Iraq:

Five days after the grenade attack, Lt. Call and his men from the 2nd platoon were planning an afternoon "hearts and minds" foot patrol to hand out soccer balls to local kids.

As Call sat in the schoolhouse, preparing to go out, he heard two loud bursts from the .50-caliber machine gun on the roof.

Specialist Michael Pena, a beefy 21-year-old from Port Isabel, Texas, had opened fire. Boom-boom-boom. Boom-boom-boom.

Call and his men dashed out the front door. Pena had shot an unarmed Iraqi man on the street. The man had walked past the signs that mark the 200-yard "disable zone" that surrounds the Alamo and into the 100-yard "kill zone" around the base. The Army had forced the residents of the block to leave the houses last year to create the security perimeter.

American units in Iraq usually fire warning shots. The Rakkasans don't.

A few days later, Call said his brigade command had told him, "The Rakkasans don't do warning shots." A warning shot in the vernacular of the Rakkasans, Call said, was a bullet that hit one Iraqi man while others could see.

"That's how you warn his buddy, is to pop him in the face with a kill shot?" Call said incredulously. "But what about when his buddy comes back with another guy ... that and the other 15 guys in his family who you've made terrorists?"

Looking at the man splayed on the ground, Call turned to his medic, Specialist Patrick McCreery, and asked, "What the f--- was he doing?"

McCreery didn't answer. The man's internal organs were hanging out of his side, and his blood was pouring across the ground. He was conscious and groaning. His eyelids hung halfway closed.

"What ... did they shoot him with?" McCreery asked, sweat beginning to show on his brow. "Did someone call a ... ambulance?"

The call to prayer was starting at a mosque down the street. The words "Allahu Akbar" - God is great - wafted down from a minaret's speakers.

The man looked up at the sky as he heard the words. He repeated the phrase "Ya Allah. Ya Allah. Ya Allah." Oh God. Oh God. Oh God.

He looked at McCreery and raised his finger toward the house in front of him.

"This my house," he said in broken English.

McCreery reached down. With his hands cupped, he shoved the man's organs back into his body and held them in place as Call unwrapped a bandage to put around the hole.

"He's fading, he's fading," McCreery shouted.

Looking into the dying man's eyes, the medic said, "Haji, haji, look at me," using the honorific title reserved for older Muslim men who presumably have gone on Hajj - pilgrimage - to Mecca.

"Why? Why?" asked the man, his eyes beginning to close.

"Haji, I don't know," said McCreery, sweat pouring down his face.

An Iraqi ambulance pulled up and the Humvees followed. They followed the man to the hospital they'd raided a few days earlier. The soldiers filed in and watched as the man died.

Call said nothing. McCreery, a 35-year-old former foundry worker from Levering, Mich., walked toward a wall, alone. He looked at the dead man for a moment and wiped tears from his eyes.

A few days later, Call's commander asked him to take pictures of the entrails left by the man Pena had shot, identified as Wissam Abbas, age 31, to document that Abbas was inside the sign warning of deadly force.

[RTK]

This article written awhile back from Samarra has stuck with me regarding ROE in Iraq:

The unit highlighted in this story was perhaps the more ruthless and uncontrollable unit in theater during OIF III. Aside from numerous OPSEC issues I see with that story, I see a unit somewhat out of control with a cavalier attitude towards what they were doing. The ROE doesn't cover a lot of what the Rakkasans did last rotation, to include many of the ugly things. Common sense, decency, and professional warfighting doesn't allow you to pull some of the things the Rakkasans pulled this last time. Keeping track of unit and individual kills is like keeping track of RBIs or stolen bases in baseball. Once emphasis is placed on the importance of shooting people in the face, that becomes some soldiers' primary focus. All else becomes ancillary.

So how does this relate to Haditha and dealing with the aftermath? The problems go directly back to leadership. How can a unit fromt he 101st allow 3 privates and 2 NCOs to dress in civilian clothes, get drunk, go out into the South Baghdad area, rape and kill a young girl, and then come back to the FOB undetected? Further, how can a company of Marines go through Haditha immediately after an IED and start looking for any reason to tear the place up?

We have some outstanding wheat in terms of leadership in the Army and Marine Corps. We also have our fair share of chaff that need to be seperated from the wheat.

[jmm99]

that is, the "Haditha Event"; and the merits trial of the United States v Wuterich, commencing on 9 Jan with opening statements.

Not quite 6 years ago, Jon Custis wrote, ... things not often what they seem

I too have held off on commenting on this situation, but among the folks here, I feel it is important to add something. I've spoken with two Marines who have provided a considerable amount of insight. One is a close friend of one of the relieved company commanders and has talked with him directly, and the other is an officer who was in the AO at the time and has some hands-on with the situation.

It is an extremely complex one, compounded by things said and done by people pretty far removed from that day's events. We are going to have to wait this one out and see what the final results of the investigation are. From what I am hearing, speculation can't come close to what actually transpired.

BTW, I also think the Honorable Mr. Murtha was out of his lane. Just my $.02.

Jon's reasonable advice has proved out over the last 5-1/2 years. Briefly, from Defend Our Marines:

THE HADITHA CASE IN BRIEF...

Eight Marines were originally charged. Evidence of a massacre never materialized, and the original reports by the news media, and Congressman John Murtha, have been thoroughly discredited. To date, seven Marines have been cleared.

Charges were dismissed against five Marines. The sixth was found not guilty on all counts in courts martial. A Board of Inquiry found no misconduct in the LtCol Chessani case. Only SSgt Wuterich remains of the accused.

I don't predict jury outcomes. Clearly, the defense presented is one of justification - if the evidence breaks as MAJ (ret.) Faraj outlined it:

by Nathaniel R. Helms | Monday, January 9, 2012 | Day Three: Opening statements

Camp Pendleton, Calif. – Haytham Faraj, retired Marine major and now civilian defense attorney for SSgt Frank Wuterich, revealed startling new evidence in his opening statements this morning.

According to Faraj, “30 percent” of the expended cartridges found in what is now called House Number Two were Kalashnikov 7.62mm AK-47 cartridges and a number 9mm pistol rounds that weren’t fired by attacking Marines where eight people died.

The government ignored it, “ Faraj added incredulously. “Where did this come from, where did the 7.62 come from? Who was in the back bedroom, who shot the 9mm rounds?”

What Helms reports of the prosecutor Gannon's opening is far from overwhelming evidence to convict - but that is to me, who is not a totally objective reviewer:

Much of Gannon’s short summation was a rehash of the government’s frequently disabused argument in which rules on a yellow card trump bullets in the conduct of war. According to Gannon, Wuterich failed to follow the Rules of Engagement, he failed to make a positive identification (PID) of the targets he took out, and he disregarded his training when he took a knee and began shooting seconds after one of his Marines was blown in half.

To me, MAJ Gannon is mixing the "status" metaphor (PID of a member of a force declared hostile) with the "conduct" metaphor (AK bullets flying in a house clearing scenario):



Please note that L.Cpl. Stephan Tatum (#4 in diagram; initially charged with 2 murders) had all charges dismissed against him.

As Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes, Jr. (an MOH awardee as a Civil War grunt) noted (in a "conduct" situation): "... the law does not require detached reflection in the presence of an upraised knife."

See, the brief article by our Bob Wiemann, Undermining Warfighting Doctrine (January 5, 2011), again looking at this case from the standpoint of the leader in the trenches.

Regards

Mike