The Army Capstone Concept: the Army wants your comments

[Cole]

The useful design produts that SOCOM designed are classified for good reason. What your talking about that is unclassified is SOCOM's visual version of the JOE inappropriately labeled design. it shows the convergence of trends and does trigger some interesting questions. The actual design prodcts facilitate a deeper understanding of a specific problem in depth and how it interacts with other systems and actors globally. It has nothing to do with Seliel or Cole's interpretation. Selil is focused on design from an engineer perspective, and Cole from a tactical perspective. Wilf agee the definition provided was useless. The real design products are manpower intensive, involve the interagency and a large commitment of the intell community, plus academia. Once developed a tactical unit can provide input based on their view of ground truth, but the initial product is not produced by 3 staff officers. It can be useful for some problem sets, but the wat it was presented clearly led to confusion which isn't useful.

The way you have seen it is used in practice may differ from the way the TRADOC Operational Concept and now doctrine describe it, but Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design indicates that Selil's description is pretty accurate...at least if you are going to use the term "design" when some other term might be more appropriate:

http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525-5-500.pdf

The first chapter helped me understand design much better. Particularly liked this quote:

(3) Every ill-structured problem is essentially unique and novel. Historical analogies may provide useful insights—particularly on individual aspects of a larger problem—but the differences between even similar situations are profound and significant. The political goals at stake, stakeholders involved, cultural milieu, histories, and other dynamics will all be novel and unique to a particular situation.

Believe some miss the point that not every Soldier must read/study doctrine. But instructors/trainers at institutional level must study it to create lesson plans that are doctrinally-founded. Combat training centers O/Cs and other evaluators need some evaluation source based on more than opinion of how they did it in their particular unit under a unique commander/leader/staff officer, in a particular theater and year in theater, and a unique village, valley and ethnic/tribal mix when public opinion and the threat may have differed substantially.

In my solely academic perspective, the lesson plans we create are based on collective tasks which in turn are based on doctrine, task lists, and researched lessons learned. In our particular case, we used the FM 5-0 (and FM 3-0, & previous 5-0.1) "plan, prepare, execute, and assess continuously" as the outline for many lessons on multiple subjects...because it works and helps you not to forget something. That "operations process" and troop-leading procedures are probably most of what your typical NCO must understand where FM 5-0 is concerned.

I'm still not sure from the TRADOC Concept what planning products result from "Design." Suspect they exist in multiple formats and differ based on the nature of the ill-structured problem and command-designated courses of action that may change based on subject matter experts briefings. But as "Global Scout" indicates, many may be classified, many are probably unique to particular commanders, and most "Design" probably involves operational/strategic commanders and tactical units like SOF that have strategic influence.

Also believe many critical of the writing don't comprehend that it is often a team effort with multiple reviewers altering content to leave a hodgepodge of styles and substance by the time it is approved. It may not be pretty, but if it isn't done, you are left relying on opinions of how to do things based on historical experiences/perspectives of particular units/individuals that no longer apply.

[IntelTrooper]

Also believe many critical of the writing don't comprehend that it is often a team effort with multiple reviewers altering content to leave a hodgepodge of styles and substance by the time it is approved. It may not be pretty, but if it isn't done, you are left relying on opinions of how to do things based on historical experiences/perspectives of particular units/individuals that no longer apply.

Hi Cole,

I hope the following isn't offensive, it's just my own biased observation of most military publications:

Option 1: Not writing a paragraph, or manual, and allowing for some ad-lib on the part of the target audience.

Option 2: Include confusingly worded, "hodgepodge of styles and substance" in publication.

Net Effect(Option 2) minus Net Effect(Option 1) = x thousands of dollars used for creating, publishing, and maintaining Option 2.

[MichaelJayy]

Hi Cole,

I hope the following isn't offensive, it's just my own biased observation of most military publications:

Option 1: Not writing a paragraph, or manual, and allowing for some ad-lib on the part of the target audience.

Option 2: Include confusingly worded, "hodgepodge of styles and substance" in publication.

Net Effect(Option 2) minus Net Effect(Option 1) = x thousands of dollars used for creating, publishing, and maintaining Option 2.

I totally agree with IntelTrooper

[SWJED]

MichaelJayy your two post so far resemble those who add one-liners of no substance in order to establish a "post count" to be followed by spam PM to our members or spamming the threads. You have 24 hours to explain why you should not be banned from SWC.

[Ken White]

...Believe some miss the point that not every Soldier must read/study doctrine. But instructors/trainers at institutional level must study it to create lesson plans that are doctrinally-founded.

True -- but those instructors also appreciate a little clarity and concise thought.

Combat training centers O/Cs and other evaluators need some evaluation source based on more than opinion... and the threat may have differed substantially.

That was equally true back in the days when clarity and brevity were not goals but requirements. People fighting wars with high tempo operations do not have time to sort out the chaff.

Also believe many critical of the writing don't comprehend that it is often a team effort with multiple reviewers altering content to leave a hodgepodge of styles and substance by the time it is approved. It may not be pretty, but if it isn't done, you are left relying on opinions of how to do things based on historical experiences/perspectives of particular units/individuals that no longer apply.

Nothing wrong with all that -- BUT someone, not a committee, needs to be responsible and make some hard editorial decisions. These are military doctrinal publications, not high school textbooks; fluff and 'gee whiz' stuff is unnecessary and can be inimical to the doctrine promulgated.