AP: General calls for more Afghanistan troops

[Steve the Planner]

Rob's on track:

"I think there are also some cultural differences between military professionals and politicians. That is not a swipe at politicians (or military folks), its just the way their experiences shape them - however it may contribute to misunderstandings."

The questions that stem from this cultural void remain unanswered. What are we really trying to accomplish? Some people know from their perspectives, but, in listening to Sec. Clinton on BBC tonight, it seems that things are still a bit up in the air---an ongoing new study.

The General is one point of data among many other smart people.

Steve

[slapout9]

John raises an important issue in #3 - that political leadership and military leaders may have different understandings about strategy and about each others role in it, and that those different understandings may lead to some difference in expectations.

I think there are also some cultural differences between military professionals and politicians. That is not a swipe at politicians (or military folks), its just the way their experiences shape them - however it may contribute to misunderstandings.

Best, Rob

Rob, anyone,
I just saw a short clip from a weekend tv show with the President. After being asked a question he expressed some concern about how A'stan links to leading to the real enemy AQ, as in if we are successful in A'stan we will still have to deal with AQ. I think that is valid concern because AQ is a parasite they can still go anywhere they could infiltrate including the US regardless of how A'stan turns out. Maybe the General Krulak plan has merit?

[MikeF]

Rob, anyone,
I just saw a short clip from a weekend tv show with the President. After being asked a question he expressed some concern about how A'stan links to leading to the real enemy AQ, as in if we are successful in A'stan we will still have to deal with AQ. I think that is valid concern because AQ is a parasite they can still go anywhere they could infiltrate including the US regardless of how A'stan turns out. Maybe the General Krulak plan has merit?

Slap,

This question is one that has confused me throughout this debate. GEN McChrystal was quoted a week or two ago stating that there was NO indication of AQ presence in Afghanistan. The proponents of continued or ramped-up operations in A'stan contend that if we leave then AQ will come back. I don't see the link or relevance to the overall objective of defeating AQ. If we need to help A'stan b/c it's the right thing to do, then say that.

v/r

Mike

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Slap, I might totally miss answering your question - so sorry in advance.

There is usually more than one way to approach a problem, or a set of conditions you are trying to change. There are usually pros and cons associated with all of them, and there is usually some degree of risk.

I think even something that might appear as a fairly straight forward objective could prove complex depending on how one defined it, and translated it into operational requirements. It all depends on how far the executive direction that is/was provided says to go - or how well it was defined. That direction may be informed from a number of places to include military and civilian advice. It may also be considerate of other policy objectives that in some cases may be at odds or in competition with each other. Or it might not be defined at all, or in such a way that it provides ambiguous direction and as such others are left to define it as they think best.

So while I've seen some comments from pundits that General (Ret) Krulak's recommendations could not possibly succeed I'd say that depends on what you are trying to achieve - strategic context matters. I'd equally remark that the comments that say the only way to succeed is to proceed in the other vein are also qualified only by the context in which they are defining success.

Conditions and Objectives should drive requirements. However the policy end and the desired conditions which support it are defined, when the "ways" are acknowledged and agreed upon by the executive authority to achieve that end and its associated conditions then there would seem to be an obligation to either provide the means required or revisit the "ends" and "ways".

There is something to the phrase - that if you don't like the answer, (those who provide direction) should not ask the question, or at least be prepared to revisit it.

That is probably not a good answer, and I'm sorry. There may not be a good answer, but I'd rather tell you that then say there is only one way.

Best, Rob

[slapout9]

That is probably not a good answer, and I'm sorry. There may not be a good answer, but I'd rather tell you that then say there is only one way.

Best, Rob

Rob, what concerns me is putting the enemy in a position where there is no good answer....is good strategy.....unfortunetly it is being done to us,not by us.

[John T. Fishel]

is read the whole assessment. McChrystal makes a very complex but effective case, IMHO.
Mike, I suspect that the "quote" was a misquote because that is NOT what he says in the assessment. In fact, he says clearly that AQ is there; is closely aligned with one of the 3 Taliban factions all of whom collaborate in a realtively loose coalition.
Talk about confusion! I heard Carl Levin on NPR yesterday saying he fully agreed with McChrystal but seemingly coming to the conclusion that we should infuse trainers but no more combat troops or not until there are Afghan troops sufficiently trained....

Cheers

JohnT

[marct]

In some ways, my twisted (and highly visual) mind has been generating a series of random game rules for "Whack-A-Mole". The current version of the rules seems to state that you can whack a Taliban mole if and only if it is seen in close proximity to an AQ mole. This would mean, by rule inversion, that the mission is a "success" if there are no AQ moles left in play, regardless of how many Taliban (or other) moles are still around.

Given that new AQ moles can be generated by a 10 year old sitting at a computer anywhere in the world and proclaiming their "allegiance" to AQ, one does have to wonder.....

Leaving off the mole analog and imagery, there are certain key grand strategic (GS) conditions (actually feedback loops) that do not seem to be included as metrics in the strategic level but, IMHO, should be.

1. What metrics are used to track correlations between continuance of the Afghan mission and radicalization in the US /NATO nations and countries that "we" are trying to influence by diplomatic means?
2. What metrics are in use to track the GS reputation of US / NATO military forces vise a vis changes in diplomatic "power" and "prestige"?
3. What metrics are in use to track changes in US / NATO civil rights and freedoms in relation to the stated goal of a "war" on AQ?
4. What metrics are being used to track the effects of various "strategies" vise a vis national political polarization?

Three historical event spaces keep popping into my mind: the campaigns of Pyrrhus, the polarization of the late Roman Republic under Marius and Sulla, and the "restoration" of the Republic under Octavian (Augustus).

[MikeF]

Mike, I suspect that the "quote" was a misquote because that is NOT what he says in the assessment. In fact, he says clearly that AQ is there; is closely aligned with one of the 3 Taliban factions all of whom collaborate in a realtively loose coalition.

John- The remarks were made on 9/11 at the Hague:

The top commander of U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan said Friday he sees no signs of a major al-Qaida presence in the country, but says the terror group still maintains close links to insurgents...

"I do not see indications of a large al-Qaida presence in Afghanistan now," McChrystal told reporters at the Dutch Defense Ministry, where he met military officials.

But he warned that Osama bin Laden's network still maintains contact with insurgents and seeks to use areas of Afghanistan they control as bases.

"I do believe that al-Qaida intends to retain those relationships because they believe it is symbiotic ... where the Taliban has success, that provides a sanctuary from which al-Qaida can operate transnationally," he added.

Certainly, AQ has influence in A'stan. I'm starting to try and develop what AQ's strategy is for the Long War.

Assumption 1: Both sides view this conflict as a Long War.

Assumption 2: Iraq and A'stan are the INITIAL battles in this war.

Assumption 3: AQ realizes they lost Iraq.

Assumption 4: AQ adjusted strategy.

New Strategy: Transition into a war of exhaustion. Suck US into A'stan and Pakistan. Begin repositioning forces to Somalia, SE Asia, and other safehavens. As US COIN operations succeed over X amount of years (through high cost in both blood and treasure), main body moves and US is forced to follow. Eventually US quits fighting.

Endstate: US quits, and AQ can begin planning to conduct UW campaign in Saudi Arabia (the overall objective). Historians write it off as US winning battles and not the war.

That's what I would do.

So, now, I am wondering as I've wondered for the last eight years:

What is our strategy to defeat AQ?

Thoughts?

v/r

Mike

[John T. Fishel]

Lordy, Marc, y'all are sure all over the hysterical map!

Good questions. I'm not sure that Mc Chrystal and his team tackled them all but they did address some of your MOE (metrics). What I am sure they did was apply the classic FAS test of strategy to their thinking - that is, they questioned the Feasibility, Acceptability, and Suitability of their strategic construct. McChrystal's answer was that his strategy would achieve the stated mission objectives if it was applied. To be successful, it would need additional resources and, initially, would result in larger US and NATO casualties. But with support from the President and his team, he could achieve measurable progress before public support ran out. They (the MOE you suggest) are also issues to be addressed in the NSC system and ultimately by the President. I'm afraid that my level of confidence in how he is addressing them and will address them is not very high.

Cheers

JohnT

[marct]

Hi John,

Lordy, Marc, y'all are sure all over the hysterical map!

LOL - I told you that I view GS as a different type of thinking !

Good questions. I'm not sure that Mc Chrystal and his team tackled them all but they did address some of your MOE (metrics). What I am sure they did was apply the classic FAS test of strategy to their thinking - that is, they questioned the Feasibility, Acceptability, and Suitability of their strategic construct. McChrystal's answer was that his strategy would achieve the stated mission objectives if it was applied. To be successful, it would need additional resources and, initially, would result in larger US and NATO casualties. But with support from the President and his team, he could achieve measurable progress before public support ran out.

Agreed. I've gone through his assessment now, and I'm pretty impressed by it. Sure, i have some quibbles with it - I think it is still to geographically based for example - but that is somewhat moot. The key resources he needs, however, are not only the old "men and materiel" but, more importantly, political resources which are something that cannot be drawn from general stores .

They (the MOE you suggest) are also issues to be addressed in the NSC system and ultimately by the President. I'm afraid that my level of confidence in how he is addressing them and will address them is not very high.

Agreed, although i would say that the venue for such assessment goes well beyond the US to include all of the NATO nations involved since the levels on the feedback loops change with each country and over time.

[carl]

I think that is valid concern because AQ is a parasite they can still go anywhere they could infiltrate including the US regardless of how A'stan turns out. Maybe the General Krulak plan has merit?

Steve:

To carry your analogy a bit further, parasites only flourish when they have the proper host. If they pick the wrong host, no more parasite. Taliban run Afghanistan was a close to perfect host. The border areas of Pakistan are pretty good too because of their remoteness, semi-anarchic state, Pathan mores and, a big and, a Pakistani army that tolerates or even encourages the parasite. Those conditions would not be found easily anywhere else, especially in western countries.

[reed11b]

Good analogy Carl. Next step in that line of thought is to look where else those conditions may appy and try to prevent AQ from getting established there. Somalia and some other muslim african countries come to mind. If we wait until AQ is pushed out of A-stan, it will be too late. No "peace" dividend for a while yet.
Reed

[Steve the Planner]

It started as a simple exercise in bring more troops to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Now, we have shifted to an AQI focus that is transnational, and only secondary to Taliban in Afghanistan (to the extent they would provide a base for AQI).

Unfortunately, I am now hearing two potentially discrete objectives: (1) pursue AQI including in places that may be attractive refuges; (2) stabilize and improve self-governance in Afghanistan (via a new Army).

Last night, I caught CNN Andersen Cooper: Micheal Were and Peter Bergen argued for a major military increase to fight Taliban in Afghanistan; discussion included buying off warlords as an off-set to more troop deployments. Rory Stewart argued for a downscaled US/NATO mission to just AQI prevention, building a long-term development relationship to improve actual Afghan's lives, and, implicitly, an Afghanization of the internal/external conflicts.

Like Brezinzki's warning that sending more troops will incur more wrath and opposition to the "foreign occupier", and the debate over whether this is a COIN problem which can only be addressed by a COIN solution (based on the COIN staffing model, it all seems pretty complicated---but not in the military realm.

I agree with the opinion that the assessment says, if it is a military problem, here is what we need, but the crying out gap in that report is the political one.

What are we trying to achieve in Afghanistan?

My guess, and it follows some of Rory Stewart's approach, is that if our goal is to assure a permanant, long-term relationship with an adequately powerful governance group capable of limiting AQI influence over time, we may be talking warlords, Talib accommodation, and many other Afghanizations yet to be discussed here in the apppropriate depth.

The above-referenced long-term relationship is precisely what we failed to achieve in Iraq, and why I'll keep my gorillas boxes in the garage for the next round.

How do we establish long-term meaningful relationships with sufficiently powerful leadership capable of sustaining itself after our departure?

There is no grand strategy in shooting bad guys until our hunting license is revoked. The ones who survive become the next crop of bad guys.

Steve

[Ken White]

The People of Afghanistan -- the nominal focal point of a COIN campaign -- are not our focal point, they are an ancillary issue. So this, as Slap says, is not really a COIN Campaign.

The US political process has never, does not now and is unlikely to ever support the truly coherent planning that Steve would like or the grand strategy that Marc would like. We tend to wallow about and generally end up doing more good than harm...

MikeF has some good thoughts on AQ strategy and I agree that's what I would do and think that's what they're angling for. He ends with the question "What is our strategy to defeat AQ?" My guess is we have now realized we cannot do that and we will continue to disrupt and deter.

The Marines version of strategy is realistic -- you have an end goal, you have means and from that you craft a way. The Army version is idealistic and incapable of execution at an international level in most cases because you will never have all the means at your disposal; you have to do with what you have. I suspect that the 'policy maker' -- the civilian politicians -- have a variant the reads:"Ends+Ways+MeansMade Avaliable+Escape route=Strategy." I'm unsure that the three versions can be decently merged but I'd opt for the Marine version as being best for everyone...

Marc suggests metrics. The word to me implies relatively provable factual data points to facilitate logical decision making. He suggests:

1. What metrics are used to track correlations between continuance of the Afghan mission and radicalization in the US /NATO nations and countries that "we" are trying to influence by diplomatic means?
2. What metrics are in use to track the GS reputation of US / NATO military forces vise a vis changes in diplomatic "power" and "prestige"?
3. What metrics are in use to track changes in US / NATO civil rights and freedoms in relation to the stated goal of a "war" on AQ?
4. What metrics are being used to track the effects of various "strategies" vise a vis national political polarization?

Since we are not looking at logical decisions but rather at political decisions, I respectfully suggest that each of those collections of metrics are not amenable to realistic numeration or positive/negative assessments but require rather nuanced and probably quite lengthy summaries -- and all of which will be subject to interpretation and /or spin by various wheels in the policy establishments (plural) as it would appear best for them. The President may have been a community organizer but as Steve said, he thus should be aware of the capabilities and the limitations of political intercourse (word advisedly used...).

Which is where we are. We went to Afghanistan to rid the world of Al Qaeda. Unfortunately, the principal policy makers did not comprehend the fact that it is not going to be destroyed -- it's not even going to be defeated, best we can do is disrupt and deter. That's what we're doing reasonably well and we'll get better at that. After we got there, we blew several attempts to "get Bin Laden" (which we weren't, correctly, all that serious about anyway) and someone or something convinced G.W. Bush to say we would stay and 'fix' Afghanistan regardless.

Thus we're there as a result of a flawed strategy that the Armed Forces / DoD did not particularly want to implement because they knew the potential problems, knew the civilian establishment would accept little or no responsibility for what they had ordered and that establishment would constantly change the rules. They also suspected they would be tasked to do things that were not their job in the process -- all that has come to pass.

Steve cites Rory Stewart who I believe has better insights than most and should be listened to. Steve then asks:

How do we establish long-term meaningful relationships with sufficiently powerful leadership capable of sustaining itself after our departure?

Haven't been in that area for almost forty years but I suspect the Afghans haven't changed all that much. My guess in answer to his question is that you cannot and it is foolish to try...

What many in the Armed Forces want out of this is a military win. Not going to happen; never was. Most know that but the system demands that they try so they at least get credit for a draw. They will stay and do their best with what they are given but would much rather be elsewhere...

What most Western politicians want is a political win, a semi-viable Afghan state that they can chalk up a at least a tilted draw and which will not be significant problems until they're long out of office -- after that, they don't care. Not an ounce. For now, they'd just rather be elsewhere...

So it is now realized that we are not going to beat AQ, at least not in Afghanistan and thus we merely want to be sort of sure they won't resettle there until our disrupt and deter works better -- and it will. That leaves us with a need to 'fix' Afghanistan to some extent for several valid reasons.

The problem is that sounds nice but if properly done will be a multi-generational effort and neither the US or NATO are going to do that. We just want an acceptable outcome and the people of Afghanistan are not a major consideration. They never were. We will do as well by them as we can in order to achieve for The US and NATO and Pakistan and Afghanistan (in that order) an acceptable outcome. How do we get an acceptable outcome? What is an acceptable outcome?

We haven't figured that out as far as can be publicly ascertained at this time. Add to that there is NO 'right answer' but instead many alternatives of varying complexity and cost with even more potential variance in results. That's why no one can say what we are going to do...

Which, IMO, is to be expected and is better than trying to do something that simply cannot be done within the human, political and financial constraints extant. IOW, the means in the fullest sense are constrained, they always were and failure to consider those factors placed us in an unenviable position.

[Ken White]

There is no grand strategy in shooting bad guys until our hunting license is revoked. The ones who survive become the next crop of bad guys.

Even the Politicians that ignore that intuitive concept and some reasonably sound military advice to avoid doing that and go ahead and order it done anyway...

The question is how do you get them -- the Pols -- to clean up their act?

That's your planning problem.

[Greyhawk]

Writes

This story is not about an argument between two powerful men. It is about an argument between two or more sets of strategic assumptions concerning the mission and desired end state in Afghanistan.

Read the whole thing - I think that quote is key but there's much there of interest.

[Steve the Planner]

Now, we are dealing with reality.

The scope of the mission that, in my opinion, is politically sustainable is disruption and deterrence of a known bad guy (AQI) which is a transnational movement, rather than a country.

In April 2008, I came home on leave from Iraq, and everybody at the neighborhood cocktail parties wanted to know anything I would tell them about Iraq---it was issue No. 1 in a very republican, conservative, very DoD neighborhood (near Ft. Meade).

In September 2000, nobody wanted to know anything but "When are you going to be home?" The war lost most public support during the election run-up, and was flattened by the economic issues.

The US public's taste for crooked governments, competing tribes, and unresolved centuries-old civil wars is simply gone. Doesn't mean the risk is gone, but a democracy has inherent inefficiencies.

Within the theory versus practice gap, I am pretty sure that, from what is going on locally (regardless of my interests), the Summer of 2008 broke the back of unlimited US interest in fighting a global war on terror. Now, it is back to a highly bounded reality of accomplishing the most important US security objectives with a set of resources that must continually be downscaled.

It is within that context that the President and NSC must figure out what to do next.

It is also in that context that I remember the Petreaus/Crocker hearings where one congresswoman was asking the details of the numbers of the Sons of Iraq program---how much does it cost per person to buy these guys off?

My belief was that her questions were heading in the direction of our old lessons with the Barbary Pirates. How much does the US have to pay to move goods unmolested in the world?

I suspect the answer, which I assume some smart folks are actively pursuing as we speak, is being negotiated somewhere, with the folks likely to be able to deliver. Problem, of course, is that you always have to pay tribute, and the amount increases as fast as health coverage costs.

So every now and then, you have to show your "partners" that there is some off-setting risk in asking for too much. I expect that the threat of a full-scale assault (anywhere) would be met with derision, but what things do we bring to the negotiation table? Disruption and Deterrence measures?

Steve

[Ken White]

Albeit more concisely...

Referring to Greyhawks linked post (Steve types faster than I do...).

Dueling strategeries, the American way of War. Probably means the system works, just not rapidly or ever to everyone's satisfaction. Those contretemps are even older than the Revolution. Always has two sides, Executive and Legislative. Sometimes like now adds a third, Executive (Military). Very rarely even the Judicial weighs in. Or the Public (even more rarely).

The guy in Greyhawk's linked article does have one money quote with respect to the Media:

Questions like these show a reflexive craving for controversy and a bewildering ignorance...

True dat...

[carl]

Good analogy Carl. Next step in that line of thought is to look where else those conditions may appy and try to prevent AQ from getting established there. Somalia and some other muslim african countries come to mind. If we wait until AQ is pushed out of A-stan, it will be too late. No "peace" dividend for a while yet.
Reed

Reed: I wonder if those conditions exist anywhere else. Somaliland and Puntland might not let them in and south Somalia is such a mess that they might not find any real refuge there. Sudan kicked Osama out once already. The others I don't that much about but the big important ones seem to be fairly effective police states and the small ones are really remote. Maybe if AQ could be squeezed out of Afghanistan and Pakistan, there wouldn't be any place else to go.

[MikeF]

MikeF has some good thoughts on AQ strategy and I agree that's what I would do and think that's what they're angling for. He ends with the question "What is our strategy to defeat AQ?" My guess is we have now realized we cannot do that and we will continue to disrupt and deter.

Ken,

Your guess is probably correct; however, I think that this "realization" is a little short-sided. To date, little analysis has been conducted on AQ's ideology and strategy. The CTC at USMA amongst others have done an tremendous job interpreting captured and public documents, but we fail to analyze. I would suggest this marker should be our start point:

1. Who is our enemy?
2. What do they want to accomplish?
3. How will they maneuver to seize their main objectives?

Or simply put, as many others throughout time have espoused, know your enemy as you know yourself.

In my mind, this answer is the beginning of defining the problem. Throughout the last two years, I've searched for anyone trying to answer these questions. SWJ is the only forum that comes close with Slapout and Bob's World's discussions.

In the end, we can create a modern nation-state in both Iraq and A'stan that are both friendly towards the US, but neither solution will solve our AQ problem.

v/r

Mike