The problems with comparisons to Japan and Germany are numerous.

Most important was the concept of complete capitulation. Those countries were totally defeated, yet educated, effective, and in need of rapid humanitarian and capital assistance. The peoples were largely responsible for stability and reconstruction.

In Iraq, we defeated the leadership, not a country. Then, took a thin occupation stance while removing the existing governmental structure. To my knowledge, we never effectively engaged a post-conflict population stabilization and reconstruction effort, which, in part, exacerbated the instability.

Moreover, unlike Germany and Japan, the UN sanctions did what they usually do---created a huge black market, and very entrenched mafiosi. This, we probably made worse, not better, by bringing back all the exiles as the power base.

As conditions worsened after occupation, arguably 15%-20% of the population voted with their feet (refugees), compounding instability, and undermining further reconstruction.

Against all of that, we launched incoherent and uncoordinated stabilization/reconstruction efforts amongst the bullets flying, and never established an effective effort to get basic human and government services re-established under our supervision.

Been there, done that.

Is the question really whether, by incorporating traditional (UN style) approaches to post-war conflict, a viable alternative strategy? If so, we might get somewhere.

Political parties aside, what's the biggest concern of average Iraqi in the past and next election? Establishing basic services.

But Iraq became Iraq, for its own reasons. It seems that scabbing some UN ideas onto it after the fact is not going to let us refight that war.

Steve