Frontline in Afghanistan

[MikeF]

The way COIN is supposed to work is first you control the population, then the population tells you where the Taliban and are setting up the ambushes.

I'd submit that this reasoning is akin to your second point.

The guy in the video appears to be doing the equivalent of walking up to a girl and saying, "Why aren't you willing to have sex with me." It takes time, patience, there has to be something in it for her and you need to prove yourself worthy of trust.

If I control the populace, then they'll tell me where the Taliban are setting up ambushes. Or, the girl in the bar will have sex with me b/c I'm a badass Marine. Control doesn't work that way. You gotta have some Mojo- Influence, Persuasion, and sometimes Bribery (If you're into that type of tribe ).

Same bar, same dance, same song.

v/r

Mike

[John T. Fishel]

of controlling the population... In Malaya, the Brits relocated the Chinese population to "safe" controlled villages - not voluntarily - and it worked. In Vietnam, the GVN on US advice tried to do the same thing and called it the Strategic Hamlet program - it failed. In Guatemala, the govt relocated villages to "Development Poles" (read strategic hamlets) with armed militia patrols (PACs) - it worked. 3 cases of essentially the same program 2 of whichworked but for different reasons with differentg adaptations and one of which failed because of both poor execution and a failure to adapt.

A key to success is flexibility, ADAPTATION of what worked in the past and appropriate new TTP.

Cheers

JohnT

[Pol-Mil FSO]

The problem with employing standard population control measures in Afghanistan is that they would quickly annoy Afghans and increase hostility towards foreign forces. Pashtuns do not like to be ordered around, especially by foreigners. I think it would take draconian measures as Ken White noted, to compel Afghan cooperation. Maybe something like public executions and other intimidation tactics but for very good political, ethical, and legal reasons we are not going to go there. That leaves us with the persuasion and bribery alternative to get the population on the government side.

The Guatemalan Army addressed both the population control and force ratio issues by going into the Mayan highlands in the early 1980's and forcing male inhabitants of the villages to join the self-defense patrols (PACs) with a penalty of death for refusal. Within a couple of years there were over a million villagers enrolled in the PACs - more than 10% of the total population. Each PAC was controlled by the military commissioner (an Army NCO) stationed in the village. The Army pursued a deliberate strategy of involving the PACs in massacres of unarmed civilians and other human rights abuses in order to exert psychological control over the PAC members and break any ties that PAC members might have had with the insurgents. This brutal but effective employment of PACs was part of a ruthless COIN strategy that earned Guatemala widespread international condemnation and left the Army without any overt international support in its fight against the insurgents, apart from some minor assistance from Israel and Taiwan.

[John T. Fishel]

either the Brits or the Guats nor to excoriate the US and GVN but simply to point out the similar methods can work or fail depending on how employed and the culture in question. Obviously, strat hamlets did not work in Vietnam because the culture would not accept it. What I am suggesting it that there are likely to be effective ways of controlling population even in Pashtun areas with an appropriate understanding of the culture. As a start, one might begin by asking how the Brits successfully coopted Pashtun elements even incorporating them in the Corps of Guides. The questions to ask are what worked in the past, might they work now, how would we need to adapt them.

Cheers

JohnT

[slapout9]

I was going to make the same point. The guy in the video appears to be doing the equivalent of walking up to a girl and saying, "Why aren't you willing to have sex with me." It takes time, patience, there has to be something in it for her and you need to prove yourself worthy of trust.

That is really a good lesson, you are trying to build a relationship. That is why most good Cops will spend as much time as possible trying to bond with the suspect/informant before you start on asking the hard questions.

1-So introduce yourself
2-Meet for coffee
3-Go to lunch
4-Go to dinner and start to define the relationship

[Backwards Observer]

In Malaya, the Brits relocated the Chinese population to "safe" controlled villages - not voluntarily - and it worked. In Vietnam, the GVN on US advice tried to do the same thing and called it the Strategic Hamlet program - it failed.

From Born A Foreigner: A Memoir of the American Presence in Asia by Charles T. Cross (1999):

There was no talk of the crucial differences between Malaysia, where Thompson’s ideas originated, and Vietnam, where they were to be carried out. The British were in complete charge of the military, the police and the civil services in Malaysia. They had a cadre of experienced life-time colonial officials, speaking the languages of the country, who could in quiet, disciplined ways maneuver the political process toward clear, unambiguous goals of eliminating the communists and establishing self-government. Moreover, the war in Malaysia had been smaller, with only 8,000 to 10,000 armed guerillas in the whole country at the height of the Emergency. Single provinces in South Vietnam at times had that many or more, counting the North Vietnamese in regular conventional units. Our own political aims for South Vietnam were as confused as those of the South Vietnamese themselves, agreeing between us only on opposition to North Vietnam. p.158

Born A Foreigner - (Amazon)

Charles T. Cross (Wikipedia)

Killers in Retirement, the last chapter of Jim Morris', Fighting Men, has some war stories from the period.

Fighting Men- (Amazon)

[John T. Fishel]

Ambassador Cross should know (and his editors should have caught it) that the Emergency took place in Malaya, not Malaysia - the latter didn't exist. He is certainly correct that the Brits controlled everything -at least until 1957 when Malaya gained its independence. After that, the Brits had to deal with the govt of the PM Tunku Abdel Rahman. While the civil servants in Malaya - or a fair number of them - spoke Malay, how many spoke Chinese? Also, the language of Malaya was English as it is today in Singapore - then part of the Malay Federation - with its largely Chinese population. So, language was a factor but it was the native language of the colonial power.

Cheers

JohnT

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Steve Blair,

Good lessons, Mike, and it's interesting to me (as a historian) how many of them should not be new. Quite a bit of it is classic Vietnam (circa about 1968-69, but was being done earlier in some places). Not knocking your lessons at all, which are hard-earned, but more observing that we could/should do a better job of preserving those lessons. And on a possibly related note, many of them could have been pulled directly from the old Small Wars Manual.

Posted by Ken White,

The problem is that our training got dumbed down in the 1970s and 80s and we stopped teaching NCOs how to talk to people. I saw dozens if not hundreds of on NCOsS doing what that guy was doing on presence patrols in three countries. Most, not all doing it pretty well.

The above comments simply reinforce the SECDEF's assertion that we have failed to institutionalize the lessons learned from our previous experiences in irregular warfare. It is not the same as conventional war, thus the argument if you can win in a conventional conflict you'll be able to win in an irregular conflict is dangerously misleading. While many of us disagree with the definitions and some of the new fangled theories being pushed (with no historical evidence to support them), most of us hope the SECDEF is successful in institutionalzing the study and practice of irregular warfare throughout DoD.

[Ken White]

The above comments simply reinforce the SECDEF's assertion that we have failed to institutionalize the lessons learned from our previous experiences in irregular warfare.

Not on that; that's totally correct and a lick on us.

It is not the same as conventional war, thus the argument if you can win in a conventional conflict you'll be able to win in an irregular conflict is dangerously misleading.

Heretical comment -- I'm not that sure we would've done all that well in a conventional war against a near peer competitor. I'd rephrase that statement of yours a bit; "If you're well enough trained to win a conventional war, you're probably well enough trained to do okay in irregular conflict." Mostly because I do not think we were at all well trained for conventional war; we were and are too rigid, too reluctant to take risk and we do not trust our subordinates adequately.

Well trained troops can handle both and the Army and Marines both worked at being able to do that in the early 60s with some success, noting that there were a some units that specialized in MCO, a few that emphasized IW and an even smaller few who trained for full spectrum.

I'd also suggest that in most IW, the possibility of 'winning' is not good for anyone if the fight even somewhat approaches a mid level conflict -- as in Afghanistan or Iraq.

While many of us disagree with the definitions and some of the new fangled theories being pushed (with no historical evidence to support them), most of us hope the SECDEF is successful in institutionalzing the study and practice of irregular warfare throughout DoD.

Yep. Needs to happen. Training required to win against a near peer in MCO needs only slight modification and additions to adapt to irregular war -- with the caveat that the GPF will never do more than an adequate job at IW or COIN. Not their thing...

[Backwards Observer]

Ambassador Cross should know (and his editors should have caught it) that the Emergency took place in Malaya, not Malaysia - the latter didn't exist.

I thought that was strange too, but then you hear a lot of funny things from foreigners. We were having lunch with a gentleman (as in Southern Gentleman) from the US Embassy in Singapore, it was a long time ago and I can't remember what his position was, but he saw "Chicken Maryland" on the menu. He turns to us and says, "You know, any establishment that serves Chicken Maryland is probably run by the CIA." Then he orders the Chicken Maryland. A few years earlier, we'd seen Spiro Agnew at one of the tables there, I don't know if he had the Chicken Maryland.

[Backwards Observer]

As a follow-up, I'd like to add that the afore-mentioned gentleman had the most impeccable manners and appearance, and was in his own way as inscrutable as a Mandarin. The trick was in figuring out whether his humour derived from something being outlandishly absurd or outlandishly true. Someone once asked him if he could describe the difference between Northerners and Southerners, to which he replied, "Ma'am, I was well past my youth before I could admit to myself that 'Damn Yankees' were even Americans." He was also popular with the ladies, which may have accounted for some of his world-weariness.

[Schmedlap]

The two things that struck me in the 24 minutes of preview:

1) the contrast between the footage in D.C. and the footage of the Marines fighting to secure the population
2) the lack of USG civilians and GIRoA security forces (there were some ANA - I did not see any USG civilians.

Ditto on number 1. Those people have lots of neat ideas and some very sharp presentations. Meanwhile, back in the real world...

[jkm_101_fso]

So I just finished watching it. Am I to understand that the main point of this episode was that the US military effort in AFG is mostly in vain until the U.S. makes REAL diplomatic progress with PAK, especially ISI who still supports the Taliban to this day?

[Steve the Planner]

The diplomatic problem crossed a lot of lines, beginning at the local level.

[Cavguy]

http://www.afcea.org/mission/intel/nightwatch.asp

Afghanistan: NightWatch comments on the Frontline Report on PBS. The one-hour special is important more for its visual images than for any words in the script or from interviews. The visual images add dimensions to understanding.

The script is about protecting people and establishing local rapport. The interviews with generals reinforce those messages. The video and audio of a local village encounter show that young US Marines are clueless. Even the more reflective Marine captain, with all the best intentions in the world, comes off as clueless, far too young and inexperienced for the task his superior set for him to establish rapport with the Pashtuns of Helmand Province.

The language of the script is that of Western academic study of insurgency. The ironic reality is that very young American men presume to preach about survival to Afghans old enough to be their grandfathers. There is no respect for age shown in any of the local encounters PBS filmed. The videos showed the Americans to be afraid, unprepared and ill-informed and the Afghans were uniformly defiant, in the NightWatch view. One wondered whether the young officer knew the clan of the men he was addressing?

The most startling segment of the telecast was a scene in which a Marine officer tried to persuade locals that the village was now safe because the Marines arrived. They wanted the locals to help them. The Afghans challenged how could the Afghans help the Marines? They did not even own a sword.

The setting was a village that was empty of inhabitants who fled when they learned the Marines were coming to save them from the Taliban. Nevertheless, inexplicably and in an empty village, the Marine officer was interrogating a dozen or so Afghan men, using an interrogator who did not speak the local dialect.

The US officer got impatient with the Afghans because they were not being cooperative, the script indicated. He could not speak the language and his interpreter was not qualified but he directed his anger at the Afghans … and the insanity of the situation, no doubt. Th4e video showed him to be arrogant and disrespectful of the residents and especially of the elders in the group. He probably was mostly scared and maybe a little embarrassed.

Neither PBS nor the Marine officer noticed that a significant portion of the men wore black turbans, the signature headdress of the Taliban. Who can know for sure, but experience suggests any men found in a Helmand village without children or women are Taliban. These facts raise a significant probability that the Marine officer was issuing orders to and expressing frustrations with the actual rulers of the village, who were Taliban or Taliban sympathizers and apparently was not aware. It was like watching films from the early period of the Vietnam War all over again.

And when did governance, or more accurately government, become so important in Afghanistan? A significant portion of the video focused on this issue in interviews and commentary.

This is an American obsession. Louis Dupree, the foremost US expert on Afghanistan before he died, never thought good government was important. His writings and experience indicate that Afghans prefer no government outside the local shura. What westerners call corruption Afghans call survival.

The message of the Frontline special is not in the script, but rather in the images which invariably put the lie to the words. The take away is that US words to not match US actions. That is the fundamental Afghan gripe against the US: it promised a lot and did not deliver. The Pashtuns judge they were better off under their own leaders, after waiting eight years for some benefits from having ousted the Taliban.

[Entropy]

Pretty brutal Cavguy. I haven't watched it yet (got it on DVR for tonight, hopefully), but I will see if my interpretation squares with Mr. McCreary's.

[tequila]

Didn't watch the entire thing, had to DVR so will watch tonight. But it's worth mentioning that the most of the interactions in the FRONTLINE piece were filmed at the very beginning of Operation Khanjar this past summer. It'd be very interesting to hear an update on how Helmand is progressing (or not) now that the Marines have been on the ground for awhile.

[Ken White]

Cav Guys link, though, resonates with me -- I saw the same sorts of errors all too frequently in other places at other times. We just flat do not do this stuff well...

I also went to the provided LINKand saw this Note appended to the Cav Guy quote:

Note: this comment is not a criticism of the American soldiers and Marines. It is a criticism of those who prepared them, or rather failed to prepare them. Watching US helicopters sweep across the broad expanses of Helmand Province, the words from officials in Kabul about progress, protecting people, development and governance seemed otherworldly.

At the risk of repetition, the US Army and probably all the NATO armies are not large enough to protect the villages, were they entirely deployed in Afghanistan. That is a key NightWatch takeaway from the Frontline special.

The first paragraph properly ascribes blame to poor strategy, poor operational deployment and poor tactics -- the latter two exacerbated by poor military training and education.

The strategic error is neatly summed up by the last quoted paragraph.

[MikeF]

http://www.afcea.org/mission/intel/nightwatch.asp

Good article Niel. That would probably be my assessment on a cranky day when I am convinced that GPF are not suited for COIN. On more optimistic days, I think that we can do it, and we just need to train better. Still, someone needs to decide if we SHOULD be doing it.

Outside of all the different literature and doctrine on COIN, I'd suggest the one quality that CANNOT be neglected is people skills and the ability to communicate.

In Iraq, during initial infiltration, I would spend long hours just listening and asking various questions to establish repoire. These talks had nothing to do with the immediate fight...

- So how was life under Saddam?
- How did your government use to work?
- Tell me about fighting in the Iran-Iraq war or Kuwait. This was a money question. Every veteran loves to tell war stories. This transcends culture.
- Why do y'all hate Israel?
- So, tell me about Islam.

Later, after repoire was established:
- So, when are you going to quit fighting?
- What type of world do you want your children to grow up in?
- What are you going to do about it?

These talks probably served as one of the best shaping maneuvers for my troop. Over time, regardless of if the sheik was a sunni who backed the resistance or a shia who backed JAM/BADR, my troop was humanized to the leaders in my area. It didn't solve all the problems, but it was a good start.

v/r

Mike

[IntelTrooper]

In Iraq, during initial infiltration, I would spend long hours just listening and asking various questions to establish repoire. These talks had nothing to do with the immediate fight...

- So how was life under Saddam?
- How did your government use to work?
- Tell me about fighting in the Iran-Iraq war or Kuwait. This was a money question. Every veteran loves to tell war stories. This transcends culture.
- Why do y'all hate Israel?
- So, tell me about Islam.

Later, after repoire was established:
- So, when are you going to quit fighting?
- What type of world do you want your children to grow up in?
- What are you going to do about it?

They need to clone you, sir!