FOB Keating attack repulsed

[Fuchs]

100 instead of 50 men in that base wouldn't have changed much.

The enemy would have massed against another base instead.

Double outpost strength everywhere won't cut it either - still not enough outposts.

Many more outposts at double ordinary strength won't do much either (except risking to alienate more indigenous folks) - the enemy could mass against a convoy instead.

More powerful convoys don't help much because convoys are stretched by definition and always have weak spots. All those troops in-country need also more supply than today, so more convoys - or longer ones.


And even if you somehow managed to deter each and every attack by strength (or turn it into a hopeless action), you would still not come much closer to mission accomplishment.
The enemy could turn his attention on the ANA.

Better ANA ... attack on ANP ... better ANP ... larger concentration ... larger ANP ... attacks on civilian authorities ....


That's why there's so much written about initiative in all those old-fashioned field manuals.

[Kiwigrunt]

That's why there's so much written about initiative in all those old-fashioned field manuals.

Hmmmm, good post. And on the money me thinks.
It does appear that the unintended consequences of NATO strategy create an environment that provides the enemy with ample opportunity for initiative, while we keep struggling to figure out why we keep missing it.

[Rank amateur]

Hmmmm, good post. And on the money me thinks.
It does appear that the unintended consequences of NATO strategy create an environment that provides the enemy with ample opportunity for initiative, while we keep struggling to figure out why we keep missing it.

I don't think it's strategy so much as terrain. There's a reason all the other counter insurgents failed too. Np one can cover all the terrain.

But it's starting to look like this attack is pure Sun Tzu. They knew exactly what was happening inisde the wire. We had no idea what was happening outside it.


From CNN:

The United States now believes that about 200 insurgents -- mostly local fighters, with some Taliban organizers and leaders -- had been planning the attack for days, hiding mortars, rockets and heavy machine guns in the mountains. Sources said the Taliban may have been watching the troops make preparations to depart and launched their attack at a time of vulnerability.




Forward Operating Base Keating, seen in 2007, is surrounded by tall ridge lines.

[Ken White]

But it's starting to look like this attack is pure Sun Tzu. They knew exactly what was happening inisde the wire. We had no idea what was happening outside it.

True. That's what happens when you don't conduct patrols. Not that the US Army hasn't learned that lesson literally thousands of times before...

[Ken White]

100 instead of 50 men in that base wouldn't have changed much. The enemy would have massed against another base instead.
Double outpost strength everywhere won't cut it either - still not enough outposts...

All true.

Better ANA ... attack on ANP ... better ANP ... larger concentration ... larger ANP ... attacks on civilian authorities ....

That's why there's so much written about initiative in all those old-fashioned field manuals.

Yes...

[Michael C]

And even if you somehow managed to deter each and every attack by strength (or turn it into a hopeless action), you would still not come much closer to mission accomplishment.
The enemy could turn his attention on the ANA.

Better ANA ... attack on ANP ... better ANP ... larger concentration ... larger ANP ... attacks on civilian authorities ....

Fuchs, I love the idea but you didn't take it far enough. Attacks on civilian authorities...leads to alienation of the local population...alienation leads to spontaneous uprising called Sunni Awakening...Awakening leads to better intelligence...better intelligence leads to much more effective search and destroy missions...government establishes a strong foothold.

Now in Afghanistan, it obviously wouldn't be a Sunni Awakening, it would be something else. But right now, the Taliban and their ilk don't have to threaten the local populations to live off of them. They get to do so willingly. Now, if they had to attack local populations with force to survive, the population would be driven into our hands.


As to the attack at FOB Keating compared to the luxury life at BAF. Don't just look at the numbers, look at the amount of ordinance dropped. Something like 1 percent of all ordinance expended in Afghanistan occurs around BAF. Basically, when historians write the history about failure in Afghanistan it will be a history of greed, gluttony and sloth by upper leadership (division level and up).

[Fuchs]

Fuchs, I love the idea but you didn't take it far enough. Attacks on civilian authorities...leads to alienation of the local population...alienation leads to spontaneous uprising called Sunni Awakening...Awakening leads to better intelligence...better intelligence leads to much more effective search and destroy missions...government establishes a strong foothold.

It doesn't alienate the population much if you kill a super-corrupt police chief (who had been assigned to his post from far away) by blowing up his house with him and his family.

[Entropy]

Looks like the base was abandoned:

KABUL (AP) - U.S. forces have withdrawn from an isolated base in eastern Afghanistan that insurgents attacked last week in one of the deadliest battles of the war for U.S. troops, the NATO-led coalition said Friday.

The pullout from the Kamdesh outpost near the Pakistani border is likely to embolden insurgent fighters in the region. The Taliban swiftly claimed "victory" for forcing the coalition to leave and said they had raised their flag above the town.

The withdrawal, however, had been planned well before the Oct. 3 battle and is part of a wider strategy outlined by the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who has said for months he plans to shut down such isolated strongholds to focus on more heavily populated areas in an effort to protect civilians.

[Schmedlap]

Interview with Soldiers involved in the fight: http://www.youtube.com/ISAFMEDIA#p/f/4/movYzOxeKso

[Entropy]

Another interview over at Tom Rick's place.

[Ken White]

We've also forgotten, unbelievably, that installations and that's what we're building -- installations in a COIN fight, fer chissakes, -- are static and invite attack and that if they are located in a Valley, the bad guys will simply occupy the high ground and nail you while you cannot see them. We should've figured that out at Ticonderoga 232 years ago (among other places ...).

We are playing to the strengths of our opponents.

Ooops, Think I did mention that. 'Scuse the redundancy...

I have it on pretty good authority that several months ago, the question was surfaced upstream "Why does this COP exist, this is a dumb thing in a dumb place."

Let me add today that at Ricks site, the picture shows a 'watch tower' thingy built atop a Hesco barrier. In the former and late unlamented SE Asia War Games those were called "RPG Magnets." I can't think why...

Not to mention that one at COP Keating is about 200 meters from a blinding turn in a brushy cliff, a virtual invitation to disaster. There are those that like to think we are a well trained Army -- that picture alone puts the lie to that myth...

I have also been told that since patrolling is dangerous (AMAZING NEW MILITARY DISCOVERY. Who knew?) some decided that the smart way to 'get the Taliban' was to place these COPs out and about and draw the Talibs to attack and thus do them in with 'fires.' That's not dangerous? If that's true, it is beyond abysmally stupid. Many including some who were supposed to know better at the direction of some others who obviously did not know better also tried that in Viet Nam -- how did that work out for us?

This is basic stuff. Good SPCs know better than this...

Is this the only Army in the world that insists on revisiting its mistakes to see if they can do worse this time...

[jcustis]

I am perplexed why the Army would set up a staged interview about the incident in basically a clean room, with those Soldiers providing their perspective. They handled themselves well, but what is the Army getting at? That we can take some licks, go back to the FOB for a shower, pop the top on an O'Douls, and get a nice haircut before recounting the chain of events?

I know we are in a new media age and all, so maybe I am just having a hard time understanding the intent, but those clips on the ISAF youtube page about the COP fight pretty much de-motivated me as I watched.

I'm really, really perplexed.

ETA: I think I get it now. This is indeed IO, akin to the "Buy More War Bonds" campaigns of the last world war, and more focused on support back home than anything else.

[Firn]

The interviews were handled pretty well by the soldiers and the interviewer. Of course both sides belonged to the same team and of course it was prepared accordingly. It could provide insight for the western media, sadly it all comes a bit late.


That insurgents can launch concentrated and coordinated attacks under certain regional and local circumstances comes not as a big surprise. This has happened time and time again, in Spain's guerilla struggle against the French or in Vietnam.

According to our idea of a people's war, it should, like a kind of nebulous vapoury essence, never condense into a solid body; otherwise the enemy sends an adequate force against this core, crushes it, and makes a great many prisoners; their courage sinks; every one thinks the main question is decided, any further effort useless, and the arms fall from the hands of the people.

Still, however, on the other hand, it is necessary that this mist should collect at some points into denser masses, and form threatening clouds from which now and again a formidable flash of lightning may burst forth.

Understanding this danger of a small war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult to execute. The will to keep a strong presence in Nuristan too is perfectly understandable, but with the way things are there and the amount of moral and tangible force available it is not possible to sustain it in the current way.

A very bitter truth is that trying to have the troops physically close to the CoG aka populance pushed them in the specific situation more and more away from it. The soldiers were seemingly put in the hand of the enemy like a small hedgehog. Stingy enough to avoid the crushing, but unable to move and act and with the terms dictated by the enemy.


Firn

[Schmedlap]

The interview didn't strike me as having any target audience. How many people - other than us - are really going to sit down and watch 30 to 40 minutes of this stuff and have any idea what they are talking about?