FOB Keating attack repulsed

[MikeF]

Entropy- thanks for the links and background.

You're a good man, sir.

IntelTrooper- no man is an island particularly in a small war. Any commander that does not recognize that is either stupid or caught up in his own ego. This thread reminds me of the "huddles" I had with my PLs, PSGs, and SLs a long time ago. Heated debates to find truth.

Ken said to Niel:

Mike's idea will work, so will yours. The most important thing is to realize that due to your item 2 (and my follow on comment to it) we are not going to turn this thing into achievement of the stated -- not necessarily the actual -- goals in Afghanistan. Thus, in the interim, we simply need to do what we are doing but get better at the Tactical side of things.

I think we just developed the best COA for our reaction to Nuristan. In the short term, reinforce as I suggested to prove a point and hold through the winter. Second, do a map recon and analysis as Ken suggested. Use METT-TC. Third, consider Niel's points- "Is this worth it?"

Niel's points should drive the operational actions and subsequent strategy in the spring.

On the backside of any US led COIN operation, we must consider the fall-out. This article had me thinking all weekend. Niel, your AO, so I'd appreciate your thoughts and feeback on the accuracy.

In Anbar, U.S.-Allied Tribal Chiefs Feel Deep Sense of Abandonment
Anthony Shadid
Washington Post

RAMADI, Iraq -- There was once a swagger to the scotch-swilling, insurgent-fighting Raed Sabah. He was known as Sheik Raed to his sycophants. Tribesmen who relied on his largess called him the same. So did his fighters, who joined the Americans and helped crush the insurgency in Anbar province.

Sabah still likes his scotch -- Johnnie Walker Black, with Red Bull on the rocks -- but these days, as the Americans withdraw from western Iraq, he has lost his swagger. His neighbors now deride him as an American stooge; they have nicknamed his alley "The Street of the Lackeys."

"The Americans left without even saying goodbye. Not one of them," Sabah said in his villa in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar, once the cradle of Iraq's insurgency. "Even when we called them, we got a message that the line had been disconnected."

Nowhere is the U.S. departure from Iraq more visible than in Anbar, where the 27 bases and outposts less than a year ago have dwindled to three today. Far less money is being spent. Since November, more than two-thirds of combat troops have departed. In their wake is a blend of cynicism and bitterness, frustration and fear among many of the tribal leaders who fought with the troops against the insurgents, a tableau of emotion that may color the American legacy in a region that has stood as the U.S. military's single greatest success in the war. Pragmatism, the Americans call their departure. Desertion, their erstwhile allies answer.