Two frontline reports

[MikeF]

I didn't expand enough on my initial comment/question. Schmedlap offers a great short-term solution, but I was looking long-range.

If operations and intelligence should be considered equal, then the battalion commander should have an S2 and S3 of equal rank. I guess I was envisioning it from this angle- a battalion commander with 2-3 tours in Iraq/Afghan has a junior captain as his S2. Is he really going to listen to the analysis or is the BN XO going to be hamstrung trying to fill the gap?

Moreover, the enlisted MI dudes would get to experience intelligence collection on the lowest levels. As they rise in rank, they would have a better understanding of the data flow v/s the realities on the ground.

If we actually considered this, I don't think it would be as big a burden personnel wise as initially thought considering the massive intel staffs on the highest levels. In 2005, I counted 200 personnel working in the MNC-I G2 staff.

I think the prospect could be win-win for both communities.

v/r

Mike

[Kiwigrunt]

... He can format it for immediate consumption by the 2 shop. Contrast that with having all of your 2 shop minions within your reach, but they're spending lots of their time collecting intel from the companies that is light on details, often sloppily put together, and they spend half of their time just rewriting it into a usable form. And, because much of it was not obtained via a proper debrief, it is usually much lighter on details.

Some very good points there Schmedlap. I’d be inclined to agree. Your suggestions seem to make it a lot easier for everyone to be singing from the same sheet.

In Timor I and some others were attached to Batalion S2 ‘information cell’. (We were not Intel trained at all but they didn’t know what else to do with us…..but that’s a whoooole different story.) We did indeed spend most of our time ‘translating’ info into our database. That included transforming a few ‘self designed’ Coy-databases into our own. Lots of vaguely overlapping procedure and timewasting with many people not really knowing where they fit in best.
I hope following rotations managed to streamline things a lot better….not sure.

[Schmedlap]

I didn't expand enough on my initial comment/question. Schmedlap offers a great short-term solution, but I was looking long-range.

Actually, I thought it would make for a great long-term solution, as well. Does it seem inadequate for a long-term plan because it is so simple?

If operations and intelligence should be considered equal, then the battalion commander should have an S2 and S3 of equal rank. I guess I was envisioning it from this angle- a battalion commander with 2-3 tours in Iraq/Afghan has a junior captain as his S2. Is he really going to listen to the analysis or is the BN XO going to be hamstrung trying to fill the gap?

I think ops and intel should be considered different. Also, I have not encountered any commanders - good or bad - who equate rank with competence, credibility, or any other attribute (at least beyond 2LTs). Is he really going to listen to the analysis? Why wouldn't he? The credibility of every S-2 that I've seen, in the eyes of his commander, has been based directly upon how well he did his job. So, yes, the commander will listen to the analysis. Maybe our experience differs, but not all of my Bn XOs were always up to speed on current intel or ops. They were usually up their eyeballs in admin/maint/other issues.

The rest of your comments make sense to me (though I'm not an MI guy), but I wonder if you're addressing problems that don't actually exist. Is the knowledge gap really significant for the S-2 shop in regard to company level ops?

[IntelTrooper]

I'm not sure that there is a problem with battalions hoarding intel assets, at least not from what I've seen. Currently, in Afghanistan, HCTs are distributed geographically, not organizationally. Things may be changing but with the relatively few HCTs available, our AOs encompassed two to three companies, but we were not necessarily stuck with the BN HQ.

Just by way of quick explanation, each BDE has an OMT/J2X which coordinates HUMINT collection activities. Therefore, HCTs are not directly subordinate to BNs, although they are assigned to and work for a BN. I think this is how it should be. I highly resist collection assets being placed "under" someone at the company level. Collection needs to be highly autonomous and not subject to the whims of young captains or upper enlisted who are not familiar with the requirements of running a HUMINT mission.

That's not to say that we didn't coordinate a lot with the company leadership responsible for our AO (and a wise intel guy knows the value of liaison relationships above all else). And that's also not to say that there shouldn't be someone responsible at the company level for tracking intel activities and reports for their AO. But I don't think it should be the BN's already-limited intel assets.

[MikeF]

Actually, I thought it would make for a great long-term solution, as well. Does it seem inadequate for a long-term plan because it is so simple?

but I wonder if you're addressing problems that don't actually exist. Is the knowledge gap really significant for the S-2 shop in regard to company level ops?

I don't know. That's why I posed the question for discussion. I've directly observed seven battalions and three brigades in combat (hardly a statiscally relevant number). I've seen good S2s and bad ones.

As we move from a top-down to bottom-up level of assesment, I would submit that the intel community is falling behind. Moreover, the inverse proportion of their pyramid hyarchy brings question to its structure in this type of war. I guess I was just suggesting a more bottom up structure.

v/r

Mike

[Schmedlap]

And that's also not to say that there shouldn't be someone responsible at the company level for tracking intel activities and reports for their AO. But I don't think it should be the BN's already-limited intel assets.

Not sure if that is a response to anyone/thing in particular, so I'll just clarify my comments. I was not suggesting that the intel guy should be OPCON to the company and/or act as their intel cell. I think it makes sense for the S-2 to retain control of his guys, but to push his guys down to the company so that the shop can work more efficiently and so that it can obtain more valuable intel. While he and the S-2 NCOIC might prefer to have their guys within arms reach for various admin/control reasons, he loses a lot of valuable intel by not having them do the critical work of debriefing patrols.

If he keeps them within arms reach, then what he gains in analysis, he loses in collection... which begs the question: what is he analyzing? And what is he getting out of it? I would assert that the answers are: "very incomplete information" and "not as much as he would get out of it if he had more complete information."

[Tom Odom]

Mike et al

Good discussions on a subject I have worked for the past 7 years. There are a number of CALL products on this that I put together, sone with help from folks on here.

the first step in the bottom intel process is recognizing that reality; that is very hard to sell to rice bowl owners, usually tied to branch-centric definitions concerning what is real intelligence and what is combat information.

I first used the Brits Northern Ireland Bluebook as a model working with the exchange officer we had at JRTC Ops Grp. That model uses infantrymen--junior NCOs--to establish a company informartion collation cell and the Brits run a short course to satisfy the need to train them.

The Marine Corps has also pursued this with a similar out of hide approach.

Army units vary. But we have intel cells, company TOCs, O/I cells or whatever they are called near universally now at the company level. I still believe we need to standardize with the aim of building organic capacity through the M&TOE and training.

Best
Tom

[MikeF]

Thanks Tom. I haven't been on the CALL site for a long time. I'll have to brush up on it and see what y'all published.

Army units vary. But we have intel cells, company TOCs, O/I cells or whatever they are called near universally now at the company level. I still believe we need to standardize with the aim of building organic capacity through the M&TOE and training.

Schmedlap is correct with his suggestion of sending one guy down from the BN level to help out, and the Company intel cells are a great ad-hoc solution as long as you get the right people. I am just looking at a totally different approach to try to better optimize capabilities. In my own company, I held intel as one of my primary functions as a commander.

Everyday, along with the required patrol reports, my platoon leaders would submit operational summaries. After discussing the information in an informal huddle session with E6 and above, I would consolidate and publish an operational summary and intelligence summary. These reports were sent higher, but they were also distributed down to the E5 level. Every sergeant had the responsibility to brief their soldiers.

This process worked well. It helped to get everyone on the same page, understand how I viewed the battlespace, and it helped the NCO's have a better understanding on what to look for when answering the CCIR and PIR.
Every once in a while, a young soldier would spot discrepencies in what was reported based off what they had seen. So, we had feedback loops to continually try and gain clarity within the fog/friction of war.

Simultaneously, two or three scouts would volunteer to work with me at night to translate recovered documents, review confiscated DVD's, and search the intelligence web for anything relevent to our AO. We were able to conduct our own analysis and summaries at the company level. Talking it over with the BN S2, this effort was greatly appreciated.

the first step in the bottom intel process is recognizing that reality; that is very hard to sell to rice bowl owners, usually tied to branch-centric definitions concerning what is real intelligence and what is combat information.

My version of problem-solving is usually to try and determine the best COA, and then apply the realities of rice-bowls, competing stakeholders, etc. Often times, that is just wishful thinking

v/r

Mike

[MikeF]

I wonder if you're addressing problems that don't actually exist.

I probably should have started by defining the problem. With exceptions (Strykers and SF stick out), there are fundamental systematic problems with intelligence collection, assessment, and dissemenation. These problems have existed for a long time, and they were exasperated as the MI community had to switch from the Top-Down to Bottom-Up Intel of COIN (Or in Cav terms, recon pull v/s push).

One issue is stove-piping and rice bowls. Many will hold on to intel and not pass it on to anyone they feel is outside the need-to-know.

Another more grieviace issue is analysis. Back on my time in staff, I would follow reports from battalion, to brigade, to division, and onto Corp. What I observed was best described as editing rather than analysis. This is a problem. IMO, this issue caused us to NOT understand the true nature of the war in Iraq b/c we (collectively) were afraid to tell the boss what was really going on on the ground. So, we'd edit any bad news. This editing left the highest commands unaware of many of the problems brewing and simmering on the ground.

In organizational design, one can adjust process, structure, or culture to effect change in an system. The proposal that I posted is a structure change.

v/r

Mike

[davidbfpo]

Mike,

So, we'd edit any bad news. This editing left the highest commands unaware of many of the problems brewing and simmering on the ground.

This is not an issue unique to the US military intelligence community and I can recall, in the Afghan context, a marked reluctance to be polite, to permit analysts reporting back to the UK the extent of the drug trade at the begining of our involvement (2001-2002). Such reporting was not appreciated by the politicians, so stop.

There are a few notable, public examples of that happening in UK law enforcement; for example a warning of mounting tension on Broadwater Farm, an urban flashpoint, was "edited" and within days there was a lethal riot.

How to stop this practice has been debated in the academic community, for example in the journal 'Intelligence and National Security'. I cannot recall a "consumer" or a senior officer commenting on the issue. A direction from the top 'Tell me the bad news always' is needed.

davidbfpo

[MikeF]

This is not an issue unique to the US military intelligence community and I can recall, in the Afghan context, a marked reluctance to be polite, to permit analysts reporting back to the UK the extent of the drug trade at the begining of our involvement (2001-2002). Such reporting was not appreciated by the politicians, so stop.

David,

I should have added some caveats. First, this happens in every bureaucracy and probably every other organization . Second, I'm sure it has happened in every war that was ever fought. Third, the intelligence problem is only one of other issues with the military. I was not trying to imply the intelligence problems led to our initial failures in Iraq.

If we're fighting a village war or bottom-up approach, then I think we should have as many people close to the village as possible.

v/r

Mike

[IntelTrooper]

Not sure if that is a response to anyone/thing in particular, so I'll just clarify my comments. I was not suggesting that the intel guy should be OPCON to the company and/or act as their intel cell. I think it makes sense for the S-2 to retain control of his guys, but to push his guys down to the company so that the shop can work more efficiently and so that it can obtain more valuable intel. While he and the S-2 NCOIC might prefer to have their guys within arms reach for various admin/control reasons, he loses a lot of valuable intel by not having them do the critical work of debriefing patrols.

If he keeps them within arms reach, then what he gains in analysis, he loses in collection... which begs the question: what is he analyzing? And what is he getting out of it? I would assert that the answers are: "very incomplete information" and "not as much as he would get out of it if he had more complete information."

I'll also clarify -- collection and analysis are two different processes, and two different organizations are responsible for them. The processes are also fairly regimented, in true Army fashion, and even a very perceptive analyst with excellent situational awareness is not going to change the system enough to really justify pushing them down to the company level. The targeting process is set, with the thresholds and requirements being set at RC or theater level.

Ultimately, in my opinion, HCTs should sensitize platoon leaders and squad leaders to the kinds of information and people they are looking for, but the responsibility for creating an environment where important information is noted and reported belongs to the battalion and company commanders who are creating the PIRs and CCIRs.

Perhaps in coordination with the collectors and analysts, units could distribute a set of notecards with EEIs (Essential Elements of Information) to line leaders to ask if they run across certain types of people, locations, or information.