is engendered by 1919 Personnel and Force Structure system that impacts everything you do. You can tweak the training but that will never adequately correct for the major systemic flaws that have built up over years of resistance to change (including on the part of the Congress...).
For example, aside from a Personnel system lost in a time warp, we have structure and grade problems that it creates and that are exacerbated by dysfunctional force design.
Company commanders should be Majors, and each should have two CPTs, a supporter and a trainer of the LTs who are PLs (period) as well as a 1SG who's the trainer of the enlisted swine AND an Admin Spt NCO (7 or 8) as well as 6 or 7 Operations and Training NCO (peacetime) / Intel NCO (wartime).
Companies are undermanned; Bn and Bde Staffs are way overmanned.
Thus you are trying to train an organization that is really not well organized and one that has to adapt on an ad-hoc basis for every war. Fortunately, we have in the past done ad-hoc well. I'm not all sure we can reliably do that in the future...
I'm sure General Dempsey is very much aware that he effectively wears two hats, director of training for the US Army -- and the proponent for the DOCTRINE that drives both the personnel system and force structure. Or should. I do not question that it should. I question that it does in fact do so.
Improving leader training is important -- improving the force they lead is equally important. Good, well trained leaders can overcome dysfunctional organization and doctrine but they can perform so much better if those impediments are removed.
As you said:Thus, answering your questions of how the ALDS impacts the budgetary process or helps reset TRADOC or the Army at large will help our understanding of where this leader development strategy fits in the larger concept for organizational change.(emphasis added /kw)
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