Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq

[Jedburgh]

Cordesman's response, published 5 Sep 06. As is usual with "working drafts" from CSIS, the document is full of typos, but it is a good read in conjunction with the original document posted above by SWJED.

The Aug 06 Quarterly Report: Progress but Far from the Facts the Nation Needs and Deserves

If the US is to fight "long wars" against asymmetric opponents, particularly wars where political and ideological perceptions are as important as the facts on the ground, it is vital to have an honest assessment of how well its strategy and tactics are performing and of the problems and risks it faces. Spin and exaggeration can motivate for brief periods but not for sustained conflicts. Ethnocentric or xenophobic statements can only mislead. Claiming success before it is achieved is a recipe for losing credibility and support at every level. The same is true of understating problems and risks...

ExecSum

The broad summary of strategy does not identify the need to shift US strategy to deal with the growing risk of civil conflict, the failure to reach a new political accord, and commit US troops to preventing sectarian and ethnic conflict and concentrate on the "battle of Baghdad." It essentially restates the President's strategy speeches in the fall of 2006. (pp. 1-2)

The analysis of Political Progress ignores all of the practical problems in choosing the Iraqi government, in making it work, and the problems that must be solved in the future. It is little more than an exercise in lying by omission. (pp. 2-3)

The Economic Activity analysis remains over-optimistic rubbish. The economic impacts of the insurgency and sectarian and ethnic violence are not mentioned. No discussion is made of unemployment and underemployment, sectoral economic problems, distribution of income, the impact of ethnic and sectarian cleansing, and the failures in the aid effort discovered by the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction. No US official with a shred of integrity could sign off on this text. (pp. 2-3)

The Security Environment section does a far better job than previous reporting of warning about the scale of sectarian and ethnic strife and that the primary threat in Iraq has evolved over time from terrorism to insurgency to civil war. It does serious understate the risks of Kurdish actions that could divide the country, and the failures of the Maliki government, focusing almost solely on extremists and the Mahdi (Sadr) militia. (pp. 3-4)

The Iraqi Security Forces section makes all the usual claims about the readiness of the Iraqi Army, but provides no assessment of problems and risks. The major weaknesses and shortcomings in the Iraqi security forces, police forces, and paramilitary forces are totally ignored. The need for years of additional US military, advisory, and aid support is not mentioned. (p. 4)

The Transition section refers to a historical milestone that does have some importance. It makes no effort, however, to describe the true readiness and capability of the Iraqi forces involved, the level of continued US support required, the problems in provincial police and security forces, or the problems in transferring real authority to Iraqi forces throughout the country. (p. 4)...

(10 pages of more detailed analysis of the assessment follow)

[Jedburgh]

Here's the November 2006 Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq Quarterly Report
Just the ExecSum runs to three-and-a-half pages, so I only pulled out these base-line numbers:

...In the past three months, the total number of attacks increased 22%. Some of this increase is attributable to a seasonal spike in violence during Ramadan. Coalition forces remained the target of the majority of attacks (68%), but the overwhelming majority of casualties were suffered by Iraqis. Total civilian casualties increased by 2% over the previous reporting period. 54% of all attacks occurred in only 2 of Iraq’s 18 provinces (Baghdad and Anbar). Violence in Iraq was divided along ethnic, religious, and tribal lines, and political factions within these groups, and was often localized to specific communities. Outside of the Sunni Triangle, more than 90% of Iraqis reported feeling very safe in their neighborhoods. Still, concern regarding civil war ran high among the Iraqi populace....

Of course, CSIS has a follow-up, dated 22 Dec 06:

The DoD Quarterly Report on Stability and Security in Iraq: The Warning Indicators

This time Cordesman has followed a different format - he's excerpting whole sections of the report, and inserting his comments in italics at the pertinent places in the narrative. It makes for an interesting read, but for clarity's sake I recommend reading the DoD report in its entirety before going over the CSIS paper.

[Bill Moore]

I'm working my way through the "The Sling and the Stone" by COL Hammes, and it struck me that there is definitely a parallel between the Vietnam War and OIF. COL Hammes was expanding on how the U.S. focused on military victories, while the Vietnamese focused on political victories. First they eroded the political will of the French, then the Americans. Now I'm taking some liberty with COL Hammes' interpretation, but not much. He added that the Tet offensive was a complete failure, and basically broke the back of the Viet Cong, they were never an effective force again. Following that, the Easter Offensive by North Vietnamese regulars was soundly defeated, and furthermore the S. Vietnamese people, for the most part, supported their government during this offensive. Yet despite these victories, after years of the administration and military misleading the American people, the American people simply lost faith in their government. This was furthered along by Watergate and Nixon's resignation, so President Ford had no political power to persuade Congress to aid S. Vietnam when NV launched their next major offensive. To think we "may" have been a few weeks away from victory if we simply provided the promised logistical and air interdiction support.

Beyond a doubt our current administration has lost credibility with the American people (in both red and blue states) based on its inept management of the war. First there were no WMD, then the premature claim to victory, then denial that there was an insurgency, then there was no civil war, not to mention not having a plan for phase IV, and the list goes on. The point is that even if we are now making progress, America's will is eroded, not so much by the enemy, but by our own executive branch.

If there is a lesson in this that we obviously failed to learn in Vietnam, it is that we must be completely honest with the American people. They haven't lost patience, they lost faith. I think the President needs to replace several key leaders (the SECDEF was a good start, but not enough), and the new leaders in the administration must be allowed to maintain their credibility so the American people will give them the manuever space needed to get us on the right track.

The first report on stability measures coming out with Mr. Gates in charge of DoD needs to be brutally honest, and it should caveat where the report may be "unintentionally" misleading. We have two key fights now, one in Iraq, and second winning back the faith of the American people.

[Jedburgh]

...and now the latest, 2 Mar 07, update:Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq

No ExecSum this time, so I'm pulling a piece from the section on the overall security environment:

...The conflict in Iraq remains a mosaic and requires maximum flexibility on the part of the Coalition and the GOI to uproot the main drivers of violence in different areas of the country.

• The conflict in the north is characterized by sectarian tensions, insurgents and extremist attacks, and competition among ethnic groups (Kurd, Arab, Turkomen) for political and economic dominance, including control of the oilfields centered around Kirkuk. Violence remained focused primarily in and around the northern cities of Kirkuk, Mosul, and Tal’Afar, where ethnic competition for power is exacerbated by violence from Sunni extremists.

• Violence in Anbar is characterized by Sunni insurgents and AQI attacks against Coalition forces. AQI and affiliated Sunni extremists are attempting to intimidate the local population into supporting the creation of an Islamic state. However, in a positive development, these efforts are provoking a backlash among some tribal figures and Sunni insurgent leaders, who are encouraging local opposition to AQI, particularly in ar-Ramadi. Local Sunni sheikhs are leading this opposition and have strengthened recruiting efforts for local police forces.

• Violence in Baghdad, Diyala, and Balad is characterized by sectarian competition for power and influence between AQI and JAM, principally through murders, executions, and high-profile bombings. AQI and JAM elements rarely clash directly; most of their reciprocal violence is against Shi’a
and Sunni civilians through high-profile bombings or campaigns of sectarian cleansing.

• The conflict in the southern provinces is characterized by tribal rivalry; factional violence among the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)/Badr Organization, the Office of the Martyr Sadr/JAM, and smaller militias for political power; and attacks on Coalition forces....

[Jedburgh]

Here's the June 2007 Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq Quarterly Report

....Overall, it is too early to assess the impact of the new approach. For the period covered by this report, the additional forces to support the new approach were not fully in place, and those that were had only a limited time to conduct operations. In addition, new initiatives such as enhanced PRTs and focused efforts to improve GoI budget execution and rule of law remain in their initial stages. On the political front, reconciliation is a top priority. Economically, further provision of goods and services by the GoI that benefit the Iraqi population is required. Progress will depend on Iraqi follow-through on their commitments made as part of the new approach; the actions of insurgents, militia and terrorists to disrupt reconciliation will be a key challenge to the Iraqi government’s ability to fulfill its commitments....

Again, CSIS has a follow-up, dated 20 Jun 07:

Still Losing? The June 2007 Edition of Measuring Stability in Iraq

The latest Department of Defense report on “Measuring Stability in Iraq” attempts to put a bad situation in a favorable light. It does not disguise many of the problems involved, but it does attempt to defend the strategy presented by President Bush in January 2007 in ways that sometimes present serious problems. More broadly, it reveals that the President’s strategy is not working in any critical dimension....