That was before McNamara and Earle Wheeler...Originally Posted by jmm99
Yes we might, I have a question for anyone should would focus on the villages or the major cities?
They existed in a time when thinking was not discouraged.
That was before McNamara and Earle Wheeler...
Hey, another Amen ....
at least as to McNamara - I have to pass on Wheeler (insufficient knowledge).from Ken
That was before McNamara and Earle Wheeler...
------------------------
From a civilian and political standpoint, any enclave concept would have to take transportation and communications into account. Setting up enclaves in say a dozen or so of Astan's widely separated cities would simply set up a dozen or so Dien Bien Phus. More logical would be enclaving on the basis of local commerce (such as it is), where the enclaves would be relatively self-sufficient with respect to the indigenous populace - and close enough to be eventually networked.
Someone military can address the military pros and cons of enclaving.
Last edited by jmm99; 09-04-2009 at 04:22 AM.
Surfer, my thoughts are yet to be finalized, but then i have the luxury of being able to stay on the fence (as an observer, though as a citizen I cannot be absolved of all responsibilities). Instead of giving you an amateur operational plan, I will lay out some random thoughts that came to my mind today; maybe they will trigger some insights in more qualified people (and these are really random thoughts, I reserve the right to be more coherent tomorrow):
1. I caught myself thinking "maybe I shouldnt say A or B because the US is probably going to pull out. Can i risk saying this? I will still have a connection with Pakistan and should i really risk trouble and misunderstanding (or correct understanding) among those likely to be holding the long knives after the Americans are gone". Then I thought, AHA! this is why losing afghanistan will be a much bigger disaster than just giving up some of the planet's most inhospitable real estate. If someone like me is having these thoughts, imagine what the average fence sitter in Pakistan and Afghanistan is thinking. This withdrawal talk can snowball...
2. Defeat in Afghanistan (or just the serious prospect of defeat in Afghanistan) will mean that everyone from Iran to Russia to China to India (and of course, Pakistan) has to reassess what they will do the day after. Do I trust them all to do better without the US of A around to muck things up? Will their own relationships with the US remain unchanged in such a scenario? I find myself thinking "hell no"! Maybe I am just a natural born pessimist, but every time i try to play it out in my head, i end with massive disaster.
3. OK, why use the word defeat. What about partial withdrawal, or some other thing in between. Why the apocalyptic talk? But the problem is that I cannot see any obvious scenario which is not a defeat but is still a withdrawal or even a backing off.
4. What about staying and winning? The closest thing I have seen to a plan that looks viable to me is one I saw on abu muqawama (posted by Anan), that involved putting the ANA in the lead and embedding US troops with them instead of the other way around, but the problem with that is that the ANA is not the govt. The govt of astan is karzai and company. Maybe they are ten times more capable than they look in the media, but unless thats almost literally true, we are in deep doo doo. The US army is the most lethal army in human history and very professional, but it cannot seem to find the taliban's leaders or even attack them too proactively. Most of what we read seems to be going out and having THEM attack. Does someone have a cunning plan(and not the kind in "black adder)_?..
3. So what? Disaster there is hardly the same thing as disaster in the continental United States. As a Pakistani-American I may not be able to ignore the prospect of taliban/jihadi takeover, but as an AMERICAN, I dont necessarily have to care? or do I? That question is one of many to which I have no good answer yet. But I am trying out answers. Someday, one will seem to fit.
4. With less American intervention, latin america seems to have become a BETTER place (no paradise, but better). What if the same thing happens in southwest asia? But I am from southwest asia, and unless the CIA has been responsible for much more #### than we ever knew, we are really capable of far too much mayhem without any help from the CIA. What if the CIA leaves and we turn into central africa with better technology? But, can we expect America to spend blood and treasure to save the necks of some (probably ungrateful) westernized liberals in Pakistan and Afghanistan ? Whats in it for America? Superpower status? what if we are NOT a superpower anymore? Sweden and Canada are not superpowers, but their citizens seem pretty happy. They even have national healthcare. What if the US really doesnt remain the sole superpower or even A superpower? who gets hurt? Israel? why should i care? "paleoconservatives" and leftists both think being world policeman is an evil distraction. Could they be right? On the other hand, arent Sweden and Canada just enjoying the fruits of order maintained by the US marines and the long arm of the US armed forces?
as you can see, I have no solution. At least not tonight. Maybe tomorrow....
Some good points here.
This isn't about "victory or defeat" so much as it is about "success or failure."
As Jeremy points out, we've kept moving the bar as to what it is we want to accomplish. The follies of the proposed 'strategy', IMO, are primarily that there is little evidence that massive "effectiveness of governance" campaigns waged by some outside state have ever resolved the conditions of poor governance that gave rise to insurgency within that state.
It is a bold, and expensive experiment that sets the bar for success very high; thereby increasing the odds of failure.
Defeat? Not likely, but then that was never the issue in the first place.
We must decide what success for the US in Afghanistan is, as well as what success for Afghanistan is. They should not be the same thing. Arguably we achieved success back in 2002. But then we moved the bar.
Is there some rule that says we can't move the bar closer instead of constantly moving it farther away? This is another reason why I have trended toward my current position on FID intervention in another nation's insurgency. Narrowly focus your efforts to helping to ID and address those narrow issues of "poor governance" (quite likely to be intangible and able to be largely curred by changes of policy rather than massive infrastructure programs of effectiveness), shaped by the local values rather than our own; and assist with creating conditions perhaps to put those changes of policy into motion. All the time being very careful to not create the perception that this is a US imposed solution, but rather one selected and implemented by that nation (as we must avoid infecting the government with the perception that it draws its legitimacy from us, as this will make its job many times more difficult, and when it fails most of the blame will fall to us, or if we try to prop it up artificially, the insurgents will target us).
As to our issues with AQ? We need neither to fix Afghanistan nor break Pakistan to wage a persistent, enduring, low visibility campaign against that little club of villains (oh yeah, and all you intel types out there: just because you put on an Aerosmith t-shirt and like to play their songs in your basement on your "guitar hero", doesn't make you a member of Aerosmith; similarly all these nationalist insurgencies that either affiliate with the AQ UW operation or even change their name to some form of AQ does not make them members of that band either. They're probably just doing it for the chicks as well). And by addressing our own policies of engagement with the nations of the populaces they draw their support from we will ultimately render them irrelevant. "Defeat" is the wrong verb. It sets the bar higher than it needs to be and lends itself to a family of engagement that produces tremendous negative second and third order effects (see thread on "deterrence of irregular threats"). "neutralize" is all these guys deserve; and it should be a supporting task to the military in a State Department plan for promoting US interests in the current environment; not a primary task in a DOD plan for countering terrorism. Balance and perspective, roles and missions, work smarter not harder.
We can do this. We must do this.
Last edited by Bob's World; 09-04-2009 at 09:54 AM.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
BW,
Good comment!
I think that's a key insight. Sometimes it is possible to do more with less and a maximalist approach can make success less likely, not more. My biggest frustration with the Afghanistan debate is the competing strawman positions that our only two COA's are abandonment or a full-blown pop-centric COIN effort. There is a lot of middle ground between those two extremes - middle ground that should be fully explored.This is another reason why I have trended toward my current position on FID intervention in another nation's insurgency.
Wow, you really don't like intel people. It's a shame you've apparrently had some bad ones along the way.oh yeah, and all you intel types out there: just because you put on an Aerosmith t-shirt and like to play their songs in your basement on your "guitar hero", doesn't make you a member of Aerosmith; similarly all these nationalist insurgencies that either affiliate with the AQ UW operation or even change their name to some form of AQ does not make them members of that band either. They're probably just doing it for the chicks as well
BW has it right
At the war college they teach that strategy...at least effective strategy...ties together and balances the ends, the ways, and the means. But we seem to be unable to do that due to our inability to suppress our appetite for grandiose ends, or to abandon ways of operating that we can't support. The core problem in Afghanistan is that the means required for a politically acceptable end are not themselves politically acceptable. The secondary problem is that our leadership (and the for-profit-punditocracy) seems to think that we can reach an acceptable end with insufficient means if we can only devise clever enough ways to do so. Hence the ongoing rearranging of deck chairs.
Sorry, you can't get there from here.
I think the best we can salvage from the situation is a return to 2002. Place American firepower in the hands of a few selected power-brokers to ensure the Taliban cannot regain power and hope that over a decade or so the Afghans can sort themselves out. I think they can restore the social and political restraints that existed pre-1979 which afforded the country a modicum of stability and prospects for economic growth.
Actually I like intel people tremendously
I just hate the pig-headed "threats R US" approach the community clings to, coupled with its complete disregard to the fact that they are completely clueless about the nature of this type of conflict; and absolutely no instituional motivation to learn or change. Dangerous. They send us pell mell in pursuit of tactical victories with absolute obliviouisness to the strategic risk they put as at.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
I dont think you can go back to 2002 in 2009. Unfortunately, the world moves on. Other people have already adjusted to things that happened in 2002. As far as I can see, this war is more about making Pakistan (and other countries) behave than actually making "afghanistan a better place". My guess is, the naughtier boys in Pakistan and Iran and elsewhere are going to take any return to 2002 as vindication of their strategy (wouldnt you?) and go much further than they ever did in 2002. Just a thought...
Oddly, my experience has been almost the exact opposite--the IC folks that I know consistently stress the variations and difference, and emphasize that not all Islamists (even radical violent ones) or NSAGs are the same. Indeed, it is a matter of some frustration to them that the nuances they spend so much of their time analyzing get rather overlooked when the product leaves the building.
They mostly come at night. Mostly.
- university webpage: McGill University
- conflict simulations webpage: PaxSims
Send some of your boys down our way...
Becuase everytime I review a US intel product I swear it came out of the AQ Ops or Plans shop.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
I think there is something to that, but one should be careful painting with too broad a brush. Intel people do tend to have a "threat" mindset because that is the way we are trained (at least for military intel people), which is something I frequently complain about.
However, Commanders and policymakers have the ability to force change, starting with priority intelligence requirements (PIR's). PIR's, for those who don't know, are like a Commander's intent/guidance for intel. PIR's tell intel people what information a Commander wants in priority order. BW, have you looked at the CENTCOM or even USSOCOM's PIR's recently? It's been a couple of months since I've read them, but I recall they were very threat-centric.
As I pointed out in another thread on this topic, Commanders are in control of what intel they receive. They set the PIR's and the intel people are usually their subordinates. If they want less "threats R US" they have the authority and ability to change that through a variety of means.
One effective method is feedback - one of my biggest complaints about the ops side of the house is a lack of feedback. If what we're providing isn't relevant or useful, then we need to know. Too often there is zero feedback on products or briefings. I've learned through experience that this can be a warning sign, but many intel people interpret the silence as a sign they are adequately performing their job. In short, if your intel folks are overly focused on threats, all you need to do is tell them that they need to focus more on whatever area you want them to focus on. Additionally, make sure your PIR's reflect that.
There are systemic problems as well. Intel support is still setup with the assumption that HHQ will have more information and a better "picture" of what's going on and will push information down. In Afghanistan, Iraq and other irregular conflicts the knowledge gap is often reversed - individual units will know more about their AO than HHQ, so much of the intel that passes down is wrong, irrelevant, or is "well duh" information the local unit already knows. I know this is an issue that's heavily debated in the MI community, but as an AF guy I don't really know where things are headed or what changes, if any, have been made.
Finally, the strategy problems (particularly for Afghanistan) affect intel as well. As you know, the intel requirements for an AQ-focused, limited CT mission are much different than the requirements for a population-centric COIN effort. When our ends ways and means are not clear then intel support is going to suffer because requirements will conflict and collection and analytical resources are limited. So your perception about intel could, I think, reflect a bigger conflict on strategy.
Good comments. We all swallowd the "Intel leads ops" mantra
We must get sound strategy out in front of the problem. And here of course is the rub. Find 10 "experts" on this conflict and get 10 conflicting answers. Add to that our "intel leads ops" approach, and you have what we have.
Are commanders, planners, and ops all innocent? Clearly not, plenty of fame and shame to go around; but as an institution it is the intel community that is the most dogged in its refusal to evolve and focus on the environment over the threats that emerge from that environment. They analyze symptoms rather than causes, and defend that as their right and their duty.
I won't excuse them.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
I think it's pretty accurate.
The problem is that our own rhetoric led us into overreach. I googled the following terms:
Community of Nations 179,000 hits for the past year
World Community 2,770,000 hits for the past year
International Community 8,980,000 hits for the past year
As long as we think in those terms we also think in terms of the rights and responsibilities of membership, among which are human rights and law enforcement. Since no one was doing the latter (especially not the UN), and since it's in the nature of US culture to "fix things," the US obligingly stepped forward.
If we all recognized that the "community" does not in fact exist, and that most people don't want their problems "fixed" for them by outsiders, we'd be much better off.
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
An unruffled person with some useful skills.
Process Problem
Sir, I think it is more of an process problem as Enthropy noted:
Transition from top-down to bottom-up intelligence collection and analysis is a day-to-night adjustment. I observed many analysts that simply edited rather than analyze intel pushed forward. It's kind of like assuming that IW is just the converse of UW so if you are trained at UW then you can easily do IW.There are systemic problems as well. Intel support is still setup with the assumption that HHQ will have more information and a better "picture" of what's going on and will push information down. In Afghanistan, Iraq and other irregular conflicts the knowledge gap is often reversed - individual units will know more about their AO than HHQ, so much of the intel that passes down is wrong, irrelevant, or is "well duh" information the local unit already knows. I know this is an issue that's heavily debated in the MI community, but as an AF guy I don't really know where things are headed or what changes, if any, have been made.
The best analysts that I observed passed intelligence horizontally AND vertically to the appropriate stakeholders. The best product I received from higher during my last deployment in Diyala Province was passed down from division. A heads up marine intel dude in Anbar received reports of AQ trafficking/smuggling from a sheik in diyala. I was able to consolidate his reports and add them to my own in order to arrest that sheik and keep him in jail.
My belief is that as more intel guys do deployments on the line and more combat experienced combined arms guys transition to intel, it'll sort itself out although egos and ricebowls will always hamper mission success.
v/r
Mike
Last edited by MikeF; 09-04-2009 at 04:33 PM. Reason: spelling
My fun time in the ME, eating Shishlik and drinking locally
distilled if illegal Vodka with a number of locals in the wee hours of the night in several nations leads me to believe you have got it exactly right.
I agree with Bob's World and Eden on many things but one thing you cannot do is put the cards back in the box and call them new...
SBW- Jackpot except not only is there no community....I don't think is an A'stan except in some politicians mind. Even higher ups are waking upto this with the term Af-Pak but it is a lot worse than that. I think there are a 100 little A'stans inside a man drawn map of what he "thinks" A'stan is or should be....which has nothing to do with the reality of the situation.
Point 2 as the SWC SME on Music anybody that listens to Aerosmith has no business in Intell. Would you believe anything from a guy that listens to "Dude Looks Like A lady"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1qRTu5I2loY
Hey, that might not be so bad when there are MAM's with guns running around in Burkas.Would you believe anything from a guy that listens to "Dude Looks Like A lady"
Funny, I was just going to say that the first 45 seconds or so of that song sounded remarkably like the rhetoric of an ex-VP and Sect'y of Defense you guys used to haveHey, that might not be so bad when there are MAM's with guns running around in Burkas.!!!!
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
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