"We're pinned down": 4 Marines die in Afghan ambush

[Cavguy]

I think Niel makes some very good points, along with others on this thread, especially Schmedlap's caution about establishing facts before making sweeping conclusions.

But to Niel, it is very possible that what drove the actions and decisions in this whole affair was in fact the General's recent guidance to avoid civilian casualties. So on the one hand say you support it, but on the other and very understandable one you are viscerally upset that these men didnt get the fire support they needed.

At least for me this is a tough contradiction (to which your post does not resolve) to let stand.

thanks

gian

Sir,

I see where my own conflicts may muddy what I was trying to express.

On one level, GEN McCrystal had to tamp down on the excessive use of indirect assets, that despite earlier guidance, was still being employed in ways that strengthened the insurgent's ability to mobilize the use of force.

My fear, articulated better by Ken, was that such guidance falls prey to the bureaucratic imperative and does not contain sufficent flexibility/guidance as to what situations are exceptions to the rule.

No set of rules can ever compensate for every forseeable situation, which is why draconian measures such as the CG's guidance provide opportunities for incidents like this one (if description is accurate) to happen. It is odd, but in effect many are more willing to let others suffer/die than endure a (potentially career ending) reprimand.

In the end, leaders are paid to make hard choices and take responsibility for them.

The greater question is why such draconian guidance was required in the first place - which indicates a greater flaw in our leader development system and lack of understanding of the dynamics present in the Afghanistan operating environment.

Hope this clarifies.

Niel

[J Wolfsberger]

On one level, GEN McCrystal had to tamp down on the excessive use of indirect assets, that despite earlier guidance, was still being employed in ways that strengthened the insurgent's ability to mobilize the use of force.

Niel,

I think we all pretty much agree that the use of heavy ordnance can create bigger problems down the road than those it solves in the immediate here and now. The more pervasive and frequent the use, the greater the likelihood of those bigger problems emerging. Left unchecked, its use would likely increase since, in any situation, people tend to respond with a mix of "here's something from my standard tool kit" and "let's use this, since it's available." So here's a question for you and others with field experience as I try to understand the intention and implications of the new ROE. How much of a problem was the use of heavy ordnance that the new ROE addresses?

[Michael C]

To all:

A few days ago I was in the shopette when I first read the McClatchy article in the Stars and Stripes. I purchased it on the spot. The article intrigued me and I had to buy the paper because this section of Konar was my platoons sole responsibility in Konar province. After we left, my platoon AO was expanded to a company AO--that is how large it is.

I know Ganjgal intimately and that is why this story infuriates me so. From my previous posts and blog it is clear where I stand on the COIN debate (hugely for population-centric COIN). I don't want to rehash that battle here, but elaborate on the points that from the synopsis I read I truly believe are mishandled. Overall, we can not condemn GEN McChrystal's guidance on COIN or new ROE based on a single firefight. I mention this because I have already seen blogs and some comments prepared to condemn strict ROE based on a single engagement of ANSF/CF.

First, as Greyhawk mentioned, the bulk of casualties in an ambush occur in the first few moments. Without close air support on station or heavy weapons support, it is unlikely that the casualties would have been avoided. The needed support was not artillery but UAV or, even better, an ITAS system on a TOW vehicle that could easily spot the dismounted ambush's heat signatures as the soldiers entered the village.

Second, I know the exact distance that artillery support is fired to support Ganjgal. While at some point, ROE might have been invoked on the radio, much more likely is the fact that artillery is not a precision system. I have seen rounds fly hundreds off yards off course. While insurgents might not have specifically been in the village, even if they are a hundred yards in the woodline the rounds very easily could impact into the village and create a humanitarian crisis, a gigantic IO victory of the AAF.

Third, because this was the first patrol into Ganjgal, expectations should be low. Ganjgal is the perfect example of how CF/ANSF are not conducting clear, hold and build. The patrol to Ganjgal was the first in a long time and would probably be the only patrol for months. Thus, we might clear, but we would not hold. That is a recipe for a Taliban ambush.

Fourth, the best method to extricate forces in this region is a well prepared quick reaction force. Ganjgal is accessible by dirt road. I believe the failure to coordinate with CF mounted platoons and ANA mounted platoons (both stationed at the nearest Camp, few minute drive from Ganjgal) was much more critical to the pinning down of US forces then the lack of immediate artillery support. Also, the patrol should have been planned with close air support which is both more accurate and responsive than artillery.

We can not condemn the new ROE because one attack went poorly. This ROE was not in effect when the battle of Wanat occurred in the same AO. The ROE was not in effect during the ambush of 9 November 2007. Casualties are an eventuality of war. If we refuse to lose any soldiers in pursuit of victory then we need to reevaluate the war, not the tactics. We can debate the merits of the ROE but we can use this one case to condemn GEN McChrystal's strategy; too many other factors contributed to this attack.

Finally, the belief, that has also circulated, that this new strategy disproportionally risks our US forces is logical fallacy. The article reports that nine Afghans died in addition to another nineteen being wounded. We truly are sharing the cost with Afghans and hopefully we can teach them the

To Wolfsberger: The addiction to fire power, specifically mortars, artillery and CAS is huge in Afghanistan. Because we lack the maneuver to patrol mountains, ridgelines and many capillary valleys, we rely on fire power to act as our maneuver. We combine this with UAVs to solve our problem. To the folks who say we need to kill our way out of this fight, that has been our solution for the first eight years, using fire power to make up for our lack of cultural awareness and maneuver capability.

[MikeF]

Probably described it best. We taught him the ins and outs of call for fire. Now, he's on his second tour- this one in Afghan.

afghanistan f-ing blows. literally and in multiple ways. this place is no joke. i tried calling for fire.... theres so many false ridges and draws and #### that you cant see on maps or binos till the smoke covers em

v/r

Mike

[Ken White]

perspective.

One minor point -- I agree with all your positions, however, I do have a couple of comments on your last sentence:

"To the folks who say we need to kill our way out of this fight, that has been our solution for the first eight years, using fire power to make up for our lack of cultural awareness and maneuver capability."

The cultural awareness adequate for troop units has been available for most of that time but many units have not made an effort to pump that knowledge into the Companies, Troops and Platoons who have to do the work.

Both that and the lack of maneuver capability are functions of poor or inadequate education and training coupled with equipment not designed for mission accomplishment in a risk averse culture. Those are all flaws inflicted by the US Army upon itself. That they existed in 2001 was and is sad and unnecessary -- that they still exist after eight years of war is borderline criminal.

As an aside, I have heard that the use of H&I fires and ridge sweeps by mortars and artillery in Afghanistan has been halted. I thought we learned in Viet Nam how abysmally stupid and counterproductive are both techniques -- after we had learned it in Korea...

[Pol-Mil FSO]

A great explanation from Michael C that makes me wonder if the fact that the Marines were CSTC-A ETTs not under ISAF may have inadvertently caused some problems with respect to mission planning and QRF coordination. I do not know how things are in RC-East but in RC-South I saw some coordination issues between OEF CSTC-A and ISAF coalition forces (exacerbated by the fact that coalition units did not have Blue Force Tracker).

[Greyhawk]

...at least, not yet.

The Washington Post: "As U.S. Toll in Afghanistan Rises, Lawmakers And Families Are Questioning New Restrictions"

Our friend Quatto weighs in here - with several points that may seem familiar to those who've read this thread. Said points are well stated there.

What I find confounding about the situation is from one (imho false) narrative General McChrystal is playing fast and loose with the lives of his troops via the ROE set to appease his political leadership, from other more recent (imho equally false and stated so by the man himself) claims he is on the verge of resigning because his political leadership is playing fast and loose with the lives of his troops.

And the first argument continues even after the second was raised - apparently its legs were a bit stronger than I first hoped. I sympathize with those who must counter both in time of war - along with some likely third argument which will put all that together in some coherent (ala Frankenstein's monster) way. (That is, assuming we don't pack it in over the combined weight of the two mutually exclusive arguments first. Between them there's something for everyone to oppose.)

[Uboat509]

Can anyone show me ANY evidence that a theoretical psychological gain is more important than the life of a US service member? Has the use of indirect fires been abused by some? Sure. Does that mean we should restrict its use by everyone? Once again, military leadership has chosen the easiest, safest solution to a problem, and to hell with the consequences with that solution.

SFC W

[Rank amateur]

Thus, we might clear, but we would not hold. That is a recipe for a Taliban ambush.

I was going to say this, but it is much better said by someone who was there. Still, I think it bares repeating. The issue isn't ROE. It's insufficient resources to execute the strategy.

[William F. Owen]

To the folks who say we need to kill our way out of this fight, that has been our solution for the first eight years, using fire power to make up for our lack of cultural awareness and maneuver capability.

Could be that you've just been doing it badly for 8 years. Cultural awareness has no relationship to Fires and Manoeuvre, that I am aware of.
Additionally, Fires can only strike, and to some extent fix. They cannot FIND and they cannot EXPLOIT - thus if you choosing not to manoeuvre you are either incompetent, badly trained, or not being given the resources to make it possible.

ROE is only relevant to the policy being set forth. Thus ROE is always situation dependant. SO it might be that 4 dead Marines may have more negative political impact than 4 dead Afghans - just a thought.

[Michael C]

First, the US Army and its NATO allies (the UK included), have been waging poor counter-insurgency for the last eight years. Not all bad in every area, but yes generally trending downward.

Cultural awareness does have a relationship to maneuver and fires and intelligence. They are all related: you must have intelligence to maneuver on the enemy, or to be effective at it, and fires can fix the enemy to allow you to maneuver. Now, not necessarily "cultural awareness", but whatever term describes all the tasks like psyops, reconstruction, political relationships, cultural attaches, language ability, information operations, civil action projects, training missions; all those soft skills fall in categories distinct from fire, maneuver and intelligence. Bad counter-insurgents cover up their lacking cultural awareness with an over reliance on firepower, like the US in Afghanistan and Vietnam previously. We have only in the last few years begun to remedy wholeheartedly our mistakes, but it cannot be done overnight.

[jmm99]

Sorry I missed this by a week:

from MC
To JMM- Isn't a democratic government a tangible goal? A democratic government holds freely run democratic elections and leadership steps down from power. Plenty of think tanks rate governments on how democratic they are. To make the intangible goal tangible we simply find the metrics and say we want an Afghan government that passes so-and-so's criteria for a democratic government.

On the other hand, we could ignore what time of government it is, be it democracy or autocracy or theocracy, and simply say we don't want it to be a failed state (the logic being failed states like Somalia or Afghanistan pre-October 2001 have a greater chance of harboring terrorists). To define a failed state we could also go to any of the NGOs or think tanks that define Failed States (Foreign Policy magazine does an issue every year). We could just say they need a per-capita GDP of X and a child mortality rate of Y and human rights ranking of Z. Thus the intangible benefits of democracy become very well defined.

Of course, you might mean that the creation of a democracy and/or the prevention of failed states are not something you care about in Afghanistan. But, it is hard to deny that there are tangible and concrete metrics we can use to measure our goals. (Whether or not our leadership clearly define those goals or not.)

First, as far as I am concerned, this is a factor in the Political Struggle and should not be part of the Military Struggle. To the extent that the military needs to use "soft" means:

from MC
..; tasks like psyops, reconstruction, political relationships, cultural attaches, language ability, information operations, civil action projects, training missions...

to advance its efforts, so be it. But, the military efforts must at least co-ordinate with the political efforts.

Second, as to the political efforts, those must be of indigenous origins and acceptable to the indigenous people - not, as you say:

... we simply find the metrics and say we want an Afghan government that passes so-and-so's criteria for a democratic government ...
....
We could just say they need a per-capita GDP of X and a child mortality rate of Y and human rights ranking of Z ....

Of course, if you really want to impose US standards on Astan or any "failed state", and implement the opinions of our many so-smart think tanks, be straight-forward and occupy the country formally and install a military government - or simply annex the country as a colony and install a colonial civil administration.

Third, what is "democracy" and what is "failed" mean very different things to different peoples (and to different think tanks). Once upon a time, a Singapore businessman was asked what communism meant to him. He replied it was freedom to carry on international business. Going back to the intangible slogan that I used - "making the world safe for democracy" - that concept meant one thing to Wilson, another thing to his British and French allies, and still another thing to Cabot Lodge and the US Senate.

Fourth, on paper, Astan has a fine democracy and a great system of governance. As it should be, since the US and the Europeans negotiated it. What, it isn't working very well in the districts ? - we should be shocked, just shocked !! If you want metrics, go district by district; and find out what form of governance the people want. Or, you can just take the reports issued by or for the Karzai government and find out that everything is wonderful and improving.

Fifth, you are unto something about JMM in your third paragraph because I am not a big fan of "creation of a democracy" or "the prevention of failed states", unless the dominant lead comes from the people of that country. If you decide to go in that direction, then using Dave Kilcullen's 8 points is a decent outline (p.265 of the Accidental Guerrilla). But, you also should dwell on the bolded heading for that section: "Counterinsurgency: Possible, Not Recommended". Dr Kilcullen has joined the "Never Again, but" School (p.269); as to which and to him, I say "welcome".

[Michael C]

Or if we agree. But my core argument, that you never quite dispute, is that democracy can be a tangible goal with clear metrics. You don't want to establish democracies around the globe, but you can't dispute that is a tangible goal.

You say, [

what is "democracy" and what is "failed" mean very different things to different peoples (and to different think tanks)"

I don't disagree. But, some states are clearly democracies and some are clearly failed. No intelligent person believes Somalia is either a democracy or a successful state. Same would go for Iraq around 2005-2006, not so much any more. No reasonable person disputes that America is both successful and a democracy. The difference is what think tanks debate. But, our civilian and military leadership should decide what goals they have when they are invading a country. If establishing a democracy is a goal, as Bush said about Iraq, then we should have metrics to back it up, and they exist.

You then said,

If you want metrics, go district by district; and find out what form of governance the people want."

In Afghanistan, I don't dispute that different districts want different things. I know how broken the system is from Kabul to the districts, I have talked to district sub-governors and village elders. That doesn't change the fact that we can find metrics to measure democracy. It also doesn't change the fact that the people of Afghanistan would prefer a stable democracy to a return of Taliban rule. Especially at the rural, district level that is what they say.

You finish by quoting Dr. Kilcullen. I thought the Accidental Guerilla was fantastic without a doubt. I agree with him that COIN should be waged as a last resort. Unfortunately, when I graduated college the Army was already waging to COIN operations. It seems, to me, that the best course now is getting by leaving stable countries in our wake, not failed ones. To do that we need metrics, and those metrics will be about stable democracies.

Final thought. Initially you said,

So, yes, I am uncomfortable with loss of life (and the other personal costs of war) for such intangibles as "making the world safe for democracy" and the like."

Isn't that exactly what our forefathers were doing by fighting the Nazis on the beaches of Normandy? WWII was nothing if not a battle of democracies--UK, France and America--versus fascist dictatorships. Just saying.