Frontline in Afghanistan

[Pol-Mil FSO]

Some thoughts on the video and comments in response to previous posts:

The NCO getting frustrated in his questioning of villagers was set up for failure. That task should have been left to a CA NCO or Officer, or a civilian. It's asking too much for an infantry squad leader to have the cultural sensitivity to see the situation from the perspective of Afghan villagers. Maybe the COINtras are right in their argument that population-centric COIN is not appropriate for GPF, even Marines?

Arming the population does have a bad track record in Afghanistan but I still think it is has to be considered as an answer to the force ratio problem. It could work if somebody - SF ODAs? - provided the required supervision, logistic support, and in-extremis reinforcement. Maybe it could take the form of a hybrid of the CIDG program? There is a SF Field Manual (I don't remember which one) that has an appendix on support to CIDG-type groups. I wanted to show it to my Canadian colleagues but couldn't do so since the material had a NOFORN designation. I suspect the Marines would have already formed some sort of group if they had been able to gain permission to do so (unlikely since when it comes to Security Force Assistance issues we share the Kabul-centric viewpoint of the Afghan Government).

One of the biggest complaints of the Marines in Helmand and Farah Provinces is a lack of ANA and ANP partners. There are not enough ANSF personnel for true partnering with the Marines, thus they become a token presence in most operations. As for USG civilians, it is not realistic to expect them to be present on patrols unless they are given infantry training. The leadership of the State Department (and probably most other agencies) is opposed to providing its personnel with weapons, let alone tactical training. It would probably also be a hard sell for most of the personnel of these agencies. During my tour I did have the opportunity to go out with an SF ODA on a couple of missions but my prior service as an 11B probably helped, and the Embassy in Kabul likely would have a strongly adverse reaction if they knew what it actually entailed.

[Schmedlap]

The NCO getting frustrated in his questioning of villagers was set up for failure. That task should have been left to a CA NCO or Officer, or a civilian. It's asking too much for an infantry squad leader to have the cultural sensitivity to see the situation from the perspective of Afghan villagers.

Disagree on two levels.
First - that NCO is talking to the locals because there are so many of them to talk to. You're not going to have nearly enough CA or civilians to do that. Also, this wasn't some big meeting - it was just a routine interaction by a patrol with the populace from what I saw.
Second - I don't think it's asking too much for an infantryman - especially a leader - to have sufficient cultural sensitivity. I wouldn't even call it that. I'd just call it people skills. I've seen lots of NCOs whose only training in dealing with people was whatever interpersonal skills one acquires through the normal course of one's life. Backgrounds, education, and training didn't seem to have any correllation. Of course, this is an anecdotal observation, and I'm a data point of one.

Maybe the COINtras are right in their argument that population-centric COIN is not appropriate for GPF, even Marines?

I guess the argument is that pop-COIN requires a level of participation from all government agencies that we currently lack the ability to provide - and that we will continue to lack the ability to provide for the next decade. Not a real useful concept, imo.

[Ken White]

The problem is that our training got dumbed down in the 1970s and 80s and we stopped teaching NCOs how to talk to people. I saw dozens if not hundreds of on NCOsS doing what that guy was doing on presence patrols in three countries. Most, not all doing it pretty well.

His only problem is that no one bothered to give him a ten minute class in people skills and then let him practice them for a grade for forty minutes. That i8s the fault of the USMC (the Army is little better). That also is done better in good units even today. Problem is, by definition, half the units are less good, half are more gooder...

Also, his comment:

I guess the argument is that pop-COIN requires a level of participation from all government agencies that we currently lack the ability to provide - and that we will continue to lack the ability to provide for the next decade. Not a real useful concept, imo.

and your observation both illustrate the major flaws in 'Population centric COIN.' Resources and timing. We cannot afford to keep the civilian structure and military training regimens required for population centric COIN so each occurrence will be a from scratch exercise that will take entirely too long to get rolling. The effort will flounder before it gets going, literally. It is a badly flawed concept much loved by people whose desire to fix the rest of the world overwhelms their common sense. Great theory, won't work. We keep proving that -- and forgetting that we proved it...

That said, we can and must better train our entering enlisted persons and officers and better educate our leaders so that some COIN like efforts and capabilities are built into the structure while remembering that the GPF will never do better than marginally well at the job.

Back to the here and now -- that NCO is exemplary of a minor system glitch, not a major uncorrectable flaw.

Good job for going out with the guys. Been my observation here and there that all embassies, like all units in the services, are not equal. Some are more active than others and more tolerant of weapons and patrols and getting jobs done versus bureaucratic safety (All FSOs aren't equal, either, as I'm sure you know ). Though I admit to being away from the bureaucracy for about 15 years, doubt things have changed so much as to greatly modify that.

[jcustis]

It's asking too much for an infantry squad leader to have the cultural sensitivity to see the situation from the perspective of Afghan villagers. Maybe the COINtras are right in their argument that population-centric COIN is not appropriate for GPF, even Marines?

To add to the dogpile , your start early, and you do it often, and you start making that NCO think outside the box, wayyyy before you go to the MRX, and before the advon departs, and definitely before the first main body ULN gets on deck to start RIP. We have been at this stuff for 7 years now, and there are few NCOs who have not known war along the way.

If he doesn't "get it", you get another squad leader, plain and simple.

We all get frustrated in routine dealings with civilians at the pointy end of things. For most, it is not an issue of lacking cultural sensitivity. The ones who have issues are more often carefully weeded out.

[slapout9]

Where is the Afghan Political Cadre that would follow the village elders everywhere they go 24/7? I say forget all this doctrine stuff......fight like a Guerrilla. Where is the Afghan Revolution? Where is the PSYOP Radio stations that should be broadcasting White Propaganda through the radios you handed out. Where is the Afghan Puff Daddy and The Real Slim Shady? You goota have some MoJo going on or ain't nobody gonna follow you anywhere

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y_3gHVRtX0U