FOB Keating attack repulsed

**Schmedlap** · 10-05-2009

It has been said that we "took our eye off the ball" in Afghanistan when we allocated resources to Iraq. In reality, we took our eye off the ball in Afghanistan for the decade plus that preceded 9/11. I wonder what future threats we are neglecting right now.

**Ken White** · 10-05-2009

at the LINK

**davidbfpo** · 10-05-2009

Within The Times report is this, not seen in the US reports on SWJ Blog:

The insurgents seized at least 35 Afghan policemen whose fate last night remained unclear.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle6860616.ece

I note all the reports refer to two outposts, one ANP and one US Army & ANA? Or were the ANP seized at the mosque? The ANP and ANA elsewhere have used local mosques for Friday prayers (IIRC Korengal Valley) and the attackers swarmed out of the mosque and village. Mmmm.

Not good for "Afghanisation" and recruitment, let alone retention.

davidbfpo

**Entropy** · 10-05-2009

Here's some open source info I've gathered:

The action took place in and around the village of Kamdesh. Fob Keating is on the outskirts.

I read about two outposts as well. In addition to FOB Keating, there is a COP on the ridgeline above the village/FOB called Warheit. I've also read there was an ANP post in the village itself. It's not clear, but it looks like the ANP post in the village was overrun and then the enemy forces turned and attempted to take FOB Keating. 20-30 ANP are missing, presumably captured, but there's also the possibility some defected. It's also not clear where the US soldiers were killed - at the ANP post or at Keating.

It also appears the enemy forces utilized tactics commonly seen in this area and were able to use weather and good opsec to mass for the attack (something I think is similar to what happened at Wanat). I think Cavguy is completely correct that the initial reports may be understating several aspects of the attack. Keating was built a few years ago - it wasn't partially-built like Wanat.

As for Nuristan in general, it is, IMO, a high-risk, low-reward area for a COIN operation. It is one of the most isolated and backward areas in Afghanistan and one that has never felt much sway from any kind of central or outside authority. There isn't much gain for us there IMO.