New Guidance on Counter-Insurgency

[slapout9]

And when I speak to populace focused approaches, it is not to say one does not go through the government; but often it is the government that must change the most for them to regain peace with their populace. So my focus is to help the Gov't get straight with its populace, or if they refuse either leave, or help the populace get a Gov't that will (depends on how big the interest is that brought us there); but to simply take the govt as they are and assist them in subduing their populace is simply to add our names to the target list.

Bob, I know you are tired of hearing this COG thing come up, but you just explained what I have been trying to say but could not do it. The Government is the COG....the People are the Objective/Target. I think that is critical to understand because just protecting the people or killing them is not going to solve the problem. And your populace based theory is a winning theory and people should read it more carefully and stuff Ask yourself why do people form governments in the first place? Understanding that and why governments fail or succeed will show you how to win.

[Bob's World]

Bob, I know you are tired of hearing this COG thing come up, but you just explained what I have been trying to say but could not do it. The Government is the COG....the People are the Objective/Target. I think that is critical to understand because just protecting the people or killing them is not going to solve the problem. And your populace based theory is a winning theory and people should read it more carefully and stuff Ask yourself why do people form governments in the first place? Understanding that and why governments fail or succeed will show you how to win.

Slap, I understand what you mean when you say the Gov't is the COG, but I also understand that you are a "Wardenphile", and that fits. I would categorize the Gov't more as both a CR and CV; and the Populace as the COG. One does not necessarily try to defeat the COG, but in these internal conflicts more aptly one is out to win the support of the COG. Every populace must have a Govt of some sort, so therefore it is a CR. Failure of Govt is what gives rise to insurgency, so therefore this CR is also a CV and must be "targeted" to fix the points of poor governance.

Even in external conflicts where the COG is likely something that must be "defeated" I rarely think it is something that should be attacked directly. Derive the CRs that make it function in the way that makes it the COG in the first place; and then derive a subset of those CRs to the ones that are also susceptible to successful engagement, and call those CVs and make them the focus of your campaign.

[Fuchs]

I read CvC in original and my stomach cringes every time when I see such 'liberal' uses of the Schwerpunkt concept.

It's time to define a new term, the 'liberal' uses are really not connected with the original meaning any more - they're more like buzzwords.

[Bob's World]

I read CvC in original and my stomach cringes every time when I see such 'liberal' uses of the Schwerpunkt concept.

It's time to define a new term, the 'liberal' uses are really not connected with the original meaning any more - they're more like buzzwords.

He really didn't have much to say about COG. But then I sure never read the original, nor all of any translation.

To me this is a concept he tossed up for consideration, and all real value comes from how it has been applied and thought about by others.

[jcustis]

Now COMISAF COIN Guidance states claims 8 years of successful kinetic actions have made the problem worse. Essentially in that killing the enemy alienates the population. So does that mean the population all support the Taliban and don't like seeing them get killed or does it mean that negligent use of fire power risks killing the population?

In fact the document explicitly states that large operations risk killing civilians.

The document also clearly states, in the third paragraph, that we will not win simply by killing insurgents.

Wilf, are you arguing that the so-called pop-centric COIN is less likely to utilize force?

I've taken it to mean that you can't rely on force alone, and that you have to get good at applying a whole range of TTPs in order to present more options, thus allowing you to focus on the population at the same time that you are continuing to target the knuckleheads. And there is nothing at all in the tactics of FID, SA, COIN, whatever, that says you have to put all of your eggs in one basket. That wasn't done when we got sharper in Iraq, and it need not be done in Afghanistan either. That's why we can employ CA as economy of force operations of a sort.

And with respect to villages and things that go bump in the night, if you are tucked in your FOB and COP and distant from the population, you can try to target the BGs and chase them all you want, but you still have to be connected to the people, in whatever massed areas they are (and the roaming Bedouin-types too). This is for the aspect of FIND, as well as anything else.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, are you arguing that the so-called POP-COIN is less likely to utilize force?

I've taken it to mean that you can't rely on force alone, and that you have to get good at applying a whole range of TTPs in order to present options, thus allowing you to focus on the population at the same time that you are continuing to target the knuckleheads.

I'm not arguing anything on behalf of POP-COIN. I am arguing that you need to go an hunt, harass, make life miserable for the bad guys, and only the bad guys Bad guys are only those trying to kill you or kill civilians.

And with respect to villages and things that go bump in the night, if you are tucked in your FOB and COP and distant from the population, you can try to target the BGs and chase them all you want, but you still have to be connected to the people, in whatever massed areas they are (and the roaming Bedouin-types too). This is for the aspect of FIND, as well as anything else.

Concur. Lots of Ambushes, lots of OPs. Lots of informer networks within the population. Find any excuse to visit villages and chat a bit to the locals. All good stuff.

The paradigm I'd want to establish is that ISAF never do any harm, to good people. The only people harming the good people are the Taliban. The people harming the Taliban are ISAF.
I don't want to promise the People I'll protect them from the Taliban (because I cannot). I will promise to avenge any deaths the Taliban cause (because I can) - and the Pashtun understand vengeance.

[Bob's World]

I'm not arguing anything on behalf of POP-COIN. I am arguing that you need to go an hunt, harass, make life miserable for the bad guys, and only the bad guys Bad guys are only those trying to kill you or kill civilians.


Concur. Lots of Ambushes, lots of OPs. Lots of informer networks within the population. Find any excuse to visit villages and chat a bit to the locals. All good stuff.

The paradigm I'd want to establish is that ISAF never do any harm, to good people. The only people harming the good people are the Taliban. The people harming the Taliban are ISAF.
I don't want to promise the People I'll protect them from the Taliban (because I cannot). I will promise to avenge any deaths the Taliban cause (because I can) - and the Pashtun understand vengeance.

... and this, of course is why strategy applied the past several years has produced strategic damage out of tactical success.

As I understand the Taliban (and I am no expert, so this is intended to be a very general assessment) they are essentially a Pashto nationalist movement that is made up largely of members of the the Pashto populace living on both sides of the Afg/Pak border; that employ a fundamentalist Islamic ideology to provide the motivation for their movement.

I really see no way one can attack members of the Pashto populace that associate with the Taliban without having extremely negative effects with the larger Pashto populace from which these men originate. The tribe may well agree with the cause the Americans are supporting, yet as we have killed their kin, and likely non-Taliban members of the tribe as well in collateral damage, we have alienated the tribe as a whole. The more we engage, the stronger the Taliban become, not because more buy into their ideology, but because more are either sucked into the blood feud, or simply agree that the outsiders must be driven out.

This leads me to say that we do not simply need new ISAF COIN tactics; but rather we need a new overall strategic approach.

Most are coming on line to agree that the Westphalian construct of what a state is, or is not, is evolving. Yet few are willing to adjust how they think about dealing with such challenges to the old view of sovereignty. To this I simply suggest: "Free your mind, and your ass will follow."

How about this: We all recognize how important the Pashto populace is to both Afghanistan and Pakistan; and all should recognize by now that targeting the insurgent segment of that Pashto populace is destabilizing to BOTH of those countries; and also to the Western countries involved in the effort. Why not simply seek a new form of lesser included sovereignty that recognizes new rights for the Pashto populace without ripping apart the two states in which they reside? A form of dual-citizenship coupled with unique rights and governmental organizations that give the tribes a voice in both states.

How would this work exactly? I have no idea, this is evolving strategy in an evolving environment. Free your mind. Trust your damn parachute and go out the door.

All I know for sure is that what we are currently doing is not working, and the slight tweak of tactics proposed by ISAF is too little too late. But it is not too late to make a major change of strategy. One of my leadership sayings probably applies here:

"While it is sometimes right to do the wrong thing, it is never wrong to do the right thing."

[Surferbeetle]

...is paved with?

This leads me to say that we do not simply need new ISAF COIN tactics; but rather we need a new overall strategic approach.

This strategy is not going to spring forth fully formed; none-the-less I see the new policy as an important step on this journey. If we accept that a sustainable solution is favored, and if we are able accept that sustainable is defined as the condition in which resources used are less than or equal to resources generated, then perhaps we can be effective partners in a regional solution.

Most are coming on line to agree that the Westphalian construct of what a state is, or is not, is evolving. Yet few are willing to adjust how they think about dealing with such challenges to the old view of sovereignty. To this I simply suggest: "Free your mind, and your ass will follow."

A form of dual-citizenship coupled with unique rights and governmental organizations that give the tribes a voice in both states.

I disagree here BW, dual-citizenship is definitely a Westphalian construct...we are back to states here...and the tax-lawyers are salivating.

A trip to the US-Mexico border might be instructive with respect to examples of commonly found clashes between strategy formulated elsewhere and operational & tactical realities found on the ground...

All I know for sure is that what we are currently doing is not working, and the slight tweak of tactics proposed by ISAF is too little too late. But it is not too late to make a major change of strategy.

Elections first, then perhaps some substantive discussions among Afghanistan, Turkey, Russia, Iran, India, Pakistan, EU, China, and the US....

[William F. Owen]

I really see no way one can attack members of the Pashto populace that associate with the Taliban without having extremely negative effects with the larger Pashto populace from which these men originate. The tribe may well agree with the cause the Americans are supporting, yet as we have killed their kin, and likely non-Taliban members of the tribe as well in collateral damage, we have alienated the tribe as a whole.

No one is talking about attacking the populace. No one is talking about killing the Non-Taliban. That is exactly what we will avoid doing. We are talking about only killing the people who are killing other people.
Basically, you suggest taking no action against the Taliban because the people they are trying to kill will hate us for trying to kill them? I wonder how do their victims feel about this?

Most are coming on line to agree that the Westphalian construct of what a state is, or is not, is evolving. Yet few are willing to adjust how they think about dealing with such challenges to the old view of sovereignty. To this I simply suggest: "Free your mind, and your ass will follow."

Sorry, but valid though observations about the treaty of Westphalia may be, we now have world composed entirely of nation states, working as competing or co-operating economic and political powers. You cannot undo that. We have to deal with how people are, not how we wish them to be.

How would this work exactly? I have no idea, this is evolving strategy in an evolving environment. Free your mind. Trust your damn parachute and go out the door.

There is no such thing as an evolving strategy. Strategy can only change if changes are made to the Policy and the means by which that policy is set forth. It can't free-wheel. Strategy is instrumental. It's like surgery or construction. It's not just something that somehow happens. No policy, no strategy.

[William F. Owen]

... and this, of course is why strategy applied the past several years has produced strategic damage out of tactical success.

I thought this worthy of a separate post, because this issue of Strategy is important.
The policy is to force a Pro-US Government in A'Stan. Correct?

The Taliban wish to overthrow that Government by violent means. - that is their policy. The means they choose (their strategy) is to kill Afghans and ISAF. Their strategy is enemy centric. It is the means they use to set forth the policy.

Has ISAF had tactical success, or has it simply conducted a lot of irrelevant tactical actions?
Unless tactical success is instrumental in setting forth the policy it is tactical action separated from Strategy.
ISAF Policy is to protect the Government. ISAF strategy should be to prevent the Taliban killing Afghans and ISAF.
I submit this means, at the most basic level, killing the people who are doing the killing. That means ISAF should not kill Afghans, trying to kill Taliban.
If anyone wants to suggest an alternative, I am very willing to swayed.

[slapout9]

Slap, I understand what you mean when you say the Gov't is the COG, but I also understand that you are a "Wardenphile", and that fits. I would categorize the Gov't more as both a CR and CV; and the Populace as the COG. One does not necessarily try to defeat the COG, but in these internal conflicts more aptly one is out to win the support of the COG. Every populace must have a Govt of some sort, so therefore it is a CR. Failure of Govt is what gives rise to insurgency, so therefore this CR is also a CV and must be "targeted" to fix the points of poor governance.

Highlights were done by me.

Bob, Yes I am a Wardenphile or a possible ASCOPEian and your description of SBW (Systems Based Warfare) is probably what he would recomend...you want to affect a change in a failing government to achieve a certain desired effect. And that does not necessarily have to be violent. If the government is the COG or Focal point and you are successful you win the population by default, however if you don't focus on fixing the government...... how would winning the population do you any good....unless you were trying to do UW or something similar???