U.S. Soldiers charged with maltreament

[ODB]

of subordinates in Iraq. I do not know enough about this yet to have an opinion. Well not really my opinion is already forming but I will wait to hear the facts.

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Four U.S. soldiers have been charged with cruelty and maltreatment of four subordinates in Iraq after a suicide investigation brought to light alleged wrongdoing, the military said Friday.

There is no confirmed evidence that the suicide, which involved a fifth subordinate in the unit, was a result of any mistreatment, said Lt. Col. Kevin Olson, a spokesman for Multi-National Division-South, who said the military is looking into that possibility.

Don't know that I've ever heard it put so eloquently as this:

He described the physical punishment as falling into the category of "undue calisthenics."

Full news article: HERE

This has the potential to have serious implications across the force, have to keep an eye on this.

[120mm]

If I were king of the Army, I would force each and every NCO and Officer to read, be familiar with and master the concepts in this book:

http://www.amazon.com/How-Talk-Kids-...0811960#reader

What most people don't get is the distinction between "punishment" and "consequences" for once's actions.

[Courtney Massengale]

The fallout from this will undoubtedly be one of the single most amazing and emotionally significant events for green tabbers as we enter the drawdown. Here’s what’s on my mind….

1) Was this guy not meeting the standard or not meeting the perception? Given that it’s a Cav unit and they’re deploying, I have a small suspicion that he may have squeeked by on the Army Standard, but wasn’t measuring up (no pun intended) to the expectations of a Soldier in his unit, in his MOS, with their mission.

2) If he didn’t meet the Army Standard, then what the hell was he doing deployed? Granted, a flag for weight control isn’t a nondeployable condition, but it really makes me want to get out the steam shovel and look into the paperwork. Was he flagged? Was the weight control packed done correctly (if required)? Was there counseling being conducted? And the biggest one... was this suicide tied to weight... or was the weight tied to deeper emotional issues that made him more prone to suicide?

3) Aren’t we beyond this? As we head into the drawdown, we (should) be able to be more selective about who a unit brings on deployment. Granted, the demands are going to be the same to meet the needs of OEF, but on a post-to-post basis, it should be getting easier to leave the baggage in the rear.

4) Is this going to alter the way the Army conducts the weight control program? Everybody knows the standards are based on the most unscientific of the various methods recognized for measuring body fat. Lots of top condition Soldiers are “overweight” and have the stigma of being taped; lots of fatasses squeak by because they have a 18 inch neck. The largest criticism (much like the APFT) is that Soldiers in trouble “train” for the weight control standard, not for a healthy body composition. Granted, changing something that is by nature arbitrary is a rather low priority, but nothing like momma’s dead son to get focus on things…

[Schmedlap]

I saw a few blurbs about this, too. Like ODB, I'm still waiting for details. But, what first came to mind when I heard this was a recent sermon on parenting by a paster whose podcast I listen to. I am probably not quoting this 100% accurately, but here is the gist of it: "punishing children is the artificial amplification of consequences for their actions before their actions cause them problems later in life." He gave a few guidelines, to include: do not punish out of anger and do not walk away; DO explain why the action is wrong. He also pointed out that spanking should be increasingly less frequent up to age five and then extremely rare thereafter. I heard that sermon before this story broke, but when I heard it I could not help but think about corrective training for Soldiers (because I'm an Army geek). I have seen NCOs "smoke" newly arriving privates to the unit as an apparent "welcome to the Army" type of initiation. Always having been very reluctant to stick my nose into "NCO business" I had to intervene here. "Sergeant, what is the point of this? Did these guys do something wrong? Are they learning something right now? Has this guy even been assigned a barracks room yet? Well why don't you put out the cigarette, get off your ass, and take care of these guys rather than using them as you own personal playthings?"

[jkm_101_fso]

Well why don't you put out the cigarette, get off your ass, and take care of these guys rather than using them as you own personal playthings?"

Classic! I once stopped an NCO promotion "ceremony" for some of my Fisters in Iraq because it got totally out of control really quick and was basically hazing. The BN FSNCO was furious with me and we had words. I told him that if he put half as much effort into his job as he did harrassing and hazing people, he might be worth a s***. I'm all for tradition and camaraderie. I'm not for stupid.

[Ken White]

it's counterproductive. No one should allow a second of it.

The funny thing is, that's a product of the 70s. It rarely occurred in the Army prior to and during Viet Nam; wasn't non-existent but it was far more rare than it was in the 1975 or so until recently period. Yet another legacy of Project 100,000.

[Starbuck]

2) If he didn’t meet the Army Standard, then what the hell was he doing deployed? Granted, a flag for weight control isn’t a nondeployable condition, but it really makes me want to get out the steam shovel and look into the paperwork. Was he flagged? Was the weight control packed done correctly (if required)? Was there counseling being conducted? And the biggest one... was this suicide tied to weight... or was the weight tied to deeper emotional issues that made him more prone to suicide?[

In some organizations, the separation authority is the CG, not the battalion commander (as is usual). This makes commanders extremely reluctant to chapter Soldiers out of the Army for merely being overweight, since they have to explain to the CG why their PT program apparently failed this Soldier.

As a result, there are a large number of obese Soldiers in the military now. Some are morbidly obese. I inherited Soldiers who were 80-100 lbs overweight, from private (he remained an E-2 for five years due to flags) to CW4. Even captains were being flagged for obesity/APFT failures. All the command could do was to flag, counsel and remedial PT--which really doesn't serve as a good deterrent against obesity (particularly for stop-lossed Soldiers). As a result, you have a large number of Soldiers who are overweight--many of them coming to their units overweight or out of shape. If you chaptered all of them out, or left them on the Rear Detachment, you'd be going into combat short.

Fortunately, we don't have the recruiting/retention pinch that we had a few years ago, and the separation authority in most organizations is going back to the O-5 level. Hopefully, these obesity problems will start working themselves out again, because it's getting completely out of hand.

[Jedburgh]

Fortunately, we don't have the recruiting/retention pinch that we had a few years ago, and the separation authority in most organizations is going back to the O-5 level. Hopefully, these obesity problems will start working themselves out again, because it's getting completely out of hand.

Unfortunately, those who were recruited under lower standards, and retained through non-enforcement of standards, are now junior and mid-grade NCOs - with some MOSs having been harmed more than others by this influx. And it is a matter of far greater import than simply having a few fat boys around. Its going to take a while, and strong, focused leadership to work this out.

[Schmedlap]

In some organizations, the separation authority is the CG, not the battalion commander (as is usual). This makes commanders extremely reluctant to chapter Soldiers out of the Army for merely being overweight, since they have to explain to the CG why their PT program apparently failed this Soldier.

As a result, there are a large number of obese Soldiers in the military now. Some are morbidly obese. I inherited Soldiers who were 80-100 lbs overweight, from private (he remained an E-2 for five years due to flags) to CW4. Even captains were being flagged for obesity/APFT failures. All the command could do was to flag, counsel and remedial PT--which really doesn't serve as a good deterrent against obesity (particularly for stop-lossed Soldiers).

I guess I can see that for E-4 and below. But NCOs and Officers are responsible for their own physical fitness. If a General asks why the PT program failed the Private, yeah that's a tough one. If he asks why the PT program failed the NCO or Officer, I would defer to the NCO or Officer to answer the question, since it is theirs to answer.

[Cavguy]

Anyone remember last year's award winning Military Review article? "Discipline, Punishment, and Counterinsurgency" by Scott Andrew Ewing.



Discussed Here:
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5990

Just as comanders are responsible for the climate in their units,
so the Army as an institution is responsible for the moral climate it fosters.
In this article, I will outline some of the contradictions and ambiguities
in Army regulations (ARs) and field manuals (FMs) that make it difficult for
leaders to understand the distinction between corrective training and punishment.

I will argue that ARs, case law, the Office of the Inspector General,
and higher-echelon commanders have, nonetheless, made it clear that such
a distinction exists and must be respected. Failure to recognize and respect
this distinction can and often does lead to illegal abuses of authority. These
abuses of authority within the Army’s ranks, and the cultural undercurrents
that condone these patterns of behavior, cripple efforts to wage an effective
counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign by fostering a mentality of paternalistic
tyranny rather than good stewardship. The moral implications of this mentality
are neither consistent nor compatible with counterinsurgency doctrine,

.....

.... an NCO who orders a Soldier to perform duties that are tantamount to punishment is giving an unlawful order.

...

My view is that commanders and NCOs are in some sense victims of a system that is highly resistant to change. I understand that it is difficult within the system to go against accepted cultural norms, but that is precisely why Army culture needs to be fundamentally changed and such changes subsequently supported at all levels.

There are three correlates with the assertions I have made thus far:

*The U.S. Army is culturally handicapped in its ability to occupy Iraq in a humane manner. The systemic acceptance of such illegal practices as “smoke
sessions” is part of a mind-set that has crippled our attempts to implement effective counterinsurgency campaigns.

*The regulations surrounding corrective training, punishment, and “smoke sessions” are confusing and need to be rewritten.

*The problem must first be fully understood by high-ranking officers. To this end, the Army ought to investigate this matter in a substantive way, and encourage Soldiers to candidly testify about these practices without fear of reprisal or prosecution.

Also see "Toxic Leader"

[tankersteve]

OK, that might sound foolish, but I think it is generally understood in the Army that a NCO may tell a Soldier to execute some extra physical training in order for the Soldier to make up for a transgression. It generally is for little things like failure to pay attention to detail, being a few minutes late for a detail, etc. This is something every Soldier in the Army experiences from the minute they enter basic training. Good NCOs ensure it is used properly. I certainly have seen some NCOs not use it in an optimal manner. Good counseling usually helped them understand that their actions were not creating an atmosphere that would obtain optimal results.

However, I don't think most Soldiers will ever stand for a 'smoke session' for a transgression that is way outside of their responsibility. Generally, they will refuse and ask to see a superior. In fact, most understand that a little PT is probably saving them from being counseled and reported for an action that would probably end up in Non-Judicial Punishment (NJP), which most commanders do not like to use for minor infractions, such as for the type noted above.

In the case of the NCO charged with maltreatment of subordinates, I wonder what the condition of the Soldier was who was abused? Was he a new troop in marginal physical condition? Had he just returned from a lengthy mission and was tired and dehydrated? Did the NCO not keep the 'PT' within a reasonable amount of time? Was it especially abusive, strenuous, or humiliating? Or was it just a way to show his power, and was not in response to a dumb Soldier action/non-action? We are going to possibly affect the general culture of the Army because one guy may have got out of hand with a technique that is technically illegal, yet is accepted at every level within the Army.

I know that some really good small units will enter a pretty vigorous casual banter and occassionally, a Soldier will say something a little too smart to a NCO, who will respond with an order to 'beat your face'. Most Soldiers are laughing when they knock out these push-ups.

Without going into another full barrage of why I don't like lawyers and particularly military lawyers, many officers see this as NCO business, when possible. For them to do anything requires sending the proper request form for an Article 15 to the SJA office, along with multiple counseling and sworn statements. Many judge advocates will not allow an Art 15 to be processed with less than multiple accounts because they want a case to take to trial in the event the Soldier or the TDS attorney get a wild hair and refuse the Art 15. Thus, by removing the option of a 15 minute PT session, a commander is forced to get multiple statements from leaders, assemble paperwork, submit the paperwork to the SJA office, and hope that an Art 15 is processed. Then it comes back for a reading, the time for a visit to TDS, and a second hearing, plus the possibility of an appeal. Not exactly dealing with the situation in a timely manner. Now try doing it while deployed and in a remote, isolated COP.

A good NCO will also not just use PT as a means of discipline. A very young NCO made a dangerous and foolish mistake, simple lack of attention to detail. The 1SG counseled him and offered him 2 options: he would submit paperwork to the commander with the likelihood of a (potentially career-ending) Art 15, or the young corporal would volunteer to be the head of the '####-burning' detail (literally - we use the 1/2 barrel and JP-8 stirred-in method still) for the next 2 weeks. Needless to say, the young NCO jumped at the opportunity to give up some precious personal time in order to avoid a formal punishment. No one in the unit saw this as abuse/misuse of an NCO's authority or felt that the individual was not being held accountable for his actions. Most were probably grateful that the unit climate allowed for 'options'.

Perhaps the real problem is that the Art 15 has transformed from a simple paperwork procedure to handle small disciplinary issues into one that is formalized and career-impacting.

Commanders still have an ultimate responsibility to know what is going on within their units and must be aware of the potential abuses and abusers of such a power. To remove the option for a few minutes of physical 'training' in lieu of a hearing/NJP would hinder the ability of NCOs to maintain high levels of training and motivation.

My .02 cents.

[Uboat509]

The bottom line is that you cannot design an effective system that Jackass NCOs (the small minority) can't find a way to abuse but you can design a system that is so ineffective that it will hamstring the good NCOs (the over-whelming majority). I suppose that it is just easier to hamstring all the NCOs than it is to identify and weed out the bad ones.

SFC W

[tankersteve]

You know, sometimes I hate it when someone summarizes in 3 lines what I spent multiple paragraphs saying. But that pretty much nails it.

Tankersteve

[jmm99]

for anyone who is interested - that is, how would you revise the procedures for Article 15s and "administrative corrective measures" to provide a solution to the problems stated (e.g., by Tankersteve and Uboat509) ?

As I write this, I'm looking at Part V ("NONJUDICIAL PUNISHMENT PROCEDURE") of the 2008 Manual for Courts-Martial - pp. V-1 through V-9, just before the Appendices (the first of which is the Constitution). So, not a lot of material to revise.

My thoughts re: a "solution" would be one where the role of lawyers would be minimized[*]; and that "judicial review" would be via the chain of command. And, ignoring the external influences, which have created the present system - e.g., Congress and the Courts - since that gets you into a morass of lawyers. The idea would be develop the "out of the box" solution - and worry about Congress and the Courts later.

Thus, the concept for the solution would have to be yours (Os and NCOs), based on what you think would work - and on your views of the Constitution.

So, if anyone is interested ....

---------------------------
[*] Billy the Bard's "let's kill all the lawyers" is always a solution, but is only a partial solution since their useful functions have to be assumed by someone else.

Hint: 17th and 18th century Québec barred lawyers from practicing as such - and especially in CFM-Canada (colonial Marine) matters. It worked fine there - even as to "administrative corrective measures". I'm not sure we want to give Schmedlap that much power, but it might be worth a spin.

[Schmedlap]

I don't think it has much - or perhaps anything - to do with UCMJ. It is a leadership issue. If the Company Commander and First Sergeant cannot establish a command climate and some basic guidelines so that their subordinate leaders know what is expected of them, then no set of objective rules will make any difference. See also: 2nd line of my signature below.

[Ken White]

The UCMJ isn't perfect but it doesn't need a lot of tinkering to 'improve' it; it does need to be better taught and understood by those who serve.

It's first and foremost a personnel policy problem -- the promotion system is skewed toward time in service and time in grade and not performance. that problem exists because Congress ignorantly, wrongly and stupidly (triple redundancy there, forgive me) insists on 'fairness and objectivity' in promotions, officer and enlisted. Thus performance, a subjective determination is rejected for years or months in grade or service, schools completed and jobs held which can all be 'measured.' Counted is perhaps a more accurate word. Yet more misuse of 'metrics.'

That flaw is exacerbated by mediocre to poor training.

Modifying the law or the UCMJ won't fix the underlying problem.