Deficit, Budget, and War

[Abu Suleyman]

There are better ways to have handled each of those. The problem was not that the money to develop and train forces capable of strategic raids had not been available, it was that the political and military will to employ the tactic in pursuit of strategy was lacking. Thus we had to employ an Armor and Euro centric force in South Asia and the Middle East -- just as we had earlier committed similar forces (and operational methods) to North Asia and Southeast Asia. We appear to be on the way to rebuilding that same force...

Would have been and would in future be far cheaper and more effective to employ such raids rather than getting tied up in lengthy, expensive in all terms and essentially marginally productive COIN efforts that in the end offer little if any change to either the nations involved or the strategic balance...

If you have a lot of money, you buy a lot of tools, supplies and such -- often more than you need. If you don't have that much money, you tend to buy smarter and buy only what you need. That lack of excess also causes you to work smarter.

So what you are saying here is that the problem is a force structure and not a force size issue. I can agree with that, but at the same time I just don't see a way that a small elite force could pull off missions of the type of Afghanistan or Iraq.

If, rather than invading Iraq, we had just sent in 10,000 (arbitrarily chosen number) SF soldiers, and they had fomented rebellion amongst hoi polloi, then we certainly would have destabilized Iraq, but I am not sure that the same 10,000 would have been able to stabilize it again.

I am willing to be convinced, but breaking things is easy; building things is hard, and it is in the building that the world gets shaped.

[Ken White]

...at the same time I just don't see a way that a small elite force could pull off missions of the type of Afghanistan or Iraq.

That's the point -- those were missions made necessary more by the existing and available force structure and the focus of military (mostly) and civilian (influenced by the military) leaders. Both Afghanistan and the Middle East needed military attention, that was IMO a strategic necessity. Neither mission as actually performed was IMO strategically desirable in virtually any respect.

If, rather than invading Iraq, we had just sent in 10,000 (arbitrarily chosen number) SF soldiers, and they had fomented rebellion amongst hoi polloi, then we certainly would have destabilized Iraq, but I am not sure that the same 10,000 would have been able to stabilize it again.

In the first place we didn't have 10K SF. In the second, why would you want to do that? Foment a rebellion and you have no idea how that might end.

We should have in Afghanistan have known the location of all AQ assets and simply have gone in an destroyed them and left. In the ME, the issue was not Saddam but to send a message to the ME that attacks on American interests were no longer going to be tolerated as they had been for the past 22 years with either no response or a tepid one; rather with a full bore slam. Iraq was as good a place as any as it was effectively a pariah state with a roundly disliked Dictator but there were other more directly related targets. Problem is that our Foreign Policy in the region (and elsewhere) for many years has been directed at a course which made the course taken almost inevitable -- and the fact that so few options were available is an indication of major errors in foreign policy as well as military policy.

The more salient fact that four Presidents over the period 1979-2001 failed to properly respond to a series of provocations and probes from the Middle East which almost certainly led us to 2001 and later should not be forgotten...

I am willing to be convinced, but breaking things is easy; building things is hard, and it is in the building that the world gets shaped.

I totally agree. Very much so. I'd also suggest that employing a sledgehammer in building is not a common thing for a good reason.

Here's what the Wiki says about sledgehammers: "Sledgehammers are often used in construction work, for breaking through drywall or masonry walls. Sledgehammers are also used when substantial force is necessary to dislodge a trapped object (often in farm or oil field work), or for fracturing stone or concrete." Not a good tool for building; better one of these; LINK.

The GPF is a sledgehammer. It should be used for its designed purpose -- to break things -- you can use it for other things to be sure but it will not be nearly as effective as the proper tool.

Building things take time and preparation, it helps to use the right tools -- and those are intelligence, diplomacy and properly applied foreign aid plus a little very low key police and / or military assistance -- with emphasis on the low key. Once you expand the military presence, you're creating targets (everyone loves to snipe at the 800 pound Gorilla); you're usually creating a need for further commitment and you are undertaking an effort that will almost certainly be time consuming, expensive in many terms and with an uncertain end state almost guaranteed.

So I again ask -- why would you do that mindlessly without even investigating other options?

The answer is, of course that our previous decisions both on diplomacy and force structure put us where we were in 2001. We now have an opportunity to be bit smarter and, I believe, an obligation to be a bit tougher. Domestically and overseas. We can and should nip a lot of this stuff in the bud and forestall any more Afghan or Iraq like commitments which are generally not worth the costs. Perhaps really never worth them. We certainly need to be prepared to do them but we equally certainly should do our level best to avoid them. Whether we will or not, I can't say. Your generation needs to work on that...

[Abu Suleyman]

Both Afghanistan and the Middle East needed military attention, that was IMO a strategic necessity. Neither mission as actually performed was IMO strategically desirable in virtually any respect.

I agree. It seems like not only the US but most countries have a real problem assessing their ideal outcome and the best tools to accomplish that, beforehand. Hindsight is nice, but not useful.

In the first place we didn't have 10K SF. In the second, why would you want to do that? Foment a rebellion and you have no idea how that might end.

I understand, knew that. This example was chosen as one of many possible COA's if we did have 10k elites, which admittedly was not the ideal one either.

We should have in Afghanistan have known the location of all AQ assets and simply have gone in an destroyed them and left.

And there is the rub. If we at any point had that good of intelligence, I highly doubt there would have been a 9/11. Even if there were, we would surely have had no need to dislodge the Taliban, we could've just sent in the Rangers to gather up OBL. Even better we could've just parked an AC-130 over the area and fired up everything that moved. But the catch is not only did we never have intel like that about UBL and AQ, but we have never had it about anyone, anywhere, ever. I wouldn't even be surprised to learn that we don't even know where every single one of our own forces are.

The more salient fact that four Presidents over the period 1979-2001 failed to properly respond to a series of provocations and probes from the Middle East which almost certainly led us to 2001 and later should not be forgotten...I totally agree. Very much so. I'd also suggest that employing a sledgehammer in building is not a common thing for a good reason.

{SNIP}

Building things take time and preparation, it helps to use the right tools -- and those are intelligence, diplomacy and properly applied foreign aid plus a little very low key police and / or military assistance -- with emphasis on the low key. Once you expand the military presence, you're creating targets (everyone loves to snipe at the 800 pound Gorilla); you're usually creating a need for further commitment and you are undertaking an effort that will almost certainly be time consuming, expensive in many terms and with an uncertain end state almost guaranteed.

So I again ask -- why would you do that mindlessly without even investigating other options?

I agree as well, and perhaps poverty will suit us well. We seemed to make much better choices as a nation in our direst circumstances. And while the military is a sledgehammer, there is no better tool for establishing security. Security is, after all the first priority of work, and without it, as we have learned in Iraq, all efforts are fruitless.

I would like to steer away from IZ/AF for a moment, because I hope that if we are bankrupted, it happens well after our departure from both of those countries, and the instability, at least as it stands, was an avoidable mess of our own making. However, messes have a way of making themselves, and they too will require sledgehammers to clean up. Our only national security problems, and our only future small wars are by no means guaranteed to result from mistakes in our foreign policy.

Imagine a collapsed Mexico, or Venezuela, or Haiti, which shouldn't be too hard, and all would be too close to ignore. A small and elite force would not be able to do anything to stabilize those countries, no matter how good they are. Moreover, unless Brazil steps up, which I believe is quite unlikely, the only people who currently have a hope of responding in any meaningful way is the US. We could find ourselves stuck in a position where we cannot afford to do nothing, and we cannot afford to do anything.

Believe me, I am all for more elite forces, especially as a percentage of total troop structure. I just do not believe that we could effectively defend the nation from many potential and legitimate threats with fewer troops than we have now. To list just a few: a Chinese incursion into certain islands in the Pacific, a collapsed Latin American country, a militarily viable state in Central Asia (more of an indirect threat I suppose), a hostile state at critical Seaways (e.g. Panama Canal, Suez, Straights of Magellan, Straights of Malacca). All of these areas would require as many troops as we have or at least enough troops that we would be hard pressed to carry out other critical missions.

Again, I am willing to be convinced, but I would have to see hard evidence that an elite soldier can secure the same battle space as a greater number of not so elite soldiers.

[Ken White]

I agree. It seems like not only the US but most countries have a real problem assessing their ideal outcome and the best tools to accomplish that, beforehand. Hindsight is nice, but not useful.

That wasn't hindsight on my part or that of others. I and others have been railing against this kind of stupidity for over 40 years. The problem is that it requires political testicular fortitude and military eschewal of parochialism -- both items in short supply in the US. Thus my comment that your generation could change it; mine got swamped by the Baby Boomers who knew everything...

...if we did have 10k elites...

Don't need elites, just very competent forces -- easily attained by cutting force structure, moving most heavy stuff into the RC and increasing the training budget by some reprogramming.

And there is the rub. If we at any point had that good of intelligence, I highly doubt there would have been a 9/11.

I'm not at all sure we didn't have it -- I do know we did not act on what we did have due to lack of political will.

I agree as well, and perhaps poverty will suit us well. We seemed to make much better choices as a nation in our direst circumstances. And while the military is a sledgehammer, there is no better tool for establishing security. Security is, after all the first priority of work, and without it, as we have learned in Iraq, all efforts are fruitless.

That's why a bunch of us in the 70s and 80s got gray hair. The heirarchy wanted nothing more than to do business as usual -- as apparently do you. The object is to NOT have to establish security...

Our only national security problems, and our only future small wars are by no means guaranteed to result from mistakes in our foreign policy.

No, only 90% or so...

Imagine a collapsed Mexico, or Venezuela, or Haiti, which shouldn't be too hard, and all would be too close to ignore. A small and elite force would not be able to do anything to stabilize those countries, no matter how good they are.

No it would not. Nor can you show me a reason for us to stabilize them other than we've always done it that way. Our neglect of South America in spite of the Good Neighbor policy and half a dozen later clones has aided in the creation of all the problems you mention. Crass stupidity on our part. I understand what's done cannot be undone but I'm not all sure we would need to interfere. In fact, I'm sure that we should not. Why not just aid them in solving their problems without sticking our over sized nose into it and trying to tell them how WE thing they should run THEIR country...

Moreover, unless Brazil steps up, which I believe is quite unlikely...

Probably unlikely for Mexico but not so for Venezuala -- they don't want stupid on their northern flank.

...the only people who currently have a hope of responding in any meaningful way is the US. We could find ourselves stuck in a position where we cannot afford to do nothing, and we cannot afford to do anything.

Define response. I agree with the word but suspect we'd disagree on the merits and execution. Putting a slew of Gringos in Mexico would be the best way in the world to get them to stop squabbling, unite and turn en masse on Los Nortenos (not the Nuestra Familia kind, the Yanqui Blanco variant).

Believe me, I am all for more elite forces, especially as a percentage of total troop structure. I just do not believe that we could effectively defend the nation from many potential and legitimate threats with fewer troops than we have now.

You keep using the word elite. I have not. Better selected and trained forces than current structure with specific equipment that we have known we've needed since the mid 70s but have not developed to the point of public acknowledgment of existence purposely to preclude the use, certainly; elite? No. The Army was purposely dumbed down in doctrine, training and skills in the 70s and 80s in an attempt to influence national policy; it was fairly successful in some respects but as Afghanistan and Iraq show, not completely successful. Blowback is a beach... [quote]To list just a few: a Chinese incursion into certain islands in the Pacific...[quote]Surely you aren't suggesting fighting China (or India) on a man to man basis. That's not a ground force effort. Never has been and is unlikely to be one in your lifetime. Or certainly should be.

a collapsed Latin American country, a militarily viable state in Central Asia (more of an indirect threat I suppose), a hostile state at critical Seaways (e.g. Panama Canal, Suez, Straights of Magellan, Straights of Malacca). All of these areas would require as many troops as we have or at least enough troops that we would be hard pressed to carry out other critical missions.

Having been to through or near all those, I don't see the problems you see. I'd also suggest that introduction of US forces into most of those area would almost certainly create more problems than it solved...

Why not put as much effort into preempting problems in all those places as it would take to execute your proposed solution in any one?

Again, I am willing to be convinced, but I would have to see hard evidence that an elite soldier can secure the same battle space as a greater number of not so elite soldiers.

I don't think you are willing to be convinced, you want to do things the same way we've been doing it. I suppose you'll get your way because it is easier than doing the hard stuff -- until you actually have to do it, then it costs you, big time -- and is highly unlikely to produce the result you desire (see Afghanistan and Iraq as well as half dozen other places I could name). There's that elite thing again -- not my word; yours. You do not have to be 'elite' to be competent.

The object should be to preclude it being battle space but if it must be that, not to secure it but to control and dominate it.

[Abu Suleyman]

The heirarchy wanted nothing more than to do business as usual -- as apparently do you.

Argh.... Dagger straight to my heart.

Actually, those daggers are useful, because they illustrate where our differences are. What you seem to be arguing is from a position of "limited engagement" or :gasp: "isolationism." (I know that often people use these word pejoratively, and I think that is crap. If it is so wrong don't argue aesthetically, argue the point, like I am about to do.) I could easily be persuaded to a position of "limited engagement" and like all good Americans I have a strong isolationist streak. However, what I am most concerned with is a precipitous decline in American strength, such that no other country is able to step into the gap, thereby creating an unstable international situation. As you said,

The object is to NOT have to establish security...

there is an old Roman saying

Quis desiderat pacem, preparat bellum!

Let he who desires peace, prepare for war!

I understand that there are other ways to fight war than big heavy forces charging in and destroying things, but politics and not tactics decide how, when and why we fight wars.

That said, I really don't see a point, including bankruptcy where the U.S. gives up its 'expeditionary' nature. Our first overseas expedition was in 1801 for crying out loud, and that proclivity hasn't ceased since. It isn't just a republican thing, either since Bill Clinton showed an amazing willingness to send troops into every situation a bleeding heart could love. (He was a sucker for anything that he could bite his lower lip over.)

My point being is, as much as we may like it or not, politically, there is no way that we are ever going to go from an Army which takes and holds territory the old fashioned way to one which relies on raids and brief incursions. Until the American political landscape changes, we are stuck with it and we can either grouse about it, or we can deal with it.

re: Mexico This should almost be another thread. I am not talking about telling anyone how to run their country, I am talking about protecting people within our own. I will say though that if the government collapsed completely, which is not out of the question, then we would either have to completely secure the border or face Pancho Villa type problems in our own country. There is no need to reenact the punitive expedition, but we cannot abandon our own people to capricious raids by well armed and organized thugs based outside the country.

re: S. America This should be another thread. So I will leave it alone until I can post that.

[Ken White]

at or alongside each other but obviously I'm failing to communicate...

Actually, those daggers are useful, because they illustrate where our differences are. What you seem to be arguing is from a position of "limited engagement" or :gasp: "isolationism." ...

Far from it, that dog won't hunt at all in this age. Nor am I suggesting that we not do any 'expeditionary' operations -- I am suggesting that we need a capability to do strategic raids on both a covert and overt basis (and that DoD has deliberately eschewed that in an effort to influence policy -- that's backwards IMO) as well as expeditionary capability which is imperative as a capability -- not desirable; to be avoided but possibly necessary. Further, that the strategic raid is more in keeping with the American psyche and norms and properly done will normally be cheaper on all accounts than a lengthy COIN-like operation. Those latter should be avoided if at all possible for all the obvious reasons.

However, what I am most concerned with is a precipitous decline in American strength, such that no other country is able to step into the gap, thereby creating an unstable international situation. As you said, [The object is to NOT have to establish security...

I can cover a road block by fire from a click or two away; I don't have to sit on the crossroads and be a target...

...but politics and not tactics decide how, when and why we fight wars.

Of course they do; that's the point. If you provide the policy makers a sledge hammer and only a sledge hammer, that's what they'll have to use even if another tool would be a far better option.

We have the capability of providing a number of tools; we have foolishly elected to build sledgehammers.

If that's all the policy makers have; they, as you seem to wish to do, will use them because it's better than nothing and they don't know any better and are taking advice from overly cautious military types. Dumb.

That said, I really don't see a point, including bankruptcy where the U.S. gives up its 'expeditionary' nature. Our first overseas expedition was in 1801 for crying out loud, and that proclivity hasn't ceased since.

Thank you for making my point -- the vast majority of those were strategic raids. Only after the foolishness of the Philippines in 1898 did we get involved with the go and stay business -- and we have NEVER done it well...

My point being is, as much as we may like it or not, politically, there is no way that we are ever going to go from an Army which takes and holds territory the old fashioned way to one which relies on raids and brief incursions. Until the American political landscape changes, we are stuck with it and we can either grouse about it, or we can deal with it.

I don't think that's correct; I acknowledge there are many who believe that way but there are others who'd dispute that. Most of the Marine Corps would, probably...

re: Mexico This should almost be another thread.

True.

we cannot abandon our own people to capricious raids by well armed and organized thugs based outside the country.

Nor would I suggest we should.

[Abu Suleyman]

Alright, I think I have figured out at least where our disconnect is, and it is that we are talking past each other.

Walking this back, I agree that a more agile, and all around better force is desirable, but I do not believe that we can decrease the number of ground troops that we have below the number we currently have for three reasons:

1. I think that the actual mission of national security, (e.g. actually guarding our borders) requires at least the ca. 500k soldiers that we have. I base this on defending both the Southern border and Pacific Islands, from diverse emergent threats.

2. Even with a less "Take and Hold" based strategy abroad, situations will inevitably arise that the US will feel compelled to take and hold territory, even without planning to do so, and the military and the country does not want to get caught short in such a situation.

3. Even with a more "Raid" mentality, there is likely to be missions and times where a smaller force would be highly stressed. Specifically, I am imagining a situation where, even though the deployments are only 3 mos. the dwell time is also on 3 mos. or other similar configuration. Tying into this, if we are going to have a force that is going to be this well trained we are going to have to be able to commit a greater amount of time to training, so a larger percentage of our force will be in training at any time.

Does that sound at all like what we are talking about? I certainly got distracted with my own discussion, so I cannot blame anyone for being confused.