FOB Keating attack repulsed

[Ken White]

The problem is that these very senior NCOs exist outside of where they are needed. CSMs can do a lot of good at the BN level. Above that, they probably don't need to exist. If a COL hasn't figured out leadership issues by the time he is selected for BDE command, having someone to whisper in his ear isn't going to help.

I totally agree. I've been both a Bn and a Bde CSM in peacetime in and in combat; three Bns, two Bdes. The Bde CSM is a totally wasted slot. A Bde CSM has a lot of negative influence but very little positive capability unless many factors hit just right. I had more positive influence as a Bde Ops SGM --also both in peacetime and in combat -- than I did as a Bde CSM -- and in both Bdes I was fortunate in being able to work for very fine Colonels and in both I was the Ops guy who became the CSM (that worked often for many people until the number of CSMs grew to its current proportions. I'm old... ).

A Bn Ops Sgt (I also disagree with making them SGMs) is too busy so at Bn the CSM makes sense. At Bde, with the larger (too large?) staff, the Ops SGM has adequate time to counsel COLs who are about to step on something and they can also arrange troop help stuff better than can their counterparts at Bn.

The CSMs are generally a waste at Bde; above Bde they literally have no function and some have a terrible propensity to concentrate on eyewash and little else -- except their next job...

I'll caveat all that by saying that a portion of that relative lack of merit is in many senses a function of how the guy is employed; the Army has not directed adequate responsibilities to and for the job, so in most cases, the guy or gal writes his or her own job description. Some do that better than others. Some Commanders give them far more to do and place far more trust in them than others. I have literally been directed to take command of a Company in a fire fight and OTOH, been barely listened to (in peacetime by a fair LTC who was an Aviator on a ground tour and who almost certainly had a really poor Platoon sergeant when he was a 2LT...).

It can be fixed and improved significantly. First and easiest by making those guys (and 1SGs) the unit trainers. Not responsible for training, that's the Cdr -- but trainers; doers and subordinate directors. That's still a band-aid. The entire personnel system still reflects 17th century practice and WW I methodologies. It and the pay system are in need of major overhaul. We need to be able to reward or pay people more without applying the Peter Principle and promoting them past their optimum level. That and moving them too often contribute to a lack of trust up and down the chain...

[Fuchs]

100 instead of 50 men in that base wouldn't have changed much.

The enemy would have massed against another base instead.

Double outpost strength everywhere won't cut it either - still not enough outposts.

Many more outposts at double ordinary strength won't do much either (except risking to alienate more indigenous folks) - the enemy could mass against a convoy instead.

More powerful convoys don't help much because convoys are stretched by definition and always have weak spots. All those troops in-country need also more supply than today, so more convoys - or longer ones.


And even if you somehow managed to deter each and every attack by strength (or turn it into a hopeless action), you would still not come much closer to mission accomplishment.
The enemy could turn his attention on the ANA.

Better ANA ... attack on ANP ... better ANP ... larger concentration ... larger ANP ... attacks on civilian authorities ....


That's why there's so much written about initiative in all those old-fashioned field manuals.

[Kiwigrunt]

That's why there's so much written about initiative in all those old-fashioned field manuals.

Hmmmm, good post. And on the money me thinks.
It does appear that the unintended consequences of NATO strategy create an environment that provides the enemy with ample opportunity for initiative, while we keep struggling to figure out why we keep missing it.

[Rank amateur]

Hmmmm, good post. And on the money me thinks.
It does appear that the unintended consequences of NATO strategy create an environment that provides the enemy with ample opportunity for initiative, while we keep struggling to figure out why we keep missing it.

I don't think it's strategy so much as terrain. There's a reason all the other counter insurgents failed too. Np one can cover all the terrain.

But it's starting to look like this attack is pure Sun Tzu. They knew exactly what was happening inisde the wire. We had no idea what was happening outside it.


From CNN:

The United States now believes that about 200 insurgents -- mostly local fighters, with some Taliban organizers and leaders -- had been planning the attack for days, hiding mortars, rockets and heavy machine guns in the mountains. Sources said the Taliban may have been watching the troops make preparations to depart and launched their attack at a time of vulnerability.




Forward Operating Base Keating, seen in 2007, is surrounded by tall ridge lines.

[Ken White]

But it's starting to look like this attack is pure Sun Tzu. They knew exactly what was happening inisde the wire. We had no idea what was happening outside it.

True. That's what happens when you don't conduct patrols. Not that the US Army hasn't learned that lesson literally thousands of times before...

[Ken White]

100 instead of 50 men in that base wouldn't have changed much. The enemy would have massed against another base instead.
Double outpost strength everywhere won't cut it either - still not enough outposts...

All true.

Better ANA ... attack on ANP ... better ANP ... larger concentration ... larger ANP ... attacks on civilian authorities ....

That's why there's so much written about initiative in all those old-fashioned field manuals.

Yes...

[Michael C]

And even if you somehow managed to deter each and every attack by strength (or turn it into a hopeless action), you would still not come much closer to mission accomplishment.
The enemy could turn his attention on the ANA.

Better ANA ... attack on ANP ... better ANP ... larger concentration ... larger ANP ... attacks on civilian authorities ....

Fuchs, I love the idea but you didn't take it far enough. Attacks on civilian authorities...leads to alienation of the local population...alienation leads to spontaneous uprising called Sunni Awakening...Awakening leads to better intelligence...better intelligence leads to much more effective search and destroy missions...government establishes a strong foothold.

Now in Afghanistan, it obviously wouldn't be a Sunni Awakening, it would be something else. But right now, the Taliban and their ilk don't have to threaten the local populations to live off of them. They get to do so willingly. Now, if they had to attack local populations with force to survive, the population would be driven into our hands.


As to the attack at FOB Keating compared to the luxury life at BAF. Don't just look at the numbers, look at the amount of ordinance dropped. Something like 1 percent of all ordinance expended in Afghanistan occurs around BAF. Basically, when historians write the history about failure in Afghanistan it will be a history of greed, gluttony and sloth by upper leadership (division level and up).

[Fuchs]

Fuchs, I love the idea but you didn't take it far enough. Attacks on civilian authorities...leads to alienation of the local population...alienation leads to spontaneous uprising called Sunni Awakening...Awakening leads to better intelligence...better intelligence leads to much more effective search and destroy missions...government establishes a strong foothold.

It doesn't alienate the population much if you kill a super-corrupt police chief (who had been assigned to his post from far away) by blowing up his house with him and his family.

[Entropy]

Looks like the base was abandoned:

KABUL (AP) - U.S. forces have withdrawn from an isolated base in eastern Afghanistan that insurgents attacked last week in one of the deadliest battles of the war for U.S. troops, the NATO-led coalition said Friday.

The pullout from the Kamdesh outpost near the Pakistani border is likely to embolden insurgent fighters in the region. The Taliban swiftly claimed "victory" for forcing the coalition to leave and said they had raised their flag above the town.

The withdrawal, however, had been planned well before the Oct. 3 battle and is part of a wider strategy outlined by the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who has said for months he plans to shut down such isolated strongholds to focus on more heavily populated areas in an effort to protect civilians.

[Schmedlap]

Interview with Soldiers involved in the fight: http://www.youtube.com/ISAFMEDIA#p/f/4/movYzOxeKso

[Entropy]

Another interview over at Tom Rick's place.

[jcustis]

I am perplexed why the Army would set up a staged interview about the incident in basically a clean room, with those Soldiers providing their perspective. They handled themselves well, but what is the Army getting at? That we can take some licks, go back to the FOB for a shower, pop the top on an O'Douls, and get a nice haircut before recounting the chain of events?

I know we are in a new media age and all, so maybe I am just having a hard time understanding the intent, but those clips on the ISAF youtube page about the COP fight pretty much de-motivated me as I watched.

I'm really, really perplexed.

ETA: I think I get it now. This is indeed IO, akin to the "Buy More War Bonds" campaigns of the last world war, and more focused on support back home than anything else.

[Firn]

The interviews were handled pretty well by the soldiers and the interviewer. Of course both sides belonged to the same team and of course it was prepared accordingly. It could provide insight for the western media, sadly it all comes a bit late.


That insurgents can launch concentrated and coordinated attacks under certain regional and local circumstances comes not as a big surprise. This has happened time and time again, in Spain's guerilla struggle against the French or in Vietnam.

According to our idea of a people's war, it should, like a kind of nebulous vapoury essence, never condense into a solid body; otherwise the enemy sends an adequate force against this core, crushes it, and makes a great many prisoners; their courage sinks; every one thinks the main question is decided, any further effort useless, and the arms fall from the hands of the people.

Still, however, on the other hand, it is necessary that this mist should collect at some points into denser masses, and form threatening clouds from which now and again a formidable flash of lightning may burst forth.

Understanding this danger of a small war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult to execute. The will to keep a strong presence in Nuristan too is perfectly understandable, but with the way things are there and the amount of moral and tangible force available it is not possible to sustain it in the current way.

A very bitter truth is that trying to have the troops physically close to the CoG aka populance pushed them in the specific situation more and more away from it. The soldiers were seemingly put in the hand of the enemy like a small hedgehog. Stingy enough to avoid the crushing, but unable to move and act and with the terms dictated by the enemy.


Firn