United Nations Peacekeeping (catch all)

[Tom Odom]

But I did read Dallaire's.

Would western militaries be anymore willing or able to take on such a task today than they were in 1994?

Matt

Matt,

There are of course an infinite number of answers to that question; all are in fact irrelevant because the militaries do the mission the politicians hand them. We get to shape that process and we may influence the mission design. But ultimately they make the critical decision.

The driving issue in the Clinton Adminstration was the idea that all things African in April 1994 were the same as all things in Somalia in October 1993. The Nat Security Directive that came out of the Somalia episode stated the US would not commit forces in areas that did not concern our national interests. Chief advocate for that position was Richard Clark and he was the one who pushed the do nothing, don't say genocide, and push for a full UN withdrawal. I am not a fan of Madelaine Albright but in the case of Rwanda she was the person who as US Ambassador to the UN stood up and refused to push the UNAMIR withdrawal any further.

My issue with General Dallaire has always been that he did not understand how a UN peacekeepibng mission was at its very core a political animal, not a unified military force that he could actually command to do the things he wanted to do. I do not think the Belgian government would have allowed a preemptive operation as Dallaire proposed and as the UN Peacekeeping Office refused.

That said, a single brigade combat team with a mission to use force to stop the slaughter could have halted the genocide in its tracks in April 1994 on into May. Afterwards I am not so sure as the war was fully raging by then and the genocide much more widespread. Our own JTF came in Opn Support Hope with a clear get in and get out mandate; the chain of command wanted no mission creep and the opening Disney-like plans to get all the refugees back into Rwanda soon met reality.

For the next 18 months I watched and warned that a new, worse war was in the cards unless someone moved to checkmate what was happening in the camps. My fears and predictions came true a few months after I left.

Are we better today? Yes. No. Maybe.

Yes we are better at interagency, combined irregular warfare.

No because we still have a fundamental imbalance between our departments in the application of power, soft or hard, kinetic or non-kinetic, military, economic, or diplomatic.

Maybe because it all goes back to that fundamental: the decision to act comes from the politician, so whether we act or how we act is fundamentally changed every time we go through the decision process. Look at us right now in regards to Afghanistan.

In the end, I hope fervently that when we face another Rwanda we are allowed to act.

Tom

[J Wolfsberger]

My issue with General Dallaire has always been that he did not understand how a UN peacekeepibng mission was at its very core a political animal, not a unified military force that he could actually command to do the things he wanted to do.

Tom,

You were on the ground, so I'll defer to your evaluation. However, I had the impression Dallaire thought he'd been sent on a political mission, realized that a military mission was needed, and tried to get the mandate changed and resourced. Did I misunderstand?

[Tom Odom]

Tom,

You were on the ground, so I'll defer to your evaluation. However, I had the impression Dallaire thought he'd been sent on a political mission, realized that a military mission was needed, and tried to get the mandate changed and resourced. Did I misunderstand?

Somewhat but keep in mind I was in Zaire while he was hip deep in Rwanda. I draw my conclusions from his writings--especially his book.

He was from the very beginnig selected to command a UN peackeeping force. He and his cohorts helped craft what they thought they needed only to have the UN cut it to the bone. The initial misread was therefore at the UN in seeing UNAMIR as a low risk, purely political mission, even though the mandate included inherently risk laden military tasks.

Dallaire as the good soldier does took what he got and tried to make it work. And he had to fight all along to get the resources he needed. He believed that his request to preempt the genocide through targeted raids was within his mandate. Nonetheless he sought permission to do so and was denied. My ambassador later told me that he told Dallaire that in his opinion Dallaire had all the authority he needed without asking permission from the UN.

My issue is simply that even with UN permission it is nearly impossible to take a UN force on an offensive against elements of the host nation and hold that force together. Advocating and even getting a stronger mandate does not change the politics involved in conducting UN operations. Dallaire and his deputy Anyidoho essentially ignored UN orders to draw down even further than they did. Anyidoho ignored the orders of his own government as well. He was very much a hero and was largely ignored.

Does that clarify it?

Tom

[MattC86]

Tom/J,

I understand, obviously, the mission does not begin with the military and, as they say "theirs not to reason why," etc., but you don't think military unwillingness plays a role in a politicians' willingness to commit? It's like Scheuer's quote that Clinton would ask for ideas for using Special Ops in Afghanistan, and an unwilling Hugh Shelton would provide "plans that looked like the Invasion of Normandy."

I think a military's unwillingness to do something is very much a part of this question - not just the political will of civilian leadership. Bill had no stomach for Rwanda after Somalia, but I'm sure you know better than I just what the Army thought about sending, say, that single brigade to Kigali.

I feel like media campaigns, outpouring of sympathy/support, etc, can get an administration moving on something it doesn't necessarily want to do. But Dallaire seems to be rightly concerned about creating a military structure and culture that embraces this sort of mission and doesn't pose a massive obstacle to successfully taking it on.

Perhaps I'm way off base and out of line with that, but I feel like that's where he gets near fanciful.

Matt

[Tom Odom]

Matt

You said:

I understand, obviously, the mission does not begin with the military and, as they say "theirs not to reason why," etc., but you don't think military unwillingness plays a role in a politicians' willingness to commit? It's like Scheuer's quote that Clinton would ask for ideas for using Special Ops in Afghanistan, and an unwilling Hugh Shelton would provide "plans that looked like the Invasion of Normandy."

I said:

all are in fact irrelevant because the militaries do the mission the politicians hand them. We get to shape that process and we may influence the mission design. But ultimately they make the critical decision.

I would say we are in agreement. It is an iterative process up until the point the politician gets to decide. Even then the ways and means decisions that flow from a decision to act continue that iterative process.

As for Dallaire's force, it is fanciful and I don't think it will happen. I love the Canadians for their efforts in sustaining peacekeeping under the UN banner. I just don't see the UN model as an effective combat force necessary in an enforcement mode.

Best
Tom

[Rex Brynen]

As for Dallaire's force, it is fanciful and I don't think it will happen. I love the Canadians for their efforts in sustaining peacekeeping under the UN banner.

Slightly off-topic, but you may need to frame that in the past tense.

Between past NATO peacekeeping in the Balkans, followed by the huge demands of the Afghan deployment on the relatively small Canadian military, we've had a sharply declining presence in UN missions. As of August, we had some 177 Canadian forces on deployment to UN PKOs, placing us 56th among troop contributing countries (somewhat behind Mongolia at 49th).

It remains to be seen whether, post-2011 termination of our Afghan combat deployments, we'll reemphasize UN missions or not. Much may depend on the party in power, with the current Conservatives noticeably cooler to the idea than the Liberals.

[davidbfpo]

The background to Dalliare's comment is that he is the co-director of a Canadian think tank, which has recently released 'Mobilizing the Will to Intervene': http://migs.concordia.ca/W2I/documen...2IAugust09.pdf

It is a long paper (160 pgs) so not read beyond the summary.

KOW have a rather sharp riposte: http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2009...anadian-style/

There you go MattC86 - a little reading inside the Beltway.

davidbfpo