Afghanistan and U.S. Interests: Kotkin vs Nagl

[kotkinjs1]

"For both the lesson is the tool that is available gets used -- whether it's a good idea or not. The solution to that is to add to the tool box. Power saws are great but sometimes you need a Scalpel..."

I think the true lesson learned is that sometimes the US doesn't need to be the only surgeon operating, even if we have the sharpest of scalpels. ;o) Beyond that, maybe the surgeon is mistakenly operating with the left hand if he is in fact right handed (mucking it up by using the DoD when the true solution lies with the other aspects of national power mainly wielded through the Interagency).

Ultimately, to run with that analogy, we enlisted a bunch of Physician's Assistants to help us out in the initial and ongoing triage (the CT effort using NATO in OEF), but maybe the time for triage is long past over and what we really need are other doctors, not just PAs, who have vested and similar interests with the patient; doctors with names like Dr. Russia, Dr. China, Dr. Iran.

[William F. Owen]

Just because a situation doesn't threaten our 'vital' national interests doesn't mean we should ignore it; just the opposite. National interests are still critical to promote (and that's they key word....versus 'enforce' or 'coerce by force') and there are instruments of national power and (thanks to 'Bob's World' for explaining this theory to me) concepts of full-spectrum deterrence to achieve them. Not only invasion, occupation, and nation-building through military intervention.

So help me understand the how to judge "Vital" national interest, versus an interests it is "critical to promote." The UK and NATO clearly does not believe it to be "critical", because they are not even trying to resource the war based on that premise.

I personally am very comfortable in a world with failed states, providing their continued failure is irrelevant to the foreign policy concerned.
It is an absolute fallacy to suggest that failed states are a threat to US National interests, based purely on the fact they are failed states.
Some maybe, but as I keep saying 911 could have been planned in Canada, by French students, protesting climate change. There is also not useful definition of failed and it is all highly context specific to the policy concerned.

Terrorism, using criminal means does not require safe havens (ask the Basques or the IRA). Irregular Forces however do. To say that a presence in A'Stan is required to prevent another 911 is an article of faith with no evidence to support it.

However, I absolutely agree that quitting A'Stan would be a de-facto US defeat, (same as Vietnam.) - so do not it. However, until a simple clearly stated unambiguous policy can be presented, I think there will continue to be a alarming level of strategic dissonance.

[Ken White]

I think the true lesson learned is that sometimes the US doesn't need to be the only surgeon operating, even if we have the sharpest of scalpels. ;o)

Ah, but do we have the sharpest of scalpels? Perhaps? Are they all in the right place, available to be be used? Do we have enough of them?

Can we deliver the covertly? Not totally because we purposely neglected development of that capability so that we could not deliver them; that way no one would get cut or contaminated with body fluids by accident. Do we have the political will to use those scalpels? That's the question that needs answering, that and delivery capability (which we've only known we needed since 1951; reinforced in 1980...).

Do we also have in addition to scalpels and the Sledgehammers, a few other intermediate tools (and the will to accept casualties and potential prisoners / hostages made of those all those tools and their wielders...)

Beyond that, maybe the surgeon is mistakenly operating with the left hand if he is in fact right handed (mucking it up by using the DoD when the true solution lies with the other aspects of national power mainly wielded through the Interagency).

I very much agree -- so did many on this thread: LINK and it's cropped up several times in other threads here -- most agree with you. As I said, ambidextrousness is nice -- but even better is one who is highly skilled using the correct hand for the job.

Ultimately, to run with that analogy, we enlisted a bunch of Physician's Assistants to help us out in the initial and ongoing triage (the CT effort using NATO in OEF), but maybe the time for triage is long past over...

Too early to tell, patient not yet stabilized.

and what we really need are other doctors, not just PAs, who have vested and similar interests with the patient; doctors with names like Dr. Russia, Dr. China, Dr. Iran.

Mmmm. Perhaps, though it might be a very good idea to insure that our assisting surgeons do not have a whopping life insurance policy on the patients.

A missed sponge -- or more difficult to spot, a simple moldy pea -- sewed in can cause sepsis. Surgeons tend to use only people they know and trust on their teams for a good reason; some people just will not play fair and a good many people in this world love nothing better than to see the big guy lose one. Though they of course would never be so crass as to say that...

Being ambidextrous is highly beneficial. Having a variety of tools is highly beneficial. Or, how about avoiding any surgery with better preventive care and treatment; paying $2K a year for prescriptions beats paying than $50K for a surgery with a 60-70+ % historical loss rate; that would be even more beneficial.

Using understudies who resent being understudies and roundly object to even the thought is not so beneficial...

As I said earlier, be careful what you ask for, you may get it.

[jmm99]

What did we (US) "break" in Astan that we (US) have an obligation[*] to "fix" ? You can make that argument (rightly or wrongly) about Iraq. I don't see it in Astan. Enlightenment please.

---------------------
[*] By obligation, I mean a moral or ethical obligation. I don't know of any substantial legal obligations that could not be satisfied by a few billion here or there.

[kotkinjs1]

Mr. Owen: Sir- I think we agree on each of the points you made. To clarify though, I think a vital interest is one that, in reality, we cannot 'choose' not to react to; one that demands a response and more often than not, that response will be martial in flavor because of the threat involved. The punitive nature of early OEF was a vital national interest as was the destruction of the Wehrmacht in WWII ("You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other Allied Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her Armed Forces.")

National interests are 'critical' (maybe important would have been a better word) to promote because through espousing our principles, we can (if we so choose) advance an economic, diplomatic, development, and trade plan with other countries because when our interests can be aligned with other nations, we can both benefit. If I can promote a free press, open markets, and the rule of law with Country X, I will have a better chance to form a lasting relationship with it to access their markets and yield other beneficial exchanges. This is an interest that my country will not be threatened from if I choose not to pursue it.

Back to your post, I too, agree that the notion of failed states in and of themselves do not fall into the former category. In fact, they can be left alone, or if we as a nation decide, can be engaged through instruments of national power to address. But that's just it - its a choice we can choose to make because the failed state of Somalia presents just as much as the ungoverned area of the Australian outback which presents just as much threat as the quasi-state of Afghanistan. Which is to say none to our vital interests. Poor governance, which is the progenitor of insurgencies that could, at some point, pose a threat to us or our overseas interests. This is what we can choose - or not - to address through the synchronized interagency. If directed, the DoD can play a supporting role in that mission or, as in (early) OEF, we can be used what militaries are best used for - to compel an enemy to do our will. Anything beyond that and its forcing democracy at the barrel of a gun.

[Ken White]

What did we (US) "break" in Astan that we (US) have an obligation[*] to "fix" ? You can make that argument (rightly or wrongly) about Iraq. I don't see it in Astan. Enlightenment please...[*] By obligation, I mean a moral or ethical obligation. I don't know of any substantial legal obligations that could not be satisfied by a few billion here or there.

In my view - jaundiced as it may be -- we have no legal obligation that would call for dispensing a few billion though we certainly have done that.

Recall I have long said we should've gone to Afghanistan, clobbered the Talibs and AQ to the max extent possible (which we could have done to a far greater extent than we actually did) and left. We did not do that. Instead, for reasons that are not clear, we decided to stay.

Bush (George W. President of the US, arbiter of US foreign affairs, etc.) said in early 2002 that we would stay and help (LINK). He reaffirmed that in 2004 (LINK) and again in 2008 (LINK). President Obama has also chimed in (LINK)Thus, IMO -- and I'll bet big money, in the eyes of over half the 250M Muslims in this world among others, we have a moral obligation to do what we can to improve the capability of Afghanistan to stand on its own. Aside from the military commitment, more billions may well be disbursed...

Whether we should have said we would stay or not, we did, thus even though I sure don't think that should've been said, it was -- and we're stuck...

[jmm99]

as to the agree:

from Ken
Recall I have long said we should've gone to Afghanistan, clobbered the Talibs and AQ to the max extent possible (which we could have done to a far greater extent than we actually did) and left. We did not do that. Instead, for reasons that are not clear, we decided to stay.

and thanks for updating the links re: presidential statements (which I am very aware of because you pointed them out to me some months ago).

Those statements express future hopes. We have reached the point where any rational person (IMO) would have to conclude that those hopes are delusional.

We supported Astan for about 10 years in the 80s, helping them expel the Soviets by assisting them in waging unconventional warfare. We then properly enough left them alone to establish their own governance. Their efforts did not turn out well - so, by 2001, there was no recognizable government in Astan (merely two warring groups).

We then engaged in another episode of unconventional warfare in support of the Northern Alliance. That actually went fairly well, considering that it was done in rapid planning mode, since no contingency plan for Astan was in place before 9/11.

The international community then set up a governance plan for Astan as reflected in the Bonn Agreement. We and many other states and organizations have been supporting that plan since Dec 2001. We are now into year 8, with progress on the governance front showing no substantial improvement over what existed in 2002. We cannot conduct the political stuggle for the Astans, or for anyone else - despite the soaring rhetoric of our presidents.

Where this thing is busted is at the political struggle (good governance) level. Militarily, we can stay there as long as we want - but, as Jim Gavin said long ago to Dave Petraeus, there is no such thing as a low-cost "limited war".

I think it would be healthy if the US would simply admit that the Bush-Obama rhetoric has been unsound and not practical of fulfillment. However, governments are loath to admit their mistakes. So, I agree with you that what we are probably looking at is 2-5 years of continued engagement in Astan, probably at higher force levels than we have now. That would be the "good case" scenario.

As to the 1 billion+ Muslims, our presence in large footprint size in a Muslim country is by orders of magnitude more a negative factor than walking away from delusional rhetoric.

My take.

PS: Camelot never lived; but it also has never died - what a wonderful country is Camelot; and what a hellish real world its rhetoric creates.

[omarali50]

More cross posting: IF the its somehow important NOT to have the region go up in smoke, then the US either has to "win the war" OR, so skillfully manage a withdrawal that they do not leave chaos behind. Most of the withdrawal options being discussed do not seem to assure the second. Most of the people wanting to win do not seem to have a convincing plan for the first. There is no easy way out any more and no easy way to win. Whatever option is chosen, success will be hard. In the end, it comes down to whether the United States is capable of carrying off ANY option well or not? If not, then a badly managed withdrawal or a badly managed "slog on for now" will both lead to reinvigoration of the jihadi project. BUT, the first victims of that reinvigorated project will be the other infidels in the region and those in Afghanistan and Pakistan who became too close to the infidels. So maybe the US should say F-you and leave? Let the locals sort it out. Which then brings us to whether the US should care what happens after it leaves? Is the US the policeman of the world? Leftists would say NO (they would also say that things will get better with the US out of the way, but that may or may not be the case). What is the correct answer to that question?Comments?

[slapout9]

- but, as Jim Gavin said long ago to Dave Petraeus, there is no such thing as a low-cost "limited war".

jmm99, is this the real Jim Gavin or somebody else?

[Surferbeetle]

IF its somehow important NOT to have the region go up in smoke, then the US either has to "win the war" OR, so skillfully manage a withdrawal that they do not leave chaos behind. Most of the withdrawal options being discussed do not seem to assure the second. Most of the people wanting to win do not seem to have a convincing plan for the first. There is no easy way out any more and no easy way to win. Whatever option is chosen, success will be hard. In the end, it comes down to whether the United States is capable of carrying off ANY option well or not?

...and we are wasting time searching for that magic silver bullet.

Omarali50,

The question in my mind is more along the lines of how the project be done, what are the project costs, what is the project schedule, and what should the realistic expectations be for the project deliverables.

In short, from this armchair, it appears to be gut check time...to be quickly followed by the issuance of appropriate marching orders.

Along those lines, there is a recent link to a Marine CAP Paper floating around on SWJ somewhere, which provides some interesting backgound on that particular concept (Dr. Holt helpfully provides references on the Marine CAP concept as well). My experiences lead me to believe that Dr. Holt's thought piece Afghan Village Militia: A People-Centric Strategy to Win has merit, and is worth considering...American patience and political cycles may not be compatible however...what are your thoughts?

[jmm99]

"Rightists" were saying that the the US should not be the policeman of the world, well before "leftists" - e.g., that rabid leftist Bob Taft in regard to our Korean "police action".

Since the New World Order is now into its sixth presidential election cycle - and is endorsed by both parties, the left-right distinction (in regard to the US and its "world policeman" role) has become meaningless.

Policies are more shaped by whether one believes that the Indian Ocean is a US lake. If so, US presence in Astan is very meaningful. If not (my view), continued US presence in Astan (in a large footprint mode) is not very meaningful - and could in fact be negative.

[jmm99]

in GEN Petraeus' 1987 dissertation - snip is on my home computer - somewhere in pp.50-100 in a footnote to Gavin's 1950's book introducing the concept of limited war. His later (in the 1980s) statement is the last sentence in the footnote.

[slapout9]

in GEN Petraeus' 1987 dissertation - snip is on my home computer - somewhere in pp.50-100 in a footnote to Gavin's 1950's book introducing the concept of limited war. His later (in the 1980s) statement is the last sentence in the footnote.

Thanks for the response.1950's book was War and Peace In The Space Age. Good to know General Petraeus reads the right books. Now if he just gets our Missiles back for the Air Force everything will be OK.

[jmm99]

from the 1987 Petraeus Dissertation, as well as two others stating the views of Gavin and MacArthur with respect to engaging in a ground war in a land-locked Asian country (in that case, Laos).

As a general note, please do not confuse those of the "Never Again, but School" (including JMM) with pacifists, isolationists and absolute non-interventionists.

[Ken White]

and thanks for updating the links re: presidential statements (which I am very aware of because you pointed them out to me some months ago).

I recalled that and since neither of us old dudes is totally addled, suspected you were up to some Lawyerly exercise (not chicanery, never that...) so I gave you one before and Obama after the two I had given earlier. Always issue a surfeit of rope.

Those statements express future hopes. We have reached the point where any rational person (IMO) would have to conclude that those hopes are delusional.

Umm, Obama maybe but I doubt even that; Bush? Not hope -- what suited his political purpose at the time. Either way, I'm pretty sure most opinion today is with you -- delusional -- but I don't think that's the case, it was almost certainly cold blooded political expediency. Took some heat off Iraq and, more importantly, to W., tied his successors hands and forced that successor (and probably his successor as well) to follow through on what Bush had done because he was concerned that his successor might not do what Bush did -- correctly, in my view (though it could've been more efficiently and effectively done...). (Syntax degarbler available on request).

I think it would be healthy if the US would simply admit that the Bush-Obama rhetoric has been unsound and not practical of fulfillment.

I don't think that would be at all wise, not least for the reason you cite:

However, governments are loath to admit their mistakes. So, I agree with you that what we are probably looking at is 2-5 years of continued engagement in Astan, probably at higher force levels than we have now. That would be the "good case" scenario.

I see no benefit in more troops, rather some downside. What should happen is the Administration publicly announcing their goals (hopefully realistic and not the CNAS / Kilcullen variant) as of this latest Commander's Assessment update and we should set about trying to get there as efficiently as possible. Note efficiency and not effectiveness...

As to the 1 billion+ Muslims, our presence in large footprint size in a Muslim country is by orders of magnitude more a negative factor than walking away from delusional rhetoric.

I didn't go for the whole Billion, only those in the areas affected (not including India who is only partly affected; they, the Indonesians and Malays, the Turks, most of the Maghreb and Muslim Africa don't really care other than as an item for rhetorical support and the odd Fighter here and there...). I don't think so. It is negative for many but it's an annoying negative and little more. Walking away from it, OTOH will just feed a new propaganda frenzy which in turn will draw more recruits -- the current crop of recruits are easily dissuaded because so many die; given 'peace', no working war, then recruiting people to do dumb things gains. Symbology, pride and such are more important to the Arab and the Afghan than they are to westerners. There is also a major double standard problem -- they don't have to do what they said and they can lie to you because you are not Muslim but you cannot return the favor because your code says you should not therefor if you do, you are doubly wrong and they'll scream it to the world. Proving yet again western perfidy to people who epitomize Huntington's quote:

"The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion (to which few members of other civilizations were converted) but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do."

They do not forget it, nor for a minute -- and they look for weaknesses in our application of violence to exploit. That includes the strategy(ies), operational techniques and TTP as well as political actions...

Creighton Abrams once said that "Generals should be noted for their silences." True. More importantly, so should Politicians. Because if the President says it in this celebrity rock star era, it becomes a commitment, not just a delusional (at worst) or political (at best? at worser?) statement which is all it really was. Not my idea, the media construct, I believe. Really stupid whoever's idea it is..

[jmm99]

Dr Holt's suggestion:

(p.2)
I propose a synthesis drawing on several COIN models: 1. the classic Thompson/Briggs [Nagl, 2002: 28-29; 70-71] politics first/the population is the center of gravity approach; 2. the village militia of the Marine Corps Combined Action Program/Platoons in Vietnam, 3. culture as a key “force-multiplier, 4. basic lessons learned from the Philippine Insurrection to the Present as noted in FM 3-24, 5. the “inkspot approach” of Galula and others, and 6. the need for a unified military and civilian structure similar to CORDS [Civil Operations and Rural Development Support] system that included 7000 advisors by 1969.

would be fine - if it were a 99% Astani effort and grew out of the villages themselves. The major problem in Astan is political, not military.

The Marine CAP program, and the majority of the CORDS programs, were good concepts - keeping in mind that CAP was a pilot program[*]. CORDS, as part of the larger South Vietnamese Pacification program (which included SVN CAP units as an integral part), has a greater number of "lessons learned".

If I were a political officer indigenous to a country plagued by an insurgency, I would adopt both as the central focus of my "COIN" effort - and find a military officer who agreed with me.

I suspect that events will gallop by before anything like Dr Holt's suggestions could be implemented. E.g, the SVN Pacification program (in various iterations) had a bit more than 15 years of historical development.

[*] We have to guard against the tendency to assume that, if a program works in 10 places (actually about 100 places in CAP's case), it will work in 10,000 places - must be at least that many villes and hamlets in Astan.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

no "syntax degarbler" needed - I fully understand your thesis; but have a different take on the risk assessment of a policy reversal. Because of the domestic politics involved, my thesis (risky or not) is not likely to be implemented. That's happened before without causing me to jump overboard.

I thought the last chapter (Chap 5) of Kilcullen's book (TAG) is interesting, with its sectional sub-heading "Counterinsurgency: Possible, Not Recommended" (p.264) and "Mission Sets" (pp. 288-289) - the two missions being "strategic disruption" and "military assistence". I've no argument with either of those as stated (especially as the latter emphasizes the political element).

I also thought it interesting that Kilcullen says (p.269) that: "My personal position on coiunterinsurgency, and on Iraq and Afghanistan in particular, could therefore be summarized as "Never again, but ...." So, it seems he is still very much on the boat but shifting seats (closer to mine ).

Cheers (temp ca. 65, sunshine, no bugs)

Mike

[Surferbeetle]

Dr Holt's suggestion:

would be fine - if it were a 99% Astani effort and grew out of the villages themselves. The major problem in Astan is political, not military.

The Marine CAP program, and the majority of the CORDS programs, were good concepts - keeping in mind that CAP was a pilot program[*]. CORDS, as part of the larger South Vietnamese Pacification program (which included SVN CAP units as an integral part), has a greater number of "lessons learned".

If I were a political officer indigenous to a country plagued by an insurgency, I would adopt both as the central focus of my "COIN" effort - and find a military officer who agreed with me.

I suspect that events will gallop by before anything like Dr Holt's suggestions could be implemented. E.g, the SVN Pacification program (in various iterations) had a bit more than 15 years of historical development.

[*] We have to guard against the tendency to assume that, if a program works in 10 places (actually about 100 places in CAP's case), it will work in 10,000 places - must be at least that many villes and hamlets in Astan.

Regards

Mike

Mike,

Not too many differences in the grand scheme of things...however...

My qualifier would be that politics (in the western sense) may be too strong a word for the demographics that I believe we need to influence (and I have never visited or worked in Afghanistan). I think many (the bulk of the curve) would be more or less happy with three hots, a cot out of the weather, and some security. Studies that I have been plowing through seem to indicate that approximately ~85% are low tech farmers scrabbling to get by...long way of saying I don't believe the participatory Jeffersonian Democracy approach (as we know it) to be a viable one in the short term.

Your point on carefully considering the applicability of the CAP model to Afghanistan is wise.

As I understand CAP and with what I have done in the Army I think that I could not only survive but that I could also be an effective team member with a CAP/CORDS/CA/PRT/HTT lead element embedded in a SF/Advisor style matrix manned by a ISAF/ANA/ANP/Militia effort plus some heavy firepower to pound the stuffing out of anybody who gets stupid.

We would be located in some key places, with no Subway/Pizza Hut/Monster Chow Hall/FOB bull#### anywhere to be seen, and all would be focused on developing some sort of a functional economy & simultaneous security, some GoA capability, getting the neighbors involved in a constructive way, and getting the hell out when it all can move on its own...

I think that the President and Mr. Gates will not keep us in suspense much longer and I suspect they understand better than most what we need to do. I haven't retired yet and will ride it out a bit longer either way...let's just get it done.

Regards,

Steve

[slapout9]

from the 1987 Petraeus Dissertation, as well as two others stating the views of Gavin and MacArthur with respect to engaging in a ground war in a land-locked Asian country (in that case, Laos).

As a general note, please do not confuse those of the "Never Again, but School" (including JMM) with pacifists, isolationists and absolute non-interventionists.

jmm99, thanks for posting that. If you want more find General Gavin's testimony before Congress during the 1966 Fulbright hearings. Short version is we shouldn't do it (Vietnam) but if we do he believed in the Enclave Strategy. This used to be on the internet but for some reason I can no longer find it, it is a most fascinating interview. For you Cavalry guys he has a few comments about how they were using the wrong helicopter...the ch-47 was meant to be the main troop carrier in his original concept of the Air Cavalry (he called Sky Cavalry) Division. Also had some comments on the Kennedy Assassination.

[jmm99]

To Steve ....

My reference to politics as the major problem was not intended to suggest that the problem is that Astans have failed to become "politically Westernized". What I'm talking about are indigenous Astan politics (as I understand them from "book knowledge" - haven't been there either), as they have stood and presently stand.

As to CAPs, we have "Combined Action and US Marine Experiences in Vietnam, 1965-71", by one Phillip J. Ridderhof. So, COL Ridderhof, if you happen to be listening, you should be telling us about the plusses and minuses of the Marine CAP program. His bottom line then:

Disregarding the political aspects of Vietnam, as a military answer to counterinsurgency, Combined Action was effective. Its use for area security could come in handy again. There is a good chance that in future, US forces could again be called on to support a friendly government against an insurgency. Combined Action, properly employed would achieve area security while providing training for the indigenous forces involved. It would have to be clear that the Combined Action units would be there for security only. The establishment of government, law and order would be up to the host government, possibly with US economic assistance. Combined Action will not win a counterinsurgency war, but it would provide civil authorities time and protection to establish themselves. Combined Action, if implemented in the future, is a military concept. Being such it can only help fight, not win in revolutionary warfare.

My argument, BTW, is not that US troops cannot do CAPs - the Marines did it; as also SF in the early CIDGs in the Highlands. Some folks can do it; most probably cannot - the two Vietnam examples involved force selection in both cases. An eventual larger indigenous "Ruff-Puff" and "People's Self Defense Force" effort was the desired end goal, never really achieved.

----------------------
To Slap

We may see something of an Enclave Strategy in Astan before we are through. That would entail a change from the policy of holding all of Astan. In Vietnam, that was politically unacceptable to the South Vietnamese. An Enclave Strategy would fit into Kilcullen's mission sets of strategic disruption and military assistence. I should guess that Karzai would be opposed.

It is interesting that the "Never Again, but Schoolmates" (MacArthur, Ridgway, Shoup, Griffith, Norstad and Gavin) tended to out of the box thinking.

Cheers and regards to all

Mike