FOB Keating attack repulsed

[JMA]

Personnel were getting ridiculously fat as a result, and we were wasting too many resources on the amenity.

Our tooth-to-tail ratio in Iraq was out of whack, and it showed when you could get 31 flavors of ice cream. Troops are not being denied a decent meal and sustenance, but the rest of the stuff McCrystal is trying to weed out was just over the top in the first place.

Getting too fat? For a soldier on active service how is that possible in the first place. Today we dig out those old company photos from the 1970s to proven that grandad did once have a 32" waist.

Maybe the hardworking troops are being penalised because the staff, admin and logisitcs types who live in the operations area losing it? If you live and work in a place where you can have a row of junk food outlets then you can have a gym and you can have fitness tests and send the failures home in disgrace.

So I say again when we were extracted after a big combat operation if we able to give the troops a pizza or a burger and let him wash that down with a choice of 31 flavours of ice cream and later a few beers that would have been perfect. There were many times in the 100 degree plus dry heat of the Zambezi Valley that I dreamed of a milkshake. Odd occasion we had cold cokes delivered with a 7 day rat resupply (at least they were cold when they left base) we enjoyed that and buried the bottles afterwards. (Its the little things that mean so much you know)

Honestly I think the first step to fixing the overweight problem would have been to let a handful of fire blowing sgt majors ( sergeants-major) loose in these bases to clean them out. A sgt major in the US is still allowed to blow fire?

[Ken White]

Getting too fat? For a soldier on active service how is that possible in the first place.

It's the folks in the rear, about 70% of the deployed force, not the 30% that is actually performing active service.

...If you live and work in a place where you can have a row of junk food outlets then you can have a gym and you can have fitness tests and send the failures home in disgrace.

Sorry, we used to do that. No more. The US culture of entitlement has grown so great that the rationale of Courts, Pundits and others is that "We provided him / her the means and opportunity to gain weight, therefor it is isn't his / her fault." Yes, there are gyms but the clod who adds pounds isn't usually a gym visiting type. Stupid, I know but that's us.

Honestly I think the first step to fixing the overweight problem would have been to let a handful of fire blowing sgt majors ( sergeants-major) loose in these bases to clean them out. A sgt major in the US is still allowed to blow fire?

Er, no, generally they are not -- those that do often get 'counselled' for being excessively harsh, thus most now devote their efforts to unimportant things like uniforms and haircuts -- and boots, boots are big. For all but perhaps 20%, tactical competence and performance of their troops are not issues. We are obsessed with appearance, though.

But then again what we considered a reward or luxury 30 years ago in a small African backwater is nowhere near what is possible and maybe even demanded by today's troops.

Well, 40 years ago what we considered rewards or luxury in any one of several Southeast Asian backwaters was nowhere near what is possible today -- nor was it demanded by troops then; it was just gratefully accepted. I suspect that is the case today, i.e. no demand, just grateful acceptance by most. There will be a few who grumble about harsh conditions and being deprived. Good riddance if they leave. Nobody needs them in any event...

[JMA]

It's the folks in the rear, about 70% of the deployed force, not the 30% that is actually performing active service. Sorry, we used to do that. No more. The US culture of entitlement has grown so great that the rationale of Courts, Pundits and others is that "We provided him / her the means and opportunity to gain weight, therefor it is isn't his / her fault." Yes, there are gyms but the clod who adds pounds isn't usually a gym visiting type. Stupid, I know but that's us.Er, no, generally they are not -- those that do often get 'counselled' for being excessively harsh, thus most now devote their efforts to unimportant things like uniforms and haircuts -- and boots, boots are big. For all but perhaps 20%, tactical competence and performance of their troops are not issues. We are obsessed with appearance, though. Well, 40 years ago what we considered rewards or luxury in any one of several Southeast Asian backwaters was nowhere near what is possible today -- nor was it demanded by troops then; it was just gratefully accepted. I suspect that is the case today, i.e. no demand, just grateful acceptance by most. There will be a few who grumble about harsh conditions and being deprived. Good riddance if they leave. Nobody needs them in any event...

I submit we have identified the problem. Now how to solve it? Is it solvable?

[Ken White]

will we solve it?

I suspect not, lacking a major war. The US governmental system is purposely, slow, infinitely variable due to political whim and a short electoral cycle. It is also tilted toward maximum freedom and individual choice. While that latter attribute has been ameliorated to an extent by communitarian requirements, the other three factors still exist and mitigate any rigorous much less draconian tightening of disciplinary measures.

We tend to do that only when confronted with a really big emergency or an existential war -- and we've only had one of those, the American Civil War. WW II was a close second. All the others, including Iraq and Afghanistan, the nation was effectively at peace and just parts of the Armed Forces went to war. Even the Pentagon doesn't really go to war, at least they have not since 1945...

So we'll piddle around the edges but change little -- until we believe we have to do so. Then we will do it and it'll work out okay. No big thing, it's terribly inefficient but in spite of mediocre training and odd rules the kids will make it work until then. And there will be a 'then.'

[JMA]

will we solve it?

I suspect not, lacking a major war. The US governmental system is purposely, slow, infinitely variable due to political whim and a short electoral cycle. It is also tilted toward maximum freedom and individual choice. While that latter attribute has been ameliorated to an extent by communitarian requirements, the other three factors still exist and mitigate any rigorous much less draconian tightening of disciplinary measures.

We tend to do that only when confronted with a really big emergency or an existential war -- and we've only had one of those, the American Civil War. WW II was a close second. All the others, including Iraq and Afghanistan, the nation was effectively at peace and just parts of the Armed Forces went to war. Even the Pentagon doesn't really go to war, at least they have not since 1945...

So we'll piddle around the edges but change little -- until we believe we have to do so. Then we will do it and it'll work out okay. No big thing, it's terribly inefficient but in spite of mediocre training and odd rules the kids will make it work until then. And there will be a 'then.'

The Rhodesian forces were lumbering along with the old Brit colonial pattern as well. It took the birth of the Selous Scouts to break the mold. Firstly as their cover (for their pseudo work) was that they were a combat tracking unit in came the beards and all and the uniforms were all cammo.

Then 'Uncle Ron' Reid-Daly (first commander of the Selous Scouts) was an ex-RSM (Regimental Sergeant Major) so the strict officer NCO structure became a little less formal.

Basically Reid-Daly as able to cut through all the crap and do only what worked (not flawless as any Selous Scout will tell you but a hell of a lot better than units shackled by so-called tradition.)

And as the RLI became almost totally deployed on Fire Force the RLI adapted accordingly. We had to, people were dying and we had to get better and smarter at what we were doing so the holy cows were discarded one by one. And of course the Selous Scouts had attracted most of the best senior NCOs from the RLI and this had a significant impact.

So maybe such units may be the bridging force between the current traditional units and formations deployed in Afghanistan and the final hand over to the Afghan army which should be considered? Perhaps with a progressive integration of Afghans?

[Ken White]

The Rhodesian forces were lumbering along with the old Brit colonial pattern as well. It took the birth of the Selous Scouts to break the mold...So maybe such units may be the bridging force between the current traditional units and formations deployed in Afghanistan and the final hand over to the Afghan army which should be considered? Perhaps with a progressive integration of Afghans?

The problem is that politicians do not want to do that sort of thing in peacetime -- the Mothers of the Troops get all upset at a 1 or 2% killed loss in realistic training. As I said elsewhere, make no mistake, the US is at peace and has been since 1945. In the war that ended then, a near existential thing as was your war existential for you, we did the same thing, formed units ad hoc and charged them with producing results. Commanders who did not produce were fired and quickly. The rules change quickly and harshly. Can't do that in peacetime; tradition and protecting the institution get in the way -- and the politics of it all are not helpful.

The Selous Scouts and their roles and missions have been discussed here and a search should show the threads. However, the US is highly unlikely to use those techniques, successful as they are, for a variety of reasons. So we'll bumble along in Afghanistan, realize a medium level of success and depart. That's okay, no one ever really wins an insurgency, the best that can be obtained is an acceptable outcome. That's what we wanted going in and we'll get it on the way out.

That said, I'll reiterate that in an existential war, the nice stuff goes out the window and we can be as effective as anyone and more so than most. We just need a real reason to do that, otherwise we just want to argue amongst ourselves and ponder Jesse James (the modern one, not the outlaw).

I would like to comment upon this in more detail. I would preface this by saying I really don't have a solution to the Afghanistan situation but am able to ask some questions. If the questions make for discomfort please resist the temptation to shoot the messenger.

No reason to shoot anyone for sensible questions. Non-sensible ones might require a second or two of thought...

If I understand this you are saying that 70% of the force level supports the 30% who actually do the fighting? If this is correct it is outrageous.

No. It is not at all outrageous, it's fairly typical today. Check this whole, short thread on the topic: (LINK). You might also ponder who else can put 150,000 troops in Iraq and 40,000+ in Afghanistan from another continent 12,000 miles away and sustain them. That capability comes with a cost.

Gee, well you make your own bed you must lie in it. But there must be a way around this? What percent of support 'troops' are obese?

Nah, not really, Politicians make the beds we all have to lie in; US, Rhodesia, south Africa, UK. Makes little difference what country, all do dumb things. not the same things perhaps, but still dumb.

To answer your question, Obese about 5-10% on a guess (none morbidly so); simply overweight another 10% or so and marginally heavy about 10 more -- that means 70± % are okay. In the US population at large, we've got BIG problem (pun intended) (LINK). That's what happens when you have too much money and too much free time. The interesting thing is that we've had the problem for about 25-30 years and got to be a laughing stock to the rest of the world -- who are now catching up. (LINK). In South Africa you do a bit better: LINK. Also, we've already started cracking down on the excess, it was allowed to slide to keep troop numbers up with on and off deployments. now that we're able to one on and two offm the housekeeping will get caught up.

Are they happy with this role? I'm sure those who have some fight left in them would be valuable to the units doing the actual fighting?

My guess would about half the Sergeant Majors are happy with it, it becomes a bureaucratic sinecure sort of thing -- and make no mistake, we are very bureaucratic. Plus most are in their forties when one realizes one is not immortal and that things break easily in field service. Of the other half, about half of those aren't happy with it but accept it for one reason or another; that leaves one lonely fourth -- or about the 20% I mentioned earlier -- that actively try to improve the tactical and technical performance of their units.

I believe Bertrand Russell commented that 80% of the work in the world is done by 20% of the people or words to that effect.

Pete's comment elsewhere is pretty accurate; we have effectively tried to create a slightly different category of NCO. It may work; I'm skeptical but we'll have to wait and see.

Yes, it is a damn shame but, like the tooth to tail ratio it also is more typical of other Armies than many are prepared to acknowledge, particularly Armies from wealthy western nations. All Armies have their problems. This LINK is old but I suspect if that problem has gone away, there are others equally debilitating...

I understand as it appears similar to my experience... but once again I say any fool can be uncomfortable.

Once again I suggest you're missing the point, possibly because the excess has to be seen to be believed. I spent almost 30 years as an Infantryman, believe me when I say that the Base Camps in theoretical war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq feature a far higher standard of comfort and convenience than I saw on my last peacetime tour in Korea in 1975 and in some respects exceeds the levels I can obtain today as an old retired Dude in the at peace United States.

Not a question of being uncomfortable -- it is a question of removing excessive comfort producing items that provide for what can only be called a cosseted existence. American have a bad tendency to overdo everything. We're not talking about removing good food, the gyms or soft drinks and the occasional beer or air conditioned billets, they stay. We're talking about taking away civilian fast food outlets and shopping facilities that exceed the per capita availability factor for most American cities.

Those Fast Food outlets by the way are a significant contributor to that obesity in the rear problem (pun again intended).

[jmm99]

from Fuchs
I know only one definition of tooth/tail in the military realm.

Tooth are those who are meant to shoot at the enemy as a unit.
Tail are those who are only meant to shoot at the enemy in self-defence.

What is the source for your definition, other than Fuchs, On War ?

By your last sentence, long range recon folks would be tail.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

If I may break this conversation down into separate parts.

The problem is that politicians do not want to do that sort of thing in peacetime -- the Mothers of the Troops get all upset at a 1 or 2% killed loss in realistic training. As I said elsewhere, make no mistake, the US is at peace and has been since 1945. In the war that ended then, a near existential thing as was your war existential for you, we did the same thing, formed units ad hoc and charged them with producing results. Commanders who did not produce were fired and quickly. The rules change quickly and harshly. Can't do that in peacetime; tradition and protecting the institution get in the way -- and the politics of it all are not helpful.

The Selous Scouts and their roles and missions have been discussed here and a search should show the threads. However, the US is highly unlikely to use those techniques, successful as they are, for a variety of reasons. So we'll bumble along in Afghanistan, realize a medium level of success and depart. That's okay, no one ever really wins an insurgency, the best that can be obtained is an acceptable outcome. That's what we wanted going in and we'll get it on the way out.

The first is the formation of irregular units to wage the war in the manner it is needed. It is easy to blame the politicians at every turn when it may well be more a case that the 'traditional' units and formations will not want control over the war to slip from their fingers. (I'm not sure what the death rate during training has to do with this though). Yes I understand to change the role of existing units would be well nigh impossible that is why I am drifting towards the idea of the formation of new 'special' units which can be disbanded as fast as they have been formed if the direction of the war changes or the political situation home and in Afghanistan demands. Remember that if there is to be a political solution in Afghanistan it will depend on the internal politics of Afghanistan and not what happens in Washington.

I use the Selous Scouts as merely an example how necessary the departure from 'traditional' thinking and behaviour probably is for any form of success in Afghanistan - both military and political. The creation of such units I believe will have the necessary shock effect on the existing troops in Afghanistan.

The formation of the Selous Scouts stripped out most of the best senior NCOs out of the RLI and they drew their African soldiers from the RAR (Rhodesian African Rifles) it hurt these units and there some initial complaint. It was the SAS who felt the most threatened (see the book "The Special Air Service - Rhodesia - the men speak" ISBN 978-0-9814321-2-0) as they also lost men to the Scouts (this is not my opinion, read the book).

So when the SAS were tasked with additional work and complained they were too busy with other tasks or that they were understaffed they were told "OK then we'll give the task to the Scouts". The SAS had to come to terms with the fact that few other than themselves gave a damn what the unit had done in Aden or Malaya. The SAS spoke of 'opposition' (as it were only this tiny unit that mattered). A classic was as told by then Maj Brian Robinson OC SAS in his own words in the book that when on occasion he was placed under operational command of the RLI and Lt Col Dave Parker was in the process of tasking him, he kept replying "That's really not an SAS job, sir." This led to the final word from Lt Col Parker "Brian, I don't know what is or isn't a SAS job but why don't you take you Squadron and f**k off back to Salisbury". Wake up call!

Now the inter service rivalry and the lack of cooperation among the US forces is similar but on a massive scale it appears.

I'm not sure it is ethical for force commanders to "bumble along" while taking causalities. They really appear to need to do some serious soul searching.

[JMA]

To answer your question, Obese about 5-10% on a guess (none morbidly so); simply overweight another 10% or so and marginally heavy about 10 more -- that means 70± % are okay. In the US population at large, we've got BIG problem (pun intended) (LINK). That's what happens when you have too much money and too much free time. The interesting thing is that we've had the problem for about 25-30 years and got to be a laughing stock to the rest of the world -- who are now catching up. (LINK). In South Africa you do a bit better: LINK. Also, we've already started cracking down on the excess, it was allowed to slide to keep troop numbers up with on and off deployments. now that we're able to one on and two offm the housekeeping will get caught up.

The stats you post indicate that in South Africa the white population shares the same obesity levels as the US. So what significance does that have? We are talking fat soldiers in Afghanistan here and the availability of junk food to rear echelon troops.

The 'new' South African defence force is made up of quotas of soldiers from the old forces and the various "liberation" forces. The sad fact is that the army is in a sorry state. When you put an army together on the following basis what do you expect: (not mentioned is the requirement to comprise 30% females)

"It's composition must be 34.15% ex-SADF, 24.48% civilian, 14.14% ex-MK (ANC military wing), 10.06% from former Bantustan armies, 5.5% ex-Apla (PAC military wing), 2.61% ex-IFP militia. The remaining 9.27% must consist of members who joined since April 1994."
http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...d/rsa/army.htm

Obesity is the least of the problems right now.

[JMA]

I would like to comment upon this in more detail. I would preface this by saying I really don't have a solution to the Afghanistan situation but am able to ask some questions. If the questions make for discomfort please resist the temptation to shoot the messenger.

It's the folks in the rear, about 70% of the deployed force, not the 30% that is actually performing active service.

If I understand this you are saying that 70% of the force level supports the 30% who actually do the fighting? If this is correct it is outrageous.

Sorry, we used to do that. No more. The US culture of entitlement has grown so great that the rationale of Courts, Pundits and others is that "We provided him / her the means and opportunity to gain weight, therefor it is isn't his / her fault." Yes, there are gyms but the clod who adds pounds isn't usually a gym visiting type. Stupid, I know but that's us.

Gee, well you make your own bed you must lie in it. But there must be a way around this? What percent of support 'troops' are obese?

Er, no, generally they are not -- those that do often get 'counselled' for being excessively harsh, thus most now devote their efforts to unimportant things like uniforms and haircuts -- and boots, boots are big.

Are they happy with this role? I'm sure those who have some fight left in them would be valuable to the units doing the actual fighting?

For all but perhaps 20%, tactical competence and performance of their troops are not issues. We are obsessed with appearance, though.

That's a damn shame.

Well, 40 years ago what we considered rewards or luxury in any one of several Southeast Asian backwaters was nowhere near what is possible today -- nor was it demanded by troops then; it was just gratefully accepted. I suspect that is the case today, i.e. no demand, just grateful acceptance by most. There will be a few who grumble about harsh conditions and being deprived. Good riddance if they leave. Nobody needs them in any event...

I understand as it appears similar to my experience... but once again I say any fool can be uncomfortable.

[82redleg]

If I understand this you are saying that 70% of the force level supports the 30% who actually do the fighting? If this is correct it is outrageous.

Well, the US has somewhere between 70,000 and 100,000 troops in A-stan. We'll use 70,000, giving the ratio the benefit of the doubt.

According to http://www.understandingwar.org/file...OrbatMarch.pdf, this 70,000 yields 2 x SF BNs, 1 MSOB (all under the CJSOTF), 6 BCTs and 2 USMC RCTs (with 6 IN BNs). Assuming that everyone in a BCT is a shooter (they AREN"T), that's 6 x 3200 (19200) for the Army plus 6000 give or take for the USMC.

I can't speak for the tooth-to-tail of the USMC, but out of 3200 +/- in an Army BCT, about 1400 are in IN COs, CAV TRPs, FA BTRY and EN COs. That's a very imperfect # (it doesn't count the BN mortar and scout platoons, for instance). Those rough numbers also don't count helo crews or EN route clearance companies (for instance), but overall they give you a pretty good idea of the tooth-to-tail.

[JMA]

Well, the US has somewhere between 70,000 and 100,000 troops in A-stan. We'll use 70,000, giving the ratio the benefit of the doubt.

According to http://www.understandingwar.org/file...OrbatMarch.pdf, this 70,000 yields 2 x SF BNs, 1 MSOB (all under the CJSOTF), 6 BCTs and 2 USMC RCTs (with 6 IN BNs). Assuming that everyone in a BCT is a shooter (they AREN"T), that's 6 x 3200 (19200) for the Army plus 6000 give or take for the USMC.

I can't speak for the tooth-to-tail of the USMC, but out of 3200 +/- in an Army BCT, about 1400 are in IN COs, CAV TRPs, FA BTRY and EN COs. That's a very imperfect # (it doesn't count the BN mortar and scout platoons, for instance). Those rough numbers also don't count helo crews or EN route clearance companies (for instance), but overall they give you a pretty good idea of the tooth-to-tail.

It would be fascinating to find out what all these 'support' people do.

[JMA]

It would be fascinating to find out what all these 'support' people do.

"EN route clearance companies" are these engineers? What do they do?

[jmm99]

Are "EN route clearance companies" = e.g., our local 1431st Engineer Sapper Company, which was in Astan during 2009:

1421st /107th deployed to Afghanistan:

Wednesday, November 26, 2008
1421st /107th deployed to Afghanistan

More than 100 members of the Michigan National Guard’s 1431st Engineer Company–former members of the 107th- Company A, are preparing for deployment to Afghanistan.

They will meet at the Calumet Armory on Friday, Nov. 28 to prepare for a Nov. 30 departure to Camp Shelby in Hattiesburg, MS. The Baraga and Calumet armories were separated from the 107th Engineer Company and given their own identity, the 1431st Engineer Sapper Company.

They will train for approximately two months at Camp Shelby before they deploy to Afghanistan. Once in Afghanistan they will provide route and convoy clearance and security during their tour.

and U.P. troops coming home (Nov 2009) and 1431st Sapper Company Freedom Salute (Mar 2010).

Regards

Mike

PS: from Soldier, husband, dad return home:

By Brad Soroka
Tuesday, November 24, 2009 at 7:57 p.m.

CALUMET -- They're the 1431st Engineer Sapper Company; between them: 42 Purple Hearts, 26 Bronze Stars and one newborn baby.

So, more tooth than tail from the PHs.

[Ken White]

It would be fascinating to find out what all these 'support' people do.

Aviation units maintain and fly aircraft; Engineers build stuff; Artillery shoots guns and rockets, Medical units keep the 'died of wounds' rate down in single figures, a worldwide wartime first; Supply and maintenance units do those things; Signal units provide comms; Military Police provide law enforcement, security and do convoy escort, Intelligence Brigades provide intel and operate some UAVs / drones (other are owned by combat units but the folks operating them are support types, not riflemen), SF do both combat and support stuff; Transportation types move stuff and people.

Combat units have mechanics and cooks who are support types. The significant US fixed wing and helicopter presence, with aircraft from all services requires a lot of maintainers, armers and fuelers to support 24 hour operations. Not to mention control tower operators...

Don't forget that the armed forces of the US are providing people to assist in rebuilding Afghan infrastructure (LINK) -- and these guys: LINK. All sorts of stuff going on there. Those US numbers also include the Air Force (fihters, transports and helicopters plus crews and support folks) and the Navy (yes, a lot Navy types there; all the Marine Medical Corpsmen and Doctors are Navy, as are the Chaplains).

P.S

In addition to the big military support package, there are a host of civilian contractors also supporting the effort.

Modern warfare is expensive and expansive...

[JMA]

Aviation units maintain and fly aircraft; Engineers build stuff; Artillery shoots guns and rockets, Medical units keep the 'died of wounds' rate down in single figures, a worldwide wartime first; Supply and maintenance units do those things; Signal units provide comms; Military Police provide law enforcement, security and do convoy escort, Intelligence Brigades provide intel and operate some UAVs / drones (other are owned by combat units but the folks operating them are support types, not riflemen), SF do both combat and support stuff; Transportation types move stuff and people.

Combat units have mechanics and cooks who are support types. The significant US fixed wing and helicopter presence, with aircraft from all services requires a lot of maintainers, armers and fuelers to support 24 hour operations. Not to mention control tower operators...

Don't forget that the armed forces of the US are providing people to assist in rebuilding Afghan infrastructure (LINK) -- and these guys: LINK. All sorts of stuff going on there. Those US numbers also include the Air Force (fihters, transports and helicopters plus crews and support folks) and the Navy (yes, a lot Navy types there; all the Marine Medical Corpsmen and Doctors are Navy, as are the Chaplains).

P.S

In addition to the big military support package, there are a host of civilian contractors also supporting the effort.

Modern warfare is expensive and expansive...

Hi Ken, thanks for the reply again.

This all started with your comment "It's the folks in the rear, about 70% of the deployed force, not the 30% that is actually performing active service."

I then (in error it seems) made the leap from converting "folks in the rear" to "support" staff.

Maybe too I was distracted by this quote from elsewhere from a certain Lt. Colonel Robert A. Lynn:

"The strength of one U.S. Army infantry brigade consists of two to four battalions with the strength typically ranging from between 1,500 to 3,500 personnel. It is usually commanded by a brigadier general or a colonel. A U.S. Army brigade with its assigned personnel and support units will vary with the mission and type of unit. A U.S. Marine expeditionary brigade consists of between 10,000 to 13,000 U.S. Marines. It is commanded by a brigadier general and consists of one infantry regiment and support units. Individual aviation squadrons are task organized to support the mission. In wars that the U.S. have been involved in since the end of World War II; the ratio of U.S. combat troops to combat service support and support have gone from 4 support soldiers to 1 infantryman to 7 support soldiers to 1 infantryman in Iraq and Afghanistan" http://tinyurl.com/yeabfz2

[Cavguy]

I can't speak for the tooth-to-tail of the USMC, but out of 3200 +/- in an Army BCT, about 1400 are in IN COs, CAV TRPs, FA BTRY and EN COs. That's a very imperfect # (it doesn't count the BN mortar and scout platoons, for instance). Those rough numbers also don't count helo crews or EN route clearance companies (for instance), but overall they give you a pretty good idea of the tooth-to-tail.

I always get annoyed when people compare the "tooth to tail" ratio of the USMC to the Army, and neglect that the USMC is incapable of above RCT level logistical support over time. The USMC logistics elements dont do theater sustainment. The Army performs that function for the USMC. That skews the overall ratio greatly. It's easy to dismiss "support troops", but without them combat units can't operate.

(Not targeting you 82redleg, just an FYI for the board)

[JMA]

Well, the US has somewhere between 70,000 and 100,000 troops in A-stan. We'll use 70,000, giving the ratio the benefit of the doubt.

According to http://www.understandingwar.org/file...OrbatMarch.pdf, this 70,000 yields 2 x SF BNs, 1 MSOB (all under the CJSOTF), 6 BCTs and 2 USMC RCTs (with 6 IN BNs). Assuming that everyone in a BCT is a shooter (they AREN"T), that's 6 x 3200 (19200) for the Army plus 6000 give or take for the USMC.

I can't speak for the tooth-to-tail of the USMC, but out of 3200 +/- in an Army BCT, about 1400 are in IN COs, CAV TRPs, FA BTRY and EN COs. That's a very imperfect # (it doesn't count the BN mortar and scout platoons, for instance). Those rough numbers also don't count helo crews or EN route clearance companies (for instance), but overall they give you a pretty good idea of the tooth-to-tail.

And the bottom line is?

Are those percentages accurate?

What I'm attempting to establish is whether the 70 : 30 ratio is correct or is a 7 : 1 ration more accurate.

[82redleg]

And the bottom line is?

Are those percentages accurate?

What I'm attempting to establish is whether the 70 : 30 ratio is correct or is a 7 : 1 ration more accurate.

The bottom line is that there are a lot of support types for not a lot of shooters. The definitions (as Fuchs pointed out) can be blurred, both by mission types, and by the COIN/SFC mission. Are the ETTs that combat advise ANA units daily tooth or tail? (I'd argue tooth, but by Fuchs definition, they are tail).

The percentages for uniformed pax are probably about 70:30, that leaves out the approximately equal number of contractors (counting them would result in a number closer to the 7:1).

[JMA]

The bottom line is that there are a lot of support types for not a lot of shooters. The definitions (as Fuchs pointed out) can be blurred, both by mission types, and by the COIN/SFC mission. Are the ETTs that combat advise ANA units daily tooth or tail? (I'd argue tooth, but by Fuchs definition, they are tail).

The percentages for uniformed pax are probably about 70:30, that leaves out the approximately equal number of contractors (counting them would result in a number closer to the 7:1).

OK so enter the civilian contractors. That's another story then.

The question this probably then, do the 7 actually assist each soldier to fight more effectively?