In looking at this as a document which is supposed to help the Army frame/prioritize what stuff to buy and how to educate and train soldiers, I found it less than useful. Knowing how the Pentagon works, there is a line in here for everyone. That, unfortunately, is how it will be used: as a source for quotes to support this or that program or initiative.

The only way to prevent that is for this document to become inculcated in the senior leadership. They must read, understand and support. The first paragraph of Gen Dempsey’s introduction states that “ideas matter”—yes they do, but not because they are written, but because they are believed and because they lead to action. Action in these terms is a prioritization of effort and resources. For me, the document didn’t give a clear sense of priority—while stating all the many things that the Army would be capable of, I didn’t get a sense of what was being left out, or left behind.

While I think that I understand the intent and emerging environment, etc., it really bothered me that a guiding document for the future of the US Army would place defeating enemies at the end of every list of key actions and capabilities. If that order is a defacto prioritization, I’m not sure if we are moving in the correct direction.

While I laud the focus on uncertainty and complexity, I was somewhat troubled by the phrasing, once again in Gen Dempsey’s cover, that spoke of “imposing order on chaos.” I’d recommend focusing that we take actions to achieve the mission or to impose our will on the enemy. However, chaos and uncertainly are just a natural part of the environment. Rather than focus on how we can’t change this, we must emphasize how we are going to use it to our advantage—leveraging chaos.

Within Chapter three—the meat of how the Army will design itself, I was confused about the differences between “supporting ideas” and “core operational actions.” Are they differentiated in some way by type, by priority? When it comes to racking and stacking, will a supporting idea get funded while a core action may not be? There needs to be more clarity on how these concepts relate to one another.

Following the same vein of my criticism, the Appendix of required capabilities seems pretty extensive. What I do not get a sense of is how much? This goes to the global operating environment. I can imagine building an Army that can do all of the things listed, but there are only four brigades when the cost is added up. The “how much” factor directly affects the what and capability factor.

All in all, I’d recommend a shorter and simpler document. If the fear is that by not mentioning something in this document, it will not be funded or pursued, then you will always end up with a document of lists. As its is, I still don’t have a clear picture of what the Army contained in this document will look like, or what real choices are being made.

Phil Ridderhof USMC