Via the SWJ Blog there is a clear link, hassle free too: http://www.scribd.com/doc/19075680/C...-COIN-GUIDANCE
davidbfpo
Via the SWJ Blog there is a clear link, hassle free too: http://www.scribd.com/doc/19075680/C...-COIN-GUIDANCE
davidbfpo
Well I'm not a fan of "Pop-centric COIN." This paper seems to confirm my opinion that PC COIN is actually a very clumsy forcing mechanism to try and educated people not to do criminally stupid and counter-productive things. Worst case is that this is "dumbing down" warfare for what is doable, rather than requiring a raising of standards to the required level.
That policy comes at the cost denigrating correctly applied combat power as being the essential element of irregular warfare.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
DOIM says that GEN McCrystal's giuidance falls into these categories:
Adult/Mature Content, Alternative Sexuality/Lifestyles, Auctions, Chat/Instant Messaging,
Extreme, Gambling, Hacking, Illegal Drugs, Illegal/Questionable, LGBT, Nudity, Online Storage,
Pay to Surf, Peer-to-Peer (P2P), Phishing, Pornography, Proxy Avoidance,
Spyware/Malware Sources, Streaming Media/MP3s, Violence/Hate/Racism.
I am currently at a training exercise so I will quickly try and reply to all.
First, towards the UK folks, I am trying to get it downloaded. As soon as it is I will post again and I will email it to you if you have an email.
Second, to Mike F. You don't really say anything with which I disagree. I believe security operations have a precise place and I believe counter-force operations have a place. The correct thing is analyzing the percentages. In a given insurgent population maybe only five percent are irreconcilables: those who have to be killed or captured. You also mention turning the population which I think is always better than killing the enemy.
You also made some great points on IO which is how it should be conducted. The only thing I would add is that once you live in the population and eliminate armed propaganda in the villages, then conduct regular shuras, eventually you will ask the people to turn in the bad guys so they can reconcile. Surprisingly they will and the violence will lower dramatically. The key is not killing the right people, its securing and living with the right people. This is also much easier when partnered with local units, not conducting solo operations.
When it comes to comparing population-centric COIN with other theories, people frequently say like what? Well, my first answer is fire-power reliant theories that the US Army used in the beginning of the Iraq war, the Afghanistan war until now, and throughout the Vietnam war. Firepower and vague concepts of maneuver replaced interaction and intelligence gathering. Above all, though, US army might say they do not advocate that, in practice that is the majority of their actions.
To William F. Owen: I don't think we see eye to eye but I don't think small little forum posts will change that. The problem with "correctly applied combat power as the essential element of irregular warfare" is defining correctly applied power. Is it fire power? Is it living with the population? Is it partnering with the local security forces? Is it gathering more accurate intelligence?
It seems like correctly applied power is a euphimism for conducting kinetic operations on the insurgent or irregular forces. And, frankly, I don't think we can shoot our way out of this operation.
Well you may yet be surprised.
- Is it fire power? - Yes, but 5.56mm and 7.62mm applied against armed targets, clearly identified and engaged within ROE.
It is not 454kg JDAMS, Hellfire, or 155mm, unless very clear criteria are satisfied- Is it living with the population? Yes, as and when it merits benefit.
- Is it partnering with the local security forces? Yes, especially if they can trained to operate in ways that acknowledge both their limits and strengths and not just as less capable mirrors of yourselves.
- Is it gathering more accurate intelligence? Absolutely! That is about the most important thing you can do!
It's not a euphemism. It is exactly what I mean.It seems like correctly applied power is a euphimism for conducting kinetic operations on the insurgent or irregular forces. And, frankly, I don't think we can shoot our way out of this operation.
If I can find 30 armed insurgents on the move, away from any population, why should I not attempt to engage and kill all of them? Are you seriously suggesting we should not do this?
If however, I risk killing civilians, or I am not sure as to the identity of those 30 armed men, then I'll seek to conduct operations to clarify their identity, till I can successfully engage them, or consider them not a threat.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
but in the mean time, maybe I posted this LINK in the wrong thread.
Everyone with all the stastical data, metrics, whatever the flavor of the month is I have one question. What percentage of the Afghan populace supports US prescence?
Some may remember my rant some months ago on some PSYOPS guys here LINK, well let's just say our I/O does not exist.....or in others words it is pure bureaucratic horsesh*t; at least in the other theatre it is that way. Maybe, just maybe someone has it right in Afghanistan......anyone, anyone, anyone?
I really need to stop all this ranting.....sorry
ODB
Exchange with an Iraqi soldier during FID:
Why did you not clear your corner?
Because we are on a base and it is secure.
ODB- Knowing what percentage of the population supports the government of Afghanistan is the most important metric. That being said, we don't know it. Finding it out would involve daily conversations with locals and rigorous searching for that answer. The result would be operations very much like population-centric COIN.
In short, that is the most important metric but in Afghanistan and Iraq the US Army's most important metric is friendly KIA.
Wilf- I guess the only thing we disagree on is that it is much better to flip a known insurgent to supporting the government than killing him. Otherwise, I agree with everyone of your points except that violence is the last resort in a counter-insurgency.
The very fact an insurgency exists, shows that the insurgent was very happy to resort to violence. Before the insurgency occurs, violence should indeed be a last resort.
I think if you can get an insurgent to give up or change sides, you should. Point being he is only likley to do that, once you have subjected him to some harm or threat.
My real concern being that POP-COIN is either very poorly explained, or actually suffers from profound failure to understand the nature or irregular warfare, - as I think my answer to your questions would seem to indicate.
The central tenet of POP-COIN is "protecting the population." My reasoning, based on history, is that if you defeat the insurgency (kill, capture, coerce) then you fulfil your aim, axiomatically. My reasoning also being that I want to protect the Government, because the Government, not the Population make the Policies, we wish to benefit from - Clausewitz!
POP-COIN is essentially a poor reasoning of END-WAYS-MEANS.
POP-COIN reasons that killing the enemy means killing the population - which is essentially assuming folks are stupid and changing the means to account for it.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
My own system at work (Canadian government) also blocks me from accessing Scribd.com - NATO's posted a copy here:
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/offici...y_guidance.pdf
Bookmarks