War of Choice?

[Zack]

Zack,

I think AQ in Afghanistan was much more important to the ultimate success of the 9/11 attacks than your comments would indicate. Despite a variety of diplomatic, criminal and military attempts to thwart AQ attacks over the years prior to 9/11, AQ retained a significant capability to train, facilitate and fund attacks against Western targets, especially the US. Efforts to contain AQ failed. I would therefore argue that military intervention was necessary to deal with the threat posed by AQ.

Now, we might quibble with what form that intervention should have taken, but I think intervention was necessary.

Ok I will grant that they have been able to retain a capability, but the 9/11 attack was not in almost any way predicated on their sanctuary in Afghanistan (so far as I can tell). The bombings in Tanzania and Kenya may have been conducted by AQ operatives trained in camps in Afghanistan, but this was not the case on 9/11 (or at the least skills learned there would not have helped their mission). If we want to disrupt and destroy AQ I would presume that we need to: kill the leadership, undermine political motives and recruiting efforts, and cut off operational funding. Our invasion of Afghanistan undermined the second requirement, and didn't solve the third. It also seems we haven't done a spectacularly good job at the targeting the leadership of AQ. So yes, we removed what little of their capabilities were present in Afghanistan, but at the expense of a surge in recruitment for them, plus costs in blood and treasure. If our goal is to keep American citizens from begin killed, invading Afghanistan seems a high-risk/low-reward scenario.

[Ken White]

... If we want to disrupt and destroy AQ I would presume that we need to: kill the leadership, undermine political motives and recruiting efforts, and cut off operational funding.

The first is symbolic but has little real effect; the second and third are ongoing and both are long term, low viz operations.

Our invasion of Afghanistan undermined the second requirement, and didn't solve the third.

Had nothing to do with the third and not all that much to do with the second. It was meant to send a message to South Asia that attacks supported from there in any way against US Soil would not be tolerated. The folks in south Asia understood that even if most westerners do not. The attacks on Iraq were to send a similar message to the ME that attacks on US interests world wide would no longer be tolerated. That also was understood by many in the world if not by most westerners.

It also seems we haven't done a spectacularly good job at the targeting the leadership of AQ.

Didn't have the tools to do it until mid 2004, by that time they were firmly ensconced in Pakistan and thus diplomatically difficult. We've got plenty of time, early days yet; it was said early on that this would be a 20 to 30 year effort and much would not be visible...

So yes, we removed what little of their capabilities were present in Afghanistan, but at the expense of a surge in recruitment for them, plus costs in blood and treasure. If our goal is to keep American citizens from begin killed, invading Afghanistan seems a high-risk/low-reward scenario.

The goal was not to keep American citizens from being killed -- there is absolutely no practical way to prevent a determined enemy from doing that. The goal was to strongly deter attacks on US soil (and secondarily on US interests worldwide) and disrupt the networks.

That's all been done and it's worked.

[jmm99]

"The Base" - and as such, is supporting to efforts by other groups on a global basis to a greater or lesser extent, dependent on its analysis of each group and its plans. It also was (and probably still is, to a lesser extent) capable of its own direct action operations.

By analogy, AQ can be viewed as waging unconventional warfare in the classic sense of our FMs. A SFOB hinges on its personnel and functions, not on its location (or locations, which can be multiple - though obviously network-linked). So also AQ. That is COL Robert Jones' concept, which makes sense to me.

As to the 2001 invasion of Astan, two reasons were (1) retribution and reprobation; and (2) specific deterrence[*]. Both reasons would have been satisfied by a complete destruction of the AQ leadership in Astan as we then knew it. That goal was not realized (Tora Bora et al).

The direct action effort against the AQ leadership still persists (separate US command); but has been submerged by the much larger efforts of UN-NATO ("nation-building" and peace enforcement in favor of the Karzai government) and the US FID-SA effort with major combat support (as noted by Bill Moore).

Since AQ (as a "base" of personnel and functions) is a moving target, the linkage between the effort against it, and the much larger Astan efforts, is not very clear to me. I expect I shall be enlightened.

The Taliban, very intentionally on their part, simply got in the way of our direct action efforts against AQ.


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[*] Specific deterrence deters the individual wrongdoer (you execute the serial killer). That may have no general deterrence effect on serial killers to be.

[Zack]

So do you think we have successfully deterred AQ and ME states opposing our interests? How? Other than the fact that we haven't had another attack on US soil (not for lack of trying), what evidence do we have that this message was effective with those we were sending it to? If OEF was meant to deter AQ, why have we had a bunch of attempted operations in the US and some successful ones in Europe? They have also had no qualms about attacking US/Coalition forces in the region (which, while not on US soil is certainly a US interest). I don't see how OIF strengthened our deterrent either. Post-invasion was bungled so badly that it seems more reasonable to say that OIF damaged our ability to deter ME states. If it was in fact just to deter WMD proliferation, Libya might be evidence of this, but I have read that Gaddafi's decision was quite apart from OIF.

Our goal is to keep Americans, and their interests safe (particularly their lives). That is what deterring attacks is all about. If we are not deterring them, we are forcing them to move their networks into less accessible areas, and we are swelling their ranks, then how have we done anything but make our situation worse?

[Ken White]

...what evidence do we have that this message was effective with those we were sending it to?

None. Too early to tell. The strong probability is that it was effective. we'll see but I suspect the targets -- the nations, not the non state groups, got the message.

If OEF was meant to deter AQ, why have we had a bunch of attempted operations in the US and some successful ones in Europe?

Not what I said. South Asia -- the Nations thereof. No nation's big military action is going to deter a non-state actor; OTOH military actions will deter adverse action and support by other nations who have those things and don't want them destroyed. Individuals and ill minded groups don't care what happens to nations, theirs or yours...

They have also had no qualms about attacking US/Coalition forces in the region (which, while not on US soil is certainly a US interest).

AQ and the Talibs have -- has any nation overtly sponsored either?

I don't see how OIF strengthened our deterrent either. Post-invasion was bungled so badly that it seems more reasonable to say that OIF damaged our ability to deter ME states.

It certainly wasn't as effective as it could have been were the post attack not so badly flawed, however, it'll likely end up being almost as successful. The message in the attack was that the US is nuts; that got pretty good coverage. That was the prime intent.

If it was in fact just to deter WMD proliferation, Libya might be evidence of this, but I have read that Gaddafi's decision was quite apart from OIF.

WMD had almost nothing to do with Iraq; they were used as the stated rationale -- and the Administration later acknowledged that was one of their several big mistakes.

Our goal is to keep Americans, and their interests safe (particularly their lives). That is what deterring attacks is all about.

Who says that is our goal? Can you explain to me how you would do that? With any assurance at all...

If we are not deterring them, we are forcing them to move their networks into less accessible areas, and we are swelling their ranks, then how have we done anything but make our situation worse?

First, what make you think we're swelling their ranks? Second, our situation worse in what way? Third, how do you deter a group of people that effectively have nothing you can attack except themselves as individuals and their funding?

[jmm99]

We've done a decent job on specific deterrence of AQ on three fronts: (1) intelligence + direct action (military); (2) intelligence + detention (law enforcement); and (3) disruption of network nodes, especially financing support (intelligence + counterintelligence).

As to general deterrence, not a real clue because I see no real plan to do that. By analogy, we need something akin to the European socialists who were anti-communist, but scarcely supportive of USG announced policies. I suppose support of certain Muslim governments (which ones ?) would be the answer. I also expect the tradeoff would be a much lesser role for the US in the Muslim world. That seems to be where Kilcullen is heading at the end of his book (Accidental Guerrilla).

As Ken noted, we are just getting into this - e.g., changes in Cold War strategy over decades.

Anyway, this is really a question for the younger generations.

So, what are your solutions to gain specific and general deterrence re: AQ ?

[Zack]

I'll try to organize my response here:

If the deterrence we were trying to achieve by OEF was against nations what were we doing that for? AQ was not really tied to any one state sponsor. The Taliban gave them sanctuary, but they weren't receiving any material support so far as I know. If our intent was to deter State-sponsored terror (what does this have to do with 9/11?) then we don't have much progress to speak of on that front either. Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, etc still support terror to some degree or another. I haven't seen or heard of any evidence suggesting that OEF & OIF have made otherwise noncompliant countries stop supporting terror.

How could security of our citizens and vital national interests not be our goal? That is the whole purpose of defense. We try to deter other actors because we don't want them killing our citizens, attacking or disrupting our national interests, or that of our allies.

So how do we deal with AQ? Like jmm99 says, specific deterrence. We go after the individual members and their sources of funding, undermine whatever popular legitimacy they have through the media and such, along with attacking the conditions that allow extremist ideologies to flourish. There is plenty of literature out there about how our occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan has attracted a large amount of foreign fighters from throughout the region; fighters who will eventually return home to cause trouble there as well. How is our situation worse? We have spent billions of dollars, have thousands more dead, and while doing so, we are helping AQ recruit.

I don't think we can deter AQ, but we can try to dismantle them, and do our best to remove the conditions that breed extremism. Targeted killings, removal of financial resources, pressure on ME countries to do educational reform/police their own populations, aid money, strategic communication... The list goes on.

Of course we won't be able to claim that Americans and their interests are safe, but we should certainly try. I don't see what you disagree with on this point. What is national security about in your opinion?

[Ken White]

If the deterrence we were trying to achieve by OEF was against nations what were we doing that for? AQ was not really tied to any one state sponsor. The Taliban gave them sanctuary, but they weren't receiving any material support so far as I know. If our intent was to deter State-sponsored terror (what does this have to do with 9/11?) then we don't have much progress to speak of on that front either.

Sponsors and support. the Taliban gave AQ support -- a home -- the fact is that could've been handled in other ways but it was not. The intent was to say that if you sponsor or support on your territory, bad things will happen.

Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, etc still support terror to some degree or another.

Against the US ot its interests outside of combat zones?

I haven't seen or heard of any evidence suggesting that OEF & OIF have made otherwise noncompliant countries stop supporting terror.

Any evidence they've directed anything against the US?

How could security of our citizens and vital national interests not be our goal? That is the whole purpose of defense. We try to deter other actors because we don't want them killing our citizens, attacking or disrupting our national interests, or that of our allies.

Of course we do -- but while we can deter other nations; deterring individuals is virtually impossible.

So how do we deal with AQ? Like jmm99 says, specific deterrence. We go after the individual members and their sources of funding...

Being done.

undermine whatever popular legitimacy they have through the media and such, along with attacking the conditions that allow extremist ideologies to flourish.

We're trying that but not doing too well for a number of reasons; mostly bureaucracy. They're ahead in the media war - partly because most western media is relatively clueless.

There is plenty of literature out there about how our occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan has attracted a large amount of foreign fighters from throughout the region; fighters who will eventually return home to cause trouble there as well. How is our situation worse? We have spent billions of dollars, have thousands more dead, and while doing so, we are helping AQ recruit.

How accurate is that literature? Most of that stuff is printed and disseminated by folks with agendas. Those numbers don't add up -- and the majority of the fighters in Iraq and Afghanistan are out of work kids for whom it's a job. What has that cost in dollars and dead -- and wounded -- bought? More importantly, what will it buy?

I don't think we can deter AQ, but we can try to dismantle them

I think we're doing that -- as I said, slow going

...and do our best to remove the conditions that breed extremism.

Pipe dream, I'm afraid. There's not enough money in the world to do all that -- not to mention that most of the potentially dangerous ideologies won't succumb to better conditions. They use that as a ploy and aren't serious about getting it fixed -- if you fixed it, then they wouldn't get any recruits; there'd be no need for them and they know that, so they'd just find another cause.

Targeted killings, removal of financial resources, pressure on ME countries to do educational reform/police their own populations, aid money, strategic communication... The list goes on.

All being done. We're back to that 20 or 30 year effort again. Turning around several centuries of hate and discontent is not going to be done in less than a couple of generations -- and we aren't even halfway through one generation thus far.

Of course we won't be able to claim that Americans and their interests are safe, but we should certainly try. I don't see what you disagree with on this point.

I thought we were trying. Still think we are.

What is national security about in your opinion?

Probably pretty much the same as yours -- but one has to be realistic about what tools were and are available as well as what can be achieved. I've long said that both the Afghanistan and Iraqi operations or something like them was necessary because four previous Presidents from both parties failed to respond to provocations and probes from 1979 on that emanated from the Middle East and each of which encouraged ever bolder and more dangerous attacks. I've also said I wouldn't have done either the way and at the time they were done -- Afghanistan was started well and properly but was morphed into another thing; Iraq had its good and bad points. Regardless of the flaws, -- and the heavy costs, I think both will achieve their design goal, albeit not as well as one could hope. Regardless, it is not possible to secure the borders in this large diverse nation and it is not possible to deter truly determined individuals. -- so you do what you can with what you have.

The big work on AQ et.al. is all Intel and Law Enforcement centric with just a little military stuff in area where there are fights going on, usually for other reasons and where AQ and such try to horn in on the action. It will take years to disrupt them and their erstwhile allies.

[Zack]

So what is the end state then? If Iraq remains mostly stable and doesn't slide back into civil war, and the Taliban are for the most part defeated, what will we have accomplished? AQ/Taliban will be located in FATA where we will continue to do our best to kill them and we will hopefully have two mostly friendly governments we can work with. So we will have made the point that if you harbor terrorists that attack the US itself (not abroad) we will deal with you directly. This may be an effective deterrent, but once again, I don't see how AQ's ability to strike on US soil had anything to do with state sponsorship. Furthermore it doesn't address state sponsored groups that attack our interests abroad. Hezbollah blew up the Khobar towers with Iranian help, etc... They and their state sponsor have consistently opposed US interests and killed US soldiers and continually threatened and fought against Israel.

Maybe you are right about the foreign fighters, I have not done the field research myself, but nonetheless I would hesitate to think that they all "have an agenda."

So if I may distill the argument. You think that that by invading and occupying Afghanistan we have told other sponsors of terror (against the US homeland) that we will destroy you if you hit us. This, to you, is worth the blood and treasure sacrifices we have made.

My contention is that the Taliban were not necessary or involved in the 9/11 attack, and as their sponsorship was not necessary to AQ's success, we should focus our attention elsewhere. Our interests abroad are still at risk to state sponsored terror groups, and thus I don't think OEF has deterred terror sponsorship. So the tradeoff has not been worth it in my opinion.

Would you distill exactly what the real strategic intent behind OIF was? I think I understand your position on Afghanistan, but what were we deterring other ME states from doing? other than proliferation of course.

[William F. Owen]

I still don't understand exactly why you think Afghanistan was a war of necessity at the beginning. I don't see the security connection between Taliban/AQ presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan and US national security. Like I said in my original post, we were not attacked by insurgents using small units tactics, or even explosives (knowledge of which could have been gained at a camp in Afghanistan). The money that funded the hijackers was not earned in Afghanistan either.

The US Attacked AQ because US public opinion demanded that it do so. The Taliban would not give them up, so they got it as well. Nothing wrong with that.
There is also the issue of reciprocity. Actions have consequences, and it's good to make enemies or potential enemies aware of that.

The desire to turn A'Stan into a modern functioning democracy is not a strategic security need. It's just an unintended consequence of a policy to go after AQ, and a belief that it is achievable given the very meagre military resources put the task.

[Ken White]

So what is the end state then?... So we will have made the point that if you harbor terrorists that attack the US itself (not abroad) we will deal with you directly. This may be an effective deterrent, but once again, I don't see how AQ's ability to strike on US soil had anything to do with state sponsorship.

It was not the sponsorship, there was none -- it was hosting AQ headquarters and training facilities.

Furthermore it doesn't address state sponsored groups that attack our interests abroad. Hezbollah blew up the Khobar towers with Iranian help, etc... They and their state sponsor have consistently opposed US interests and killed US soldiers and continually threatened and fought against Israel.

Don't confuse your Hezbollahs. The one that hit Khobar was Hezbollah Al Hejaz; the Saudi Arabian home grown variant, not the Lebanese model. The Saudis effectively dismantled theirs after we got off Saudi territory. The Lebanese version has pretty well left us alone since the Marine Barracks and Embassy bombings and kidnappings in Beirut -- which Reagan handled very poorly.

Maybe you are right about the foreign fighters, I have not done the field research myself, but nonetheless I would hesitate to think that they all "have an agenda."

Most everyone has an agenda of some sort. Nothing wrong with that, it's just wrong when you try to obscure your interest and pass it off as pure and objective news or reportage.

You think that that by invading and occupying Afghanistan we have told other sponsors of terror (against the US homeland) that we will destroy you if you hit us. This, to you, is worth the blood and treasure sacrifices we have made.

Too soon to tell for certain but I believe that a big part of why we went to both nations was to restore credibility. Whether that was the reason or not, the practical effect is that the cred has been essentially restored.

From 1979 until 2001, we were probed and provoked by folks from the ME -- not just AQ but the Muslim Brotherhood and several others and the fact that ME folks were AQ in Afghanistan added it to the mix -- and four Presidents refused to respond forcefully to those probes. That loss of credibility from Viet Nam, through Somalia and the failure to properly respond to the strike and bombings led folks to believe we could be continually pushed until we toppled. Been the cause of almost all our wars, some one though the Americans wouldn't respond. So the credibility had to be restored. Not leaving Iraq helped a great deal, not leaving Afghanistan until it is in better shape will help more.

In both cases, a far better job by the Armed Forces and fewer casualties would have enhanced that effect but the services did the best they could with what they had. My guess is that both will prove to have been worth the effort and the cost.

My contention is that the Taliban were not necessary or involved in the 9/11 attack, and as their sponsorship was not necessary to AQ's success, we should focus our attention elsewhere. Our interests abroad are still at risk to state sponsored terror groups, and thus I don't think OEF has deterred terror sponsorship. So the tradeoff has not been worth it in my opinion.

We can differ. The only real state sponsor of any significance at this time is Iran and they're a whole different ball game on several levels...

Would you distill exactly what the real strategic intent behind OIF was? I think I understand your position on Afghanistan, but what were we deterring other ME states from doing? other than proliferation of course.

In the ME -- and all the former Persian Empires (plural) which included all or part of Afghanistan, the Eye for Eye rule is followed. Afghansitan was the eye for the eye of hosting the crew that financed the 9/11 attack. Most in the area totally understood that. Iraq, OTOH, was the arm for the arm -- in the ME, eyes and arms are not interchangeable; responses are expected to be specific -- that were all the attacks around the globe including Khobar Towers and the African Embassy Bombing, the USS Cole and so forth. All those attack emanated from various parts of the ME (and few if any of the attackers were deprived youth) so the issue after 9/11 became we could not really stop attacks on the US, we're too big and the borders are too porous. All these attacks originated from various nations in the ME, so the question became could we send a message to the whole ME?

The issue was to convince them to not support actions or host those that would act against American interests

Voila, there's Iraq, geographically central, plenty of room for basing, will not disrupt the world oil supply (important -- we wanted China and India to have all the oil they wanted...), hated and despised dictator, pariah state -- there will be upset but it will be mild and then we'll have forces in the area that will help keep the neighbors honest. Folks in the ME of course screamed -- but they knew what the message was even if most in the west couldn't understand it. All the WMD and thus proliferation stuff was mostly diversionary because any attempt to state up front the real reason -- to send a message -- would never have flown past Congress whose approval was desired.

Had we gone in and gotten out quickly as was originally planned, the message would have been far more potent. It still will be adequate, I believe. Why the change to the plan in early May 2003 from rapid departure to staying, I don't know -- but it'll come out some day

[Zack]

I guess time will tell whether Iraq and Afghanistan have restored our credibility as a deterrent. I certainly hope that you are right, and that the sacrifice will have been worth it.

Regarding OEF, if restoration of our credibility was the end goal in mind, it seems a terrible risk to try to nation build. Why not just destroy the Taliban and what we can find of AQ and leave? We could have continued every time either group stuck its head out, but without committing significant ground forces, or trying to turn Afghanistan into a democracy.

The use of OIF to deter states of the ME in general still seems to an odd twist of reasoning. If you are correct and we are retaliating for Khobar, USS Cole, the embassy bombings, etc, by making an example of Iraq, how exactly does that make us a more credible deterrent? It seems to me as though our relative power was decreased (grossly?) by Iraq. I guess if it had gone off without a hitch, it might have had that effect but not now. And like you said, Iran is the last really major state sponsor, and instead of adjusting their behavior in light of threats they seem to be moving in the opposite direction, especially now that they are more or less a military junta. Hopefully Iraq will remain independent of Iran, but it is predominantly Shi'a, so I wouldn't be sure either way.

So why 2 wars to improve our credibility? I guess it was assumed Afghanistan was under control by the time Iraq got underway, but I digress. Time will tell I suppose.

[Zack]

The US Attacked AQ because US public opinion demanded that it do so. The Taliban would not give them up, so they got it as well. Nothing wrong with that.
There is also the issue of reciprocity. Actions have consequences, and it's good to make enemies or potential enemies aware of that.

The desire to turn A'Stan into a modern functioning democracy is not a strategic security need. It's just an unintended consequence of a policy to go after AQ, and a belief that it is achievable given the very meagre military resources put the task.

I agree with the first part, but if nation building is just an unintended consequence of reciprocity why is it still going on? It is obvious now that it is not achievable with meager military resources.

[William F. Owen]

... if nation building is just an unintended consequence of reciprocity why is it still going on? It is obvious now that it is not achievable with meager military resources.

Because it's now the policy. This is politics. It's not logic or reason.
We don't know that it is not achievable. The "NEW COIN" crowd believe it is. I strongly suspect, that given current resources and manpower, it is not, but that is just my opinion.

[Overland]

Why not just destroy the Taliban and what we can find of AQ and leave? We could have continued every time either group stuck its head out, but without committing significant ground forces, or trying to turn Afghanistan into a democracy.

With respect, it sounds as if you're trading one untenable situation for another.

I don't find any comfort in a strategy that relies exclusively on our ability and willingness to react. I can think of no supreme benefit inherent in a stance where the enemy chooses the field of battle and weapons employed. Even the material benefit associated with opting out of an occupation is called into question when one realizes that much of our wealth is generated by the stability of our nation and its "infallible" image-- both sure to be damaged as the mosquito bites add up (or the mosquito manages to go NBC and provide us with a heavy dose of EEE).

[Entropy]

Because it's now the policy. This is politics. It's not logic or reason.
We don't know that it is not achievable. The "NEW COIN" crowd believe it is. I strongly suspect, that given current resources and manpower, it is not, but that is just my opinion.

What Wilf said.

[Zack]

With respect, it sounds as if you're trading one untenable situation for another.

I don't find any comfort in a strategy that relies exclusively on our ability and willingness to react. I can think of no supreme benefit inherent in a stance where the enemy chooses the field of battle and weapons employed. Even the material benefit associated with opting out of an occupation is called into question when one realizes that much of our wealth is generated by the stability of our nation and its "infallible" image-- both sure to be damaged as the mosquito bites add up (or the mosquito manages to go NBC and provide us with a heavy dose of EEE).

I'm not so sure about our "infallible image," we have done considerably worse things for less valid reasons. An expensive occupation (blood and treasure) would also seem to detract from the "stability" of our nation as well.

Also how would a more limited response allow the enemy choose the field of battle and weapons employed? In either scenario (occupation or limited response) we are being reactionary (reciprocity for 9/11). If it was a more limited response; maybe a MEU blocking force, SF, air assets, we would be able to strike where we please without allowing AQ/Taliban to have much opportunity for reprisal. We would spend less money, incur fewer casualties, less negative response from other countries in the region, and still disrupt the networks, c&c, and emphasize that cooperation of AQ is something we will not stand for.

It seems to me that the occupation (if either) is more untenable than a limited, but strong response.

[Ken White]

An expensive occupation (blood and treasure) would also seem to detract from the "stability" of our nation as well.

but the real question is why did we elect to stay rather than do as you suggest...

We would spend less money, incur fewer casualties, less negative response from other countries in the region, and still disrupt the networks, c&c, and emphasize that cooperation of AQ is something we will not stand for.

Without knowledge of why that course was elected as a change to the original plan, we can only speculate. What has happened has happened. It will all come out eventually and then -- only then -- will we be able to assess the pros and cons.

It seems to me that the occupation (if either) is more untenable than a limited, but strong response.

Many agree with you, Thus why that was not done is a mystery -- at this time. Make no mistake, it is a political mystery, not military.

In the meantime, The key is to do as Overland suggests and NOT let others place us in the reactionary mode -- though I'm not at all sure that our Congress is prepared to accept that idea.

[Zack]

Congress not reactionary? Har har

So in the end we more or less agree? Or do you think the occupation was a good choice (based on your own reasoning) and it is only the motives the Bush administration acted on that are a mystery?

[Ken White]

which you call an occupation has not been beneficial, I think. I'm not sure we agree on whether all things considered either action, to include the occupation or stability operation, was worth the cost.

While I think the post attack phase in both nations was badly mishandled by the government, I fault the Army in particular for not being better prepared. Whether the results achieved (or likely to be achieved) justified the gross costs will hinge on the reason we stayed to a great extent (i.e. it was certainly political but domestic or international?). We'll know more eventually but based on what I have seen and heard thus far, I believe that both were worth it.

I think we agree that we can rely on Congress to be reactionary -- and not to allow anything remotely looking like forward thinking...