New Guidance on Counter-Insurgency

[PhilR]

I thought this worthy of a separate post, because this issue of Strategy is important.
The policy is to force a Pro-US Government in A'Stan. Correct?

The Taliban wish to overthrow that Government by violent means. - that is their policy. The means they choose (their strategy) is to kill Afghans and ISAF. Their strategy is enemy centric. It is the means they use to set forth the policy.

Has ISAF had tactical success, or has it simply conducted a lot of irrelevant tactical actions?
Unless tactical success is instrumental in setting forth the policy it is tactical action separated from Strategy.
ISAF Policy is to protect the Government. ISAF strategy should be to prevent the Taliban killing Afghans and ISAF.
I submit this means, at the most basic level, killing the people who are doing the killing. That means ISAF should not kill Afghans, trying to kill Taliban.
If anyone wants to suggest an alternative, I am very willing to swayed.

I believe this gets at the heart of the matter with FM 3-24, or "pop-centric" COIN, as its being described. I think that FM 3-24 describes a very specific COIN operational design to result in a specific political outcome. As Ken White and Col. Maxwell have described, we ARE NOT (or should not) be doing COIN in Afghanistan, but are supporting another government's COIN effort.

The ISAF guidance, however, clouds that fundamental fact by describing ISAF's direct responsibility to the Afghan people to both develop/influence a legitimate Afghan government for them, and to protect them from Taliban insurgents. It is emphasized to more work with the Afghan government, than through them. To do this assumes that we are developing an Afghan government that will eventually govern within the ethical framework of how we are conducting this campaign--that it will be "legitimate" in how we define legitimacy. I'm not sure we can dictate/influence this with any meaningful success. (The competing model currently seems to be how the Sri Lanakan government conducted its latest phase against the LTTE--an operational design that is not in keeping with FM 3-24 appraoch, but may better fit the ultimate political solution there).

In the end, we may establish a more secure environment and better trust between ISAF and the Afghan populace, but we might do it in such a way as to develop an Afghan government that is fundamentally unsustainable over the long run and will not survive once we draw down. We will have conducted a tactically successful campaign that ultimately does not, and cannot achieve its strategic objectives.

Semper Fi,
Col. Phil Ridderhof USMC

[Surferbeetle]

Sir, greatly appreciate your willingness to engage the issues. For whatever its worth, I don't post rank as I hope that any ideas which I may or may not advocate/discuss/examine will stand or fall based solely upon their merits/lack thereof.

I believe this gets at the heart of the matter with FM 3-24, or "pop-centric" COIN, as its being described. I think that FM 3-24 describes a very specific COIN operational design to result in a specific political outcome. As Ken White and Col. Maxwell have described, we ARE NOT (or should not) be doing COIN in Afghanistan, but are supporting another government's COIN effort.

My take: technically it's FID or advising, but COIN works from a marketing standpoint...coins generally have value, etc. FM 3-24, FM 3-24-2, some of the CA FM's (CAG? ones) are important steps along the journey...

The ISAF guidance, however, clouds that fundamental fact by describing ISAF's direct responsibility to the Afghan people to both develop/influence a legitimate Afghan government for them, and to protect them from Taliban insurgents. It is emphasized to more work with the Afghan government, than through them. To do this assumes that we are developing an Afghan government that will eventually govern within the ethical framework of how we are conducting this campaign--that it will be "legitimate" in how we define legitimacy. I'm not sure we can dictate/influence this with any meaningful success. (The competing model currently seems to be how the Sri Lanakan government conducted its latest phase against the LTTE--an operational design that is not in keeping with FM 3-24 appraoch, but may better fit the ultimate political solution there).

OIF1 vet, Michael Yon reader...no Afghanistan experience, non-Dari/Pashto speaker which admittedly hobbles any insights...however...given the history of Afghanistan the possibility of a spontaneous leap into 'functional nation state status' appears to be remote from this armchair without the 'benefit' of some sort of catalytic event...

In the end, we may establish a more secure environment and better trust between ISAF and the Afghan populace, but we might do it in such a way as to develop an Afghan government that is fundamentally unsustainable over the long run and will not survive once we draw down. We will have conducted a tactically successful campaign that ultimately does not, and cannot achieve its strategic objectives.

Concur...