Latest CJR -- Ricks

[Spud]

Thought these may be of interest to some on here:

Thomas E. Ricks has spent nearly thirty years in the field, covering violent conflicts from Somalia to Afghanistan, and he has been a member of two Pulitzer Prize-winning teams. After nearly ten years at the paper, he remains loosely affiliated with The Washington Post as a special military correspondent (he took a buyout last year), and is also the author of a blog, The Best Defense. His two books on Iraq are classics.
But in our new cover story, Tara McKelvey wonders if he has grown so close to the new military establishment and their counterinsurgency strategies in both Iraq and Afghanistan that he is more spokesman for them than skeptical journalist.
Meanwhile, the quantity and quality of reporting on Iraq and Iran is threatened, and diminishing resources are not the only problem. The military has changed. The military-journalist relationship in Iraq, for example, got better around 2006 under the command of General David Petraeus, who wanted officers talking to the press, partly as a way to explain his approach to counterinsurgency. But the window is closing. In the editorial in the September/October issue, we ask why.

Cover Story — September / October 2009
Too Close for Comfort?
Tom Ricks and the military’s new philosophical embeds
By Tara McKelvey
http://www.cjr.org/cover_story/too_c...t.php?page=all

Editorial — September / October 2009
Truth? Yes, Sir!
Why we need a clearer view of both our wars
By The Editors
http://www.cjr.org/editorial/truth_yes_sir.php

[Michael C]

A flaw in declaring Rick's the lackey boy of the military is that it assumes that to be "impartial" is synonymous with being critical. And, Ricks is far from uncritical to anyone who reads his blog posts portending a disaster (still) in Iraq.

I would go further. Even in Fiasco, one can see his embrace of the concepts of population-centric COIN. Joining CNAS, and supporting wise generals who see the efficacy of pop-centric COIN is almost predictable.

[Ken White]

if one must do or assist in the doing of counterinsurgency efforts. Nor is there any question that any competent Army must be able to do that job; or that the US Army was woefully and unforgivably not prepared to do it in the last few years.

The real question is; should one seek situations wherein to apply population centric COIN TTP or should one merely know how to do that if necessary and reserve application for those occasions when all else has failed and it absolutely cannot be avoided...

What do Tom Ricks, those wise Generals and CNAS have to say on that score?

[Cavguy]

From Jamie McIntyre, a competing reporter ...

http://www.thelineofdeparture.com/20...s-errant-dart/

CJR’s Errant Dart

CJR’s Errant Dart
By Jamie McIntyre Thursday, September 10th, 2009 9:38 pm
Posted in Media Watch, On War

There is inescapable irony in the criticism leveled at Pulitzer-prize winning journalist Tom Ricks in the current issue of Columbia Journalism Review. (“Too Close for Comfort?”)

At a time when serious fact-based reporting is being supplanted by superficial tabloid sensationalism, the venerable CJR has focused its critical eye on some of the most acclaimed reporting and analysis of the Iraq war, and found it wanting.

And the primary charge against Tom Ricks seems to be that he’s done too much research, talked to too many people, knows too much history, and is unafraid to say what he really thinks.

Now I “competed” against Tom Ricks for the past 16 years, and I didn’t always agree with his conclusions.

But that said, I find the criticism that Ricks may be “too close” to his sources to provide an independent dispassionate analysis, to be the kind of facile charge that is easy to make, and hard to shake.

If you don’t like what a reporter is saying, or if the story does not affirm your previously held belief, it’s all too easy to dismiss it with the assertion that the reporter has lost his independence. In short, it’s a cheap shot.

Challenge me on my facts, question my conclusions, hold me accountable for reporting that falls short, but don’t suggest just because I have spent time talking to people who know more about something than I do, I’ve been snowed; that somehow, despite my years of experience, I have lost my critical faculties, the very skepticism that is the bedrock of any good reporter.

Believe me, Ricks has lost none of his skepticism or independence over the years. Just the opposite. The CJR’s problem seems to be that after some very thorough research and firsthand reporting, Ricks has simply come to some conclusions the article’s author doesn’t agree with.

The magazine’s cover story was written by Tara McKelvey, a senior editor at The American Prospect and the author of Monstering: Inside America’s Policy of Secret Interrogations and Torture in the Terror War.

Among the things that bother McKelvey is that Ricks appears to have softened his harsh judgments of some U.S. commanders in his recent book The Gamble compared to his first Iraq war book Fiasco. In particular, Gen. Ray Odierno. What she doesn’t seem to recognize is that Gen. Odierno changed from the first book to the second. He learned from his mistakes, and Ricks’ reporting captures that.

Tom Ricks has two Pulitzer prizes, a pair of acclaimed books that are required reading for military officers, and his own blog. He certainly doesn’t need me to defend him. And I fully realize many people will see this as “circling the wagons” in defense of a Washington celebrity journalist.

So let me be clear that I am not objecting to a critical review of Ricks’ reporting. I firmly believe there needs to be more accountability in journalism, and no reporter, no matter how celebrated, gets a free ride.

But let’s stick to challenging the accuracy of his facts or the rigor of his arguments, and put to the rest the canard that Ricks is suffering from some infatuation with the generals he’s covering. It’s hardly the case.

[Michael C]

Ken- Totally agree that COIN should reserved for situations where it is absolutely needed. I would also argue that many of the generals who now embrace COIN--GEN Petraues in particular--were some of the fiercest critics of Iraq because they saw how it would end, in COIN.

As for Afghanistan, I think we had to go in there and the resulting insurgency was almost forgone. Realistically, Bush could not have sat in America and only lobbed cruise missiles at Afghanistan. The republicans levelled huge charges again Clinton that he caused 9/11 cause he failed to deal with Afghanistan. So basically our involvement there, and the insurgency that followed, were realities of the domestic agenda.

[William F. Owen]

.....one can see his embrace of the concepts of population-centric COIN. Joining CNAS, and supporting wise generals who see the efficacy of pop-centric COIN is almost predictable.

So what is POP-centric COIN? If it just means regurgitating the mantra of "protect the population," it is utterly meaningless, and profoundly stupid. Yes, there will be times when that needs to be done (Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia etc.) To extrapolate that as a corner stone of so called "COIN," is intellectually lazy and poor guidance.

As far as I can see CNAS are actually part of the problem, and it is extremely debatable as to what actually did cause the reductions in violence in Iraq. The AL An-Bar Awakening is pure Colonial deal making or the oldest school. Nothing to do with the new-COIN crowd at all - though they are keen to take the credit.

[karaka]

From the horse's mouth:

New Operational Culture: Population-centric COIN.

ISAF must operate differently. Preoccupied with force protection, ISAF has operated in a manner that distances itself, both physically and psychologically, from the people they seek to protect. The Afghan people have paid the price, and the mission has been put at risk. ISAF, with the ANSF, must shift its approach to bring seccurity and normalcy to the people and shield them from insurgent violence, corruption, and coercion, ultimately enabling GIRoA to gain the trust and confidence of the people while reducing the influence of insurgents. Hard-earned credibility and face to face relationships, rather than close combat, will achieve success. This requires enabling Afghan counterparts to meet the needs of the people at the community level through dynamic partnership, engaged leadership, de-centralized decision making, and a fundamental shift in priorities.

The rest is pages 2-12 to 2-14. Or, everything James Gavrilis writes about in The Mayor of Ar Rutbah.

[Bill Moore]

As far as I can see CNAS are actually part of the problem, and it is extremely debatable as to what actually did cause the reductions in violence in Iraq. The AL An-Bar Awakening is pure Colonial deal making or the oldest school. Nothing to do with the new-COIN crowd at all - though they are keen to take the credit.

WILF, in your view would you be satisfied if they took the word "centric" out of population centric, and just get back to the basics that the population is part of the environment we have to deal with, and what role the population will play will depend on the particular context of that conflict?

The population is normally key terrain, but I agree that the following two mantra's are over used and overly simplistic (perhaps dangerously so):

1. Through, by and with
2. Population Centric

We have done all this before in almost every conflict as required (some commanders did it well such as Abrams, others such as Westmoreland, not so well). IMO it is our warfighting doctrine, especially the new fangled EBO based doctrine, which was initially tied to some supposed mystical capability to see all, know all, be able to influence all that has blinded us to reality instead of enabling the force. We would probably be better off looking at our doctrine that was developed in the 1970's and previously.

Someone wrote a short paper a while back (I think it was MAX161) that we didn't give our doctrine (older doctrine) a chance, so we don't know if it worked our not. I think that is a fair comment.

[William F. Owen]

WILF, in your view would you be satisfied if they took the word "centric" out of population centric, and just get back to the basics that the population is part of the environment we have to deal with, and what role the population will play will depend on the particular context of that conflict?

BILL, yes I would be satisfied if they took out the word "centric" but I would also get rid of the word "population" as well.

• Populations have always been part of war.
• Modern policies make current demands to limit civilian deaths. That is it! It is no more complex than that.
• The ability to FIND to kill of capture him is best enabled by some civilian support. Friendly civilians are generally more likely to provide useful info that hostile. - so military action should not alienate civilians, when and where their support is useful or even required.

None of the above is new. It's all 3,000 years old. I believe in a unitary model of war, and population is merely a context or that modifies the application of force as an instrument of policy. If you think that's useful, give CvC the credit and not CNAS.