El Salvador war: postscripts

[davidbfpo]

Just spotted the victory of the FMLN candidate in El Salvador: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7944899.stm

A close result and hopefully violence will remain a memory.

I know references have been made to the US role in the COIN campaign / war back in the 1980's, so thought worthwhile adding.

davidbfpo

[John T. Fishel]

marks the fulfillment of the promise made by President Duarte in 1985 and President Cristiani in 1991/2 - that if the FMLN laid down its arms, it would be able to compete freely for power in elections. That it has done and finally won. It also has nearly two decades of playing a major role in the Legislative Assembly - mostly constructive (as much as Arena's role has been mostly constructive) and of governing a number of towns and cities.

I believe (and hope) that this electoral transfer of power will demonstrate El Salvador's political maturity and I wish Mr Fulnes toda la suerte posible (all possible good luck) in his Presidency.

In the end, this transition is what we sought to help the Salvadorans achieve.

Cheers

JohnT

[jmm99]

and possibly good news. A tidbit in Mauricio Funes' Wiki - his wife was involved in the Workers' Party in Brazil. Of course, that is a big tent (multi-factions). Any idea of whether she was closer to Articulação, the center-left group that Lula da Silva is a part of ?

Also, how does Funes fit into the spectrum of the other Central American figures, Álvaro Colom (Guatemala); Manuel Zelaya (Honduras); Daniel Ortega (Nicaragua); Óscar Arias (Costa Rica) ?

These mostly (Zeleya ?) seem center-left, SDP types.

[John T. Fishel]

election rhetoric, Funes is likely to govern fairly center-left (which will be a big change from ARENA). The real concern about FMLN politicians is that because of party rules on term limits about the time a legislator built up substantive expertise and cross party connections he was term limited out of office. Note that this was not law but FMLN rules. So a lot of power resides in the professional cadre of the FMLN whether it has hels office or not.

A friend of mine - and student at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in my seminar group - was an FMLN Comandante during the war and later served on the Defense Committee of the Assembly where he was best friends with the ARENA chairman, a retired Army COL. He was term limited out. In fact, when I met him at a seminar we held in San Salvador, he and another COL were chatting after the session about where they had been in Feb 87. It turns out that the COL and the Comandante had both been operating in Cabanas department on opposite sides. At that point, I interjected that I, too, had been in Cabanas in Feb 87, observing the operations of the Bracamonte Immediate Reaction Bn as part of a team from Southcom's Small Wars operations Research Directorate (SWORD).

While we will have to see what transpires in the new govt, Funes seems like an appropriate choice to lead the FMLN as a responsible govt.

Cheers

JohnT

[davidbfpo]

This will be an odd thread and I have checked that there is not a suitable existing thread on El Salvador. In a recent thread on Afghanistan several posts have been added drawing attention to this war and really they are best placed here (the thread being: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...?t=8467&page=4 ).

Accordingly the thread will appear with this introduction at the end.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

An article by Tom Ricks on Afghanistan: http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts..._wrong_in_iraq led to several comments on the war in El Salvador, especially by David Ucko. He particularly cited a RAND paper:

I would recommend Benjamin Schwarz's study on El Salvador for RAND (www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R4042/), written in 1991. What Schwarz does is illustrate the critical weaknesses of the U.S. approach in El Salvador, most of which centre around its limited leverage: its inability to get the armed forces of El Salvador (ESAF) and the government (GoES) to do what the U.S. reforms asked of them.

I know John Fishel does not agree with Schwarz or Ucko's viewpoint:

The war was never a stalemate. It proceeded as a series of shifting equilibria where first one side had the advantage and then the other would catch up. Then the initiative shfted and the process repeated. In the end, however, the Chapultepec Accords terminated the war on almost exactly the terms offered by President Duarte in 1984. That, I call, a win for the govt! An unspoken term of settlement, however, was that the govt could not publicly claim victory and was wise enough not to do so.

davidbfpo

[John T. Fishel]

on giving us a separate thread and bringing in the Ucko comments.

FSO, I really overlooked Vides. He was a really impressive guy and, when we briefed Pres Duarte on the Combined ESAF Assessment, Vides was the only person in a room fulll of senior gringos and Salvadorans who was able to answer Pres Duarte's question about whether the govt was winning the war. (Vides answered in the affirmative, correctly IMO.) I never got to know Blandon but I would agree with your assesment. I also agree that Vides got a raw deal from the USG in those suits. Amb Corr, to his everlasting credit, went out ofhis way to testify for Vides.

I also agree with you on Ponce. The Truth Commission report clearly leaves much to be desired. In general, it accepts as true any allegation about ESAF crimes without investigation but invstigated allegations of FMLN crimes and/or lumped them together while treating each allegation against ESAF individually and as true.

Finally, regarding Benavides, my sources tell me he was responsible - but he had been stashed at the Academy because he was considered to be among the least comptent of his Tanda mates - but he was a known hard liner. The problem was that whe San Salvador was underattack he had responibility for the defense of the sites you indicate and TACON of the Atlacatl for purposes of site defense. Motive and opportunity.

Cheers

JohnT

[Pol-Mil FSO]

John:

A Vides Casanova story for you: in response to continued Embassy pressure to remove COL Staben from command of the Arce BIRI, Vides reportedly said "I can't remove him, he is our Patton." (The Embassy rejoinder should have been that Patton inherited his wealth.)

One of my favorite books on the El Salvador conflict is the 1988 NDU oral history volume edited by your colleague Max Manwaring, "El Salvador at War." (See: http://www.amazon.com/EL-SALVADOR-AT...3890512&sr=1-1 ). It has a lot of interesting and useful comments from most of the U.S. and Salvadoran military players during the 1980s.

Another of my favorites is "Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas." (See: http://www.amazon.com/Strategy-Tacti.../dp/0275950182 ) As you probably know, it was ghost written by Gustavo Perdomo, the Commander of the Special Operations Group (GOE) during the war. I got to know General Perdomo when he was assigned to Salvadoran Embassy in Washington in the mid 1990s. A very sharp and charismatic guy - until Iraq and Afghanistan came on the scene he probably had more combat experience than any other Special Forces officer in the world.

[John T. Fishel]

his wealth, he did marry it (or at least most of it). For those who don't know Staben was accused of being part of a kidnapping ring. My personal belief is that if he was it was not (less) for the money but for Tanda (Academy class) loyalty. Regardless, it's a great story and captures some of the dilemmas of COIN.

We certainly worked hard on El Salvador at War which Max and Court wrote while under contract with SWORD. I was the active officer supervising the project.

I think that Dave Spencer told me that Perdomo was the real author of much of the book - that was after Dave joined us at CHDS. I met Perdomo at the Centro de Altos Estudios Estrategicos (CAEE) in 1996 when he was a Colonel and "going through the course." Camps Anaya was the CAEE Director at the time. Incidentally, CHDS just announced that it was awarding the William Perry Award (for institutions) to the CAEE this year.

Cheers

JohnT

[davidbfpo]

Spotted via Twitter an article by David Ucko, on this 2016 article 'Influencing Clients in Counterinsurgency: U.S. Involvement in El Salvador’s Civil War' and so this thread has been re-opened.

Here is a telling phrase:

the United States struggled to persuade its proxy in San Salvador to follow its advice. Whereas American offers of aid and assistance were warmly welcomed, guidance on how to do things differently often fell on deaf ears. Simply put, interests in San Salvador did not always match those in Washington DC and, more often than not, local preferences won out. In this regard, El Salvador is far from unique.

Link:https://issforum.org/articlereviews/...form=hootsuite

[John T. Fishel]

(See Post 7 for why this thread appears please).

Ken, I suspect you are right that most post WWII wars have been characterized by meeting engagments including the war in El Salvador - which is where I'm going with this.

By1987, the ESAF, govt, and the US had developed a holistic COIN strategy that included political and economic reform and development - the development strategy had evolved from the 1983-84 National Plan to Unidos Para Reconstruir 85 - 87 to Municipios en Accion after 87; from centralized phased to decentrralized. The corresponding military strategy had three parts:
1. Protect infrastructure - a prime target of the FMLN - which also meant protecting the population because the infrastructure was located where they lived. This aspect of the strategy involved the most troops but was limited to regular brigades and miilitary detachments and Civil Defense (local militia) units.
2. 24/7 patrols by Immediate Reaction Bn in areas of FMLN concentration characterized by meeting engagements. The objective was to keep the FMLN off balance and constantly on the move. Since these bn were operating in thirds - one third in the field, one third recovering, one third preparing to go back - they were rested compared to the guerrillas.
3. Intel targeted operations by the national Special Operations Group (GOE) and similar operations by brigade long range patrol elements focused on specific identified concetrations of FMLN leaders and fighters.

Together this national pol-econ-mil strategy won the war. Clearly, El Salvador is NOT Afghanistan or Iraq but we can certainly learn and adapt that which is appropriate. It is also useful to note that it took between 8 and 10 years to get all elements of the strategy in place. It is equally important that the big picture really was not clear to any single individual at the time. I never heard the military strategy described as I just described it by anybody - US or ESAF - while I was in country conducting the Combined ESAF Assessment (87-88) and I was talking with the MOD, the C3, the US Ambassador, and the MILGP commander along with the Southcom J3 who headed the team. Nevertheless, that is what was actually happening on the ground.

Cheers

JohnT

[Surferbeetle]

Together this national pol-econ-mil strategy won the war. Clearly, El Salvador is NOT Afghanistan or Iraq but we can certainly learn and adapt that which is appropriate. It is also useful to note that it took between 8 and 10 years to get all elements of the strategy in place. It is equally important that the big picture really was not clear to any single individual at the time. I never heard the military strategy described as I just described it by anybody - US or ESAF - while I was in country conducting the Combined ESAF Assessment (87-88) and I was talking with the MOD, the C3, the US Ambassador, and the MILGP commander along with the Southcom J3 who headed the team. Nevertheless, that is what was actually happening on the ground.

John/Dr. F/Sir,

As a fellow CA-bubba I recognize parts of your pol-econ-mil strategy from my time in Mosul, and saw some old echos of the El Salvador fight during a VETRETE there. During OIF 1 in Mosul we were able to reach large numbers of the populace and engage through the pol-econ-mil spectrum. As a result of this we reaped the benefits resulting from a greater mass of combined numbers (US & Iraqi) working to stabilize the area. My observation was that both US and Iraqi cultures were committed to centralized control however...later that summer de-bathification and disbanding the Army were some pretty serious below the belt shots to what we were doing...security deteriorated and the pol-econ side followed. There were still some older FMLN warriors around whom I bumped into during my visit to El Salvador. The FMLN had a distinct vision of themselves but they were peacefully pushing the pol-econ side of things in the small area that I observed. Peaceful integration is a worthy goal and I see the outcome as a success.

[John T. Fishel]

To me, the ultimate success of the El Sal strategy was the election last year of an FMLN president and his peaceful assumption of office. I saw this foreshadowed in a 2000 conference in El Sal where FMLN and aRENA legislators had forged friendships and working relationships.

On decentralization: Amb Ed Corr was the father of the MEA plan that decentralized development - at least on the US side. In his article on mil-mil contacts in Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement (vol 10 # 2) John Waghelstein who commaned the first big Milgp in 82-83 and was godfather of the original national plan, credits MEA with being the right approach.

Me, with my CA hat, am a strong advocate of local level development planning. Villagers really do know what they need better than the central govt.

Cheers

JohnT

[Pol-Mil FSO]

A somewhat tardy post related to Dr. Fishel's El Salvador comments:

In a 1988 visit to eastern El Salvador, I accompanied Ambassador Walker as a junior officer horse holder. In San Miguel, we heard 3d Brigade Commander Colonel Ponce tell us that he was more interested in protecting the population than killing guerrillas, and that he preferred turning a guerrilla to killing him. We saw this policy in action when we flew up to San Francisco Gotera, the capital of Morazan Department. Colonel Barrera, the Military Detachment Commander in Morazan, showed us a FMLN fighter who had surrendered to ESAF troops. Colonel Barrera told us that that the fighter had been a guest at the cuartel for a week and had been receiving food and shelter with no attempt at interrogation. They were waiting for the fighter to cooperate, something that they predicted would happen soon, given the good treatment and the fact that his ex-companeros were convinced that he had gone over to the other side.

It may be a somewhat simplistic formulation, but it seems to me that the ESAF COIN strategy evolved from killing the villagers whom they believed to support the guerrillas in the early 1980's, to chasing guerrillas during the middle 1980's, to considering the population as the center of gravity in the late 1980's.

[John T. Fishel]

Not only did the ESAF change over time but individuals did as well. By the time I met COL (later Gen Ponce) in 87 he was very much a pop centric believer but he had not always been so. (My source for that is a very senior US diplomat in a postion to know.) Domingo Monterrosa, who commanded the Atlacatl BIRI during the massacre at El Mozote was, by the time the FMLN assasinated him with a bomb on his helicopter, very much a believer in a pop centric strategy. (That comes from COL John Waghelstein who commanded the MILGP in 83-84 as well as other sources.) Some leaders of the ESAF changed, some stayed as hard liners, and some began as and stayed as democrats. Much was due to the constant pressure from MILGP commanders and US Ambassadors reinforced by then VP Bush reading the riot act to the High Command. For me, the traumatic event that cemented the change in the ESAF was the coming to light of the murder of the Jesuits in 89 and the choice forced on Ponce and the rest of his Academy class, the Tandona. Prior to that event the hierarchy of loyalty among ESAF officers was Tanda first, Army second, and country third. The atrocity was oredered by a member of the Tandona which forced Ponce and his classmates (who held all the key position in the ESAF) to choose where their loyalty lay. To their everlasting credit, they inverted the old loyalty pyramid and supported the prosecution of their classmate. I will be forever impressed and in awe of the American Ambassadors - Deane Hinton, Tom Pickering, Ed Corr, and Bill Walker - the MILGP Commanders - John Waghelstein, Joe Stringham, Jim Steele, and John Ellerson - and those who worked for them, and, especialy, the ESAF officers - Rene Emilio Ponce, Mauricio Vargas, Rafael Bustillo, Campos Anaya, and others - with all their faults who fought a hard war, learned and changed and adjusted to peace.

Cheers

JohnT

[Pol-Mil FSO]

Dr. Fishel:

The Jesuit massacre happened a few months after I left El Salvador but I followed it closely and discussed it with several persons who were involved in the investigation or had related knowledge of the event. As a result, I do not believe that COL Benavides ordered the killings as it would have been out of character. Benavides was known within the Tandona (Academy Class of 1966) as a follower rather than a leader. In addition, he was the Military Academy Director during the FMLN Offensive and was assigned responsibility for an ad hoc security sector that included the Military Academy, ESAF Heaquarters, and UCA; from what I have heard I understand his role to have been more in the deconfliction rather than planning of operations as he had TACON of units only when they were actually moving within his assigned sector.

Despite the assertion of the UN (so-called) Truth Commission Report, I have strong doubts that COL Ponce gave the order - he was too intelligent and not prone to panic. Nevertheless, I think the order did come from a Tandona member as those are the only persons from whom COL Benavides would take orders on such a serious matter - I think the most logical suspects would have been 1st Brigade Commander COL Zepeda or Vice MOD for Security COL Montano.

Re your list of officers - I would add two more officers whom I believe to deserve a great deal of credit for holding ESAF together from 1983 to 1988 - Generals Adolfo Blandon and Eugenio Vides Casanova, the Chief of Staff and Defense Minister, respectively. Vides Casanova played an unheralded but key balancing role in preventing right-wing coups from within the ranks while addressing the concerns of his civilian counterparts and the USG. I also believe that it was a great shame and stain on our honor that nobody in the USG did anything to support Vides Casanova when he was the target of civil suits from human rights groups in the 1990s.