"We're pinned down": 4 Marines die in Afghan ambush

[Cavguy]

To those who doubt, I challenge you to listen to the 15 minute audio interview with the story's author, which includes pictures.

If I had watched men die for want of needed support in contact, I would be fuming mad too. Sh*t happens in war, I know that well, but this one apparently didn't have to.

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/251/story/75300.html

(Sorry, can't embed the video from McClatchy's website)

On the ROE thread I mentioned why I supported GEN McCrystal's new rules, which I still do. I oppose those who can't understand when rules need to be interpreted or violated to do the right thing.

It goes back to my question as to why johnny (joe) can't think and what I posted in that thread as to what I would do if confronted with such a decision. I said:

And then there is the Cavguy solution. If you're on the ground, and the right and obvious thing to do is staring you in the face, just do it, and take the consequences. That's actually what we did that day of the video. My army experiences tell me well considered violations of rules/guidance is generally underwritten by most commanders, especially if conditions warrant.

The task force supporting obviously didn't feel they had that flexibility, or were unwilling to use it. Sad.

Niel

[davidbfpo]

From the newly id'd blogsite: http://www.quattozone.com/ by a US PAO in Afghanistan on the ambush and ROE: http://www.quattozone.com/2009/09/ru...nragement.html

commanders in Afghanistan owe their troops an explanation of why and under what conditions they should place themselves at greater risk. The rest of us need to resist the temptation of jumping on a bandwagon that equates looser ROE with supporting our troops.

Eight years of less restrictive ROE have not prevented tragedies such as the ambush in Ganjgal. In fact, more permissive use of firepower may have contributed to the murderous rage of those responsible for the attack. Had the troops caught in the ambush been able to level the village - or if Lance Corporal Bernard had been able to summon the full military wrath of his country to his aid - we might be mourning fewer dead Americans today. Tomorrow, though, we would mourn those killed by a larger, stronger insurgency in the next village. The new ROE in Afghanistan rely on a hard but sound calculus: greater risk to our troops now means less risk and a greater chance of success for our troops later.

davidbfpo

[Gian P Gentile]

I think Niel makes some very good points, along with others on this thread, especially Schmedlap's caution about establishing facts before making sweeping conclusions.

But to Niel, it is very possible that what drove the actions and decisions in this whole affair was in fact the General's recent guidance to avoid civilian casualties. So on the one hand say you support it, but on the other and very understandable one you are viscerally upset that these men didnt get the fire support they needed.

At least for me this is a tough contradiction (to which your post does not resolve) to let stand.

thanks

gian

[Greyhawk]

Frankly, IntelTrooper's point disturbs me more than any ROE questions... but on to the ROE question. I'm not writing what follows for the benefit of folks who know (aka regulars here), but threads like this one tend to draw the attention of folks who don't (aka visitors via Google, etc), so I think it worthwhile to add this.

From the publicly released portion of Gen McChrystal's tactical directive:

The use of air-to-ground munitions and indirect fires against residential compounds is only authorized under very limited and prescribed conditions (specific conditions deleted due to operational security).

(NOTE) This directive does not prevent commanders from protecting the lives of their men and women as a matter of self-defense where it is determined no other options (specific options deleted due to operational security) are available to effectively counter the threat.

I am not privy to those other specific options and conditions - so I'm speaking on generic terms. Here's the quote from the story that's generating the heat:

U.S. commanders, citing new rules to avoid civilian casualties, rejected repeated calls to unleash artillery rounds at attackers dug into the slopes and tree lines — despite being told repeatedly that they weren't near the village.

I'm left to wonder if the radio response from the TOC was "sorry, no can do - ROE says so" - or if not, how this explanation made its way into the story. If I can think of a dozen ways that could happen I'm sure others can, too.

Some of those "ways" include an accurate characterization of the decision process. Which - if that's what it is - reads to me like a misinterpretation of ROE. ("...despite being told repeatedly that they weren't near the village...") One would hope (and I think this approaches Niel's point) that errors on the side of caution would favor the guys on the ground. But obviously one could argue that (assuming the case is as described) errors in this case favored the bad guys.

None of that indicates the ROE themselves are "bad" - to make that determination we'd need to examine those specific options and conditions - something the guys who made the on-scene decision did, and something those who will officially review this incident will also do.

FWIW: in this case it appears the four Marines were killed in the opening moments of the attack prior to the request for fires, this is not to downplay the issue but to clarify that we are not talking about an incident where any US troops died as a result of whatever decision was made regarding IDF/CAS.

On the other hand, there are other troubling aspects to the (as-told) story of a unit walking to a village (where elders had "announced over the weekend that they were accepting the authority of the local government") at a pre-arranged time to meet, greet, and conduct searches of homes that we haven't delved deeply into.

Meanwhile

Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said that it did take “some time” for air support to arrive, but the delay was due to distance, not the rules of engagement.

He said the deaths are under investigation, adding, “We will hopefully get to the bottom and figure out if everything operated according to protocol.”

Honestly, I'm glad the attention is being paid. Clarity is a good thing.

[Cavguy]

I think Niel makes some very good points, along with others on this thread, especially Schmedlap's caution about establishing facts before making sweeping conclusions.

But to Niel, it is very possible that what drove the actions and decisions in this whole affair was in fact the General's recent guidance to avoid civilian casualties. So on the one hand say you support it, but on the other and very understandable one you are viscerally upset that these men didnt get the fire support they needed.

At least for me this is a tough contradiction (to which your post does not resolve) to let stand.

thanks

gian

Sir,

I see where my own conflicts may muddy what I was trying to express.

On one level, GEN McCrystal had to tamp down on the excessive use of indirect assets, that despite earlier guidance, was still being employed in ways that strengthened the insurgent's ability to mobilize the use of force.

My fear, articulated better by Ken, was that such guidance falls prey to the bureaucratic imperative and does not contain sufficent flexibility/guidance as to what situations are exceptions to the rule.

No set of rules can ever compensate for every forseeable situation, which is why draconian measures such as the CG's guidance provide opportunities for incidents like this one (if description is accurate) to happen. It is odd, but in effect many are more willing to let others suffer/die than endure a (potentially career ending) reprimand.

In the end, leaders are paid to make hard choices and take responsibility for them.

The greater question is why such draconian guidance was required in the first place - which indicates a greater flaw in our leader development system and lack of understanding of the dynamics present in the Afghanistan operating environment.

Hope this clarifies.

Niel

[J Wolfsberger]

On one level, GEN McCrystal had to tamp down on the excessive use of indirect assets, that despite earlier guidance, was still being employed in ways that strengthened the insurgent's ability to mobilize the use of force.

Niel,

I think we all pretty much agree that the use of heavy ordnance can create bigger problems down the road than those it solves in the immediate here and now. The more pervasive and frequent the use, the greater the likelihood of those bigger problems emerging. Left unchecked, its use would likely increase since, in any situation, people tend to respond with a mix of "here's something from my standard tool kit" and "let's use this, since it's available." So here's a question for you and others with field experience as I try to understand the intention and implications of the new ROE. How much of a problem was the use of heavy ordnance that the new ROE addresses?

[Michael C]

To all:

A few days ago I was in the shopette when I first read the McClatchy article in the Stars and Stripes. I purchased it on the spot. The article intrigued me and I had to buy the paper because this section of Konar was my platoons sole responsibility in Konar province. After we left, my platoon AO was expanded to a company AO--that is how large it is.

I know Ganjgal intimately and that is why this story infuriates me so. From my previous posts and blog it is clear where I stand on the COIN debate (hugely for population-centric COIN). I don't want to rehash that battle here, but elaborate on the points that from the synopsis I read I truly believe are mishandled. Overall, we can not condemn GEN McChrystal's guidance on COIN or new ROE based on a single firefight. I mention this because I have already seen blogs and some comments prepared to condemn strict ROE based on a single engagement of ANSF/CF.

First, as Greyhawk mentioned, the bulk of casualties in an ambush occur in the first few moments. Without close air support on station or heavy weapons support, it is unlikely that the casualties would have been avoided. The needed support was not artillery but UAV or, even better, an ITAS system on a TOW vehicle that could easily spot the dismounted ambush's heat signatures as the soldiers entered the village.

Second, I know the exact distance that artillery support is fired to support Ganjgal. While at some point, ROE might have been invoked on the radio, much more likely is the fact that artillery is not a precision system. I have seen rounds fly hundreds off yards off course. While insurgents might not have specifically been in the village, even if they are a hundred yards in the woodline the rounds very easily could impact into the village and create a humanitarian crisis, a gigantic IO victory of the AAF.

Third, because this was the first patrol into Ganjgal, expectations should be low. Ganjgal is the perfect example of how CF/ANSF are not conducting clear, hold and build. The patrol to Ganjgal was the first in a long time and would probably be the only patrol for months. Thus, we might clear, but we would not hold. That is a recipe for a Taliban ambush.

Fourth, the best method to extricate forces in this region is a well prepared quick reaction force. Ganjgal is accessible by dirt road. I believe the failure to coordinate with CF mounted platoons and ANA mounted platoons (both stationed at the nearest Camp, few minute drive from Ganjgal) was much more critical to the pinning down of US forces then the lack of immediate artillery support. Also, the patrol should have been planned with close air support which is both more accurate and responsive than artillery.

We can not condemn the new ROE because one attack went poorly. This ROE was not in effect when the battle of Wanat occurred in the same AO. The ROE was not in effect during the ambush of 9 November 2007. Casualties are an eventuality of war. If we refuse to lose any soldiers in pursuit of victory then we need to reevaluate the war, not the tactics. We can debate the merits of the ROE but we can use this one case to condemn GEN McChrystal's strategy; too many other factors contributed to this attack.

Finally, the belief, that has also circulated, that this new strategy disproportionally risks our US forces is logical fallacy. The article reports that nine Afghans died in addition to another nineteen being wounded. We truly are sharing the cost with Afghans and hopefully we can teach them the

To Wolfsberger: The addiction to fire power, specifically mortars, artillery and CAS is huge in Afghanistan. Because we lack the maneuver to patrol mountains, ridgelines and many capillary valleys, we rely on fire power to act as our maneuver. We combine this with UAVs to solve our problem. To the folks who say we need to kill our way out of this fight, that has been our solution for the first eight years, using fire power to make up for our lack of cultural awareness and maneuver capability.

[MikeF]

Probably described it best. We taught him the ins and outs of call for fire. Now, he's on his second tour- this one in Afghan.

afghanistan f-ing blows. literally and in multiple ways. this place is no joke. i tried calling for fire.... theres so many false ridges and draws and #### that you cant see on maps or binos till the smoke covers em

v/r

Mike

[Ken White]

perspective.

One minor point -- I agree with all your positions, however, I do have a couple of comments on your last sentence:

"To the folks who say we need to kill our way out of this fight, that has been our solution for the first eight years, using fire power to make up for our lack of cultural awareness and maneuver capability."

The cultural awareness adequate for troop units has been available for most of that time but many units have not made an effort to pump that knowledge into the Companies, Troops and Platoons who have to do the work.

Both that and the lack of maneuver capability are functions of poor or inadequate education and training coupled with equipment not designed for mission accomplishment in a risk averse culture. Those are all flaws inflicted by the US Army upon itself. That they existed in 2001 was and is sad and unnecessary -- that they still exist after eight years of war is borderline criminal.

As an aside, I have heard that the use of H&I fires and ridge sweeps by mortars and artillery in Afghanistan has been halted. I thought we learned in Viet Nam how abysmally stupid and counterproductive are both techniques -- after we had learned it in Korea...

[Rank amateur]

Thus, we might clear, but we would not hold. That is a recipe for a Taliban ambush.

I was going to say this, but it is much better said by someone who was there. Still, I think it bares repeating. The issue isn't ROE. It's insufficient resources to execute the strategy.

[William F. Owen]

To the folks who say we need to kill our way out of this fight, that has been our solution for the first eight years, using fire power to make up for our lack of cultural awareness and maneuver capability.

Could be that you've just been doing it badly for 8 years. Cultural awareness has no relationship to Fires and Manoeuvre, that I am aware of.
Additionally, Fires can only strike, and to some extent fix. They cannot FIND and they cannot EXPLOIT - thus if you choosing not to manoeuvre you are either incompetent, badly trained, or not being given the resources to make it possible.

ROE is only relevant to the policy being set forth. Thus ROE is always situation dependant. SO it might be that 4 dead Marines may have more negative political impact than 4 dead Afghans - just a thought.

[MikeF]

From the newly id'd blogsite: http://www.quattozone.com/ by a US PAO in Afghanistan on the ambush and ROE: http://www.quattozone.com/2009/09/ru...nragement.htmldavidbfpo

From the article:

Eight years of less restrictive ROE have not prevented tragedies such as the ambush in Ganjgal. In fact, more permissive use of firepower may have contributed to the murderous rage of those responsible for the attack

I think there is a problem with causation in this argument. It's like the Army football team saying the only reason the have had losing seasons for the past decade is because they only had a running game so they were going to go to a strickly passing game and no longer run. This argument minimizes and overlooks many other factors most strikingly the long-standing history of Pashtun resistance to central government and propensity to engage in fighting.

In Mike's world, there are a couple of things that I would consider common sense.

1. Bombs dropped from a UAV with no ground observation is mutually exclusive to troops in contact.

2. Dropping precision munitions to close with and destroy the enemy does not equal a scorched earth policy.

Had the troops caught in the ambush been able to level the village - or if Lance Corporal Bernard had been able to summon the full military wrath of his country to his aid - we might be mourning fewer dead Americans today. Tomorrow, though, we would mourn those killed by a larger, stronger insurgency in the next village. The new ROE in Afghanistan rely on a hard but sound calculus: greater risk to our troops now means less risk and a greater chance of success for our troops later

Did the US PAO ask the Taliban if they took this math class?

v/r

Mike

[Ken White]

to make a sensible comment. It has been my experience that newspersons accompanying troops rarely get the story straight, are not generally filled in precisely on what constituted the radio traffic and that firefights are chaotic and stories on what happened vary among participants -- even those who were right next to each other. I've also noted that each passing hour changes most stories...

Though I am still curious about the alleged dichotomy that support was denied and yet WP was fired...

[jmm99]

Here is a factoid from the McClatchy article cited by Niel:

The worst single loss of U.S. military trainers of the war brought out the deep bitterness with which many soldiers view the new rules. They feel unfairly handcuffed, especially in the case of Ganjgal, where women and children were seen running ammunition and weapons to gunmen firing from inside the hilltop hamlet.

IF (and this is an important word - see Ken's comment) this factoid is correct, it cuts both ways: fire coming from an inhabited place (hilltop hamlet) and women and children present; but men, women and children all engaged in combat or combat support.

One wonders if the "specific conditions" (which we rightly do not know as Greyhawk points out) cover this kind of situation.

[Greyhawk]

...the PAO site is his personal, unofficial site, views expressed do not reflect the official policy, etc. (Full disclaimer on site.)

[Ken White]

which IMO becomes suspect by introducing obtuse foolishness like this:

The lack of timely air support...was a consequence of the manpower and equipment shortages bequeathed by the Bush administration's failure to secure Afghanistan against a resurgence of the Taliban, al Qaida and allied groups before turning to invade Iraq.
...
The denial of heavy artillery fire to those trapped in Ganjgal also has roots in the Bush administration's decision to divert resources to Iraq and the resulting stress on the U.S. military.

Those comments would seem to questionably accurate at best, politically motivated (understandable given his background) and tangentially if at all related to the story. They discredit the rest of his reporting in my view.

More sensible is this comment:

There are a limited number of U.S. helicopters in Kunar, a stretch of craggy mountains and serpentine valleys bordering Pakistan where airpower gives a vital edge to overstretched U.S. troops fighting guerrillas who know every nook and trail of the area. Unbeknownst to those trapped in the Ganjgal kill zone, however, the available aircraft were tied up in the Shiryak Valley to the north in a battle in which two pilots were wounded, U.S. commanders said.

Though I'd suggest that air power does not give a vital edge, it merely offsets the opponents vital edge in terrain knowledge, local support and agility to a slight extent. A very slight extent...

I can give kudos to the guy for going out with the troops -- and still decry the politicization and the lack of rudimentary military knowledge by too many in the media.

And while I can comment on the reporting, I still don't know enough to comment on the incident.

[J Wolfsberger]

Mike, you raise some good points, but...

Did the US PAO ask the Taliban if they took this math class?

I'm sure they didn't, but we're not the Taliban, so we have to.

[MikeF]

Mike, you raise some good points, but...
I'm sure they didn't, but we're not the Taliban, so we have to.

I was still on my first cup of coffee with that post.

I think Niel and Ken are more on the mark.

v/r

Mike

[Ken White]

My objection to the COIN Religion is that it DOES require lopsided math like that. We have to play fair, the other guys do not.

Moreover, in playing fair and "doing COIN right" with the GPF increased casualties are a given. Add those increased casualties to the impatience of the American public (and Armed Forces...) for tangible results quickly, generally an impossible task in COIN like operations and you have a recipe for a screw up. Those are historical facts.

Thus I contend that COIN situations that might require GPF commitment are to be rigorously avoided unless there is no other option. I can think of no US operation of any size since WW II where GPF commitment to COIN efforts could not have been avoided. Nor can I think of one that has seen the GPF committed that was truly successful as opposed to ending with only a marginally decent outcome at best. One that probably was not worth the cost. While our commitment to Afghanistan is not complete, I doubt it will change that assessment.

So called COIN operations teach bad habits -- the Army today still has a number of residual Viet Nam induced problems -- and are ferociously expensive in all terms for the benefit derived. People that go around looking for places to deploy and do this stuff need to replace Bob's World's Intel weenies on point.

The Army and Marines need to be prepared for them, no question. However the policy folks need to understand that it will not be easy, will not be pretty and will likely not solve the problem they should have addressed earlier through other means. The Army and Marines should avoid these things like the Plague -- not least because that's what they are. Like the plague, they're equal opportunity killers, no slack for either side, no benefit except lowering the overpopulation counter a tad...