The Army Capstone Concept: the Army wants your comments
This capstone document is refreshing in its break from the decades of US Military doctrine which have focused almost exclusively on high intensity conflict. Many of us had experienced personal frustration with this mindset while planning and executing “other than combat” operations in Iraq (2003). Since then, it has been remarkable to observe just how slowly the institution adapts in response to visible and current evidence that war is more about dealing with a whole range of actors to influence decisions, as opposed to killing every last enemy combatant. I find it refreshing and encouraging, for example, to see substantial discussion about partnerships, including NGOs and private sector.Originally Posted by EmmetM
In his foreward, General Dempsey does an outstanding job, laying out the concept and vision, including key concepts of decentralization, adaptability and the interacting elements of physical and psychological control. There are a few weaknesses, however, in the ensuing discussion, which is intended to develop those concepts.
Wm makes an important point that we need to look ahead and not expect to fight the last war.
I also agree with Dr C. that you need to have a foot in the present and be thoughtful in projecting the future.If you look at the scenarios in the ACC, they are all things that we currently plan for based on what has already happened in the past. There are no new scenarios.
What happens to the Army if it is faced with something its never seen before? For example: a "coalition of the willing" decides it no longer wants a world that lets the US to play the role of global defender; or the US is just left out of the conversation so to speak --nations choose not to trade with us anymore, for example. Suppose Saudi Arabia stopped selling oil to the US and Canada stopped piping in natural gas, both selling the former US share to China instead.
What worked in the last war? Adaptive people working in established teams. In Iraq, small units conducting operations outside their core mission set on a daily basis: artillery soldiers providing convoy security or negotiating with tribal leaders. Sadaam was captured by some engineer solders who clearly were not busy building anything or clearing minefields at the time. These Americans succeeded to the degree that they could adapt and work together under urgent conditions.A focus on what works today isn't to be stagnant. It's to ground the future propositions in examples of what has worked. The future propositions should innovate. The process involves envisioning what might be, and writing affirmative statements that describe the idealized future, applying "what if."
How will future trends affect the operating environment? One glaring omission from the Capstone paper is effective consideration of globalization and concurrent shifts in political and economic power (e.g., Section 2-3). China is producing more engineers than we have people; they are building an unprecedented high tech (even green!) industrial capacity and are aggressively establishing strategic, international partnerships. World petroleum reserves, which carry with them economic and political power, are increasingly in the hands of less stable nations, or those with little or no alignment with US security agendas. Clearly, we will operate with significantly less autonomy or freedom of maneuver (not just geographic, but in the human/political dimensions). The authors should shorten discussions of historical events such as Iraq and Lebanon in favor of some recognition of significant and relevant world trends.
These emerging shifts sharpen the importance of another historic American weakness, our ingrained narcissism. Even as we recognize that we now must consider “the people” (in addition to “us” and “them”), the Capstone document does not really capture the point that Steve the Planner and others have made in this discussion – that “the people” are not just some benign set of neutral bystanders. Section 1-6b, for example, treats “others” as sort of minor complications – mentioning, for example, the seemingly simple need for “. . . flexibility to secure populations and organizations.”
In fact, “the people” are a diverse set of actors with different agendas (independent of our own), but with whom we must form a full range of relationships. This is a critical concept to understand constructs such as narco-terrorism, where the various actors work together with complementary but very different agendas. Afghani contractors who sell us pipe or dig wells need not to be American patriots. Iraqi communities work with us to rebuild schools because we share a value of education – not because they want their town to be occupied by US forces.
In order to succeed in the future operating environment, information is perhaps the most critical tool. We rarely win wars by decimating the enemy – today, we probably would not stop al Qaeda or the Muslim extremist movement by killing Osama. Section 3-2c is woefully inadequate in conveying this concept. The bottom line is not that “Russians and Chinese believe that information warfare is a way of resolving conflict in their favor.” It is that we win wars through decisions, which are based substantially upon information. While cyber warfare is important, it does not warrant dominating the discussion space allocated to Information Warfare; this again reflects the American fascination with technology.
Finally, we still struggle to think beyond geographical boundaries and established government structures. The Capstone document is littered with evidence that we are stuck in the paradigm that operations equal combat in an area defined by geographic (3-D) space. Section 2-2 includes several references to conflict being constrained to space (incorrectly, by the way, suggesting terrorists and criminals operate primarily in lawless spaces – like New York, Chicago, Miami, London and Bogata?). Section 3-4a. misses an opportunity to set the stage for discussion of the “Military Solution” through a more expansive description of “operational area” to clearly include human and information dimensions.
Military operations are all about soldiers on the ground. However, we need to expand our thinking in terms of what those soldiers do.
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