Exum on NPR

[MikeF]

Andrew Exum spoke on All Things Considered today explaining portions of the new Afgan strategy. I thought that he did an excellent job describing the SFA/Partnering plan for the next two years and in detailing how there will most likely be a spike in violence and higher casualties. However, I believe that he fell a bit short in defining anything towards what success/victory will be and how we hope to get there.

Worth listening to. It ties in well with several on-going discussions in the SWC.

v/r

Mike

[Pol-Mil FSO]

I see two problems with the "Growing the ANSF" policy:

1. How do you get an effective police force when working with human material that is 90 percent illiterate and 50 percent drug-addicted? Not to mention being plagued with systematic corruption that originates at the top in Kabul? I'm not convinced that CSTC-A and others involved in police training have the solutions to these problems.

2. Who pays for an expanded ANSF at a 400-500,000 force size level? I've heard cost figures in the billions of dollars. I suspect that the Afghan Government is many years from being able to sustain such a financial burden through its own budgetary resources. Can we count on our coalition partners and the international community to subsidize these expenses for the long term? Do we have the political will to fund it alone, in necessary?

Despite the above comments, I agree that a troop increase is needed to reverse the current trends and buy some breathing space. We need, however, to revisit the civil defense-cum-tribal militia option in order to gain more boots on the ground. To cite one supporting example: Ghorak, Khakrez, and Maruf Districts in Kandahar Province have been dominated by the Taliban with only a minimal ANP presence at the district administrative centers. Even deploying coalition or ANA units to these districts is problematic because the lines of communication are extremely vulnerable to interdiction by IEDs. In the absence of an unlimited supply of helicopter lift for resupply, it makes more sense to raise tribal militia/civil defense units to secure these districts, with support from an embedded advisory detachment and over-the-horizon QRF. Some analysts would argue that the above-mentioned districts do not have sufficient population to be worth an investment of coalition or government effort but I would counter that the psychological perception of lack of government control - together with the benefits to the Taliban of freedom of movement - compel action to secure these districts. There is admittedly a bad track record on the employment of militias and auxiliary police Afghanistan but I believe that most of the problems have been caused by a lack of understanding of the social and tribal dynamics and by an insistence on supporting and managing these forces through a Ministry of Interior that is too corrupt and too inept to execute the required program oversight.

[Schmedlap]

I suspect that the Afghan Government is many years from being able to sustain such a financial burden through its own budgetary resources. Can we count on our coalition partners and the international community to subsidize these expenses for the long term? Do we have the political will to fund it alone, in necessary?

People have often griped about the amount of foreign aid that we dole out, but I don't think that it has ever caused so much bellyaching as to cause us to consider cutting it off. Just a few billion here and there. That's nothing. In terms of scale, that's just an earmark.

[Surferbeetle]

...is always important.

1. How do you get an effective police force when working with human material that is 90 percent illiterate and 50 percent drug-addicted? Not to mention being plagued with systematic corruption that originates at the top in Kabul? I'm not convinced that CSTC-A and others involved in police training have the solutions to these problems.

Illiteracy and the ability to provide acceptable police/security services are not mutually exclusive. I suspect that surveys of surrounding countries as well as some in Africa would provide some interesting benchmarks to compare Afghanistan against. With this in mind please define effective police force (desired vs. good enough).

I would also be interested in sources for "...50 percent drug-addicted..."

2. Who pays for an expanded ANSF at a 400-500,000 force size level? I've heard cost figures in the billions of dollars. I suspect that the Afghan Government is many years from being able to sustain such a financial burden through its own budgetary resources. Can we count on our coalition partners and the international community to subsidize these expenses for the long term? Do we have the political will to fund it alone, in necessary?

My view with respect to cost estimates is similar to yours in that sustainability appears to be an issue. If per capita GDP is indeed around the $300 USD mark, and we assume a 500,000 person force we of course see an annual $150,000,000 cost for base salaries alone not counting incentive pays and overhead costs as a low ball number, this estimate (2.5 billion/year Army plus 1 billion/year Police) is probably much closer to the western expectation of acceptable. The American taxpayer is counting upon our FSO's to create dialogue and find acceptable solutions among the concerned parties as we wait for the PRT's and other elements to help the GoA resuscitate its economy and governance.

Despite the above comments, I agree that a troop increase is needed to reverse the current trends and buy some breathing space. We need, however, to revisit the civil defense-cum-tribal militia option in order to gain more boots on the ground. To cite one supporting example: Ghorak, Khakrez, and Maruf Districts in Kandahar Province have been dominated by the Taliban with only a minimal ANP presence at the district administrative centers. Even deploying coalition or ANA units to these districts is problematic because the lines of communication are extremely vulnerable to interdiction by IEDs. In the absence of an unlimited supply of helicopter lift for resupply, it makes more sense to raise tribal militia/civil defense units to secure these districts, with support from an embedded advisory detachment and over-the-horizon QRF. Some analysts would argue that the above-mentioned districts do not have sufficient population to be worth an investment of coalition or government effort but I would counter that the psychological perception of lack of government control - together with the benefits to the Taliban of freedom of movement - compel action to secure these districts. There is admittedly a bad track record on the employment of militias and auxiliary police Afghanistan but I believe that most of the problems have been caused by a lack of understanding of the social and tribal dynamics and by an insistence on supporting and managing these forces through a Ministry of Interior that is too corrupt and too inept to execute the required program oversight.

Not having reviewed the pol-mil situation for these areas I for one would be interested in any open source references which would help me to understand your concerns...

Having thought a bit about militas/armed organizations, the DDR process and their derivatives in Latin America and having seen some of the associated residual effects I am sensitive to the potential implications and always willing to learn more...

[William F. Owen]

Actually, I find this all a bit worrying.

My personal take is that A'Stan is essentially a de-facto civil war. "Insurgency" is very comforting label, but it's now a block to useful thought.

It being a civil war, you need strong government forces, conducting effective operations. The US's job is to ensure that the Government win. I've not seen much discussion in that direction. All we seem to see is the context and detail free pumping of the POP-COIN agenda.

Additionally, based on a conversation last night, I see a central facet of the POP-COIN being "We cannot inflict defeat on the Taliban." - actually, what is not said, is "We do not know how to inflict defeat on the Taliban."

I am close to forming the opinion that once you get past "COIN Skills erode war fighting capability," it may well be more relevant to say "POP-COIN erodes irregular warfare skills."

[MikeF]

Actually, I find this all a bit worrying.

My personal take is that A'Stan is essentially a de-facto civil war. "Insurgency" is very comforting label, but it's now a block to useful thought.

What's the difference between civil-war and insurgency? I've never found a good answer on that besides that is a matter of opinion between different actors.

v/r

Mike

[TheCurmudgeon]

Additionally, based on a conversation last night, I see a central facet of the POP-COIN being "We cannot inflict defeat on the Taliban." - actually, what is not said, is "We do not know how to inflict defeat on the Taliban."

Maybe we should be asking "What does the Taliban offer to these remote towns and villages that the government does not? What is their appeal to the people?"

I doubt it is the Taliban’s liberal mindset or their equal rights for women. I also believe that, if the remote villages were so inclined, they could remove the Taliban themselves or at least would accept and support our efforts to rid the Taliban from A'Stan.

I don't think traditional COIN doctrine will work here because it assumes the people are the center of gravity. I saw the people in the remote regions I travelled to as pragmatic. They did not care about governments. They cared about living from day to day. And a new building or a well does not impress them. A road might. But in the end, life will be the same miserable existence it was yesterday no matter who is in charge.

I am going to way oversimplify, but... life in remote A'Stan is harsh. The Taliban are harsh. Kind of reminds me of the Amish and the strict rules they live by (with the difference being that the Amish do it by choice). The Taliban mindset is more closely aligned with the mindset of the people - thier answers make sense.

Traditional COIN says that you must first establish Security. Security is not what worries these people. Day-to-day life there will kill you. I think we are projecting a set of beliefs onto the Afghanis that they do not proscribe to and therefore we are attacking the problem from the wrong angle.

Then again, I HAVE been standing out in the hot sun a lot lately.

[Tom Odom]

What's the difference between civil-war and insurgency? I've never found a good answer on that besides that is a matter of opinion between different actors.

v/r

Mike

Mike

It really is a question of scale and degree as well as who is defining what is happening. And you are correct in stating the demarcation between the two is a best fuzzy. The Rwandan Civil War started as an open invasion then regressed to insurgency before exploding with the genocide into full scale civil war. Look at the period here in Iraq 2005 into 2008 as a similar transition.

Best
Tom

[William F. Owen]

Maybe we should be asking "What does the Taliban offer to these remote towns and villages that the government does not? What is their appeal to the people?"

I doubt it is the Taliban’s liberal mindset or their equal rights for women. I also believe that, if the remote villages were so inclined, they could remove the Taliban themselves or at least would accept and support our efforts to rid the Taliban from A'Stan.

There's a lot to what you say. I have never believed that "insurgents" need popular support. They just need the means to coerce the population into giving them what they want. Popular support being a requisite insurgencies is a "New-COIN" fallacy.

I don't think traditional COIN doctrine will work here because it assumes the people are the center of gravity.

In a democracy, you'd be right, but what is traditional COIN doctrine? I think it's worth bearing in mind that the idea of traditional "COIN Doctrine" is very open to debate.

Bear in mind, that the UK traditionally never had a "COIN Doctrine". (nor should we be writing one!) It had separate operational doctrines for each Campaign, built on a coherent understanding of "irregular warfare" or "Small Wars."

[MikeF]

It really is a question of scale and degree as well as who is defining what is happening. And you are correct in stating the demarcation between the two is a best fuzzy. The Rwandan Civil War started as an open invasion then regressed to insurgency before exploding with the genocide into full scale civil war. Look at the period here in Iraq 2005 into 2008 as a similar transition.

Thanks Tom. Scope seems to be the appropriate measurement. I've spent some time recently trying to get smart on the various African small wars, but they seem to blend together in my mind b/c I've never visited that continent.

From that perspective, Wilf maybe correct. Another interesting look at both Iraq and Afghanistan is the internal fights between ethnicities. These states are not homogenous nations. In Afghan, Karzai, Abdullah Abdullah, and Mullah Omar represent 3 distinct groups. In Iraq, the Kurds, ####tes, and Sunnis are still competing. Sometimes, I wonder if our desire to force the democratic nation-state system in leau of other forms of government on developing areas tends to worsen the situation.

This week, I'm trying to get smart on a rather obscure and understudied topic- "Formerly Dominant Minorities." E.G.- Sunnis in Iraq, Tutus in Africa, Whites in South Africa, Jews worldwide. Dr. Barbara Harff conducted an empirical study that showed when FDM's lose power, there is a high propensity towards genocide as the larger repressed groups seek payback. That seems to match what I observed in Iraq circa 2006-2007 to some degree.

"

I am close to forming the opinion that once you get past "COIN Skills erode war fighting capability," it may well be more relevant to say "POP-COIN erodes irregular warfare skills."

Wilf, you may be close to the truth on that one.

For those that are looking for current statistics on Afghanistan (literacy rate, employment rate, etc.), I'd recommend the CIA World Factbook although it didn't mention any statistics on drug use.

v/r

Mike

[William F. Owen]

This week, I'm trying to get smart on a rather obscure and understudied topic- "Formerly Dominant Minorities." E.G.- Sunnis in Iraq, Tutus in Africa, Whites in South Africa, Jews worldwide.

Jews a formerly dominant minority world wide? When? On which planet?

[MikeF]

Maybe we should be asking "What does the Taliban offer to these remote towns and villages that the government does not? What is their appeal to the people?"

I doubt it is the Taliban’s liberal mindset or their equal rights for women. I also believe that, if the remote villages were so inclined, they could remove the Taliban themselves or at least would accept and support our efforts to rid the Taliban from A'Stan.

Fear trumps popularity. Moreover, religion, customs, and social norms trump external intervention creating a rather wicked problem. I think that we can destroy/neutralize the Taliban military capacity if we want to make that investment; however, trying to change the mindset and bring them into modernity will take many generations. Education is probably the deciding factor.

v/r

Mike

[MikeF]

Jews a formerly dominant minority world wide? When? On which planet?

Sorry, I mistated that. Dominate in economic terms. Her paper is entitled, "No lessons learned from the Holocaust, Accessing risks of genocide and mass murder since 1955."

v/r

Mike

[Rex Brynen]

That seems to match what I observed in Iraq circa 2006-2007 to some degree.

Although what is interesting about Iraq is the extent to which there wasn't large-scale Shi'ite violence directed against Sunnis until after the February 2006 al-Askari Mosque bombing. Indeed, through 2003-2006 both Kurdish and Shiite orientations towards the Sunni minority were remarkably restrained, despite both past history and ongoing AQI violence against Shi'ites in particular.

[Surferbeetle]

Although what is interesting about Iraq is the extent to which there wasn't large-scale Shi'ite violence directed against Sunnis until after the February 2006 al-Askari Mosque bombing. Indeed, through 2003-2006 both Kurdish and Shiite orientations towards the Sunni minority were remarkably restrained, despite both past history and ongoing AQI violence against Shi'ites in particular.

In Mosul during 03-04 there was intermarriage between Arab (Sunni & Shia) & Kurd (Sunni & Shia) and Arab & Assyrian Christian, no observations on Yazidi, all groups worked more or less together...although I did see some evidence of ethnic & religious grouping in the economic arena/prestige professions...

[Pol-Mil FSO]

Providing a tardy response to some of the previous posts as I can only access this blog after work:

-- I would define an effective police force as one that has some investigative capacity to solve major crimes and also attempts to protect rather than prey on the local population

-- the figure of 50 percent drug addiction among the ANP is a conservative estimate from a Royal Canadian Mounted Police trainer in Kandahar Province in 2008.

-- the International Community has been strongly opposed to the idea of tribal militia/civil defense because of bad decisions made in the 2001-2003 time frame (about arming warlords) and because the last attempt at forming Auxiliary Afghan National Police cadres in 2007 was a failure. The idea has again been resurrected in the pilot Afghan Public Protection Program in a couple of provinces. The Afghan Government in Kabul has also been ambivalent about the idea since it conflicts with the centralization perspective of Kabul. I can't recall any open source documents that closely examine this issue since the conventional wisdom is that security needs are best addressed by training more conventional/official GIRoA military and police units.

-- Another issue that doesn't get much media attention is the Taliban's shadow government structure in some regions that allows the Taliban to provide better justice services than the government. In reality, the population probably prefers informal tribal-based reconciliation but in many areas this has broken down or been overwhelmed by Taliban justice. In contrast, the government's Western-style justice system is non-existent except in major population centers and is corrupt, tardy, and ineffective.

[Schmedlap]

What's the difference between civil-war and insurgency? I've never found a good answer on that besides that is a matter of opinion between different actors.

I would think that an insurgency is a fight primarily directed at removing the government, whereas a civil war is a fight for the purpose of one group obtaining power. There can probably be significant overlap. The Sunni-Shia communal civil war in 2006/2007 was a civil war, rather than an insurgency, because it was two groups fighting each other for a position of strength, largely out of fear and anger. I don't think either group was all that concerned about what form the government took. They just wanted to establish homogenous areas in order to feel safe. The violence preceding it, though it had ethnic/sectarian overtones, was geared more towards preventing the establishment of the new gov't, rather than slaughtering "them" - thus, insurgency.

As always when talking beyond my level of expertise... be advised that I have no particular expertise on this topic.

In Mosul during 03-04 there was intermarriage between Arab (Sunni & Shia) & Kurd (Sunni & Shia) and Arab & Assyrian Christian, no observations on Yazidi...

It may be on YouTube by now (not that it is something one should watch), but in 2007 there was a cellphone video being spread around the internet of a Yizedi woman being stoned to death because she converted to Islam in order to marry her Muslim husband (or it might have been vice versa - a Kurdish Muslim woman being stoned to death for converting to marry a Yizedi husband - I forget).

[Surferbeetle]

Maybe we should be asking "What does the Taliban offer to these remote towns and villages that the government does not? What is their appeal to the people?"

I doubt it is the Taliban’s liberal mindset or their equal rights for women. I also believe that, if the remote villages were so inclined, they could remove the Taliban themselves or at least would accept and support our efforts to rid the Taliban from A'Stan.

I don't think traditional COIN doctrine will work here because it assumes the people are the center of gravity. I saw the people in the remote regions I travelled to as pragmatic. They did not care about governments. They cared about living from day to day. And a new building or a well does not impress them. A road might. But in the end, life will be the same miserable existence it was yesterday no matter who is in charge.

I am going to way oversimplify, but... life in remote A'Stan is harsh. The Taliban are harsh. Kind of reminds me of the Amish and the strict rules they live by (with the difference being that the Amish do it by choice). The Taliban mindset is more closely aligned with the mindset of the people - thier answers make sense.

Another way to vote...

From the WSJ by YAROSLAV TROFIMOV Warlord's Switch to Taliban Shows Rising Afghan Threat

HERAT, Afghanistan -- Ghulam Yahya, a former mayor of this ancient city along the Silk Road, battled the Taliban for years and worked hand in hand with Western officials to rebuild the country's industrial hub.

Now, Mr. Yahya is firing rockets at the Herat airport and nearby coalition military headquarters. He has kidnapped soldiers and foreign contractors, claimed the downing of an Afghan army helicopter and planted bombs in central Herat -- including one that killed a district police chief and more than a dozen bystanders last month.

Mr. Yahya's stranglehold over the outskirts of Herat has destabilized a former oasis of calm and relative prosperity. "The security situation here is critical," said Herat's current mayor, Mohammed Salim Taraki.

Unlike Mr. Khan, the water and power minister, Mr. Yahya failed to secure another government job. He retreated to his ancestral stronghold in the Gozara district, a densely populated expanse of mudbrick villages that straddles the road between Herat's airport and the city itself. There, he quietly built up a militia that now numbers hundreds of men. "He was forced to go and take up arms," said Mr. Khan, who said he still maintains contacts with his former protégé.

According to area residents, Mr. Yahya hasn't enforced in Gozara the kind of harsh Islamic restrictions that are implemented by the Pashtun Taliban elsewhere in the country: Girls' schools remain open and youths in the villages are allowed to listen to music and watch television and pirated DVDs. But, like the Taliban -- whose ascent in the 1990s was welcomed by many Afghans tired of lawlessness -- Mr. Yahya has been ruthless in cracking down on crime.

"People love him. He has punished all the thieves: now, not a single thief is left in our area," said shepherd Saif ud-Din as he tends his flock of sheep near the airport road in Gozara. "The only people who fear Ghulam Yahya are the criminals," adds local flower grower Noor Ahmad.

It is hard to find anyone in Gozara -- and even in Herat -- willing to openly criticize Mr. Yahya. The insurgent levies taxes on peasants, and forbids them from paying land rent to the government or absentee landlords. Local youths are conscripted into his force. Some people who disparage Mr. Yahya in public have turned up dead. "Everyone is afraid of him. No one can speak out," said Mr. Taraki, the city's mayor.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Bear in mind, that the UK traditionally never had a "COIN Doctrine". (nor should we be writing one!)

I admit my mistake. As an American I am a relative newcomer to the game. Perhaps Neo-Traditional COIN doctrine would be better.

Another way to vote...

From the WSJ by YAROSLAV TROFIMOV Warlord's Switch to Taliban Shows Rising Afghan Threat

I realized after I read it that my second and third paragraphs contradicted themselves to a point. What I think I really wanted to say is that using western ideals as the metric of success in a society where the mindset is still quasi-medieval is probably the wrong way to go. Elections aren’t going to magically create legitimacy. Providing for the needs of the people in a way the people understand and at a level they really want (and is sustainable), even where that need seems barbaric, may be what is required to win over the population.


Problem is that politically, that is unpalatable.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Maybe what we need is a combination of new and old. Something we can get the home front involved in.

I was thinking maybe a "Night Letter Writing" Campaign. People back home could write letters about how great democracy is and we could translate them and surreptitiously put them on people’s doors along with a thinly veiled threat.

Might work