Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
We choose to remember things how we want to see them.
I have been telling people for over 50 years: "Fulfill that airborne myth to the best of your ability -- but don't believe a word of it; that BS'll get you killed..."

That, in essence means I agree with Marc's answer to his own question which Mike further expanded -- and I'd posit two more factors. One is Ego. The cultural belief that guys fix things takes hold and people will try to fix things that do not need fixing. Conversely, they will waste little to no effort on an item that they do not believe (or believe their Boss believes) needs fixing...

It's a whole lot easier to worry about Eward Heebley's haircut, vehicle registration or his wife's erratic behavior than it is to train a Platoon to cross open ground (n.b. Pics still show Troops in Afghanistan way too close together in most situations) and it's also easier to let SGT Phugabosky tell the Troops that 50m between individuals is BS, 5 is enough than it is to challenge him on his logic -- or laziness. The 5 makes it easier for him to control things, no more. The 50 might avoid a Purple Heart or two. If he trained his troops well, he wouldn't have to worry about control. So ego drives us to do the things that are easy and prone to get attention. It also drives doctrine and AAR writers to leave out important things because, as they don't understand the need, it must not be necessary. Dealing with it causes good leaders not to do things they think they should because a hassle with an ego is usually fruitless...

The second factor is self confidence. A leader with an adequate amount will study the writings of a five year old if he thinks they have merit. He'll steal ideas from anyone. One with a lack of self confidence will insist he needs no help, he knows it all...

Those are two gross oversimplifications and the actuality is far more nuanced but ego and inadequate self confidence pair together in strange ways to affect actions and reactions -- and those with an excess of the first and a shortfall in the latter are amazingly prevalent in the US Armed Forces and most eschew research, history and the ideas of others lest they appear 'weak.' The actuality, of course, is that they're fooling no one but themselves. They're also a detriment to better training and performance. Those two factors lead to an attitude that believes "I am in charge. I must never appear weak. I will not accept advice from others for I will seen as unsure or hesitant and my senior rater will not like that..." Hyperbole but there's much truth there.

Those factors are why we do not have eight years of experience in Afghanistan. Averaging tour lengths across the services and for the period, we have about 10 to 14 short tours there. It is perhaps noteworthy that the Asymmetric Warfare Group noted in both Iraq and Afghanistan that loss of continuity between rotations was a major problem. Schmedlap has here outlined errors in the process he saw. My son's three tours, in each case, the new unit wanted NO help or advice. FWIW I saw the same thing in the Marines in Korea and in the Army several places sround the world in the 56- 79 period. It's a human factors thing and we should correct for it which we could easily do but then what would that say about some of our icons...

Egos; can't bruise the old self confidence.