Deficit, Budget, and War

[Abu Suleyman]

Part of the reason that Afghanistan and Iraq are "Small Wars" to the United States is that they are relatively small in comparison to our military capacity. If Iran were to invade either of those two countries, that would be a major military operation for them, and one that likely would not bode well for either side in the conflict. For the past thirty or more years, the U.S. has substituted military technology for casualties, and it has worked relatively well. (Compare American casualties in Afghanistan with Russian ones.) This has all been made possible by a tremendous budget which currently outstrips the next ten countries combined.

However, the national debt, which for the better half of a century has not been trivial, now looks to take a turn for the gargantuan. If, as has been recently predicted the national defict increases by nearly a trillion dollars each year for the next ten years, it is likely that the U.S. will have to cut deep into defense spending in order to return to solvency. (This is disregarding all of the other significant problems created by spending more than you have).

Rather than having a conversation about national budget policy per se my point is to raise the question of how a smaller military budget would influence the US's ability to intervene in Small Wars around the globe. I see several possibilities. The first is that the U.S. starts substituting bodies for technology, which is practical, but not politically feasible for now. The second is that the U.S. relies more heavily on allies. While that sounds appealing, most of our allies are not militarily capable to pick up enough slack. That is not to say their hearts are not in the right place, but frankly, they have come to rely on the American military and have cut a very deep 'peace dividend' which they cannot easily recover.

The final possibility is the traditional American reaction of Isolationism. Even cutting our military involvements overseas, America can still probably be safe(ish). While I personally do not agree with this strategy there have always been groups that argue for is, and there are still many important scholars who make just such an arguement, and spme variant of this COA seems most probable.

In the end, if the US's military capacity collapses under the weight of its financial profligacy, how do you thing that will change the wars she fights? Do you believe there will be more wars or fewer (between all countries)? Can groups like the UN and NATO survive without the US? What about less powerful countries? I am interested to know what this forum thinks.

[Ken White]

...This has all been made possible by a tremendous budget which currently outstrips the next ten countries combined.

Which in turn is caused by the fact that the next ten nations in line are unable (due total population) to spend that much and elect not to spend more than they do because we are able to spend that much.

We have spent a relatively small amount of GDP (not a good measure but one that is convenient) on Defense through out our history and not all that much more, as a percentage of GDP than most of those other ten nations.

The budget crunch you accurately cite is due to the increasing amount spent on social welfare by the Federal Government. I'd simply point out that such spending is not the Federal role, it is a State role and the Feds are doing it because our arcane tax system gives them about 60+ % of all government revenue while they expend less than 40% including some but not all of that social welfare and 95+% of the defense expenditure. The difference is transferred to the States and local authorities via grants and transfers -- a woefully inefficient system that wastes scads of money. Were the tax system revised to provide the right amounts at the right level of government and thus better transparency on what amount is spent for what purpose, we might make more sensible decisions. However, Congress will not like that, they prefer the opacity...

All that to point out that the money angle is not as simple as the size of the defense budget.

Rather than having a conversation about national budget policy...

Pretty hard not to -- as it is at the heart of your query. It and the various impacts budget and other, of our idiot Congress are really the crux of your post and the drivers of defense policy.

That is not to say their hearts are not in the right place, but frankly, they have come to rely on the American military and have cut a very deep 'peace dividend' which they cannot easily recover...The final possibility is the traditional American reaction of Isolationism. Even cutting our military involvements overseas, America can still probably be safe(ish).

True on the allies, true on isolationism which almost certainly will not occur in spite of some pressures but not true on more troops, less tech. I'd argue for significantly fewer -- but far better -- active troops plus a larger, well equipped and trained Strategic Reserve force...

In the end, if the US's military capacity collapses under the weight of its financial profligacy, how do you thing that will change the wars she fights? Do you believe there will be more wars or fewer (between all countries)? Can groups like the UN and NATO survive without the US? What about less powerful countries? I am interested to know what this forum thinks.

Not likely to occur; Decreased budget will probably make little real difference in methodology; No major change in the number of conflicts but a generally slowly declining number of State on State wars; Yes, they can survive but I doubt it'll come to that -- if it does, look for the UN (-the US) to declare war on the US. (If the EU doesn't beat them to it); Don't understand the "what about less powerful countries" issue?

[Abu Suleyman]

Don't understand the "what about less powerful countries" issue?

In this case what I am talking about are places like Kuwait, East Timor, and Kosovo, which only by the grace of the United States are they independent. It is possible that they might use the tactics of insurgency to guarantee their existence, but in the words of Stalin, quantity has a quality all of its own.

The budget debate that I wanted to avoid, could be summed up thusly: Yes, the vast majority of the largesse previously and currently in the budget is social welfare. Indeed, even if we were to completely abandon all military spending, it would not decrease the projected shortfalls for the next ten years by anymore than half. Given a choice between decreasing spending on virtually any social program and national defense, I would cut everything before decreasing defense spending.

However, it seems to me that the precient

"When the people find they can vote themselves money, that will herald the end of the republic."

~Benjamin Franklin

has come to pass. Once programs are in place people view the money coming to them as entitlements, and defend them as such. Usually the only way to acheive any cuts is through a 'compromise' which will almost assuredly result in defense budget cuts.

Even without such cuts, outside forces could force them upon us. Economists have no idea how many dollars are outside the U.S. If demand for things like US Government Bonds, or Oil priced in dollars wanes, the devaluation of the dollar could be precipitous, resulting in a real decrease in spending even without a nominal one.

[Watcher In The Middle]

In other words, it seems likely to me, that unless we control spending, we are likely to see future warfare, which will look a lot like Iraq and Afghanistan, but with way higher casualties, and much less desirable outcomes.

Just a few considered implications (from a non-military political type):

1) Less willingness (for money reasons) for the United States to get involved in foreign 'adventures', regardless of cause. Now I'd bet that the extremes of both parties (isolationist types on the right, and anti-war types on the left) would both be very, very happy with those results, but the problem is likely to be "Never want something so badly, because you just might get it".

For example, if the US military is substantially constrained from it's current 'role' of "Chief Cop" in any number of different locations, you could see any number of regional conflicts brewing up, and the constraints that currently exist in modern day warfare on how the conflicts would unfold would be unlikely to continue (think reverting to Taliban style tactics, only being both considerably more brutal and widespread).

2) More conflicts would be likely to have either a primarily religious, ethnic, or economic survival overtones (Example: conflicts over water). And those types of conflicts tend to get very scary, because a strong part of the intent of the combatants on all sides is to dehumanize the opposition, so few, if any weapons and tactics available to either side would not be utilized. Think Republic of the Congo, only more brutal and with less restraint.

3) Regional conflicts. When it's the small players fighting by themselves, these types of conflicts can and will spread quickly as the neighbors are more likely to choose up sides - particularly if the big guy is going to be sitting it out. This is probably the one I'm the most concerned about - because if the US starts to take an attitude that they are going to sit out these regional conflicts, then we are almost turning over resolution of the conflict to the least stable leadership which is actively involved in the conflicts.

4) Tactics in such conflicts. These types of conflicts aren't going to be rewarding for precision warfare - instead it's likely to be "more terror, all the time". Targets which generate/inflict the most losses, fear, and loathing will be preferred, and also inflict the most pain. It's not going to be strikes against opposition military as instead against much softer civilian and economic targets. And I could see substantial use of CBW in such conflicts, because when each side goes out to dehumanize the opposition, there's a lot fewer restraints against such use of such weaponry.

Obviously, the above is worst case outcome. But warfare could easily slide back to being extremely brutal, with the Iran-Iraq war being typical in terms of losses.

[J Wolfsberger]

Here's the FY2009 Outlays (in $ millions):

MILITARY PERSONNEL
ACTIVE FORCES 108,555
RESERVE FORCES 20,019
TOTAL MILITARY PERSONNEL 128,574

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 212,733
PROCUREMENT 112,897
RESEARCH, DEV, TEST & EVAL 76,352
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION 14,113
FAMILY HOUSING 3,354
REVOLVING AND MGMT FUNDS 3,725
DEFENSE-WIDE CONTINGENCIES 200
DEDUCT FOR OFFSETTING RCPTS -1,561
TRUST FUNDS 296
ALLOWANCES 547
INTERFUND TRANSACTIONS -126
TOTAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 551,105

The two heavy hitters are personnel and O&M, at 44%.
Procurement is 21%. (I assume that is systems, not beans and bullets).
RDT&E is 14%.
Those three account for 79% of the budget.

As the force grows, one of three things will happen:

1. Personnel cost increases will be covered by cuts to O&M
2. Personnel and O&M cost increases will be covered by increasing the budget
3. Personnel and O&M cost increases will be covered by (.9999 probability) shifting funds from one of the other two.

I expect a combination of 1 and 3.

Which leaves less than $189B available for budget reductions. Maybe, big maybe, 10% of that can be trimmed, for any reason, without crippling national capability to design, develop and produce major weapon systems.

The consequences I foresee are:

1. Training and readiness deteriorate.
2. The ability to develop and produce new systems deteriorates, including recapitalizing existing systems.
3. The level of military power available begins a steady decrease.
4. US ability to project power deteriorates.

Your big question is: "...if the US's military capacity collapses under the weight of its financial profligacy, how do you thing that will change the wars she fights?"

I think the answer is that we will lose the ability to effectively fight any. Think in terms of 18th and 19th century Spain.

[Abu Suleyman]

I think the answer is that we will lose the ability to effectively fight any. Think in terms of 18th and 19th century Spain.

That, I believe has distinct implications for things like small wars, especially. Using the 18th and 19th Century Spain example, we saw Spain go from fighting a series of small wars against people like Simon Bolivar, to fighting one final big war for its imperial life against the United States. Such a decline was primarily a function of Spain's inability to keep a budget as the revenue from gold in it colonies dried up.

This is important today, because the U.S. is the guarantor of much of international security. Unlike Spain, whose decline began well before the Napoleonic wars, and who finally abandoned her global empire quietly at the end of the 19th Century, the US is currently engaged in many small wars throughout the world. Those wars will not go away because of American bankruptcy, and indeed we might find ourselves in a situation where small wars become large ones, without changing scope. (e.g. Iraq/Iran breaks into full on warfare, because the U.S. is unable to guarantee their security.)

I agree that the U.S. will likely lose the capability to fight in wars in any way resembling what it does now, but it will not lose its incentives to manipulate outcomes to its best interest. It seems to me likely, that the U.S. will shift away from a policy of international engagement to one of more cautious isolation. Such a policy could mean that the U.S. only becomes involved when the situation is bad enough (the British are evacuating from Dunkirk again). However, I don't think that a diminished ability to fight wars on America's part will change the nature of wars. Even the wars in which the U.S. is involved in now could, if not successfully concluded and stabilized in some way, could easily turn into Large Wars absent a near-leviathan like the U.S. to underwrite them, which needless to say is very bad indeed.

In other words, it seems likely to me, that unless we control spending, we are likely to see future warfare, which will look a lot like Iraq and Afghanistan, but with way higher casualties, and much less desirable outcomes. While this may seem like I am 'securitizing' the budget debate, it seems to me that there is precious little discussion of an issue that clearly has long term national and international implications.

[Schmedlap]

... my point is to raise the question of how a smaller military budget would influence the US's ability to intervene in Small Wars around the globe. I see several possibilities. The first is that the U.S. starts substituting bodies for technology, which is practical, but not politically feasible for now...

I would argue that it is neither politically feasible nor practical. The more bodies, the more difficult quality control becomes and the more difficult C2 becomes. Greater chance of more incidents that resemble Abu Ghraib, Haditha, and that douche who raped a girl and killed her family. A smaller number of better trained folks would be more practical, imo, if for no other reason that they will commit fewer follies.

[Abu Suleyman]

I would argue that it is neither politically feasible nor practical. The more bodies, the more difficult quality control becomes and the more difficult C2 becomes. Greater chance of more incidents that resemble Abu Ghraib, Haditha, and that douche who raped a girl and killed her family. A smaller number of better trained folks would be more practical, imo, if for no other reason that they will commit fewer follies.

I agree, but part of the reason that we have the really well trained military we do now is money. If money gets cut it is at least as likely to come from training budgets as it is from R&D and Acquisitions. Indeed, because of the diffuse costs and specific benefits incentive structure, it is actually more likely to come from training than from either of those areas. For evidence of this, the training division of every single service is the least well funded in comparison to its mission. That is usually because there are only a couple of congressmen with training bases in their area, but there are a crap-load with factories that make things.

I do have to say, though, that I already believe that we are already at the minimum number of soldiers we can have and continue to carry off missions like Iraq or Afghanistan with any hope of success.

[Ken White]

I do have to say, though, that I already believe that we are already at the minimum number of soldiers we can have and continue to carry off missions like Iraq or Afghanistan with any hope of success.

There are better ways to have handled each of those. The problem was not that the money to develop and train forces capable of strategic raids had not been available, it was that the political and military will to employ the tactic in pursuit of strategy was lacking. Thus we had to employ an Armor and Euro centric force in South Asia and the Middle East -- just as we had earlier committed similar forces (and operational methods) to North Asia and Southeast Asia. We appear to be on the way to rebuilding that same force...

Would have been and would in future be far cheaper and more effective to employ such raids rather than getting tied up in lengthy, expensive in all terms and essentially marginally productive COIN efforts that in the end offer little if any change to either the nations involved or the strategic balance...

If you have a lot of money, you buy a lot of tools, supplies and such -- often more than you need. If you don't have that much money, you tend to buy smarter and buy only what you need. That lack of excess also causes you to work smarter.

[Abu Suleyman]

There are better ways to have handled each of those. The problem was not that the money to develop and train forces capable of strategic raids had not been available, it was that the political and military will to employ the tactic in pursuit of strategy was lacking. Thus we had to employ an Armor and Euro centric force in South Asia and the Middle East -- just as we had earlier committed similar forces (and operational methods) to North Asia and Southeast Asia. We appear to be on the way to rebuilding that same force...

Would have been and would in future be far cheaper and more effective to employ such raids rather than getting tied up in lengthy, expensive in all terms and essentially marginally productive COIN efforts that in the end offer little if any change to either the nations involved or the strategic balance...

If you have a lot of money, you buy a lot of tools, supplies and such -- often more than you need. If you don't have that much money, you tend to buy smarter and buy only what you need. That lack of excess also causes you to work smarter.

So what you are saying here is that the problem is a force structure and not a force size issue. I can agree with that, but at the same time I just don't see a way that a small elite force could pull off missions of the type of Afghanistan or Iraq.

If, rather than invading Iraq, we had just sent in 10,000 (arbitrarily chosen number) SF soldiers, and they had fomented rebellion amongst hoi polloi, then we certainly would have destabilized Iraq, but I am not sure that the same 10,000 would have been able to stabilize it again.

I am willing to be convinced, but breaking things is easy; building things is hard, and it is in the building that the world gets shaped.

[Ken White]

...at the same time I just don't see a way that a small elite force could pull off missions of the type of Afghanistan or Iraq.

That's the point -- those were missions made necessary more by the existing and available force structure and the focus of military (mostly) and civilian (influenced by the military) leaders. Both Afghanistan and the Middle East needed military attention, that was IMO a strategic necessity. Neither mission as actually performed was IMO strategically desirable in virtually any respect.

If, rather than invading Iraq, we had just sent in 10,000 (arbitrarily chosen number) SF soldiers, and they had fomented rebellion amongst hoi polloi, then we certainly would have destabilized Iraq, but I am not sure that the same 10,000 would have been able to stabilize it again.

In the first place we didn't have 10K SF. In the second, why would you want to do that? Foment a rebellion and you have no idea how that might end.

We should have in Afghanistan have known the location of all AQ assets and simply have gone in an destroyed them and left. In the ME, the issue was not Saddam but to send a message to the ME that attacks on American interests were no longer going to be tolerated as they had been for the past 22 years with either no response or a tepid one; rather with a full bore slam. Iraq was as good a place as any as it was effectively a pariah state with a roundly disliked Dictator but there were other more directly related targets. Problem is that our Foreign Policy in the region (and elsewhere) for many years has been directed at a course which made the course taken almost inevitable -- and the fact that so few options were available is an indication of major errors in foreign policy as well as military policy.

The more salient fact that four Presidents over the period 1979-2001 failed to properly respond to a series of provocations and probes from the Middle East which almost certainly led us to 2001 and later should not be forgotten...

I am willing to be convinced, but breaking things is easy; building things is hard, and it is in the building that the world gets shaped.

I totally agree. Very much so. I'd also suggest that employing a sledgehammer in building is not a common thing for a good reason.

Here's what the Wiki says about sledgehammers: "Sledgehammers are often used in construction work, for breaking through drywall or masonry walls. Sledgehammers are also used when substantial force is necessary to dislodge a trapped object (often in farm or oil field work), or for fracturing stone or concrete." Not a good tool for building; better one of these; LINK.

The GPF is a sledgehammer. It should be used for its designed purpose -- to break things -- you can use it for other things to be sure but it will not be nearly as effective as the proper tool.

Building things take time and preparation, it helps to use the right tools -- and those are intelligence, diplomacy and properly applied foreign aid plus a little very low key police and / or military assistance -- with emphasis on the low key. Once you expand the military presence, you're creating targets (everyone loves to snipe at the 800 pound Gorilla); you're usually creating a need for further commitment and you are undertaking an effort that will almost certainly be time consuming, expensive in many terms and with an uncertain end state almost guaranteed.

So I again ask -- why would you do that mindlessly without even investigating other options?

The answer is, of course that our previous decisions both on diplomacy and force structure put us where we were in 2001. We now have an opportunity to be bit smarter and, I believe, an obligation to be a bit tougher. Domestically and overseas. We can and should nip a lot of this stuff in the bud and forestall any more Afghan or Iraq like commitments which are generally not worth the costs. Perhaps really never worth them. We certainly need to be prepared to do them but we equally certainly should do our level best to avoid them. Whether we will or not, I can't say. Your generation needs to work on that...

[Schmedlap]

I agree, but part of the reason that we have the really well trained military we do now is money. If money gets cut it is at least as likely to come from training budgets as it is from R&D and Acquisitions. Indeed, because of the diffuse costs and specific benefits incentive structure, it is actually more likely to come from training than from either of those areas. For evidence of this, the training division of every single service is the least well funded in comparison to its mission. That is usually because there are only a couple of congressmen with training bases in their area, but there are a crap-load with factories that make things.

I do have to say, though, that I already believe that we are already at the minimum number of soldiers we can have and continue to carry off missions like Iraq or Afghanistan with any hope of success.

When I ponder budget cuts, my first concern is not training. It is manning and equipping. We have a larger force because of the mission set. We are also getting more money because of the missions set - and because the public demands lots of stuff for those troops. I can't see budgets being cut significantly unless the mission set changes and/or the force size is reduced. That would be the impetus, imo. I would also add that many of the positive changes made in our training over the past 10 years had very little to do with money, but lots to do with leaders' attitudes about risk and preparation for war. For example, the old practice of rodding people onto ranges and teaching them to fear their weapons is going away due to attitude adjustments, not budgets. I would also add that the most significant thing that has made us into a better trained force is our optempo. Training is nice, but experience is better.