Attached is a Word document with some initial comments / recommendations.
Attached is a Word document with some initial comments / recommendations.
Last edited by Ken White; 10-27-2011 at 01:20 AM.
Greg Grant at DoD Buzz has posted a long commentary on this effort titled Army Wants Ideas on Future Wars.
First, I will strongly second Ken's recommendation to add "Disrupt" (see his file, upthread).
Secondly, I will heartily commend the theme of "Complexity and Uncertainty" and the emphasis upon adaptive thinking.
Thirdly, my rec:
Re: IO, PSYOPS, PD, etc. in light of "uncertainty" and "complexity"
Adaptive response to uncertainty and changing conditions require that commanders have flexibility and autonomy. Generally, the amount of flexibility/autonomy they have is inverse to the amount of media attention their operations generate because media attention is a valuable currency that attracts political actors ( domestic and foreign, state and non-state).
The military has attempted to "manage" the media with limited success. The infosphere is now global, networked and viral and many major players (BBC, al Jazeera etc.) begin from a stance of critical hostility toward USG foreign policy/military objectives. The greater the degree that a US operation is the subject of media attention, the worse our strategic starting point is in terms of information. Under such conditions, trying to "spin" or court media influencers is like the Dutch boy putting fingers in the leaking dike.
The media in its varied forms but particularly major TV and print media have very finite resources. They can as a system, give one global crisis tight scrutiny but when the number of newsworthy events coincide, they quickly demonstrate the effects of exceeding "cognitive load". The volume of information cannot be effectively juggled or processed either by the media filters ( reporters, editors) or the audience. This has immediate policy implications.
Even in the simple media era of the early Cold War, simultaneous crisises degraded the ability of superpowers to respond effectively to either. Case in point, the Suez Crisis intersecting with the Soviet invasion of Hungary resulted in Dulles and Eisenhower waffling on Hungary and delivering a sharp elbow to France and Britain. Khrushchev, by contrast, had no realistic possibility of aiding Nasser had Ike sided with the British, Israelis and French. The number of officials in any great power who make key decisions on the use of force are too few to manage multiple intersecting calamities. If the amount of "noise" in the system is increased, their job becomes more difficult.
U.S. war planners need to conceive of campaigns in terms of a global "attention economy". The greater the number of competing stories that exist to suck up media attention during military operations, the wider the latitude that U.S. ground commanders will have to "adapt" to circumstances. The competing stories do not have to be another geopolitical crisis either - a sex scandal or death of a celebrity figure like Princess Diana or Michael Jackson serves just as well. The crux is that the story needs to be attractive to key media decision makers from a business standpoint.
Last edited by zenpundit; 09-23-2009 at 05:16 AM.
Zen mate, not having a pop but...
ALL WAR has ALWAYS been uncertain and complex. Adaptation has ALWAYS been required. Media attention is utterly irrelevant unless commanders are taking their orders from the BBC. You conduct operations in line with political guidance from your chain on command. You do not modify a plan because you fear the media. You modify a plan so as it best gains the political objective you Commander in chief is seeking to achieve.
You cannot "manage" anything in war. You either react to it, or force it to do your will, by what ever means (ask nicely, ask, tell, and then force )The military has attempted to "manage" the media with limited success. The infosphere is now global, networked and viral and many major players (BBC, al Jazeera etc.) begin from a stance of critical hostility toward USG foreign policy/military objectives. The greater the degree that a US operation is the subject of media attention, the worse our strategic starting point is in terms of information.
Sorry, the idea that "The media" has changed War is evidence free. The idea that modern war is complex, is progressed by those unable to understand it.
Media is only relevant in terms of it's political effect - so Clausewitz applies. Martin Luther had no modern media, and the Nazis only had radio and print - all of which was used to "political" not Military effect.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 09-24-2009 at 10:44 AM.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
and I totally agree with that.On this, though in reverse order -- I agree that modern war is no more complex. In fact all things considered, it's probably slightly less complex than it was a century ago due to better communication and broader knowledge.Sorry, the idea that "The media" has changed War is evidence free. The idea that modern war is complex, is progressed by those unable to understand it.
On the media affecting war being evidence free, I agree. However, I think it does affect some, say about 10 to 20%, warfighters. The rub and the perception that media affects war can come from where in the chain of command representatives of that small percentage are found. A senior commander with a fear of adverse publicity can do strange things. I have seen good senior commanders who totally ignored the media and others, less good, who were quite concerned with their image...
Then, of course, there's the effect of media attention on Politicans. Those Squirrels tend to be quite media sensitive -- and they tend to have directive or budgetary authority...
with this:
But, the "political objective" of the CinC is very much likely to be modified by the media, by polling and by everything else that goes into modern politics.You modify a plan so as it best gains the political objective you Commander in chief is seeking to achieve.
The question is who does PR - as to which there will be many divergent answers.
Always good to hear from you, Wilf and glad that you helped get this discussion flowing. Your views here on the media and warfare are neat, plausible and wrong
The media is not "irrelevant". If commanders find themselves eschewing perfectly legal and militarily efficient options because of how they would "look" under conditions of a panopticon battlefield, then the political effect of the media is one of the variables to which modern armies must adapt. If the adaptation is a continual circumscribing of military operations over time, then I submit that they are not being particularly creative in adapting.
Yes, but what matters here is to what degree?ALL WAR has ALWAYS been uncertain and complex. Adaptation has ALWAYS been required
Warfare has oscillated historically through periods of stability where tactics, weaponry, accepted rules of engagement and parley, treatment of prisoners went unchanged in significant ways for decades or even centuries. I agree with you that "adaption has always been required" but as institutions, militaries are often very conservative. It often takes many hard knocks for them to give up beloved but outdated practices, be they caste-based military systems, red coats, bronze cannon, horse cavalry or battleships.
This can be contrasted with periods of innovation where new ideas - for example, metal weapons, writing, the stirrup, gunpowder, close order drill, republican government, nationalism, industrial mass production, railroad timetables, atomic bombs - disrupted customary patterns of warfare. Some of these inventions amounted to game-changers for warfare.
The military that recognizes the need for adaption and executes it successfully wins a comparative advantage - for a time. The greater the number of innovations a military has to deal with at once, the more difficult that process becomes organizationally. Particularly, when the change is a societal one that is periphereal or indirect to immediate military concerns - like the information revolution.
Wilf, what democratic government with a modern military conducting operations is not going to expect its military leaders to make an effort a priori to account for the possible political effects of global media in their planning?You conduct operations in line with political guidance from your chain on command. You do not modify a plan because you fear the media. You modify a plan so as it best gains the political objective you Commander in chief is seeking to achieve.
This concern goes beyond the traditional political-psychological-morale effects we saw at, say, at Tet after Cronkite's infamous broadcast. In a globalized world, war news impacts "hot money" flows of currency in or out of national economies. By itself, this media-driven market reaction can have a strategic, even crippling, impact on a nation's war effort in a very short time frame.
I do not see many examples of militaries these days successfully disaggregating political and military effects during combat, and a major reason for this is the ubiquity of media - professional and amateur.Sorry, the idea that "The media" has changed War is evidence free. The idea that modern war is complex, is progressed by those unable to understand it.
Media is only relevant in terms of it's political effect - so Clausewitz applies. Martin Luther had no modern media, and the Nazis only had radio and print - all of which was used to "political" not Military effect.
Modernity is relative, not absolute. Luther had the printing press and the Bible in the vernacular. For his time, that was "modernity" and it had an explosive political impact that transformed the military dynamic of the Holy Roman Empire by giving rise to Protestant powers. While the Kaiser lost control over the Imperial German Army to Ludendorff and Hindenburg, Hitler's use of the radio ensured his ultimate command and control over the army and state until his very last days on earth before committing suicide. Radio was "modern enough" to permit the national political leadership to decisively micromanage the affairs of theater and army command.
To conclude, what I'm arguing for really, is greater military adaption to the effects of a global media in a way that preserves the greatest latitude for commanders to carry out their mission.
I don't fear being wrong. I fear being confused... which currently I am not...
I never said the media is irrelevant. I said it is "utterly irrelevant unless commanders are taking their orders from the BBC." The political dimension is decided by the chain of command (civilian) - not the media. Politics is why wars occur and how they are conducted. Media influence is ENTIRELY political. The impact of the media is only relevant to the the policy being sought by force. If it is not, then commanders are asking Media permission or approval to do stuff - which is like asking an 8 years old for advice on marriage.The media is not "irrelevant". If commanders find themselves eschewing perfectly legal and militarily efficient options because of how they would "look" under conditions of a panopticon battlefield, then the political effect of the media is one of the variables to which modern armies must adapt. If the adaptation is a continual circumscribing of military operations over time, then I submit that they are not being particularly creative in adapting.
So show me successful armies that failed to adapt? 1914-18 and 1936-45 saw far more radical changes in Warfare than anything seen today. Why do we now think it "requires adaptation." Kind of silly to even say it, in an historical context.Warfare has oscillated historically through periods of stability where tactics, weaponry, accepted rules of engagement and parley, treatment of prisoners went unchanged in significant ways for decades or even centuries. I agree with you that "adaption has always been required" but as institutions, militaries are often very conservative. It often takes many hard knocks for them to give up beloved but outdated practices, be they caste-based military systems, red coats, bronze cannon, horse cavalry or battleships.
Again, show me a successful Army or society that failed to notice this. What is more, where are new technologies used by our enemies since 2001? - I submit none.This can be contrasted with periods of innovation where new ideas - for example, metal weapons, writing, the stirrup, gunpowder, close order drill, republican government, nationalism, industrial mass production, railroad timetables, atomic bombs - disrupted customary patterns of warfare. Some of these inventions amounted to game-changers for warfare.
Whose media and effect on who? You cannot please everybody. Military forces, use violence to gain political outcomes. "The Media" is not a cohesive coherent body. What play well with Fox, will be called a "war crime" with the BBC, and no one in Texas cares what anyone in Cairo things.Wilf, what democratic government with a modern military conducting operations is not going to expect its military leaders to make an effort a priori to account for the possible political effects of global media in their planning?
German media cared very little about the alleged atrocities of German troops in Belgium in 1914, yet they became a de-facto "cause for war" for the British population.
So why not point this out and stop panicking about complexity and media? Do we really think that the political dynamic of today is more complex than that in Europe at the time of Luther?Modernity is relative, not absolute. Luther had the printing press and the Bible in the vernacular. For his time, that was "modernity" and it had an explosive political impact that transformed the military dynamic of the Holy Roman Empire by giving rise to Protestant powers.
The critical relationship is between military force and politics. Media only bears on the latter - as CvC explained. Surely the aim here is to explain something simply and usefully, not compound the problem.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Precisely. And since war is the continuation of politics by other means, if one side can use media to break the political will of their opponent, they win without firing a shot. (Or at any rate firing fewer.)
As an example, in Iraq the media was using the war as a cudgel to beat on a president of whom they disapproved. The result (intended or not) was to encourage our opponents while sapping public support. Even worse, the steady drum beat caused the administration to view ALL criticism of any aspect of the war as nothing more than domestic partisanship.
Add to that the difficulty partisan media hostility created in the area of Information Operations/Psychological Operations. Several attempts by the military to release favorable information, both domestically and in theater, were outed and (successfully) discredited - without regard to the impact on strategic objectives, let alone the verity of the information.
I took one of your points to be that commanders in the field can't conduct mission planning around media impact - and I agree. However, military and political leadership at national, strategic and possibly even operational levels must.
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
An unruffled person with some useful skills.
I'm doing a line-by-line on it right now, but I think the point about communications really needs to be covered better. I also agree with a lot of the concerns Ken expressed over potential "misunderstandings" of words. I'm stuck in a rehearsal all day tomorrow, so I probably won't post my comments until Sunday or Monday.
Cheers
Marc
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
OK, so if we say, military and political leadership at national, strategic and possibly even operational levels must consider the overall politcal aim then I am in total agreement.
If they say "consider the impact of the media," they are totally wrong, because the "effect" depends on the action, and you cannot predict 2nd and 3rd order effects reliably or even how the media will see them. - you cannot tell the future.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Media: I'm not sure the bombing of Dresden or Hamburg would possible today due to media influence. The Allies killed 200,000 people in 3 days (mostly all civilians). There's no way we could do that today. Do you think we could get away with bombing Tehran like we did Dresden or Tokyo?
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
but it is far more likely that they would claim some separate radical group was responsible. We would likely respond with a "measured and proportional" strike using precision guided munitions on "media acceptable" targets. On the other hand, if they detonated a nuclear weapon against Israel, I wouldn’t bet against Tehran ceasing to exist.
"The pure and simple truth is rarely pure and never simple"
- Oscar Wilde
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