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  1. #1
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    Default Perhaps

    Finding non-bias unclassified sources has proven to be a challenge. For example, there are Cuban Exile websites and extreme right wing sites that state beyond a doubt Cuba provided substantial logistical support. While it has been proven that Cuba provided support, the degree of support is hard to determine.

    This first article is an excellent professional development article regarding logistic support for insurgents. A couple of excerpts below, much more at the link.

    http://sci.tech-archive.net/Archive/...5-01/0005.html

    The success of the Nicaraguan revolution in 1979
    highlighted the need for a coordinated effort by all five anti-government groups operating in El Salvador. After months of negotiations in Havana, Cuba, the major guerilla groups emerged consolidated under the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU). In part this unity is believed to have been due to the pressure of Fidel Castro who sought to consolidate training and
    logistical support. Shortly after the announcement of the creation of
    the DRU, in May, 1980, there were indications that approximately 600
    tons of weapons had arrived in El Salvador.

    The largest percentage of 5.56mm M16/AR15 rifles captured have been traced to weapons either provided to the Republic of South Vietnam or issued to US units sent to Vietnam. Both US Defense Intelligence Agency serial number trace data and the Institute's samples examined in El Salvador show the single largest source of M16/AR15 rifles provided to the FMLN has been
    Vietnam.

    Between 1984 and 1989, Eastern Europe emerged as an important new
    source for FMLN small arms. Salvadoran government documents show that
    prior to 1987 so-called "Communist Bloc" weapons represented less than
    one percent of all captured weapons. By 1990 the total of such weapons
    had grown to over 30 percent and continues to grow.

    Eastern Europe has not been the only recent supplier of weapons to the
    FMLN. Increasing numbers of North Korean manufactured 7.62 x 39mm Type
    68 (AKM) rifles have been captured by government forces.

    Logistical support for the FMLN has not been dependent upon a single
    source, nor a single region.
    This information seems plausable, but I'm a little leery of the source:

    http://cuban-exile.com/doc_201-225/d....html#Salvador

    With unified tactics and operations now possible, Cuba began to assist the guerrillas in formulating military strategy. Cuban specialists helped the DRU devise initial war plans in the summer of 1980. The Cubans influenced the guerrillas to launch a general offensive in January 1981. After the offensive failed, guerrilla leaders traveled to Havana in February 1981 to finalize a strategy to "improve our internal military situation" by engaging in a "negotiating maneuver" to gain time to regroup.(11)

    Cuba provided few weapons and ammunition to Salvadoran guerrillas from its own resources but played a key role in coordinating the acquisition and delivery of arms from Vietnam, Ethiopia, and Eastern Europe through Nicaragua.(12) After the unmasking of this network, Cuba and Nicaragua reduced the flow in March and early April. Prior to a guerrilla offensive in August an upswing in deliveries occurred. The arms flow continues via clandestine surface and air routes. In addition, the Cubans over the past year have established a network of small ships to deliver arms to Salvadoran insurgent groups.

    Cuba also assists the Salvadoran guerrillas in contacts with Arab radical states and movements to arrange military training and financing for arms acquisition. In September 1980, Cuba laundered $500,000 in Iraqi funds for the Salvadoran insurgents. In March 1981, the Salvadoran Communist Party Secretary General, Shafik Handal, visited Lebanon and Syria to meet with Palestine leaders. Cuba also coordinated the training of a relatively small number of Salvadoran guerrillas in Palestinian camps in the Mideast.
    The El Salvador civil war still interests me, because of the second and third order effects ranging from MS-13 gangs (several members were in the FMLN), cached arms that are available to highest bidder, probably narcoterrorists, and the fact that the FMLN is now a credible political party that is capable of winning the national election in 2009. I don't know what color their stripes are now, but the effects of the conflict still linger.

  2. #2
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    Default Nicaragua v. United States - ICJ

    Most of the ICJ judges in 1986 agreed with your initial impression; and ignored the materiality of the evidence submitted by the US. So, judgment for Nicaragua - a victory for the "anti-colonialists"; judgment enforcement sought in UN with most everybody against the 600 lb. gorilla; an SC veto effectively ended the sideshow.

    Wiki summary of this leading I Law case is here.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaragua_v._United_States

    The ICJ webpage is here (menu to all pleadings, docs, etc.), where you find a summary of Judge Schwebel's opinion (in full, available from ICJ menu):

    Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel

    Judge Schwebel dissented from the Court's Judgment on factual and legal grounds. He agreed with the Court in its holdings against the United States for its failure to make known the existence and location of mines laid by it and its causing the publication of a manual advocating acts in violation of the law of war. But Judge Schwebel concluded that the United States essentially acted lawfully in exerting armed pressures against Nicaragua, both directly and through its support of the contras, because Nicaragua's prior and sustained support of armed insurgency in El Salvador was tantamount to an armed attack upon El Salvador against which the United States could react in collective self-defence in El Salvador's support.

    Judge Schwebel found that, since 1979, Nicaragua had assisted and persisted in providing large-scale, vital assistance to the insurgents in El Salvador. The delictual acts of Nicaragua had not been confined to providing the Salvadoran rebels with large quantities of arms, munitions and supplies, which of themselves arguably might be seen as not tantamount to armed attack. Nicaragua had also joined with the Salvadoran rebels in the organization, planning and training for their acts of insurgency, and had provided them with command-and-control facilities, bases, communications and sanctuary which enabled the leadership of the Salvadoran rebels to operate from Nicaraguan territory. That scale of assistance, in Judge Schwebel's view, was legally tantamount to an armed attack. Not only was El Salvador entitled to defend itself against that armed attack, it had called upon the United States to assist it in the exercise of collective self-defence. The United States was entitled to do so, through measures overt or covert. Those measures could be exerted not only in El Salvador but against Nicaragua on its own territory.

    In Judge Schwebel's view, the Court's conclusion that the Nicaraguan Government was not "responsible for any flow of arms" to the Salvadoran insurgents was not sustained by "judicial or judicious" considerations. The Court had "excluded, discounted and excused the unanswerable evidence of Nicaragua's major and maintained intervention in the Salvadoran insurgency". Nicaragua's intervention in El Salvador in support of the Salvadoran insurgents was, Judge Schwebel held, admitted by the President of Nicaragua, affirmed by Nicaragua's leading witness in the case, and confirmed by a "cornucopia of corroboration".

    Even if, contrary to his view, Nicaragua's actions in support of the Salvadoran insurgency were not viewed as tantamount to an armed attack, Judge Schwebel concluded that they undeniably constituted unlawful intervention. But the Court, "remarkably enough", while finding the United States responsible for intervention in Nicaragua, failed to recognize Nicaragua's prior and continuing intervention in El Salvador.

    For United States measures in collective self-defence to be lawful, they must be necessary and proportionate. In Judge Schwebel's view, it was doubtful whether the question of necessity in this case was justiciable, because the facts were so indeterminate, depending as they did on whether measures not involving the use of force could succeed in terminating Nicaragua's intervention in El Salvador. But it could reasonably be held that the necessity of those measures was indicated by "persistent Nicaraguan failure to cease armed subversion of El Salvador".

    Judge Schwebel held that "the actions of the United States are strikingly proportionate. The Salvadoran rebels, vitally supported by Nicaragua, conduct a rebellion in El Salvador; in collective self-defence, the United States symmetrically supports rebels who conduct a rebellion in Nicaragua. The rebels in El Salvador pervasively attack economic targets of importance in El Salvador; the United States selectively attacks economic targets of military importance" in Nicaragua.

    Judge Schwebel maintained that, in contemporary international law, the State which first intervenes with the use of force in another State - as by substantial involvement in the sending of irregulars onto its territory - is, prima facie, the aggressor. Nicaragua's status as prima facie aggressor can only be confirmed upon examination of the facts. "Moreover", Judge Schwebel concluded, "Nicaragua has compounded its delictual behaviour by pressing false testimony on the Court in a deliberate effort to conceal it. Accordingly, on both grounds, Nicaragua does not come before the Court with clean hands. Judgment in its favour thus unwarranted, and would be unwarranted even if it should be concluded - as it should not be - that the responsive actions of the United States were unnecessary or disproportionate."
    http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index....e=70&k=66&p3=5

    A partial summary of the evidence presented by the US (76 pp. of a 476 page doc) is here - with the links to Cuba, how C&C worked, etc.

    http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/9633.pdf

    I expect a large number of original source materials are available for this case, which would further prove the extent of Nic & Cuban support.

    Judge Schwebel's 538 page full opinion (32 MB download) is here.

    http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6523.pdf

    Hope the above helps.
    Last edited by jmm99; 12-01-2008 at 03:52 AM. Reason: add link

  3. #3
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    Default This is actually one of those cases

    where the classified intel was actually better than what was in the public domain. The Soviets, Cubans, and Sandinistas all provided material aid and support to the FMLN. I heard GEN Paul Gorman discussing supplying the FMLN from Nicaragua via the Gulf of Fonseca by small boat - 1985. It was still being done in 87 and 88. Cuba was responsible for the unification - such as it was - of the FMLN by insisting on it if the 5 insurgent groups wanted any aid from any communist source. Note that negotiations between the govt and the FMLN began in earnest only as the USSR was falling apart and the Sandinistas had been voted out of power in Nicaragua. Both events meant that no more Soviet bloc supplies would be coming in to the FMLN.

    Arms aid also came through Honduras. Sanctuaries existed in the disputed pockets on the Honduran Salvadoran border called the "Bolsones" where FMLN units could rest and refit while arms were smuggled to them from Nicaragua under the not very watchful eyes of the UN bureaucrats who ran the refugee camps.

    Gorman produced a pamphlet at the time. I suspect that the CARL has it and others - all unclas - but because they were sanitized from classified stuff, less than 100% compelling.

    Cheers

    JohnT

  4. #4
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Default Contra Cross

    As I recall Contra Cross has some tidbits on this as well.

    PM Bill Meara and ask him!

    Tom

  5. #5
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    Default Good idea, Tom.

    Bill was there, after all.

    Cavguy, PM me and I can give you a couple of email addresses that might be useful.

    Cheers

    JohnT

  6. #6
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Default

    Thanks for all the replies and PMs, I'm digging in.

    Without going too deep into anything classified, can anyone comment as to whether the amount of support and sanctuary that may have been offered materially affected the length and outcome of the insurgency?

    To add clarity, I'm doing some academic research on whether our COIN best practices are based on cases where insurgents received little outside support and/or sanctuary (Kenya, Malaya, Philippines) versus insurgencies with significant outside assistance and sanctuary (Afghanistan (1), Vietnam, etc.) The next step is comparison of successful COIN examples of each type and seeing what the critical types were.

    Going into it I thought El Sal was overall a non-externally supported insurgency (meaning for the terms of my paper it had some but not meaningful support), but have run across some conflicting sources, hence this question.

    Niel
    "A Sherman can give you a very nice... edge."- Oddball, Kelly's Heroes
    Who is Cavguy?

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