FOB Keating attack repulsed

**Fuchs** · 10-08-2009

Originally Posted by Michael C

Fuchs, I love the idea but you didn't take it far enough. Attacks on civilian authorities...leads to alienation of the local population...alienation leads to spontaneous uprising called Sunni Awakening...Awakening leads to better intelligence...better intelligence leads to much more effective search and destroy missions...government establishes a strong foothold.

It doesn't alienate the population much if you kill a super-corrupt police chief (who had been assigned to his post from far away) by blowing up his house with him and his family.

**Entropy** · 10-09-2009

Looks like the base was abandoned:

KABUL (AP) - U.S. forces have withdrawn from an isolated base in eastern Afghanistan that insurgents attacked last week in one of the deadliest battles of the war for U.S. troops, the NATO-led coalition said Friday.

The pullout from the Kamdesh outpost near the Pakistani border is likely to embolden insurgent fighters in the region. The Taliban swiftly claimed "victory" for forcing the coalition to leave and said they had raised their flag above the town.

The withdrawal, however, had been planned well before the Oct. 3 battle and is part of a wider strategy outlined by the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who has said for months he plans to shut down such isolated strongholds to focus on more heavily populated areas in an effort to protect civilians.

**Schmedlap** · 10-10-2009

Interview with Soldiers involved in the fight: http://www.youtube.com/ISAFMEDIA#p/f/4/movYzOxeKso

**Entropy** · 10-10-2009

Another interview over at Tom Rick's place.

**Ken White** · 10-10-2009

We've also forgotten, unbelievably, that installations and that's what we're building -- installations in a COIN fight, fer chissakes, -- are static and invite attack and that if they are located in a Valley, the bad guys will simply occupy the high ground and nail you while you cannot see them. We should've figured that out at Ticonderoga 232 years ago (among other places ...).

We are playing to the strengths of our opponents.

Ooops, Think I did mention that. 'Scuse the redundancy...

I have it on pretty good authority that several months ago, the question was surfaced upstream "Why does this COP exist, this is a dumb thing in a dumb place."

Let me add today that at Ricks site, the picture shows a 'watch tower' thingy built atop a Hesco barrier. In the former and late unlamented SE Asia War Games those were called "RPG Magnets." I can't think why...

Not to mention that one at COP Keating is about 200 meters from a blinding turn in a brushy cliff, a virtual invitation to disaster. There are those that like to think we are a well trained Army -- that picture alone puts the lie to that myth...

I have also been told that since patrolling is dangerous (AMAZING NEW MILITARY DISCOVERY. Who knew?) some decided that the smart way to 'get the Taliban' was to place these COPs out and about and draw the Talibs to attack and thus do them in with 'fires.' That's not dangerous? If that's true, it is beyond abysmally stupid. Many including some who were supposed to know better at the direction of some others who obviously did not know better also tried that in Viet Nam -- how did that work out for us?

This is basic stuff. Good SPCs know better than this...

Is this the only Army in the world that insists on revisiting its mistakes to see if they can do worse this time...

**davidbfpo** · 10-10-2009

From Ken: Is this the only Army in the world that insists on revisiting its mistakes to see if they can do worse this time...

No, it appears to be a fault in many armies. British military history has many examples from the colonial e.g. Boer Wars to full scale wars, notably WW1. In a hierachical and professional structure - you know far better than I - that lessons can be identified, not learnt and few want to listen "upstairs".

davidbfpo

**Bill Moore** · 10-10-2009

I have it on pretty good authority that several months ago, the question was surfaced upstream "Why does this COP exist, this is a dumb thing in a dumb place."

I agree with the dumb place comment based on what I have read, but why is it a dumb thing in your opinion? I think COPs are essential in COIN; however, like in any conflict location is everything. Key terrain is not an empty term, it actually means something, and in this case it appears the COP was surrounded by key terrain.

Just because this particular COP was poorly designed, doesn't mean we shouldn't establish COPs. How business is executed at COPs is how your force protection issues are addressed. In theory if you saturate the area with patrols with patrols 24/7, then the COP is not overly vulnerable. It is just a locaton that patrols on occassion and not all at once go back to refit, take their casualties etc. It should be the C2 and log node basically, not a Ft. Apache where the bad guys have free reign outside the walls. Of course that means we'll have less COPs, because they need adequate manning to maintain this 24/7 presence outside the wire. Where does that take us? IMO back to the oil spot strategy. Start relatively small, consolidate your gains and then expand. If you expand contiguously you won't allow the enemy any space between the seams to undermine your previous gains.

I don't think COPs in themselves are a flawed concept, I just think we're executing them incorrectly. We're pushing them into the middle of enemy terrority, instead of expanding out from neutralized zones, so in effect as stated they're not focused on protecting the populace, they're focused on protecting themselves (out of necessity). That doesn't achieve much from an operational and strategic view.

Perhaps instead of rushing, we need to slow the train down, consolidate and gradually push out with the main forces that are securing the population. We have forces that can execute deep patrols (much like the SAS did during Malaysia) to disrupt the enemy in the outlying areas. No new ideas here, just haven't seen them discussed yet.

**jcustis** · 10-12-2009

I am perplexed why the Army would set up a staged interview about the incident in basically a clean room, with those Soldiers providing their perspective. They handled themselves well, but what is the Army getting at? That we can take some licks, go back to the FOB for a shower, pop the top on an O'Douls, and get a nice haircut before recounting the chain of events?

I know we are in a new media age and all, so maybe I am just having a hard time understanding the intent, but those clips on the ISAF youtube page about the COP fight pretty much de-motivated me as I watched.

I'm really, really perplexed.

ETA: I think I get it now. This is indeed IO, akin to the "Buy More War Bonds" campaigns of the last world war, and more focused on support back home than anything else.

**Firn** · 10-12-2009

The interviews were handled pretty well by the soldiers and the interviewer. Of course both sides belonged to the same team and of course it was prepared accordingly. It could provide insight for the western media, sadly it all comes a bit late.

That insurgents can launch concentrated and coordinated attacks under certain regional and local circumstances comes not as a big surprise. This has happened time and time again, in Spain's guerilla struggle against the French or in Vietnam.

Originally Posted by Clausewitz

According to our idea of a people's war, it should, like a kind of nebulous vapoury essence, never condense into a solid body; otherwise the enemy sends an adequate force against this core, crushes it, and makes a great many prisoners; their courage sinks; every one thinks the main question is decided, any further effort useless, and the arms fall from the hands of the people.

Still, however, on the other hand, it is necessary that this mist should collect at some points into denser masses, and form threatening clouds from which now and again a formidable flash of lightning may burst forth.

Understanding this danger of a small war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult to execute. The will to keep a strong presence in Nuristan too is perfectly understandable, but with the way things are there and the amount of moral and tangible force available it is not possible to sustain it in the current way.

A very bitter truth is that trying to have the troops physically close to the CoG aka populance pushed them in the specific situation more and more away from it. The soldiers were seemingly put in the hand of the enemy like a small hedgehog. Stingy enough to avoid the crushing, but unable to move and act and with the terms dictated by the enemy.

Firn

**Schmedlap** · 10-12-2009

The interview didn't strike me as having any target audience. How many people - other than us - are really going to sit down and watch 30 to 40 minutes of this stuff and have any idea what they are talking about?

**jcustis** · 10-13-2009

I would modify my comments in the face of what you wrote schmedlap. Good point, and you're right...outside of trooping survivors out in front of the camera, there runs the risk of zero context unless you are an observer and looking to hear/see something specific.

**davidbfpo** · 10-13-2009

Yet again an Imperial (British Empire in India) lesson to be read and hat tip to the UK blogsite (again): http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.co...re-before.html

There are links to other sources within. maybe worthy of a new thread, but for once left here - as the current Afghan thread.

I do wonder whether the Pakistani military remember this too? Imperial history is still part of the tradition and army units have kept their old Imperial names, head dress and more (not the consumption of alcohol).

Moved to a new thread for discussion: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8665

davidbfpo