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Thread: "We're pinned down": 4 Marines die in Afghan ambush

  1. #41
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    Default It's too late at nite ...

    to get into why we ended up fighting WWII - and how our strategic plans in PTO and ETO developed.

    Take a tangible example, Astan. I know it's tangible because I was just looking at pictures and maps of it.

    Tell me the metrics (not slogans) that you think will make Astan a democracy. That is Point B.

    Tell me the same metrics that exist now. That is Point A.

    Tell me how you get from Point A to Point B.

    Regards

    Mike

  2. #42
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    Point A- Either you mean 1. for me to tell you what metrics we currently measure or 2. tell you where Afghanistan stands with regards to my metrics in point B. Basically, for part 1, I don't think the US Army does measure any metrics worth measuring except maybe body count. It is one of my major criticisms with our leadership. As for point 2, as a lowly officer stationed in Arizona, it is next to impossible for me to know country-wide metrics on Afghanistan, don't you think?

    As to Point B- A single post on a forum could never describe all the metrics we should measure in Afghanistan. As I have said, I think keeping a nation from falling into a failed state status is the best metric. So, I would refer you to Peace and Conflict 2010 and would copy the metrics they use. It is a think tank but I like their work. Of course, any other think tank measuring either stabiity or democracy would work.

    As to "Tell me how you get from Point A to Point B.", I really wish I could but I have to say I cannot. In short, I would say GEN McChrystal's plan or population-centric COIN, but if I were smart enough to tell you the way out of Afghanistan in a forum post, then I would be general of the Army and not a simple Captain.

    But we do have a tangible goal in Afghanistan, to keep it from failing and becoming again a safe haven for Al Qaeda or other Islamic extremists who use terrorism.

  3. #43
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    Quote Originally Posted by Michael C View Post
    Basically, for part 1, I don't think the US Army does measure any metrics worth measuring except maybe body count. It is one of my major criticisms with our leadership.
    Can anyone speak to the accuracy of this? That is certainly an often cited criticism, but is it accurate? I would be very surprised if we were doing something so stupid and simplistic.

  4. #44
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    Default Let's end the metrics of democracy discussion

    Plato and Aristotle set the classifications of government into a six box matrix. The quantitative measures were: one, few, many. The qualitative measures were: good or bad. You can substitute other value judgments for good or bad; but the matrix box is what we still have. BTW, "democracy" was in their "many, bad" box.

    There is no magic set of quantitative metrics that determines what democracy is or is not. It is an intangible. If you want to have some fun, attempt to classify the British parliamentary system from the time of Simon de Montfort to the present. And, if you want to talk about more modern concepts, are you talking about actual democracy, representative democracy, constitutional democracy, economic democracy, social democracy or popular democracy - or a combination of one or more of those (plus some others, I've probably forgotten).

    As to your link, see p.8 pdf, as to democracies:

    How important is democracy to post-conflict rebuilding and sustainable peace? About half of all post-conflict countries today have some form of democratic governance. But many are semi-democratic regimes in which, typically, electoral processes and legislatures are at the whim of autocratic executives. In 2008, a total of 86 countries had consistently democratic regimes, 28 were autocracies, and the remaining 45 were anocracies, a term we use for hybrid regimes (Pate, Chapter 4). The empirical evidence is compelling that factional, semi-democratic regimes are fragile and subject to failure, whether through armed challenges or institutional failure or both. In fact competitive elections in such regimes often precipitate armed violence and massacres, as happened in Kenya in 2008.

    Consistently democratic regimes are unlikely to be challenged by civil wars in the first place. If fully democratic institutions can be established after wars, economic redevelopment is more rapid, the risks of conflict recurrence are less, and transitional justice is more effective (Hegre and Felde, Chapter 8; Meernik et al., Chapter 10). Democracies also have a relatively good track record of reducing political discrimination against minorities, thereby reducing the salience of one major source of grievance around which anti-regime movements coalesce (Pate, Chapter 4). And democratic regimes have a better record of incorporating women into the political process (Caprioli et al., Chapter 9). Yet women seldom are recognized participants in peacemaking or societal reconstruction. So opportunities are lost that might give women more leverage to minimize the risks of war recurrence.
    All this we know as a qualitative rule: the more a country looks like a nice, tidy "Western" democracy (whatever its "kind"), the less likely is a substantial segment of its population to revolt. On the other hand, a substantial segment of the population of a very effective (read that as an effective state security service) authoritarian regime is also less likely to revolt.

    Yes, there are quantitative measures (I do read this stuff) for classifying "failed states". That is what your link (and a lot of other ones) is all about. The moral and ethical question that the individual making the decison has to face is whether intervention in a "failed state" has a decent probability of preventing more deaths than the intervention will cost. The question a nation has to face is where does the intervention fit into its priorities and into its capabilities. And, whether regional military groups (or non-kinetic groups, for that matter) could handle the matter - perhaps, not as well as we "exalted" Westerners; but handle it.

    When I get home, I'll add the monograph to my folder on Peace Enforcement; and read the articles - and also check out the webpage. Thanks for the link.

    PS: I don't buy the "lowly CPT" line - if you want to address GEN's topics, then you have to be able to present a GEN's arguments, even if you aren't one.

  5. #45
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    Default In my defense

    Can anyone speak to the accuracy of this? That is certainly an often cited criticism, but is it accurate? I would be very surprised if we were doing something so stupid and simplistic.

    All I know, is that as a PL on the ground I was never told what the metrics for ISAF were. Also, I know that my BDE didn't have any relevant metrics, or at least PLs and COs on the ground didn't know them.

    I also know that in the Accidental Guerilla, Dr. Kilcullen made a point that when the surge operations began and he was brought in, one of the big changes was a clear refining of metrics and tracking them much better down the chain of command. Could the same mistake be made twice? Easily.

    So, if the high command of a country has metrics, but the American people, the Afghans of the country and the soldiers on the ground don't know them, do they really exist?

  6. #46
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    I think you just answered my question...
    Quote Originally Posted by Michael C View Post
    All I know, is that as a PL on the ground I was never told what the metrics for ISAF were. Also, I know that my BDE didn't have any relevant metrics, or at least PLs and COs on the ground didn't know them.
    The amount of stuff that PLs and COs do not have visibility on dwarfs what they do have visibility on.

    Quote Originally Posted by Michael C View Post
    I also know that in the Accidental Guerilla, Dr. Kilcullen made a point that when the surge operations began and he was brought in, one of the big changes was a clear refining of metrics and tracking them much better down the chain of command. Could the same mistake be made twice? Easily.
    I would say that, just as easily, they could learn from that in less than 2 years. Lo and behold they did, in Iraq. I don't know why the assumption that they haven't in Afghanistan, especially given that much of the same brain trust that revamped our approach in Iraq is now trying to apply Iraq v2.0 in Afghanistan.

    Quote Originally Posted by Michael C View Post
    So, if the high command of a country has metrics, but the American people, the Afghans of the country and the soldiers on the ground don't know them, do they really exist?
    I don't understand the question. Why would the American people or the Afghans need to know them? And as I ponder the metrics that we had in Iraq, I don't even understand why the troops on the ground (as opposed to the troops in the TOC) needed to know them. I doubt that they did, which reinforces my skepticism as to why this would matter. Metrics do not drive operations; they measure the effectiveness of operations.

  7. #47
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    I found a link on Foreign Policy that pretty much answered most of my assertions and questions. The Obama administration has set clear metrics for Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the documents words,

    Background: During his March 27, 2009 speech announcing our new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, President Obama said "going forward, we will not blindly stay the course. Instead, we will set clear metrics to measure progress and hold ourselves accountable."

    The reason PLs and COs, along with Afghans and Americans, should know the metrics we are using in a counter-insurgency is because they are the ones executing the policies. When everyone is on the same page, we get better results plain and simple. Also, the PLs and COs will be the ones reporting progress, so why wouldn't know what they are being evaluated on?

  8. #48
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Can you give me an idea of what you'd consider a valid metric

    for Afghanistan given the situation as you know it and our publicly stated goals?

  9. #49
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    Quote Originally Posted by Michael C View Post
    The reason PLs and COs, along with Afghans and Americans, should know the metrics we are using in a counter-insurgency is because they are the ones executing the policies. When everyone is on the same page, we get better results plain and simple. Also, the PLs and COs will be the ones reporting progress, so why wouldn't know what they are being evaluated on?
    It's the same reason that you shouldn't gear the teaching in a classroom towards the standardized test. The test becomes nothing more than a measure of how well the teacher was able to prepare the kids for the multiple choice questions, rather than a test of how well the kids are educated.

    Metrics aren't necessarily part of "being on the same page." They're just a measure of performance and effectiveness. I remember when our metrics in Bosnia dealt with number of patrols and number of safety violations. Operations were then geared towards number of patrols and safety. The definition of "patrol" became not a trip out the gate, but rather a 2-hour period outside of the gate. So, if you were out on a 3.5 hour mission, your commander would tell you to ride around for an extra half hour so that it would count as two patrols - I'm not making that up (how could I?).

    That said, the metrics should have a lot in common with the commander's intent - which everyone should know.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Michael C View Post
    Can anyone speak to the accuracy of this? That is certainly an often cited criticism, but is it accurate? I would be very surprised if we were doing something so stupid and simplistic.

    All I know, is that as a PL on the ground I was never told what the metrics for ISAF were. Also, I know that my BDE didn't have any relevant metrics, or at least PLs and COs on the ground didn't know them.

    I also know that in the Accidental Guerilla, Dr. Kilcullen made a point that when the surge operations began and he was brought in, one of the big changes was a clear refining of metrics and tracking them much better down the chain of command. Could the same mistake be made twice? Easily.

    So, if the high command of a country has metrics, but the American people, the Afghans of the country and the soldiers on the ground don't know them, do they really exist?


    Well. Wow. You have the metrics. As a CO/PL your guys are doing the measuring. You might not be making the suit but you and others like you are gathering the raw data. It is usually not hard to follow. where does my report go? What is the working group of the on-high taking out of my reports. What is the way ahead? If you are not reporting on your observation in the community regularly to higher well yeah you are wasting your peoples time and effort. DOnt do that. Is it good to have x is why we do y well sure it is preferred but the answers are around if you know the questions to ask. And it may not be your job it may belong to someone else.

  11. #51
    Council Member 82redleg's Avatar
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    Default Metrics exist

    At least in 2005-2006 they did, and they were reported and discussed monthly. My buddies that went back in 2007-2008 were using the same process, with similar metrics, so I assume they are still being used.

    The issue is that the Afghans DON"T want democracy, at least not what we consider democracy. They want to live in peace in their little valleys like it is the 1300s- which is FINE. I could give a #### less what they do to themselves in East Bum####istan. I do care when the shelter murderous scumbags that get people to fly planes into buildings. When they do that, we go kill the bad guys, and those that support/shelter/aid them. The ones that don't can go back to living in the 1300s, for all I care.

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    Default At Ken White

    The link I posted has a whole host of good metrics, the best being reconciliation programs in what number of districts. This is correlated with strong district government which is the key to winning, in my opinion.

    Of course, my personal favorite for all states is infant mortality. It doesn't relate to direct causes, but is far and away the most correlated to good government. Basically, the countries you want to live in with good economies and standards of living, have low infant mortality and failed states have very high infant mortality. Now, in a country like Afghanistan, it has had historically abysmal infant mortality rates. If America could cut their rate in half, do you think Afghans or Pakistanis or Arabs would hate us for that?

    Of course, some would say that Afghans just want to live in the 1300s, but trust me they want to have less of their babies die more than anything else.

  13. #53
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Hmm. Interesting

    Quote Originally Posted by Michael C View Post
    The link I posted has a whole host of good metrics, the best being reconciliation programs in what number of districts. This is correlated with strong district government which is the key to winning, in my opinion.
    We can disagree on the validity of those 'metrics.' I contend the majority of those bullets are goals, not metrics. The Metrics would be the quantifiable indicators of achievement of those goals. I further suggest that the answers relating progress toward those goals are either totally meaningless if they are quantities or are subjective judgments -- which are fine but they aren't metrics...

    For example, your "reconciliation programs in what number of districts" would likely change fairly frequently as the tide of Talibs surges and goes to Pakistan for rest and refit. The various reconciliation programs would likely have varying levels from District to District and would change on a random but probably more than weekly basis. A key to good metrics is to ask the right questions or have the right components for measurement. My experience with the US Army is that we, as an institution, are quite good at manipulating that to look good...
    Of course, my personal favorite for all states is infant mortality. It doesn't relate to direct causes, but is far and away the most correlated to good government. Basically, the countries you want to live in with good economies and standards of living, have low infant mortality and failed states have very high infant mortality. Now, in a country like Afghanistan, it has had historically abysmal infant mortality rates. If America could cut their rate in half, do you think Afghans or Pakistanis or Arabs would hate us for that?
    In reverse order, Yes, some would -- think about it. No one likes you if you do something they cannot do for themselves. They'd take the improvement and like that but they would not like us simply because we did something they wanted to do but could or did not.

    I'm not sure what a failed state is and I think that's dangerous term because it implies (to all the residents of that State) that you look down upon them -- 'failed' is pejorative, anyway you phrase it. The issue in any event is can you move it to 'unfailed' status, other than humanistically is it in your interest, what will it cost and is the benefit worth the cost?

    Let's say you halve the infant mortality rate. In Afghanistan, how long do you think it will take you to achieve that and will you have to make changes to the local culture that may not be acceptable to achieve it? If you attempt to do it and fail, could you do more harm than good? If you promise it and do not deliver, will this loss of credibility affect your other -- perhaps more important to you -- goals?

    From your linked list of 'metrics' hare are some of those pertaining to Afghanistan:

    1. Degree to which security operations are integrated into the overall COIN campaign.
    2. Level of insurgent-related violence *
    3. Public perceptions of security **
    4. Percent of population living in districts/areas under insurgent control *
    5. Percent of population living in districts/areas undergoing clearing operations * ***
    6. Percent of populations living in districts/areas "held" by coalition and/or ANSF and where "build" activities are ongoing ***
    7. Percent of key lines of communication under government control
    8. Effectiveness of Afghan border security efforts **
    9. Level of trust and confidence by the Afghan people in the ANSF's (Army and Police) ability to provide sustained security **
    10. Capability, to include size, of the ANA and ANP
    11. Effectiveness of ANSF-ISAF partnered counterinsurgency operations
    12. Ability of the ANSF to assume lead security responsibility ^
    13. Level of corruption within the ANSF ^^ **
    14. Ability of the ANSF to handle their own logistics needs^^ * ** ***

    Asterisks added: * =Will change so frequently as to negate sensible interpretation. ** =Will fluctuate as people respond with answers that are to their advantage; they will game the system. ***=Personal Mobility will provide erroneous conclusions. ^=That one may have some merit. ^^=Heh, heh. Number 10 will be a moving target...

    I submit that most of those require subjective answers; that most will also have frequent changes up and down scale; that not one of them will truly tell you how the campaign is doing toward achieving the overall goals publicly stated for the mission. Only one will tell you how soon you might, just might, see some small successes.

    War is an art, not a science. While one can produce all sorts of 'metrics,' warfare does not lend itself to metrics; most are really meaningless with respect to success or failure of combat or stabilization actions. They can tell you many things from ammunition expenditure through the number of authorized ZF -- both those and most in between also will change daily or really more often...

    They will not really tell you how effective your effort is. That's a subjective, experience related judgment that sense how the people involved -- friendly, enemy, civilians, bystanders -- perceive their lot and the effort. You cannot metricate that. We can't really metricate it, no matter how enamored many are of the idea. War is not a numbers game, it's a people game and you cannot quantify ideas and perceptions.

    All that said, use metrics if they make you happy; I know many in the Army (and elsewhere) love them. Just recall some day far in the future that someone once told you to use them but not to put too much stock in what they purport to show about how your war's going...

  14. #54
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    Default "Report: Army denied aid to team under fire"

    That's the Marine Corps Times headline.
    “The absence of senior leaders in the operations center with troops in contact in the ... battlespace, and their consequent lack of situational awareness and decisive action, was the key failure in the events of 8 September 2009,” the report says. “The actions of ... senior leaders were clearly negligent.”
    "The investigation found a slew of mistakes," we are told. Among them, key senior personnel “were not continuously present in the operations center” - and some who were are described as “not adequately experienced, qualified or trained.” On the other hand, mission planning and coordination was accomplished "without participation from fire-support personnel."

  15. #55
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    Default Yawn ...

    Okay, so there were a lot of people preoccupied with other parts of the Kunar Province, including Kamdesh. So there were some moderately incompetent people in charge, or people who didn't man their jobs like they should have, and so on and so forth, or this or that, or something else, or whatever. This MC Times article is no different than the immediate reports of the AR 15-6 right after it came out. Yawn ...

    What's important is what it doesn't say, and specifically what it denies. It denies the very specific claims made by the Marine Corps field grade officers and the McClatchy reporter on site at the time of the fire fight, to wit, that the officers specifically had to tell them that there were no noncombatants around, arty support was repeatedly denied because there could be noncombatants, they had to specifically say that there weren't any noncombatants around, arty support was denied because there could be noncombatants around ... wash, rinse, dry, repeat.

    And even though they were all out for a smoke, or at the gym, or calling their girls or whatever the AR 15-6 comes up with, they had the time and presence of mind to use arty to fire white phosphorus smoke to hide their retreat ----- but not ordnance, um, well, because there could be nomcombatants around and the ROE prevented it, in spite of being told sixteen hundred times that the Marines needed arty and were going to die if they didn't get it. And to top it all off, the AR 15-6 concludes that while the 'perception' existed (and still exists) that ROE prevented the use of arty, we are to be assurred that this is all just 'perception'.

    http://www.captainsjournal.com/2010/...unar-province/

    Color me unpersuaded.
    Last edited by Danny; 03-05-2010 at 10:23 PM. Reason: Dumb typos ...

  16. #56
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    Wiser men then I can argue Right from Wrong, Left or Right, Up or Down, all I know is, my brothers died, from lack of support ? That my Friends, is UNFORGIVABLE !
    NO American life should be sacrificed without great toil, great regret and dire need ! I love my country, ... I don't trust my government.
    Most people go through life wondering if they have made a difference, United States Marines do no have that problem, Pres. R. Regan 1985

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    How many of these people were KIA in the opening moments of this well coordinated ambush? The moments before support is impossible to be had. The mistake was made at the local level during the planing phase. I wonder if anyone bothered to mention that this looks like a great place for a U shaped ambush from the high ground. Getting too comfortable is deadlier than lack of support. We've been making this same mistake since Custer and before. It's a jagged little pill to swallow.
    "But suppose everybody on our side felt that way?"
    "Then I'd certainly be a damned fool to feel any other way. Wouldn't I?"


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