How so? Eight US and 7 Afghan KIA after an onslaught by around 100 or so attackers who apparently know what they're doing? That seems like a pretty good performance by the good guys. I guess it depends on one's perspective. I suspect that many Americans think that wars can and should be lopsided affairs like in the movies.Originally Posted by Kevin23
Last edited by Schmedlap; 10-04-2009 at 09:02 PM.
My mistake, I didn't see that a thread on this had already been started.
I guess in terms of my comments, I thought the attack just drove home the need to reassess the situation in Afghanistan.
If our objective were to hold ground or attrit enemy this would be a clear win. But there are obvious questions to be raised here about COIN...
...except those questions would fall into the same category with those Ken discusses.
Because we aren't doing COIN in Nuristan, not in any real sense. We are defending remote outposts (and little beyond the Hescos) and awaiting decisions from far away. (There's part of the answer Westhawks' "1) Why the delay closing the eastern outposts?") Wait long enough and bad things happen. Bad things happen and decisions are impacted....
To clarify...
We were not waiting for something bad to happen; something bad happened while we were waiting for clarity on exactly what direction we would be going.
That lesson will be lost in the resulting noise.
Last edited by Greyhawk; 10-05-2009 at 12:47 AM.
Got an email from a friend who is on a ETT with the ANA that there had been a large fight yesterday. He was of course vague due to OPSEC, but he isn't the type to send such an email b/c of a run of the mill fight. It's his 3d tour as well, so it must have been something.
I suspect the first reports are perhaps understating the complexity/scope/duration of the attack. And a good catch that it may be tied to Taliban IO about moving out of the remote outposts, which I called for awhile ago. We weren't really accomplishing much out there anyway. Classic case of GEN McCrystal's dilemma on "60 Minutes", where yes, things were getting better, but not at the rate they needed to be.
I would argue that being "close to" suspected positions in no way means that those COPs influenced a thing. Anyone asking McChrystal this line of questioning doesn't get it all.3) The President's objective is to “to disrupt, dismantle and destroy al Qaeda.” Yet you plan on abandoning the positions in Afghanistan that are closest to the al Qaeda senior leadership's suspected positions in Pakistan and al Qaeda's principle infiltration routes into Afghanistan. How will this strategy achieve the President's objective?
I am reminded of the Portuguese in Mozambique, who enjoyed relative mobility when they decided to saunter forth, but spent an unbalanced amount of time secluded in their COPs. The results were almost predictable.
Disrupting Al Qaeda is definitely germane to the discussion right now. Are we still after AQ at all, considering the instability we see in the country? Are they operating in AFG with the impunity they once enjoyed?
It has been said that we "took our eye off the ball" in Afghanistan when we allocated resources to Iraq. In reality, we took our eye off the ball in Afghanistan for the decade plus that preceded 9/11. I wonder what future threats we are neglecting right now.
One batch
at the LINK
Afghan aspect
Within The Times report is this, not seen in the US reports on SWJ Blog:
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle6860616.eceThe insurgents seized at least 35 Afghan policemen whose fate last night remained unclear.
I note all the reports refer to two outposts, one ANP and one US Army & ANA? Or were the ANP seized at the mosque? The ANP and ANA elsewhere have used local mosques for Friday prayers (IIRC Korengal Valley) and the attackers swarmed out of the mosque and village. Mmmm.
Not good for "Afghanisation" and recruitment, let alone retention.
davidbfpo
Last edited by davidbfpo; 10-05-2009 at 11:34 AM. Reason: Add link
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