New Guidance on Counter-Insurgency

[MikeF]

There is no simple if this then that, but changing the bulk of our patrols will lead to a more empowered government.

Maybe it will; maybe it won't. Empowered, better governance is up to the host nation. We can secure areas, build infrastructure, advise the government and military apparatus forever, but in the end, it is up to the populace and governing bodies to determine how they are going to live. I believe that this never-ending tactical debate on kinetic versus non-kinetic actions in war distracts our thinking on the real debate.

I would suggest, as currently constructed, a population-centric COIN model applied to the coalition efforts in Afghanistan may allow the Governent of Afghanistan to secure large portions of territory. That is it. It will not solve the illiteracy problem, the unemployment problem, the drug problem, the ethnic divisions, nor will it end radical Islamic terrorism. So, what should we be doing? This answer is something that has been perculating for a while...Maybe this thread is a good place to explore.

I think we need to relook our assumptions. Here's some that I've started.

1. We don't do COIN outside US borders. Ken White restated this again earlier this morning, but it is true. COIN is something that a Host Nation (HN) does. When we conduct operations inside someone elses borders, we are playing the role of a partisan force or International Community. Some examples of intervention include:

A. Occupation. We take over. Germany and Japan after WWII.
B. Security Force Assistance. Combination of military and political ASSISTANCE throughout the world. (Phillipines, Colombia).
C. Peace-keeping. Bosnia/Kosovo.
D. Regime Change (For lack of a better term.) Iraq (2003), Afghanistan (2001).

2. The military is best equipped to conduct security operations. We have several approaches to accompish security. It appears that a combination is currently being used in Afghanistan.

A. Mentoring. Typical MiTT teams. Small groups of advisors focus on training military staffs.
B. Advice/Assist. Traditional Foreign Internal Defense. Small groups of advisors work directly with a larger combat unit.
C. Partnering. GPF forces pair up with HN companies on a 1:1 or 1:2 ratio.
D. Unilateral. We do it ourselves, and hope that the HN military catches up.


3. There are other alternatives to nation/state-building than military options.

A. One understudied approach is the use of non-state actors to tackle non-state symptoms. Greg Mortenson's work in building schools in Pakistan and Afghanistan is a great example of a social entrepeneur creating real progress WITHOUT security.

B. Another approach is soft-power or indirect approach. Plan Colombia is a great example where State Department leads the effort to assist the government with a small military presence as advisors.

Long post, but a culmination of my thoughts for the week. Looking foward to hearing others comments/criticisms.

v/r

Mike

[Tom Odom]

1. We don't do COIN outside US borders. Ken White restated this again earlier this morning, but it is true. COIN is something that a Host Nation (HN) does. When we conduct operations inside someone elses borders, we are playing the role of a partisan force or International Community. Some examples of intervention include:

True but we support COIN ops by those host nations as part of FID, SFA or whatever we call it.

Tom

[MikeF]

True but we support COIN ops by those host nations as part of FID, SFA or whatever we call it. Tom

Tom,

You aptly described what we are doing (Oxford and Princeton version),; I am attempting to reframe the conversation towards what should we be doing not monday-morning quarterback the boys on the ground.

I am simply trying to shift this debate from tactical towards strategic and policy. If I was a commander on the ground in Afghanistan right now, I would follow McChrystal's words verbatem.

There is simply a huge gap between clear and build, between COIN theory and nation-building. If anything, your time in Africa can attest to that.

Overall, my thoughts are the tactical debate (Nagl v/s Gentile, kinetic v/s non-kinetic, those that get "it" v/s those that don't) is irrelevant in the strategic sphere of transnational terrorism, limitations of democratization, and constraints of globalization coupled in the age old mantras of tribes, ethnicity, and religion.

I wish I had simple answers. I do not.


v/r

Mike

[William F. Owen]

Overall, my thoughts are the tactical debate (Nagl v/s Gentile, kinetic v/s non-kinetic, those that get "it" v/s those that don't) is irrelevant in the strategic sphere of transnational terrorism, limitations of democratization, and constraints of globalization coupled in the age old mantras of tribes, ethnicity, and religion.

I wish I had simple answers. I do not.

OK, all good points, but what do you mean "Strategic?" Strategy and policy are not the same things. Tactics (Operations?) is how you apply strategy. Strategy should set forth the policy.

The Policy in Iraq/A'Stan is to force Pro-US Governments upon the population of each nation. Anti-US Governments are unacceptable.
That, simply stated is the aim. In this case, the "Strategy" is how you use specific actions and effects (Tactics) to make that happen. That may include violent (military) and non-violent (diplomacy) means. Military means require the use or the threatened use of force.

Overall my thoughts are that the COIN/FID/Peacekeeping debate is irrelevant in that it always manages to frame the problem, and thus solution, in the terms the observer finds most appealing to their political inclination and not in terms of what the evidence suggests.

The issue you are trying to force in irregular warfare is almost always that the irregulars (insurgents?) cannot win by violent means. They must surrender/disband and/or negotiate a settlement beneficial to you, the Government. Unless the enemy is being convinced of that, all else is frankly rubbish.

What ever you want to call it, the reason the US Armed Forces are in Iraq and A'Stan is there is a need to conduct warfare. Warfare requires will and skill, regardless of the type being conducted. Any policy or idea that detracts from that simple truth is extremely risky and historically likely to fail.