"We're pinned down": 4 Marines die in Afghan ambush

[Michael C]

The link I posted has a whole host of good metrics, the best being reconciliation programs in what number of districts. This is correlated with strong district government which is the key to winning, in my opinion.

Of course, my personal favorite for all states is infant mortality. It doesn't relate to direct causes, but is far and away the most correlated to good government. Basically, the countries you want to live in with good economies and standards of living, have low infant mortality and failed states have very high infant mortality. Now, in a country like Afghanistan, it has had historically abysmal infant mortality rates. If America could cut their rate in half, do you think Afghans or Pakistanis or Arabs would hate us for that?

Of course, some would say that Afghans just want to live in the 1300s, but trust me they want to have less of their babies die more than anything else.

[Ken White]

The link I posted has a whole host of good metrics, the best being reconciliation programs in what number of districts. This is correlated with strong district government which is the key to winning, in my opinion.

We can disagree on the validity of those 'metrics.' I contend the majority of those bullets are goals, not metrics. The Metrics would be the quantifiable indicators of achievement of those goals. I further suggest that the answers relating progress toward those goals are either totally meaningless if they are quantities or are subjective judgments -- which are fine but they aren't metrics...

For example, your "reconciliation programs in what number of districts" would likely change fairly frequently as the tide of Talibs surges and goes to Pakistan for rest and refit. The various reconciliation programs would likely have varying levels from District to District and would change on a random but probably more than weekly basis. A key to good metrics is to ask the right questions or have the right components for measurement. My experience with the US Army is that we, as an institution, are quite good at manipulating that to look good...

Of course, my personal favorite for all states is infant mortality. It doesn't relate to direct causes, but is far and away the most correlated to good government. Basically, the countries you want to live in with good economies and standards of living, have low infant mortality and failed states have very high infant mortality. Now, in a country like Afghanistan, it has had historically abysmal infant mortality rates. If America could cut their rate in half, do you think Afghans or Pakistanis or Arabs would hate us for that?

In reverse order, Yes, some would -- think about it. No one likes you if you do something they cannot do for themselves. They'd take the improvement and like that but they would not like us simply because we did something they wanted to do but could or did not.

I'm not sure what a failed state is and I think that's dangerous term because it implies (to all the residents of that State) that you look down upon them -- 'failed' is pejorative, anyway you phrase it. The issue in any event is can you move it to 'unfailed' status, other than humanistically is it in your interest, what will it cost and is the benefit worth the cost?

Let's say you halve the infant mortality rate. In Afghanistan, how long do you think it will take you to achieve that and will you have to make changes to the local culture that may not be acceptable to achieve it? If you attempt to do it and fail, could you do more harm than good? If you promise it and do not deliver, will this loss of credibility affect your other -- perhaps more important to you -- goals?

From your linked list of 'metrics' hare are some of those pertaining to Afghanistan:

1. Degree to which security operations are integrated into the overall COIN campaign.
2. Level of insurgent-related violence *
3. Public perceptions of security **
4. Percent of population living in districts/areas under insurgent control *
5. Percent of population living in districts/areas undergoing clearing operations * ***
6. Percent of populations living in districts/areas "held" by coalition and/or ANSF and where "build" activities are ongoing ***
7. Percent of key lines of communication under government control
8. Effectiveness of Afghan border security efforts **
9. Level of trust and confidence by the Afghan people in the ANSF's (Army and Police) ability to provide sustained security **
10. Capability, to include size, of the ANA and ANP
11. Effectiveness of ANSF-ISAF partnered counterinsurgency operations
12. Ability of the ANSF to assume lead security responsibility ^
13. Level of corruption within the ANSF ^^ **
14. Ability of the ANSF to handle their own logistics needs^^ * ** ***

Asterisks added: * =Will change so frequently as to negate sensible interpretation. ** =Will fluctuate as people respond with answers that are to their advantage; they will game the system. ***=Personal Mobility will provide erroneous conclusions. ^=That one may have some merit. ^^=Heh, heh. Number 10 will be a moving target...

I submit that most of those require subjective answers; that most will also have frequent changes up and down scale; that not one of them will truly tell you how the campaign is doing toward achieving the overall goals publicly stated for the mission. Only one will tell you how soon you might, just might, see some small successes.

War is an art, not a science. While one can produce all sorts of 'metrics,' warfare does not lend itself to metrics; most are really meaningless with respect to success or failure of combat or stabilization actions. They can tell you many things from ammunition expenditure through the number of authorized ZF -- both those and most in between also will change daily or really more often...

They will not really tell you how effective your effort is. That's a subjective, experience related judgment that sense how the people involved -- friendly, enemy, civilians, bystanders -- perceive their lot and the effort. You cannot metricate that. We can't really metricate it, no matter how enamored many are of the idea. War is not a numbers game, it's a people game and you cannot quantify ideas and perceptions.

All that said, use metrics if they make you happy; I know many in the Army (and elsewhere) love them. Just recall some day far in the future that someone once told you to use them but not to put too much stock in what they purport to show about how your war's going...

[Greyhawk]

That's the Marine Corps Times headline.

“The absence of senior leaders in the operations center with troops in contact in the ... battlespace, and their consequent lack of situational awareness and decisive action, was the key failure in the events of 8 September 2009,” the report says. “The actions of ... senior leaders were clearly negligent.”

"The investigation found a slew of mistakes," we are told. Among them, key senior personnel “were not continuously present in the operations center” - and some who were are described as “not adequately experienced, qualified or trained.” On the other hand, mission planning and coordination was accomplished "without participation from fire-support personnel."

[Danny]

Okay, so there were a lot of people preoccupied with other parts of the Kunar Province, including Kamdesh. So there were some moderately incompetent people in charge, or people who didn't man their jobs like they should have, and so on and so forth, or this or that, or something else, or whatever. This MC Times article is no different than the immediate reports of the AR 15-6 right after it came out. Yawn ...

What's important is what it doesn't say, and specifically what it denies. It denies the very specific claims made by the Marine Corps field grade officers and the McClatchy reporter on site at the time of the fire fight, to wit, that the officers specifically had to tell them that there were no noncombatants around, arty support was repeatedly denied because there could be noncombatants, they had to specifically say that there weren't any noncombatants around, arty support was denied because there could be noncombatants around ... wash, rinse, dry, repeat.

And even though they were all out for a smoke, or at the gym, or calling their girls or whatever the AR 15-6 comes up with, they had the time and presence of mind to use arty to fire white phosphorus smoke to hide their retreat ----- but not ordnance, um, well, because there could be nomcombatants around and the ROE prevented it, in spite of being told sixteen hundred times that the Marines needed arty and were going to die if they didn't get it. And to top it all off, the AR 15-6 concludes that while the 'perception' existed (and still exists) that ROE prevented the use of arty, we are to be assurred that this is all just 'perception'.

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2010/...unar-province/

Color me unpersuaded.

[E6TLS0369]

Wiser men then I can argue Right from Wrong, Left or Right, Up or Down, all I know is, my brothers died, from lack of support ? That my Friends, is UNFORGIVABLE !
NO American life should be sacrificed without great toil, great regret and dire need ! I love my country, ... I don't trust my government.