Cordesman's response, published 5 Sep 06. As is usual with "working drafts" from CSIS, the document is full of typos, but it is a good read in conjunction with the original document posted above by SWJED.

The Aug 06 Quarterly Report: Progress but Far from the Facts the Nation Needs and Deserves
If the US is to fight "long wars" against asymmetric opponents, particularly wars where political and ideological perceptions are as important as the facts on the ground, it is vital to have an honest assessment of how well its strategy and tactics are performing and of the problems and risks it faces. Spin and exaggeration can motivate for brief periods but not for sustained conflicts. Ethnocentric or xenophobic statements can only mislead. Claiming success before it is achieved is a recipe for losing credibility and support at every level. The same is true of understating problems and risks...

ExecSum

The broad summary of strategy does not identify the need to shift US strategy to deal with the growing risk of civil conflict, the failure to reach a new political accord, and commit US troops to preventing sectarian and ethnic conflict and concentrate on the "battle of Baghdad." It essentially restates the President's strategy speeches in the fall of 2006. (pp. 1-2)

The analysis of Political Progress ignores all of the practical problems in choosing the Iraqi government, in making it work, and the problems that must be solved in the future. It is little more than an exercise in lying by omission. (pp. 2-3)

The Economic Activity analysis remains over-optimistic rubbish. The economic impacts of the insurgency and sectarian and ethnic violence are not mentioned. No discussion is made of unemployment and underemployment, sectoral economic problems, distribution of income, the impact of ethnic and sectarian cleansing, and the failures in the aid effort discovered by the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction. No US official with a shred of integrity could sign off on this text. (pp. 2-3)

The Security Environment section does a far better job than previous reporting of warning about the scale of sectarian and ethnic strife and that the primary threat in Iraq has evolved over time from terrorism to insurgency to civil war. It does serious understate the risks of Kurdish actions that could divide the country, and the failures of the Maliki government, focusing almost solely on extremists and the Mahdi (Sadr) militia. (pp. 3-4)

The Iraqi Security Forces section makes all the usual claims about the readiness of the Iraqi Army, but provides no assessment of problems and risks. The major weaknesses and shortcomings in the Iraqi security forces, police forces, and paramilitary forces are totally ignored. The need for years of additional US military, advisory, and aid support is not mentioned. (p. 4)

The Transition section refers to a historical milestone that does have some importance. It makes no effort, however, to describe the true readiness and capability of the Iraqi forces involved, the level of continued US support required, the problems in provincial police and security forces, or the problems in transferring real authority to Iraqi forces throughout the country. (p. 4)...
(10 pages of more detailed analysis of the assessment follow)