AP: General calls for more Afghanistan troops

[IntelTrooper]

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/s...ryId=103363131

"The only thing I've said to my folks is, 'A, I want an unvarnished assessment, but, B, I don't want to put the resource question before the strategy question,'" Obama said. "Because there is a natural inclination to say, 'If I get more, then I can do more.'"

I think that's fair enough, but the 'If I get more, then I can do more' comment strikes me as a little Rumsfeldian. I have to imagine that the number of troops available would weigh heavily in deciding what strategy to pursue.

[SWJED]

McChrystal: More Forces or 'Mission Failure'
by SWJ Editors

Via The Washington Post:

The top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan warns in an urgent, confidential assessment of the war that he needs more forces within the next year and bluntly states that without them, the eight-year conflict “will likely result in failure,” according to a copy of the 66-page document obtained by The Washington Post. Bob Woodward reports; Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Karen DeYoung provide analysis; and a declassified version of document is available on washingtonpost.com.

The Report: Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal says emphatically: “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) — while Afghan security capacity matures — risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.” … McChrystal describes an Afghan government riddled with corruption and an international force undermined by tactics that alienate civilians. He provides extensive new details about the Taliban insurgency, which he calls a muscular and sophisticated enemy that uses modern propaganda and systematically reaches into Afghanistan’s prisons to recruit members and even plan operations.

Bob Woodward’s full story can be found here.

Analysis: McChrystal’s assessment, in the view of two senior administration officials, is just “one input” in the White House’s decision-making process. … When Obama announced his strategy in March, there were few specifics fleshing out his broad goals, and the military was left to interpret how to implement them. As they struggle over how to adjust to changing reality on the ground, some in the administration have begun to fault McChrystal for taking the policy beyond where Obama intended, with no easy exit. But Obama’s deliberative pace — he has held only one meeting of his top national security advisers to discuss McChrystal’s report so far — is a source of growing consternation within the military. “Either accept the assessment or correct it, or let’s have a discussion,” one Pentagon official said. “Will you read it and tell us what you think?” Within the military, this official said, “there is a frustration. A significant frustration. A serious frustration.”

The full piece by Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Karen DeYoung can be found here.

The Department of Defense on Sunday evening released a declassified version of Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's assessment of the war in Afghanistan. The Post agreed to publish this version, which includes minor deletions of material that officials said could compromise future operations, rather than a copy of the document marked "confidential." The document can be viewed here.

[John T. Fishel]

few understand what it is. I go by the Army War College definition that strategy consists of an ends, ways, and means construct based on the nature of the threat. It does not, as most so-called strategists think, consist only of ends and ways. It always requires a realtionship between ends and means. So, unless our President is waiting for the Afghan (and US) political situation to shake out - as one article last week said - and is using his current phrasing to buy time, then he simply doesn't understand strategy as I do and as is taught in the war colleges and staff colleges.

Cheers

JohnT

[MikeF]

As posted by Exum here. PDF was too large to attach. I'm sorting through it now. One question that I think we must consider is:

What are maximalist objectives for Afghanistan?

In Iraq, we set out to develop a democratic, federal state that was friendly to the US. BG McMaster's states those objectives were maximalist and defied reality. Given that Afghanistan ranks at the bottom on almost any world metric of nation-states, what is the best we can hope for? No easy answers.

v/r

Mike

[slapout9]

So, unless our President is waiting for the Afghan (and US) political situation to shake out - as one article last week said - and is using his current phrasing to buy time, then he simply doesn't understand strategy as I do and as is taught in the war colleges and staff colleges.

Cheers

JohnT

Kinda hits the nail on the head in my opinion.

[Steve the Planner]

If only we can connect to the "powerful Afghan people."

Isn't that the crux of the problem?

The Afghan people are neither powerful nor meaningfully engaged in any of this. They are pawns of powerful international and transnational forces, as expressed through national, regional and local power brokers of one form or another, all working for their own, or some "bigger" objective not related to the people of Afghanistan. At best, they "people" are working to survive, and at worst, to prosper on the backs of the rest.

The Kharzai re-election was no more a surprise to knowledgeable folks than the new "discovery" of widespread governmental corruption and ineffectiveness. Now, it is plain for all to see.

So where, in this assessment, is the means, ends and ways of connecting the Afghan people to a viable future? Short-shrift to some vaguely discerned civil-military operational tweaking?

A serious plan for Afghan civil restoration, in light of substantial public corruption from the top down, and major civilian governmental ineffectiveness at all levels and by all parties, really needs to be civilian-focused, econ/agriculturally based, and not military-driven.

Packing a bunch of FSOs, USG bureaucrats, former military (now in civilian billets), and anthropologists into a military plane and flying them to Afghanistan for relatively short deployments has been tried before (over and over), and it just doesn't work any better than giving billions to NGOs for disjointed ineffectiveness.

Absent a viable civilian/economic/political means, end and ways that will result in a sustainable Afghanistan, all of this military "strategy" isn't strategy at all. It is just rearranging deck chairs.

So, what is the civilian, economic, political strategy to which a military sub-strategy can be successfully aligned?

Steve

[Rob Thornton]

I agree with John. I don’t think it is incumbent upon the military to decide what our policy end should be - that is a job for the elected leaders based on what is best for our interests - after all its the use of our people and resources to achieve that end. I understand fully that Afghanistan has a NATO consideration, got it - but I think its clear based on commitment of resuorces the U.S. is the designated driver. So in this case our "interests" are broad and include broader stability of the region, U.S. leadership/prestige, viability of NATO, etc. Consdieration of those interests should not constrain us, but should always be balanced against what ultimately matters to the United States and its ability to have some control over its course in the future.

Waiting on something to become politically viable is a sure way to miss opportunity and let events get to a point where you are only in a position to react.

The military's share of strategy:

I think it’s the military’s requirement to inform policy and to determine the best ways to achieve the policy and give the best military advice on what means will be required. I think the military might also give several alternative COAs that offer varying perspectives on what might be achieved in the context of feasibility, acceptability and sustainability. Ultimately, the folks with the responsibility to determine the policy ends are the elected leaders.
Without a determined policy end that guides the application of power and influence, those charged with developing an operational approach are kind of left to muddle through as best they can.

It sounds like ISAF has given their best estimate of ways and means given what they understand to be the policy end. If the answer is uncomfortable, then redefine (or perhaps just define it) the end and see what new estimates come back.

Best, Rob

[slapout9]

So, what is the civilian, economic, political strategy to which a military sub-strategy can be successfully aligned?

Steve

Steve, planning is Communism so we don't do that. We do allow the Military to cheat and plan some stuff but other than that.....we just wait for that Invisible Hand to swoop down and guide us to.........where ever.

[marct]

really bothers me about the discussion is that it is focused on "strategy" and not grand strategy. While I can easily live with the ends ways means version of strategy, this is missing the key element which is the overall vision of purpose. And, after going through the assessment, I am left feeling somewhat frustrated with the buck passing that is going on. As I rather snarkily noted

If you read the assessment carefully, and not only between the lines, there is a quality of “put up or shut up” to it regarding the political ends. Someone from the political side has to stand up and act as the lead on this, and I really cannot see either President Karzai or President Obama doing so effectively.

So, a) what is the grand strategic objective and b) who is the lead on it? This, BTW, gets to the part behind the "means".

[Steve the Planner]

We are always planning. It is just that so much of it can be disjointed and counter-productive.

Having spent enough time with military planning to understand the exigencies of driving such a big ship through narrow channels, I am always left with the feeling that we are using the wrong tool---the hammer in search of a solution.

Civilian planning starts with Jane Jacobs, an open ended approach to interactive self-actualizing systems grounded in local connections and choices. Doesn't matter what community it is, engaging them, and helping them to frame a positive future---and the means and ends to get there---is the root.

What are some critical branches? Meaningful public participation, open government, goal focused plans, plan-based budgeting, forums for address and redress, reasonable checks and balances against excesses/corruption, feedback loops, ongoing refinements.

President Obama starts as a community activist, so he knows the basics (and limitations) of what has to be done on the civilian side to by-pass, and ultimately, change a disfunctional community and governance structure.

I am afraid that, upon entry to office, he was a bit too bewildered by all the stars, bars, jargon, and bureaucracy, to look at Afghanistan through a traditional community-based and people-focused lens.

But time flies, the political/economic/social crisis is at hand, and the limits of US civilian/military bureaucracy are pretty self-evident. So what CHANGE does he bring?

The current assessment really underscores the problem: The military can not plan around the current civilian policy/implementation gap. Somebody needs to set a new civilian strategy for the military to conform to, and he is the somebody.

Steve

[slapout9]

few understand what it is. I go by the Army War College definition that strategy consists of an ends, ways, and means construct based on the nature of the threat. It does not, as most so-called strategists think, consist only of ends and ways. It always requires a realtionship between ends and means. So, unless our President is waiting for the Afghan (and US) political situation to shake out - as one article last week said - and is using his current phrasing to buy time, then he simply doesn't understand strategy as I do and as is taught in the war colleges and staff colleges.

Cheers

JohnT

John, you know thats not a bad idea.....we should send(invite) the president to the War College.

Ends,Ways,Means and Risks don't forget the Risks!

[John T. Fishel]

Slap, I never got to the FAS test in my previous posts.

Marc, to my way of thinking all strategy from grand strategy to theater strategy to even a business strategy should be built around the ends, ways, means construct. The differences are the levels of generalization and the level of objectives. American Grand Strategy for the Cold War was laid out pretty well in NSC 68 which really filled in trhe ways and means of the Containment Policy.

Steve, once upon a time I was also a "community organized" in Mexico and Peru. The understanding of strategy that I got as a LTC in SWORD and afterward at SSI would have stood me in good stead in those days. I would add, however, that doing strategy from the bottom up is probably one of the more difficult things one can attempt. Real stratregic corporals and PCVs are hard to come by in the best of circumstances.

Cheers

JohnT

[marct]

Hi John,

Marc, to my way of thinking all strategy from grand strategy to theater strategy to even a business strategy should be built around the ends, ways, means construct. The differences are the levels of generalization and the level of objectives. American Grand Strategy for the Cold War was laid out pretty well in NSC 68 which really filled in trhe ways and means of the Containment Policy.

The only problem I have with that construct is that it is linear (and limited), while I tend to view Grand Strategy as dynamic and highly integrated systems thinking, usually guided by a fairly well laid out philosophical underpinning. That being said, I can't think of many nations that have managed to achieve what I would truly call a Grand Strategy that lasted longer than, say 50 years or so. As you can see, I tend to take a long view when it comes to Grand Strategy .

Cheers,

Marc

[slapout9]

Hmmmm seems to be differant.
The Army says Ends+Ways+Means=Strategy.
The Marines say Ends+Means=Way(Strategy).

Link from SWJ Libraray on USMC Strategy manual
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/mcdp1-1.pdf

[Steve the Planner]

I was just reading new and old Zbrezinski quotes.

In 1998, he was crowing about how he Carter & Gates had duped the Soviets into Afghanistan to counter our "secret" backing of the Taliban.

Now, his point is that, by increasing the amount of troops stationed in country, we will incur the same wrath as a foreign occupier----mirroring Mullah Omar's point.

How much is too much?

Back to the boring old question: What are we really trying to achieve?

Steve

[davidbfpo]

If this conflict / intervention was not taking place in Afghan culture and society - what would we seek to achieve and what would we do? This may seem abstract, but allows clearer thought IMHO.

Yes, a Grand Strategy without Afghans. Slot in your objectives such as stabilise Pakistan, deter AQ from return to the area and 'X'.

Then factor in Afghan history and the Afghans. Allow thinking on whether the aims and means are worthwhile, let alone practical, politically OK etc.

Make your decisions and issue directions.

Steve the Planner,

I think we know what the objectives are, just that few express them well. Let alone take into account the actions of the current Afghan power brokers and bandit "lords" who have done everything to reduce Western involvement.

davidbfpo

[Adrienne]

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/s...ryId=103363131


I think that's fair enough, but the 'If I get more, then I can do more' comment strikes me as a little Rumsfeldian. I have to imagine that the number of troops available would weigh heavily in deciding what strategy to pursue.

While I respect POTUS's decision to wait until he has all the facts to determine strategy, he could start with articulating a POLICY on Afghanistan. He doesn't need a full, unvarnished assessment to explain what we're actually trying to do there. Yes, he's said our goal is to rid Afghanistan of al-Qaeda and prevent their return, but we need a few more details. We went through this same thing in Iraq - we can get the job done, but what exactly is the job you're asking us to do?

Also a bit concerned of the emphasis in the McChrystal report on ramping up the Afghan security forces. Reminds me of Iraq as well - from 2004-2006 it was all about training the ISF, and to hear MNSTC-I tell it by 2006 things were going pretty swimmingly. The reality on the ground was that things were getting worse by the day. We tend to overestimate the capabilities and willlingness of indigenous security forces to conduct a strong counter-insurgency campaign. It doesn't help when some elements of the security forces are beholden to specific ethnic/sectarian factions. I don't know the Afghan security forces that well, but I would be cautious about estimates of how fast we can transfer security to them.

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Slap

Hmmmm seems to be differant.
The Army says Ends+Ways+Means=Strategy.
The Marines say Ends+Means=Way(Strategy).

While I agree with the former, I could live with the latter.

What I'd rather avoid is Means + Ways = Ends = Strategy. There may be times when it is all you can do based on resources - got it, but its not where I would want to be as it generally means you don't have the initiative, and/or are subject to whim and fancy (or bias and agenda)

Best, Rob

[slapout9]

What I'd rather avoid is Means + Ways = Ends = Strategy. There may be times when it is all you can do based on resources - got it, but its not where I would want to be as it generally means you don't have the initiative, and/or are subject to whim and fancy (or bias and agenda)

Best, Rob

Hi Rob,
It seems to me this is what we are doing right now? Agree yes/no...comments.

Also I don't think A'stan is exactly a traditional COIN type fight and may get us into trouble....has gotten us into trouble.

[Rob Thornton]

John raises an important issue in #3 - that political leadership and military leaders may have different understandings about strategy and about each others role in it, and that those different understandings may lead to some difference in expectations.

I think there are also some cultural differences between military professionals and politicians. That is not a swipe at politicians (or military folks), its just the way their experiences shape them - however it may contribute to misunderstandings.

Best, Rob