Latest CJR -- Ricks

[karaka]

From the horse's mouth:

New Operational Culture: Population-centric COIN.

ISAF must operate differently. Preoccupied with force protection, ISAF has operated in a manner that distances itself, both physically and psychologically, from the people they seek to protect. The Afghan people have paid the price, and the mission has been put at risk. ISAF, with the ANSF, must shift its approach to bring seccurity and normalcy to the people and shield them from insurgent violence, corruption, and coercion, ultimately enabling GIRoA to gain the trust and confidence of the people while reducing the influence of insurgents. Hard-earned credibility and face to face relationships, rather than close combat, will achieve success. This requires enabling Afghan counterparts to meet the needs of the people at the community level through dynamic partnership, engaged leadership, de-centralized decision making, and a fundamental shift in priorities.

The rest is pages 2-12 to 2-14. Or, everything James Gavrilis writes about in The Mayor of Ar Rutbah.

[Bill Moore]

As far as I can see CNAS are actually part of the problem, and it is extremely debatable as to what actually did cause the reductions in violence in Iraq. The AL An-Bar Awakening is pure Colonial deal making or the oldest school. Nothing to do with the new-COIN crowd at all - though they are keen to take the credit.

WILF, in your view would you be satisfied if they took the word "centric" out of population centric, and just get back to the basics that the population is part of the environment we have to deal with, and what role the population will play will depend on the particular context of that conflict?

The population is normally key terrain, but I agree that the following two mantra's are over used and overly simplistic (perhaps dangerously so):

1. Through, by and with
2. Population Centric

We have done all this before in almost every conflict as required (some commanders did it well such as Abrams, others such as Westmoreland, not so well). IMO it is our warfighting doctrine, especially the new fangled EBO based doctrine, which was initially tied to some supposed mystical capability to see all, know all, be able to influence all that has blinded us to reality instead of enabling the force. We would probably be better off looking at our doctrine that was developed in the 1970's and previously.

Someone wrote a short paper a while back (I think it was MAX161) that we didn't give our doctrine (older doctrine) a chance, so we don't know if it worked our not. I think that is a fair comment.

[William F. Owen]

WILF, in your view would you be satisfied if they took the word "centric" out of population centric, and just get back to the basics that the population is part of the environment we have to deal with, and what role the population will play will depend on the particular context of that conflict?

BILL, yes I would be satisfied if they took out the word "centric" but I would also get rid of the word "population" as well.

• Populations have always been part of war.
• Modern policies make current demands to limit civilian deaths. That is it! It is no more complex than that.
• The ability to FIND to kill of capture him is best enabled by some civilian support. Friendly civilians are generally more likely to provide useful info that hostile. - so military action should not alienate civilians, when and where their support is useful or even required.

None of the above is new. It's all 3,000 years old. I believe in a unitary model of war, and population is merely a context or that modifies the application of force as an instrument of policy. If you think that's useful, give CvC the credit and not CNAS.

[Michael C]

WILF, what Karaka posted and what is in the FM 3-24 Counter-Insurgency roughly equal population-centric COIN. Along with that, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife and some articles in Military Review.

You said, "None of the above is new. It's all 3,000 years old." I don't think CNAS, or the individual authors associated with the new theories, have ever disputed this. They strive to change contemporary US Army doctrine, but they repeatedly stress that successful policies are not new, they are old. They hold up successful past COIN as the examples.

The only thing they might dispute is crediting CvC. CvC did a lot of theorizing about inter-state wars, but I tend to side with John Keegan who views his approach as very limited. CvC, it seems to me although I have not studied him as extensively as you, was very confused about irregular warfare and populations and his policies were not for them.

[Ken White]

...they repeatedly stress that successful policies are not new, they are old. They hold up successful past COIN as the examples.

Can you give me an example of a successful 'COIN operation' since WW II by the US where a large number of troops were committed to assist another nation?

Or one by any western nation in another nation or area even when that western nation was the de-jure government of the territory involved in which the TTP used would be acceptable today?

[tequila]

Can you give me an example of a successful 'COIN operation' since WW II by the US where a large number of troops were committed to assist another nation?

Does Iraq in 2006-2008 not count? The Sunni insurgency was defeated by the U.S. and its Iraqi government allies.

[Ken White]

Don't think so. Was it defeated or temporarily co-opted? What about the other, non-Sunni minor insurgencies that are also now semi dormant? Then there's the Kurdish problem. What about the dissident Sadrists?

I'll grant you that it apparently comes closer to being a 'successful' operation to date than any other. We have never publicly stated the real goals -- the WMD bit was so much fluff and Saddam was just a good target -- but I believe one of about a dozen goals was long term basing of adequate size and utility in the ME. We have other bases but all have shortfalls of one kind or another; thus far it looks as though that goal may not be achieved. I don't think that's an insurmountable problem but if it was a goal, it wasn't attained. There are some strategic goals that I think were achieved and some seemingly not. Getting the British to return to the Gulf didn't fly. Keeping French, German and Russian commercial interests out or at least subordinate to American commercial interests apparently didn't work. We temporarily stopped the switch of the oil trade into Euros but it now looks as though that could happen...

Thus we cannot truly answer the real question due to unknowns and in the end, to be successful, the benefit to the US has to outweigh the cost. I suspect it will take a decade or two to fully answer that...

My point to MichaelC and all COIN fans is that it is an extremely costly way to do business, is rarely as effective as we'd like and has not really produced any glaring success stories to be held up as examples. And Malaya is a terrible example. Comparing Malaya and Viet Nam as an academic exercise may be fun -- but it avoids reality...

[William F. Owen]

WILF, what Karaka posted and what is in the FM 3-24 Counter-Insurgency roughly equal population-centric COIN. Along with that, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife and some articles in Military Review.

OK, but I think FM23-4 is not fit for purpose and I do not think much of "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife."

You said, "None of the above is new. It's all 3,000 years old." I don't think CNAS, or the individual authors associated with the new theories, have ever disputed this. They strive to change contemporary US Army doctrine, but they repeatedly stress that successful policies are not new, they are old. They hold up successful past COIN as the examples.

Sorry, but some very much wish to inject novelty and insight into COIN. That's why they are called "new theories." ...and they are using a whole new language to try and appear original.

The only thing they might dispute is crediting CvC. CvC did a lot of theorizing about inter-state wars, but I tend to side with John Keegan who views his approach as very limited. CvC, it seems to me although I have not studied him as extensively as you, was very confused about irregular warfare and populations and his policies were not for them.

If they do dispute it, it is because they have not read CvC or understood him. Keegan certainly did not and nor did Van Creveld.
CvC wrote about War. Not War just between states. There has never been an armed conflict in the entire span of human history to which the majority (if not all) of his observations did not apply.

He was not confused in any way by regular and irregular warfare. He just saw no point in their differentiation. War is War.

As concerns populations,
"War is a setting forth of policy with an admixture of other means,"
Policy is pretty much relevant to populations is it not? What more would you like to add?

[Michael C]

Tequile answered my first argument by saying Iraq circa 2006-2008. Vietnam would be the example of a US failure, same with Somalia. And you already discounted Malaya so... I don't disagree with you.

Unfortunately, my Army is waging to counter-insurgencies right now. Whether or not I agree with the strategic policy of getting involved in messy political situations or invasions is not the issue, ending the violence is. In that case, I could look at the example of messy violent political situations where the US has done poorly, like most of Vietnam or Algeria or Afghanistan under the Russians or Iraq in the beginning, and see what not to do. Then I can see what enabled Western forces to at least do ok in Malaya, the Philippines, Kosovo, Bosnia and copy them.

I didn't decide to invade either Iraq or Afghanistan. But I do believe a precipitous withdrawal under the wrong circumstances would harm our credibility seriously. The solution in the interim is something called population-centric COIN.

[Michael C]

OK (citing Wilf),

but I think FM23-4 is not fit for purpose and I do not think much of "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife."

Not surprised, but for most of my fellow officers they are the books that they read and say, "OK these are things I can do." I would love to know your recommendations on books or articles that provide actionable tips for currently serving officers.

Sorry, but some very much wish to inject novelty and insight into COIN. That's why they are called "new theories." ...and they are using a whole new language to try and appear original.

Except straight from the horse's mouth FM 3-24: "Insurgency and its tactics are as old as warfare itself." Also, the most commonly cited counter-insurgency experts is David Galula and he published a long time ago.

Keegan certainly did not and nor did Van Creveld.

I do not know enough on this front to dispute you assessment. All I have ever read is introductions or summaries of his work. Based on the fact that all his writings explain every conflict, it wouldn't surprise me if they were just vague enough to be able to be interpreted to every conflict. As I said, I haven't read him though.

Unfortunately, I see Clausewitz more as the father of WWI and the Cold War and less useful for messy political wars. That is just my opinion I haven't read him, I only know who he has influenced.

[Ken White]

I could look at the example of messy violent political situations where the US has done poorly, like most of Vietnam...

Good catch and caveat on the "most of." The pre 1963 effort was okay as was the post 1970 period -- we just screwed up the interim by an excessive yet inadequate number of troops. Excessive in that there were too many poorly trained people bombing about doing more harm than good. Inadequate because we did not even then possess enough troops to cover the area and population. An even more important factor was the government was not us. I would note the same factors prevail in Afghanistan today...

...Then I can see what enabled Western forces to at least do ok in Malaya, the Philippines, Kosovo, Bosnia and copy them.

I suggest that Malaya is a bad example because, once again, we are not the government as the UK was in Malaya. Add to that the fact many techniques employed by the British will not be employed by us for various reasons. The Philippines are time dependent; now, we and they are doing well. Against the Huks, the Philippines did okay. Us in the early 20th century -- we did fairly well but it took us a while to learn and it took a long time, time that may not be available now or in the future. Kosovo and Bosnia are bad examples of anything and everything. Classic how not to do it. The 82d was doing okay in Bosnia initially and then BG Ric Sanchez came in and messed it up. All those SSGs out playing Village Mayor were pulled back in to forts and the edict was issued that no patrol would go out with less than a field grade officer in charge. They did alright as well in Kosovo until they were told to stop being population centric. Some people adapt better than others. So do some units. One of my pet Generals, old Airborne head, once told me that "...Airborne units are a lot of fun but they aren't the Army." True dat. Very true...

I didn't decide to invade either Iraq or Afghanistan. But I do believe a precipitous withdrawal under the wrong circumstances would harm our credibility seriously. The solution in the interim is something called population-centric COIN.

I very strongly agree on the former, we cannot withdraw too soon. On the latter, I agree with your ideal, I really do but I also know the reality -- the US Army is not going to do that because it cannot due to training inadequacies, temperament and the fact that it is a foreign body in the eyes of Afghans. Even if it could and would do it, the Army does not have adequate numbers for that process to work in a nation like Afghanistan. Nor does it or can it ever have adequate local knowledge.

Population centric COIN is a great theory -- anyone who tries can make the precepts work at a local level but to make it an effective process for a nation you must have adequate strength, local knowledge and both unity and continuity of purpose. With the US Army if Afghanistan or most other places (and especially with a coalition...) you will almost certainly never have any of those and yet you must have all to prevail in the population centric COIN mode.