Efficacy of punitive strikes?

[slapout9]

Jed that's my point. It is an assest that we could seize and protect and turn into something that would benefit the US and Iraq. Yes, I read everyday how they are attacking oil infrastructure and how poorly maintained it is. But again that's my point, they don't know how to run and they cain't protect it we should do it. Crazy,yes,no,maybe,change it around some?

[Jones_RE]

Where I'm going with questions about the (hypothetical) Iranian response is this: they're going to have one. Right now the assumption is that nothing can defeat our conventional assault. In the sense that they can't deny our soldiers the use of territory or maintain a body of troops with the capacity to conduct maneuver warfare that's absolutely right. In the sense that maneuver warfare will get us what we want, I think it's absolutely wrong.

Our problem isn't with the Iranian Army (which would be the target of maneuver war). We could certainly deploy engineers to destroy centrifuges, reactors and other equipment - when we can locate it.

Given the operational limitations your plan puts on our forces, mainly that the mission has to be quick, we can't do some other things.

1) We can't surprise them. A fast, lightning operation that can defeat the Iranian army and accomplish our objectives would call for a massive ground force. That takes a long, long time to deploy. Many months. They'll certainly see this coming - and make a variety of plans to deal with it. You obviously haven't given any real thought as to the specifics of those plans - a few minutes of concentrated effort on your part would reveal a lot of ugly things that they could do to harm our interests and kill our troops.

2) We can't target named individuals. History suggests this: Pancho Villa, Fidel Castro, Gen. Aidid, Osama bin Laden, Zarqawi, etc. The list of guys we've caught is also instructive: Che Guevara, Pablo Escobar, Saddam Hussein. Each one of these individuals took months or years of effort to catch - even when our best troops were involved with no political constraints on their search methods. Take it as given that we haven't particularly improved in this regard.

3) We can't completely abrogate the laws of land warfare. In a media saturated environment, where the US military has taken enough PR hits from abu Ghraib, Fallujah, GITMO and Haditha we're going to have to remain somewhat sensitive in our targeting.

Given those limitations, even the most massive military invasion force will only accomplish so much for us. In fact, I think the accomplishment is worth so little that it's not worth doing.

[Jones_RE]

Some possible counter tactics.

1) Global terrorism. There are Shiite communities throughout the Arab world - Iran is probably in touch with their dissidents even if Tehran doesn't support them. These communities would provide ready support for terrorism and sabotage through Saudi Arabia, for example.

2) Trouble in Iraq. Many Shiite militias (who are the most powerful group there, right now) have significant backing from Iran. With a porous border, the Iranians can run weapons and agents through there with no problem. Currently, Iraqi militias lack the will and equipment to fight US troops. Given a motivation, and more advanced RPG warheads, small arms ammunition and body armor they could prove a major threat to our troops in most of the country.

3) Preemptive strike. Our forces take months to build up to strenght. The Iranians could easily decide to launch a suicidal ground, air or naval assault figuring they have nothing left to lose. Such an assault wouldn't have to be targetted at our soldiers to screw us, either: the oil infrastructure in the region can't take that many cruise missiles to shut down.

4) Continuity of Government. They'd certainly put a plan in place to keep their government operational. Unlike Iraq, which was a dictatorship, they can put such a thing together. Iran is governed by an elected leadership with a broad base of support - they can have enough successors on hand that they can replace whatever Mullahs we do catch. Moreover, they'll make efforts to hide their people and protect them.

5) Infrastructure protection. Camouflage, Hardening, redundancy and reparability. We can fly a plane over anything and bomb it. But of course, first we have to find it. Then the bomb has to actually destroy it. They have to care about losing it. And they can't just fix it two days later. This applies to pretty much anything you can name.

6) Consolidation of Power. They're not going to let a lot of insurgents hide our in their own population. In the run up to war, the smart move is to neutralize these people by whatever means necessary, because they're certain allies of the invader. Likewise, you're going to purge your armed forces of any disloyal, unprofessional or unmotivated elements ahead of time. The lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan should be obvious.

7) Preparation for guerilla warfare. This involves teaching troops infantry, hit and run tactics, sabotage and tradecraft. It also involves caching weapons and supplies throughout the countryside and the cities. Sniper training is a big deal here - most armies don't focus on it the way they should.

8) Scorched earth. They may well decide to destroy anything that could be of use to us. The road nets in and out of the country probably aren't good to begin with - once the enemy takes to them with everything from bulldozers to sledgehammers you're going to find the fuel, ammo and rations necessary for high intensity maneuver war a lot harder to supply.

9) Preparation for the latest US ground technology. Old style (single warhead) RPGs don't reliably get effects on US ground vehicles. Newer tandem warhead models are effective against Bradley Fighting Vehicle and Stryker with slat armor. Steel core AK-47 rounds can't penetrate Interceptor with SAPI. The ammo that can is a little hard to improvise or get ahold of, but not impossible. It wouldn't take much of this stuff in the right hands to make their snipers highly dangerous. Night vision gear is handy stuff, too. Older generation gear isn't as effective as what US troops use, but its main purpose is to show soldiers (in training) the kind of thing they're up against.

10) Preparation of citizen militias. These groups are there to help you regain control after US forces leave. Their job isn't so much to fight back, as to prevent whatever cheapass native forces we leave in place from being a problem later. Factional fighting won't happen if you murder all the factions anyway. They can also suicide bomb our troops on the side.

11) Evacuation of key personnel. What happens to your brilliant plan if half the Mullahs turn up in Moscow or Beijing? You think the Russkies will hand them right over? You think we'll invade Red China to get them? Or would you rather stick around and nation build in Iran to keep them from coming right back in. Hey, why stop at the Mullahs? Ten thousand Revolutionary Guards could suddenly go on leave in the third party country of your choice. What then? If they picks folks with clean backgrounds, who've never been implicated in any kind of war crime, they could even vacation in Europe!

That's eleven steps I'd recommend - and any one of them could throw a real kink in our plans for a short victorious war.

[slapout9]

I'll play blue team. My backround 3 years 82nd airborne,2 special assignments with 5th Special Forces. Semi-retired Police Officer. Went to college for a little while,fell asleep alot. Should take you 10 minutes to win. I fight unconventionally you do what ever you want. Keep it civil nothing personal learning experience for all. Deal?? I am work now may not be able to respnd fast.

[CPT Holzbach]

This thread is getting mired (quagmire?!) in the specific instance of Iran, which was not it's intention, but thats cool, it makes for an interesting scenario. Here's my thoughts on your post, Jones. Im gonna avoid quoting the whole thing to shorten the post.

Some possible counter tactics.

1. Global terrorism is happening anyway. To not act for fear of terrorism is surrender.
2 and 3. These are closely tied. The Iraqi Shiite militias are big, and thats it. If they want to go toe to toe with us, they would be crushed, same as before. Some body armor and better RPGs would not change that. And a spoiling attack on the part of Iran would be a DREAM scenario. Because if there's one thing Iraqis, both Shiite and Sunni DONT want, it's Iranian interference. Iraqis and Iranians hate each other. Remember, this isnt just a religion thing. The Iranians are Persian, the Iraqis are Arabs. That's very important to both groups. I can only wish the Iranians would do this. Some short term damage would be more than worth the trade off in Iraqi unity. Might go a long way towards even reducing the Iraqi insurgency, giving them a nationalist cause to unite behind.
4. The point with Iran isnt necessarily to kill leaders. Getting Ahmadinejad (hell yeah thats spelled correctly) would be great, but unnecessary. Destroying the nuclear capability would be the mission.
5. Point conceded about FINDING the stuff. But destroying it? We're the USA. Firepower is, unfortunatly, what we do.
6. This can backlash. The regime's enemies are surely adept by now at hiding. This can also increase support for our effort if we ally ourselves with these people.
7. Is this in reference to American troops? Well, the point isnt to exterminate the Iranian Army, merely render them briefly ineffective. Let them run. They'll have to leave behind all their heavy equipment. Guerrilla warfare is ineffective against the type of attacks Im talking about. It takes time and weak targets. Neither will be made available.
8. The US Army is overwhelmingly tail heavy. We can support ourselves. This is just basic warfare. This would be well anticipated. I will say that any fighting in Iran's mountainous regions would be tough.
9. No one views the Iranian Army as incompetent or obsolete. All the more reason to hit as hard and fast as possible.
10. I've already said that we should let them fight it out after we've accomplished our mission and left.
11. This one is extremely hypothetical.

Attacking Iran would be tough. So what? So was Omaha beach. Any scenario, even just air strikes is a bad plan for a variety of reasons. But it's time to choose the least of several evils. And a punitive attack would be vastly preferable to regime replacement and nation building. And it's a damn sight better than letting nukes fall into the hands of a guy who talks to the 12th Imam at the bottom of a well.

[slapout9]

Capt. Holzbach, well I see you survived the sneak attack by refugees in tugboats with nuclear weapons, whew that was close. Don't worry I never got the reward money after my defection. But back to the point. I think your idea has a lot of merit.

1)So forget Iran, can you expand your idea by explaining a scenario you have or had in mind?

2) Care to comment on my suggestion about seizing the oil wells.

[Jedburgh]

Jed that's my point. It is an assest that we could seize and protect and turn into something that would benefit the US and Iraq. Yes, I read everyday how they are attacking oil infrastructure and how poorly maintained it is. But again that's my point, they don't know how to run and they cain't protect it we should do it. Crazy,yes,no,maybe,change it around some?

You are assuming that we aren't already trying to protect the oil infrastructure. The problem, as has been discussed previously, is the lack of sufficient manpower. To protect mulitiple dispersed oil facilities and long miles of isolated pipeline is extremely manpower intensive. Given the limitations of both Coalition and Iraqi forces, and the competing security demands in fighting the insurgency, hunting down the terrorists, and securing the urban centers - then we throw in protecting the oil infrastructure (along with the power and water infrastructure) and, for good measure, CA ops along with it, and all contributing allied forces, as well as the Iraqis, are stretched to the limit. Hell, we haven't been able to effectively secure Baghdad itself from the very beginning.

As far as "they don't know how to run" their oil facilities, well, I disagree. Iraq had (although I'm sure the ranks are thinning these days) a very talented group of people responsible for those facilities who have managed to hold them together with almost bailing wire and duct tape for a long time. The damage is not due to ignorance - it is due to years of sanctions and the Iraqis being forced to jerry-rig equipment to continue working long past its wear-out date. Its beyond simply needing true repairs - their facilities need a major overhaul and modernization. That very expensive bit of labor has barely begun.

Finally, as far as "seizing" Iraq's oil assets - well, I believe the first part of my response illustrates the practical lack of capacity to effectively execute that option. But, on the IO note, "seizure" of Iraq's oil assets would be perhaps the worst thing that we could do as regards relations with Iraqis and the rest of the world. It would simply finally confirm to all the cynics and those who hate the US that oil really was the reason we invaded Iraq. Plus, distribution of oil revenues is a key component of the negotiations going on within the current Iraqi government - it is hoped that an agreement on equitable distribution will help bring some of the key disaffected Sunni Arab leaders into the fold, and quieten down at least a part of the insurgency. Such a "seizure" by us at this point would simply throw oil on the fire and give added impetus to the problems we already face. Not a good thing.

[CPT Holzbach]

1)So forget Iran, can you expand your idea by explaining a scenario you have or had in mind?

2) Care to comment on my suggestion about seizing the oil wells.

Well, I had been thinking mostly about Iraq as a scenario. If we had ended the war after the first month, I cant think of how we would be worse off. Well, stick around until we got Saddam, anyway. How about that as the "break contact" signal? We discovered (to the C in C's dismay) that there were no WMDs. Check. We got Saddam. Check. What more was there to accomplish? The experiment in democracy is noble, but a bit naive. I mean, I have one of the ballots from the December 05 election framed on my wall. Im proud to have played a part in giving those people a chance to use those ballots, and the constitutional referendum ballots before that. But, as Ive stated, they can use democracy against us. I fail to see the utility of spending so much money and so many lives for it.

As far as the oil goes, I would have to agree with Jedburgh. Unless we only focus on doing that, and abandon the cities and everything else, it wouldn't be feasible. We cant keep IEDs from exploding on the streets, so Im sure we couldnt keep bombs blowing up along pipelines. And it would definatly be a political disaster. But thats allright, the hell with Iraq's oil. Its been mostly embargoed for a decade. Were used to not having it.

[slapout9]

Jed, I was assuming that we were trying to protect them(oil wells) but not being very effective because of what you have said before and I have read in the papers (not enough manpower). Since we cannot be everywhere and do everything why don't we concentrate on protecting the most vital economic asset there? That is in the Iraqi interest and US interest.

As for IO ops I don't think we are fooling anybody but ouselves, we are there because of the oil. Bush 1 and 2 are Oil people, why don't we admit that. My opinion, you are better at that sort of thing then I am.

Seizure of assests, ok your right. call it"protective custody"(but you new what I meant you have LE experience) If you cain't hit them in the face, hit them in the pocket book. OBL is always suggesting economic targets. I hate it but that is smart strategy on his part.

Which is my final point we are running out of manpower and MONEY. We need to do something. I am seeing public reactions not present since Vietnam. WE don't need that to get started.

[slapout9]

Capt. Holzbach, I was responding to Jed while you were online. So to follow up on your reponse. I am suggesting that we concentrate on the oil fields and the let the Iraqi's figure out the rest of it. I just read where rebels have or are about to sieze the oil fields in Nigeria. If this becomes an example for other groups worldwide we are in trouble. You may not be old enough to remember the Arab oil embargo of the early 1970's and the effect on America but it was not pretty. I think it is our long term interest and Iraq's to see the oil wells protected.

[CPT Holzbach]

Strickland posted an excellent article from CSIS. (Actually Dave Dilegge posted it, but Strickland brought attention to it first. Semantics!) The section of the introduction entitled "Is Counterinsurgency the Right Means to the End?" on page 20 of the introduction is applicable to this discussion. Recommend reading that. But maybe not the entire BOOK that they wrote. My kingdom for some friggen BREVITY. Does Cordesman actually write this stuff? Or does he just stamp his name on some poor staffer's work? Might be a good BOOK though, I dont know. I dont have time to read the entire BOOK.

Slapout, I think if we just concentrated on the oil infrastructure, we might be able to pull it off. But it would be political kryptonite. No, I wasnt around for the gas rationing, although I heard stories and have seen pictures of the lines. I think it would be more acceptable to avoid a serious situation like that. In the present day, there's no gas shortage or rationing, it's just expensive, which is perfectly fair. Just to avoid high gas prices, the American wont support a war. Myself included. I dont know if there's a cutoff for that. $10 a gallon? Who knows. But I wonder how much of a "punitive strike" it is if we get stuck hanging around protecting oil facilities for who knows how long.

[slapout9]

Maj. Strickland, well between you and Jedburgh and as I have admitted I suck eggs when it comes to a political solution. But here is my police viewpoint I think terroist/insurgents are just Gangs or Crime families or both.The religious or political fronts are just recruiting tools, in the end it's about money and power, protection. The danger I see in Iraq and the oil wells is this. If the biggest and meanest gang gets the oil wells they will control 94% of Iraq's national income according to the paper you talked about.(interesting paper) That means they are in fact the GOVERNMENT, no matter how many elections are held. This is a chnage in there MO(method of operation) instead of just stealing it or attacking it, they will OWN it. This is how gangs become respectable in the US. If this is seen as successfull by other gangs/terrorist/insurgents around the world we(US) have a big problem.

Valid point about the situation becoming long term as opposed to a punitive strike in Iraq, might be an option at another time and place, like south of the border ?!?!

[Bill Moore]

CPT Holzbach I concur that our foreign policy (especially the policies that drive military employment) must be based on reality, and it is obvious that we grossly excessive idealistic objectives in Iraq. I don’t know what the right answer is now, but I suspect we’ll find a solution that we will settle for, but it won’t be the utopian one that we originally agreed to.

What we tend to poke fun at the most in this forum, big conventional units, air force, etc. actually worked well during OIF phase III, and I would be very careful of losing this capability in exchange for more MPs, Civil Affairs, UW capacity, etc. These less direct methods have their place, but their application is limited to select environments that are receptive to them. For example, going in with the hopes of starting an insurgency doesn’t work if there isn’t an existing resistance in place with a plan for change, you just don’t go in and start from scratch. If you do you’ll be seen as unwanted occupiers. In certain situations where there is a viable resistance movement in place, and the people are hungry for change such as Burma (perhaps) or France (under Nazi occupation) then we would probably be seen as liberators.

I am not advocating tying our policy makers hands when it comes to employing military force, but I am advocating for employing military force correctly to achieve realistic goals. Punitive strikes definitely fall within that category. The punitive strike that Clinton launched against Saddam after they tried to assassinate Bush Sr was a perfect example, as was the punitive strike Reagan launched against Libya. While both were far from perfect options (perfect being installing a friendly government), they were realistic, and cost effective (money and blood).

There have always been definite limits to what the military can accomplish. We can destroy, secure, and begin the rebuilding piece, but we don’t have the means to implement social change unless we plan to implement draconian population control measures like Mao did in China.

Taking it a step further, should we really redesign our military to be nation builders? Where do we think we can effectively do this? How many successful models have there been throughout history? I can only think of Japan and Germany, both previously industrial nations with an educated work force and limited corruption. Our nation building efforts during the Philippine insurrection were short lived, and probably not a good example. Our nation building efforts in Vietnam were even shorter lived. We have been attempting nation building in Columbia and elsewhere for how many years to what end?

[Steve Blair]

Punative strikes are an interesting option, provided that your target actually has something that would be worth striking. As others have pointed out, they can also have some rather messy long term consequences.

Both Clinton's and Regan's strikes were interesting short-term successes, but their long-term results are at best debatable. They are obviously great "feel good" peices and involve little immediate risk to the forces being employed, since they almost always use resources that the U.S. is strong in (airpower, for example) and target areas that do not have strong defenses (a great application of 3GW). I would argue that in the long term they do not have much in the way of lasting effect, on the average. Pershing's expedition, already mentioned, was certainly intended as a punitive strike, and one of its results was the requirement to station a large number of National Guard cavalry regiments along the border both during and after World War 1. There are other examples from this period (mainly in Central America) of Wilsonian punitive expeditions that just didn't go as planned and resulted in troops (usually Marines) being tied down much longer than originally anticipated.

To discuss the tangent about the U.S. military's design: I don't think we need to retailor the entire military to fit the nation-building idea, but we also need to stop building a force for an enemy that doesn't exist. The B-2 is one of my pet peeves in this area, but there are numerous other defense projects that fit into the same category. With all the real-time evidence indicating that we need a strong conventional military (by that I mean a force that can rapidly deploy many "boots on the ground"), the defense heirarchy seems fixated on high-tech "silver bullets" that may or may not be worth their huge price tags. Both the "silver bullet" and the punitive strike (at least to me) seem to be manifestations of the American tendency to want a single, preferably simple, solution to problems that may not have any single or simple answers.

This is a very interesting discussion, Cpt Holzbach. Thanks for bringing it up!