Quote Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile View Post
I think Niel makes some very good points, along with others on this thread, especially Schmedlap's caution about establishing facts before making sweeping conclusions.

But to Niel, it is very possible that what drove the actions and decisions in this whole affair was in fact the General's recent guidance to avoid civilian casualties. So on the one hand say you support it, but on the other and very understandable one you are viscerally upset that these men didnt get the fire support they needed.

At least for me this is a tough contradiction (to which your post does not resolve) to let stand.

thanks

gian
Sir,

I see where my own conflicts may muddy what I was trying to express.

On one level, GEN McCrystal had to tamp down on the excessive use of indirect assets, that despite earlier guidance, was still being employed in ways that strengthened the insurgent's ability to mobilize the use of force.

My fear, articulated better by Ken, was that such guidance falls prey to the bureaucratic imperative and does not contain sufficent flexibility/guidance as to what situations are exceptions to the rule.

No set of rules can ever compensate for every forseeable situation, which is why draconian measures such as the CG's guidance provide opportunities for incidents like this one (if description is accurate) to happen. It is odd, but in effect many are more willing to let others suffer/die than endure a (potentially career ending) reprimand.

In the end, leaders are paid to make hard choices and take responsibility for them.

The greater question is why such draconian guidance was required in the first place - which indicates a greater flaw in our leader development system and lack of understanding of the dynamics present in the Afghanistan operating environment.

Hope this clarifies.

Niel