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Thread: The Army Capstone Concept: the Army wants your comments

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
    Both stories and opinions count as fact. On the latter, that is a large part of what constructs the entire area of market research. As to the former, that's folklore, mythology, organizational symbolism, etc.... aka, my field. The "problem" isn't that they count as facts, the problem is that they are mistaken for "Truth" (in a transcendent sense) because an inappropriate model is used to interpret them.
    Well then we at least we need to recognise that large portions of current military thought and doctrine are not held to rigour, in terms of passing several simple tests of evidence. In "fact", the less evidence the better!

    The more I think about it, the heart of all my complaints are about evidence and rigour.

    I am accepting it as indicative of an organizational cultural attitude.
    My experience is that "cultural attitudes" are the biggest roach in the schwarma. The Manoeuvre Warfare diddly is a product of culture, as is the deification of snipers.

    How did "a mobile field gun clad in armour" - as JFC Fuller described the tank - become an icon of Land Warfare power and the inheritor of the myths of Cavalry and the Armoured Knight? - instead of fire support platform to create freedom of action for the infantry.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  2. #82
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Hi Wilf,

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Well then we at least we need to recognise that large portions of current military thought and doctrine are not held to rigour, in terms of passing several simple tests of evidence. In "fact", the less evidence the better!

    The more I think about it, the heart of all my complaints are about evidence and rigour.
    Most of mine are, too . My real problem is with the selection of interpretive schemas, and I see the wrong (in the sense of poor predictive validity from the specific problem at hand) schema being chosen time and time again. Since schemas define what is and is not considered as "data" ("facts"), that inevitably leads to all sorts of mess ups even, or especially, when they are applied with rigour.

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    My experience is that "cultural attitudes" are the biggest roach in the schwarma. The Manoeuvre Warfare diddly is a product of culture, as is the deification of snipers.

    How did "a mobile field gun clad in armour" - as JFC Fuller described the tank - become an icon of Land Warfare power and the inheritor of the myths of Cavalry and the Armoured Knight? - instead of fire support platform to create freedom of action for the infantry.
    'cause it "worked" at the time . Personally, I always wanted to see a joust between a couple of Centurion VII's !!!!!
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
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  3. #83
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Err... not sure what you mean. Best practice is highly context specific. It merely refers to the use of ways and means to gain ends. That is an enduring phenomenon in Warfare. That has nothing/little to do with technological innovation. Actually, most technology does build on existing knowledge of how to do things, even if that existing knowledge comes from experimentation.
    So I will start over. I think the main concept should be this.

    Instead of solving our own problems I think we should be concentrating on creating problems........ for the enemy.


    Tom's thinking adaption might do it?
    Last edited by slapout9; 10-01-2009 at 02:47 PM. Reason: add stuff

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
    I always wanted to see a joust between a couple of Centurion VII's !!!!!
    Ahhh... Centurions VIIs! Well I'd go for the L7 variants mysefl, but you are a class act Sir! The most beautiful tank ever made. Just looking at one makes me want to say "woof" in an extremely loud voice! - how's that for an expression of culture!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Ahhh... Centurions VIIs! Well I'd go for the L7 variants mysefl, but you are a class act Sir! The most beautiful tank ever made. Just looking at one makes me want to say "woof" in an extremely loud voice! - how's that for an expression of culture!
    LOL - works for me ! I'm just glad that none of the pictures from my summer camp survived; we used to have jousts using canoes !

    Hmm, sort of like this (but I'm not in THAT picture )

    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

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    Great summer camp photos.

    My tank dreams revolve around my first command---an M60A2. Beautiful, humongous concept (a 62 ton Sheridan), but with technology not fit for any battlefield we have since been concerned about.

    Nonetheless, I found it to be an excellent Autobahn cruiser during the fall colors season (Reforger). Who needs airbags?

    On a more serious note, this thread started with the heading that the Army needs our input. Did they get it? Have they moved on to re-write stage?

    Steve

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    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Hi Steve,

    Quote Originally Posted by Steve the Planner View Post
    On a more serious note, this thread started with the heading that the Army needs our input. Did they get it? Have they moved on to re-write stage?
    No idea. It would help (significantly!) if some of the people monitoring this thread would give us all a bit of feedback.

    One of the things that has been percolating through my mind is that we really do not have a clear statement of what the ACC should achieve. We have some ideas, but some of those interpretations seem to be contra-indicated based on parts of the document itself. I suspect that one of the reasons we are devolving to "summer camp" and "what I did with my first tank" stories (and you know I'm jealous !) is because we aren't getting any feedback.

    Cheers,

    Marc
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  8. #88
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
    Hi Steve,



    No idea. It would help (significantly!) if some of the people monitoring this thread would give us all a bit of feedback.

    One of the things that has been percolating through my mind is that we really do not have a clear statement of what the ACC should achieve. We have some ideas, but some of those interpretations seem to be contra-indicated based on parts of the document itself. I suspect that one of the reasons we are devolving to "summer camp" and "what I did with my first tank" stories (and you know I'm jealous !) is because we aren't getting any feedback.

    Cheers,

    Marc
    Yep, they talk about systems thinking but they sure don't practice it

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    Council Member Dr. C's Avatar
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    Instead of asking in the capstone, "What problems do we have, what problems are we likely to encounter in the future, and what are the solutions?" we can ask,

    "What is working around here, and how can we encourage more of it?"

    If the focus of the capstone is problems, and the language we use and the focus of our attention becomes our reality, then why not focus more on what works?

    I would choose to focus on a metaphor (other than the Army as machine)for a future vision and then develop a framework toward appreciating in value what works, moving away from the problem-solution approach. Others might recognize the process as best practices or benchmarking.
    Michele Costanza, Ph.D., CKM/CKEE (Contractor)

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    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
    One of the things that has been percolating through my mind is that we really do not have a clear statement of what the ACC should achieve. We have some ideas, but some of those interpretations seem to be contra-indicated based on parts of the document itself.
    Marc,
    I suspect the ACC is not really supposed to achieve anything other than to establish a frame of reference. Its purpose is to establish a conceptual framework against which the Army can justify what it wants to buy and how it wants to organize itself. If you will, it cashes out the presuppositions upon which the Army proposes to establish what it considers to be ground truth. In other words it tries to specifiy the ground rules and assumptions that will undergird Army problem solving activity at the highest levels

    It might be worthwhile to compare the ACC to the next level up in this effort--the CCJO, available here

    Quote Originally Posted by Dr. C
    Instead of asking in the capstone, "What problems do we have, what problems are we likely to encounter in the future, and what are the solutions?" we can ask,

    "What is working around here, and how can we encourage more of it?"
    To focus on what works today is to be stagnant, to put ourselves in the position of fighting the last war when the next war comes along. At least that, I submit, is what makes things like the ACC and the CCJO have the "predicting the future" flavor that they have. Gen Dempsey had the right focus in the point about ideas mattering, particularly when they are new ideas. What he didn't identify was how to get folks to generate new ideas, produce the "AHA!" moment of discovery.

    If you look at the scenarios in the ACC, they are all things that we currently plan for based on what has already happened in the past. There are no new scenarios.
    What happens to the Army if it is faced with something its never seen before? For example: a "coalition of the willing" decides it no longer wants a world that lets the US to play the role of global defender; or the US is just left out of the conversation so to speak --nations choose not to trade with us anymore, for example. Suppose Saudi Arabia stopped selling oil to the US and Canada stopped piping in natural gas, both selling the former US share to China instead.
    Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
    The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by wm View Post
    To focus on what works today is to be stagnant, to put ourselves in the position of fighting the last war when the next war comes along. At least that, I submit, is what makes things like the ACC and the CCJO have the "predicting the future" flavor that they have. Gen Dempsey had the right focus in the point about ideas mattering, particularly when they are new ideas. What he didn't identify was how to get folks to generate new ideas, produce the "AHA!" moment of discovery.

    If you look at the scenarios in the ACC, they are all things that we currently plan for based on what has already happened in the past. There are no new scenarios.
    What happens to the Army if it is faced with something its never seen before? For example: a "coalition of the willing" decides it no longer wants a world that lets the US to play the role of global defender; or the US is just left out of the conversation so to speak --nations choose not to trade with us anymore, for example. Suppose Saudi Arabia stopped selling oil to the US and Canada stopped piping in natural gas, both selling the former US share to China instead.
    Some good stuff here.

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    Council Member Hacksaw's Avatar
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    Default In Re: Slapout

    Of course its good stuff... He's Vizzini!!!

    To assume otherwise would be inconceivable
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    Default Capstone Concept for Joint Operations

    The 2009 CCJO at least identifies the problem which concerns me (fn 5 at p.46 - reformatted for clarity):

    [5] Several terms are used to refer to the type of warfare generally waged between standing state militaries.

    Conventional warfare, perhaps the most commonly used term, suggests warfare according to established conventions, which is generally accurate. Conventional warfare is not defined in doctrine, however, although conventional forces are:

    “conventional forces—1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces.”
    DOD Dictionary of Military Terms, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/ [accessed 8 October 2008]. Based on this definition, conventional warfare thus would include irregular warfare not conducted by special operations forces.

    Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, uses the term traditional war, which

    “is characterized as a confrontation between nation-states or coalitions/alliances of nation-states. This confrontation typically involves small-scale to largescale, force-on-force military operations in which adversaries employ a variety of conventional military capabilities against each other in the air, land, maritime, and space physical domains and the information environment. The objective is to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s government or policies.”
    (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 14 May 2007), p. I-6.

    Traditional warfare, however, implies military methods based on time-honored cultural history, which routinely has included irregular warfare and which may have little in common with future warfare between regular military forces.

    The logical alternative to irregular warfare is regular warfare, which suggests warfare between regular, uniformed state militaries -- although one would be hard-pressed to find an historical example of a completely regular war.

    “Regular” is defined as “of, relating to, or constituting the permanent standing military force of a state <the regular army> <regular soldiers>.”
    Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com [accessed 8Oct08].

    Compare all these to:

    “irregular forces -- Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces.”
    [DOD Dictionary, accessed 8Oct08.]

    And:

    “irregular warfare -- A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. Also called IW.”
    [DOD Dictionary, accessed 2 October 2008].

    All of which points to the ultimate futility of trying to describe warfare in terms of definitive categories.
    While one can well agree with the bolded last sentence as a generalization; in any particular situation, one has to:

    1. Define the enemy, which includes not only identification but also a determination of status because different rules apply depending on status; and

    2. Distinction between the enemy (e.g., enemy combatants and enemy non-combatants) and non-enemy personnel (primarily civilians).

    No cookbook recipe exists for application of the principles of definition and distinction that is a "one size fits all" solution.

    The CCJO recognizes this complex environment, which if not actually chaotic is likely to provide uncertainties:

    pp.11 & 12

    Of the conditions that are changing, perhaps the most significant is what one observer has described as “The Rise of the Rest” [2] -- the increasing ability of other states to challenge the United States for influence, if not globally, then certainly regionally. The economic and military predominance that has underwritten U.S. foreign and defense policy for the past two decades can no longer be assumed. These emerging, advanced military competitors will be able to pose significant regional military challenges in the event of conflict.

    In addition, a variety of nonstate actors -- often motivated by extremist religious or ethnic ideologies -- are emerging with some of the power of states, but lacking the political discipline imposed by national sovereignty and accountability. Many of these entities already have or soon could have the capability and capacity to pursue their interests by armed force. Many operate across state or even regional boundaries. They rarely adopt the centralized structure of states, which would expose them to greater external pressure, but instead take the form of popular movements or distributed networks, usually empowered by the connectivity of the Internet.

    [2] Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of the Rest,” Newsweek, 12 May 2008.
    .....
    The foreseeable future promises to be an era of persistent conflict -- a period of protracted confrontation among states, nonstate entities, and individual actors increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political ends.[3] ... Such protracted struggles will not lend themselves to decisive military victory, but often at best will be amenable to being managed continuously over time. Many of these conflicts may cut across national, regional, cultural, and combatant command boundaries, complicating the responses to them.

    [3] Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Feb08), foreword.
    and that the mix of various forces may require re-definition or supplemention of terms we are normally used to using - having both military and legal consequences:

    p.16

    Warfare against the regular forces of a sovereign state using orthodox means and methods can be called conventional or regular warfare, while warfare against predominantly irregular forces can be called irregular warfare.[5] The latter tends to be protracted, favors working through partners, and revolves around the support of the population rather than solely the defeat of enemy fighting forces. These clean distinctions will rarely exist in reality; however, as often in the past, future conflicts will appear as hybrids comprising diverse, dynamic, and simultaneous combinations of organizations, technologies, and techniques that defy categorization.[6] Likely adversaries can be expected to pursue and adopt any methods and means that confer an advantage relative to U.S. military power -- including methods that violate widely accepted laws and conventions of war.[7] Even an advanced military power can be expected to adopt some methods considered “irregular” by Western standards, while nonstate actors increasingly are acquiring and employing “regular” military capabilities. Rather than attempting to defeat U.S. forces in decisive battle, even militarily significant states are likely to exploit increasingly inexpensive but lethal weapons in an erosion strategy aimed at weakening U.S. political resolve by inflicting mounting casualties over time.[8]

    [5] quoted in full at start of post.

    [6] Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007). “Hybrid threats incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder. Hybrid Wars can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors.” [p. 8.]

    [7] Including the popular term asymmetric warfare, defined as “armed conflict between belligerents having different strengths and weaknesses.” Wiktionary, http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/asymmetric_warfare [accessed 8 October 2008].

    [8] In classical military theory, the term is strategy of attrition, which is contrasted with strategy of annihilation. See Hans Delbrück, History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History, trans. by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), vol. 4, chap. IV.
    Having said all that, CCJO comes back to the gold standard as to its understanding of war, as opposed to the different forms and complexity of warfare (the conduct of war):

    p.16

    Despite this wide variation, all wars share the same fundamental nature. In any form or context, war is organized, reciprocal violence for political purposes. War is essentially a violent struggle between hostile and independent wills, each trying to impose itself by force directly upon the other or upon some contested population. This struggle combines physical, mental, and moral aspects. It is simultaneously a clash of material means -- weapons, equipment, and supplies; of intellect, as manifested in opposing strategies, operations, and tactics; and of resolve and morale. War is therefore not action against an inanimate object, but is “always the collision of two living forces.”[9]

    [9] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 77.
    Last edited by jmm99; 10-01-2009 at 08:09 PM.

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    Council Member Dr. C's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by wm View Post
    To focus on what works today is to be stagnant, to put ourselves in the position of fighting the last war when the next war comes along. At least that, I submit, is what makes things like the ACC and the CCJO have the "predicting the future" flavor that they have. Gen Dempsey had the right focus in the point about ideas mattering, particularly when they are new ideas. What he didn't identify was how to get folks to generate new ideas, produce the "AHA!" moment of discovery.
    A focus on what works today isn't to be stagnant. It's to ground the future propositions in examples of what has worked. The future propositions should innovate. The process involves envisioning what might be, and writing affirmative statements that describe the idealized future, applying "what if."

    I've been studying Appreciative Inquiry, which is different from problem-solving, and I like the approach much better. It's challenging on a personal level to avoid using words like "problems" and trying to focus on positive examples of what is working, instead of what is not working. Imagine getting an entire organization like the Army to move away from a traditional deficit-base, problem-solution framework and move towards Appreciative Inquiry. The capstone would have been a nice place to start since it is about generating ideas for the future.

    Here is an example of a leadership summit from the Navy, when an Appreciative Inquiry approach was used.

    "During the Leadership Summit, participants used Appreciative Inquiry questions to tap into their own past high-point experiences in the Navy. The diverse group present discovered many commonalties and hopes for the future. The participants then learned how to leverage these past strengths and shared visions to create action plans for positive change. Specific outcomes included over 30 pilot projects."

    http://appreciativeinquiry.case.edu/practice/ppNavy.cfm
    Thanks for letting me participate in your discussion, since I'm "new" to the SWJ! I can tell you're being very thoughtful and patient in your responses to my postings. Appreciative Inquiry, compared to problem-solving, isn't that easy to grasp. I've spent a lot of time in the last year reading about it, and participating in and faciliting workshops using this approach.
    Michele Costanza, Ph.D., CKM/CKEE (Contractor)

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    Council Member Infanteer's Avatar
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    Not to sound curt, but this whole document sounds like something "full of sound and fury, in the end, signifying nothing."

    Maybe I'm just dense, but I read the draft document twice and have kept up with this thread and I'm still drawing a big "so what?" A lot of high-tech buzzwords (which have been picked apart by astute observers) and now we're looking into a fancy form of analysis that is, admittedly, "hard to grasp".

    I think it was agreed upon that this document was simply too complicated to be of real use. I would hope I could put something considered "capstone" infront of a Rifle Platoon and that they could read it and easily relate it to their job.

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    Council Member Dr. C's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Infanteer View Post
    Not to sound curt, but this whole document sounds like something "full of sound and fury, in the end, signifying nothing."

    Maybe I'm just dense, but I read the draft document twice and have kept up with this thread and I'm still drawing a big "so what?" A lot of high-tech buzzwords (which have been picked apart by astute observers) and now we're looking into a fancy form of analysis that is, admittedly, "hard to grasp".

    I think it was agreed upon that this document was simply too complicated to be of real use. I would hope I could put something considered "capstone" infront of a Rifle Platoon and that they could read it and easily relate it to their job.
    The reason Appreciative Inquiry is hard to grasp is that most of us are used to taking a problem-solution approach to thinking about the future. It's not really that complicated, and I agree the capstone shouldn't really be that complicated of a document. A Rifle Platoon should be able to read it and "get it." Good point. That's why I suggested getting a core group representative of the Army from all ranks, and then asking them questions about when and how they are at their best doing their jobs, then grounding the future propositions in those examples. It's not "fancy."
    Michele Costanza, Ph.D., CKM/CKEE (Contractor)

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    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Dr. C View Post
    A focus on what works today isn't to be stagnant. It's to ground the future propositions in examples of what has worked. The future propositions should innovate. The process involves envisioning what might be, and writing affirmative statements that describe the idealized future, applying "what if."

    I've been studying Appreciative Inquiry, which is different from problem-solving, and I like the approach much better. It's challenging on a personal level to avoid using words like "problems" and trying to focus on positive examples of what is working, instead of what is not working. Imagine getting an entire organization like the Army to move away from a traditional deficit-base, problem-solution framework and move towards Appreciative Inquiry. The capstone would have been a nice place to start since it is about generating ideas for the future.
    Looks like I need to be a little clearer. Merely to describe what is working at present is to be stagnant. That we can describe, for example, that a heavy armored force is able to conduct a forced entry operation (like the run into Baghdad) successfully, makes little difference. However, if one is working to understand/explain why what works today is working, then one has a basis for getting ahead. To continue the forced entry example, an explanation that tells us why the heavy armored force is able to be successful and why it may (or may not) be better/more successful than using a light infantry force for the same kind of operation would be valuable for informing/planning/evaluating what might be a way ahead (Of course we also need to be able to explain/describe/appreciate what it means to be successful and to justify making the normative judgements that one approach will be more or less successful, i.e.,a better or worse, than another.) If endeavoring to explain why something is working is the sense of "appreciative" that is operative in appreciative inquiry, then I think it has merit as an approach.
    Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
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    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Hacksaw View Post
    Of course its good stuff... He's Vizzini!!!

    To assume otherwise would be inconceivable
    Hey Hack,

    Finish him off your way--"man to man, as God intended."
    Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
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    Default The Army Capstone Concept: the Army wants your comments

    Quote Originally Posted by EmmetM View Post
    That said, my immediate impression is of an inconsistency between the individual parts and the whole. While the introductory section give a succinct picture of the problems associated with scientific precision and etheral war, parts of the draft (e.g. 2-2 Future Operating Environment) reiterate or reemphasise the same flawed thinking about our human environment that has led to the constant replication of mistakes and constant cycle of retranche, reanalysis, revision, and repetition. These flaws are two - our focus on change and our misunderstanding of complexity.
    This capstone document is refreshing in its break from the decades of US Military doctrine which have focused almost exclusively on high intensity conflict. Many of us had experienced personal frustration with this mindset while planning and executing “other than combat” operations in Iraq (2003). Since then, it has been remarkable to observe just how slowly the institution adapts in response to visible and current evidence that war is more about dealing with a whole range of actors to influence decisions, as opposed to killing every last enemy combatant. I find it refreshing and encouraging, for example, to see substantial discussion about partnerships, including NGOs and private sector.

    In his foreward, General Dempsey does an outstanding job, laying out the concept and vision, including key concepts of decentralization, adaptability and the interacting elements of physical and psychological control. There are a few weaknesses, however, in the ensuing discussion, which is intended to develop those concepts.

    Wm makes an important point that we need to look ahead and not expect to fight the last war.
    If you look at the scenarios in the ACC, they are all things that we currently plan for based on what has already happened in the past. There are no new scenarios.
    What happens to the Army if it is faced with something its never seen before? For example: a "coalition of the willing" decides it no longer wants a world that lets the US to play the role of global defender; or the US is just left out of the conversation so to speak --nations choose not to trade with us anymore, for example. Suppose Saudi Arabia stopped selling oil to the US and Canada stopped piping in natural gas, both selling the former US share to China instead.
    I also agree with Dr C. that you need to have a foot in the present and be thoughtful in projecting the future.
    A focus on what works today isn't to be stagnant. It's to ground the future propositions in examples of what has worked. The future propositions should innovate. The process involves envisioning what might be, and writing affirmative statements that describe the idealized future, applying "what if."
    What worked in the last war? Adaptive people working in established teams. In Iraq, small units conducting operations outside their core mission set on a daily basis: artillery soldiers providing convoy security or negotiating with tribal leaders. Sadaam was captured by some engineer solders who clearly were not busy building anything or clearing minefields at the time. These Americans succeeded to the degree that they could adapt and work together under urgent conditions.

    How will future trends affect the operating environment? One glaring omission from the Capstone paper is effective consideration of globalization and concurrent shifts in political and economic power (e.g., Section 2-3). China is producing more engineers than we have people; they are building an unprecedented high tech (even green!) industrial capacity and are aggressively establishing strategic, international partnerships. World petroleum reserves, which carry with them economic and political power, are increasingly in the hands of less stable nations, or those with little or no alignment with US security agendas. Clearly, we will operate with significantly less autonomy or freedom of maneuver (not just geographic, but in the human/political dimensions). The authors should shorten discussions of historical events such as Iraq and Lebanon in favor of some recognition of significant and relevant world trends.

    These emerging shifts sharpen the importance of another historic American weakness, our ingrained narcissism. Even as we recognize that we now must consider “the people” (in addition to “us” and “them”), the Capstone document does not really capture the point that Steve the Planner and others have made in this discussion – that “the people” are not just some benign set of neutral bystanders. Section 1-6b, for example, treats “others” as sort of minor complications – mentioning, for example, the seemingly simple need for “. . . flexibility to secure populations and organizations.”

    In fact, “the people” are a diverse set of actors with different agendas (independent of our own), but with whom we must form a full range of relationships. This is a critical concept to understand constructs such as narco-terrorism, where the various actors work together with complementary but very different agendas. Afghani contractors who sell us pipe or dig wells need not to be American patriots. Iraqi communities work with us to rebuild schools because we share a value of education – not because they want their town to be occupied by US forces.

    In order to succeed in the future operating environment, information is perhaps the most critical tool. We rarely win wars by decimating the enemy – today, we probably would not stop al Qaeda or the Muslim extremist movement by killing Osama. Section 3-2c is woefully inadequate in conveying this concept. The bottom line is not that “Russians and Chinese believe that information warfare is a way of resolving conflict in their favor.” It is that we win wars through decisions, which are based substantially upon information. While cyber warfare is important, it does not warrant dominating the discussion space allocated to Information Warfare; this again reflects the American fascination with technology.

    Finally, we still struggle to think beyond geographical boundaries and established government structures. The Capstone document is littered with evidence that we are stuck in the paradigm that operations equal combat in an area defined by geographic (3-D) space. Section 2-2 includes several references to conflict being constrained to space (incorrectly, by the way, suggesting terrorists and criminals operate primarily in lawless spaces – like New York, Chicago, Miami, London and Bogata?). Section 3-4a. misses an opportunity to set the stage for discussion of the “Military Solution” through a more expansive description of “operational area” to clearly include human and information dimensions.

    Military operations are all about soldiers on the ground. However, we need to expand our thinking in terms of what those soldiers do.

  20. #100
    Council Member Dr. C's Avatar
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    Default Systemic Operational Design

    I just read an article in the September-October 2009 of Military Review by LTC (RET) Tim Challans, Ph.D., "Tipping Sacred Cows: Moral Potential Through Operational Art."

    http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...031_art006.pdf

    "Sacred cows make the best hamburgers. The Aristotelian box includes the uncritically accepted article of faith -- which we take for granted -- that revolves around reasoning about means and ends. The logic of this type of reasoning has burgeoned over the centuries (at an accelerating rate recently) in the form of "problem-solving" enshrined as a sacred principle. . . . Strategy is not about problem-solving" (p. 21).
    The author discusses Systemic Operational Design (SOD), and I pointed this article out because of his perspective on problem-solving as a framework.

    I think the capstone document would be stronger if a framework other than "problem-solution" was used. I've probably reached my word limit for how many times I can write that in one discussion thread.

    I doubt if I'm the only person who will read the capstone and take issue with the framework and how the authors arrived at their solutions. I'm trying to be helpful and suggest how to build a stronger position.
    Michele Costanza, Ph.D., CKM/CKEE (Contractor)

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