Hitting Bottom in Foggy Bottom

[SWJED]

Preparing to Lose the Information War? - Matt Armstrong, MountainRunner.

It has now been eight years since 9/11 and we finally seem to understand that in the modern struggles against terrorism, insurgency, and instability, the tools of public diplomacy are invaluable and essential. We live in a world where an individual with a camera phone can wield more influence than an F-22 stealth fighter jet. The capability of engaging public audiences has long been thought of as the domain of civilians. But for the past eight years, the functions, authorities, and funding for engaging global audiences, from anti-AIDS literature to soccer balls to development projects, has migrated from the State Department to the Defense Department. It seems whole forests have fallen over the same period on the need to enhance civilian agencies - be it the State Department or a new USIA-like entity - to provide a valid alternative to the Defense Department who most, even the detractors, agree was filling a void left by civilians who abrogated their responsibility for one reason or another.

This summer may be a turning point. Some in Congress have unilaterally decided that 2010 is the year America's public diplomacy will stop wearing combat boots. Sounds good, right? This is the future most, including analysts and the military, have wished for. The military has been the unwilling (if passionate once engaged) and often clumsy surrogate and partner for the State Department in representing the US and its interests in Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere around the world through what the House Armed Services Committee now calls "military public diplomacy." In some regions, State is almost wholly dependent on Defense money and resources to accomplish its mandate...

More at MountainRunner.

[Spud]

Personally I think it is this issue that Matt highlights that is of more concern:

House Appropriations Committee

The Committee has serious concerns about not only the significant amount of funding being spent on [information operations] programs, but more importantly, about the Department's assumption of this mission area within its roles and responsibilities.

House Armed Services Committee

The committee encourages the development of strategic communications capability within the Department of Defense as a soft-power complement to traditional hard-power tools. The committee has explored policy, management, and organizational impediments to wider adoption of strategic communications capability, but is becoming increasingly concerned that human capital planning in this area is insufficient compared to the needs.

I’m confused

[Ken White]

Personally I think it is this issue that Matt highlights that is of more concern:...I’m confused

be more confused than you; because we is!!!

Our Congress has 535 members. Getting two to agree completely on much of anything has been proven impossible...

[MountainRunner]

Spud,
Yes, confounding, isn't it? The issue hasn't been highlighted anywhere - let alone Walter Pincus's poor article back in July (blogged on here) - which is the main reason I finally wrote the post 'Preparing to Lose the Information War'. There is some assumption of collaboration and coordination, but considering HFAC, SFRC, and foreign ops approps in both House and Senate already acted and moved on before HAC-D surprised everybody in a way that actually caused some to suspect ulterior motives (and engender sympathy for DOD in unexpected quarters), we have another example of no coordination.

Ken, in this case it wasn't agreeing on something as much as simply talking to each other. This was clear from my conversations with staff from several committees and several members (House and Senate) over the summer before and during the recess. This was probably compounded by the health care debate and the rush to clear the decks before recess, which for most members was not a rest at home.

I've posted on the language of support of DOD SC in HASC and SASC reports on NDAA and HAC-D. Monday I'll post this, but here is the list in advance which may also confuse since HASC already put some wheels in motion.

IO Related Requirements in 3 Hill Reports as of 31 July 2009

SASC Report 111-35 on NDAA FY2010
·“awaits delivery of the report on strategic communication and public diplomacy activities of the Federal Government required under section 1055 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009” (p183)
·“directs the Under Secretary of Defense—Policy and Under Secretary of Defense—Comptroller to develop budget documentation materials for fiscal year 2011 that clearly articulate and document DOD’s objectives and funding levels for strategic communications and public diplomacy” (p183)
HASC Report 111-166 on NDAA FY2010
·“encourages the Commander to develop and demonstrate innovative techniques and capabilities, with respect to relevant linguistic and cultural expertise, and increase both guidance and response linkages between strategic communications and operations” (p364)
·“directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on the assessment of the Department's strategic communications workforce to the congressional defense committees within 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act. The report should include the following [6] elements…” (p374)
·“encourages the Department to conduct a legal review of the applicability of Public Law 80-402 [Smith-Mundt Act] and its intersection with Department of Defense policy guiding online media operations” (p377)
House Approps Report 111-230 on NDAA FY2010
·“[submit] a report to the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate on the Department's IO programs. This report should encompass the period from fiscal years 2005 through 2010 and include all Department of Defense information operation programs for which base budget, supplemental, or overseas contingency operation funds have been appropriated or requested. The report shall include: program strategies, target audiences, goals, and measures of effectiveness; budget exhibits at the appropriations account and sub-activity level; spend plans (including positions and other direct costs); and production and dissemination mechanisms and locations. The report shall also include an annex for the inclusion of necessary explanatory and supporting classified information. The Secretary shall submit this report in writing not later than 180 days after enactment of this Act.” (p68)

-Matt

[Steve the Planner]

Hitting Bottom in Foggy Bottom (FP), Civilian Surge Fizzles (Christian Science Monitor)---to name a few.

I keep looking for something to change the landscape, and wonder when it is going to get so bad that change will be possible.

Last Sunday, I hit bottom when reading a Washington Post Article about a brave LTC, his pride in meeting with Gen. Petreaus, and the soldiers that he lost in 2007. Somewhere in the article was a quote from 2007 from the General about the substantial strategic interests we "have" in Iraq that necessitate....yadda, yadda, yadda.....What were they again?

That came after a Thursday article that the Iraqi Ministry of Planning was suspending the upcoming census---just too hot, politically. That was especially significant to me because I spent so much time trying to build the civilian GIS mapping and demographic base in order to allow serious resource and service planning (and the census) to get started. The basic rule of quantitative methods and planning---if you can count it, you can know something about it.

So, I'm watching Afghanistan second-hand, and know that it is rapidly becoming an even bigger mess on the civilian reconstruction side. I already know that the civilian mapping base, population data, and planning there is complete chaos. Just crap thrown against a wall instead of anything serious when so many young kids' lives are on the line.

Like Rory Stewart said, working for the government (at least right now) is to be asked whether we should wear a seat belt when we drive over the cliff. Nobody seems to be concerned that driving off a cliff isn't such a great idea, or that, with a little well-informed strategy, there might be an alternative route that actually gets you somewhere other than a junk pile at the bottom of a ravine.

I keep watching for some smart military/civilian leader to say: "Gee, we ought to do things differently. What can we do instead?" But it ain't happening. "...Cannons to the right of us, cannons to the left.....rode the 600."

When is somebody going to cut the gordian knot? Where is Alexander when you need him?

Steve

Since returning from Iraq, I'm back in the States working on regular local government corruption and planning incompetence stuff. The goal is just to keep things generally on a reasonable track because perfection doesn't happen there, or here. You just do the best that is possible. And fix serious problems when they are seriously broken.