Afghanistan and U.S. Interests: Kotkin vs Nagl

[jmm99]

Dr Holt's suggestion:

(p.2)
I propose a synthesis drawing on several COIN models: 1. the classic Thompson/Briggs [Nagl, 2002: 28-29; 70-71] politics first/the population is the center of gravity approach; 2. the village militia of the Marine Corps Combined Action Program/Platoons in Vietnam, 3. culture as a key “force-multiplier, 4. basic lessons learned from the Philippine Insurrection to the Present as noted in FM 3-24, 5. the “inkspot approach” of Galula and others, and 6. the need for a unified military and civilian structure similar to CORDS [Civil Operations and Rural Development Support] system that included 7000 advisors by 1969.

would be fine - if it were a 99% Astani effort and grew out of the villages themselves. The major problem in Astan is political, not military.

The Marine CAP program, and the majority of the CORDS programs, were good concepts - keeping in mind that CAP was a pilot program[*]. CORDS, as part of the larger South Vietnamese Pacification program (which included SVN CAP units as an integral part), has a greater number of "lessons learned".

If I were a political officer indigenous to a country plagued by an insurgency, I would adopt both as the central focus of my "COIN" effort - and find a military officer who agreed with me.

I suspect that events will gallop by before anything like Dr Holt's suggestions could be implemented. E.g, the SVN Pacification program (in various iterations) had a bit more than 15 years of historical development.

[*] We have to guard against the tendency to assume that, if a program works in 10 places (actually about 100 places in CAP's case), it will work in 10,000 places - must be at least that many villes and hamlets in Astan.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

no "syntax degarbler" needed - I fully understand your thesis; but have a different take on the risk assessment of a policy reversal. Because of the domestic politics involved, my thesis (risky or not) is not likely to be implemented. That's happened before without causing me to jump overboard.

I thought the last chapter (Chap 5) of Kilcullen's book (TAG) is interesting, with its sectional sub-heading "Counterinsurgency: Possible, Not Recommended" (p.264) and "Mission Sets" (pp. 288-289) - the two missions being "strategic disruption" and "military assistence". I've no argument with either of those as stated (especially as the latter emphasizes the political element).

I also thought it interesting that Kilcullen says (p.269) that: "My personal position on coiunterinsurgency, and on Iraq and Afghanistan in particular, could therefore be summarized as "Never again, but ...." So, it seems he is still very much on the boat but shifting seats (closer to mine ).

Cheers (temp ca. 65, sunshine, no bugs)

Mike

[Surferbeetle]

Dr Holt's suggestion:

would be fine - if it were a 99% Astani effort and grew out of the villages themselves. The major problem in Astan is political, not military.

The Marine CAP program, and the majority of the CORDS programs, were good concepts - keeping in mind that CAP was a pilot program[*]. CORDS, as part of the larger South Vietnamese Pacification program (which included SVN CAP units as an integral part), has a greater number of "lessons learned".

If I were a political officer indigenous to a country plagued by an insurgency, I would adopt both as the central focus of my "COIN" effort - and find a military officer who agreed with me.

I suspect that events will gallop by before anything like Dr Holt's suggestions could be implemented. E.g, the SVN Pacification program (in various iterations) had a bit more than 15 years of historical development.

[*] We have to guard against the tendency to assume that, if a program works in 10 places (actually about 100 places in CAP's case), it will work in 10,000 places - must be at least that many villes and hamlets in Astan.

Regards

Mike

Mike,

Not too many differences in the grand scheme of things...however...

My qualifier would be that politics (in the western sense) may be too strong a word for the demographics that I believe we need to influence (and I have never visited or worked in Afghanistan). I think many (the bulk of the curve) would be more or less happy with three hots, a cot out of the weather, and some security. Studies that I have been plowing through seem to indicate that approximately ~85% are low tech farmers scrabbling to get by...long way of saying I don't believe the participatory Jeffersonian Democracy approach (as we know it) to be a viable one in the short term.

Your point on carefully considering the applicability of the CAP model to Afghanistan is wise.

As I understand CAP and with what I have done in the Army I think that I could not only survive but that I could also be an effective team member with a CAP/CORDS/CA/PRT/HTT lead element embedded in a SF/Advisor style matrix manned by a ISAF/ANA/ANP/Militia effort plus some heavy firepower to pound the stuffing out of anybody who gets stupid.

We would be located in some key places, with no Subway/Pizza Hut/Monster Chow Hall/FOB bull#### anywhere to be seen, and all would be focused on developing some sort of a functional economy & simultaneous security, some GoA capability, getting the neighbors involved in a constructive way, and getting the hell out when it all can move on its own...

I think that the President and Mr. Gates will not keep us in suspense much longer and I suspect they understand better than most what we need to do. I haven't retired yet and will ride it out a bit longer either way...let's just get it done.

Regards,

Steve