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Thread: FOB Keating attack repulsed

  1. #101
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    The requirements for a well defended position and a patrol based that actually supports part of Formation level patrol plan, are not the same.
    Okay, they are not the same, but please elaborate on the differences. I'm still not clear on what degree of skill is purportedly required to breath life into a COP/FOB, defense, whatever...

    C2 to the outside world, good fields of fire and observation, basic drainage and life support systems, and yes, a plan for supporting patrols, are requisites. They are not beyond the skill of a basically-trained infantry officer or mortar platoon leader though.

    Truth in lending...I do not support the notion that distributed COPs are the answer, and tend to side with the idea that we can do better with temporary coils when re-arm/refit is required, but keep our forces highly mobile and at a state of alert and readiness that allows for fast response to any threats that might cause surprise. Operations should be centered around patrolling as the active measure of defense, not as much as digging in. Pick the coil up and move it to another patch of dirt the next night, and so on. I think this can fit portions of the Afghanistan terrain fairly well, and can be sustained indefinitely, regardless whether it is LAV, HMMWV, MRAp (ugh...) or dismounted based.

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    Council Member Infanteer's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    I am scratching my head right now because I am not seeing all the difficulty of which you guys are speaking.
    Thank you. You are either well-sited or you aren't. If you aren't well sited for whatever reason (as Wilf alludes to) then you best take measures to offset that disadvantage (an OP comes to mind).

    Now, if I had to incorporate a Taco Bell Express into the site, that might take a bit more work, but it appears that Gen McChrystal has taken care of that with a directive that the AAFES oxygen-stealing largesse of chain restaurant crap in Afghanistan is bring terminated within the next 90 days.
    Really - good to hear, although you wouldn't know it from wandering around KAF. The TGI Fridays - a sit-down restaurant for 300 people - just opened and they have something else going up beside it.

    Truth in lending...I do not support the notion that distributed COPs are the answer, and tend to side with the idea that we can do better with temporary coils when re-arm/refit is required, but keep our forces highly mobile and at a state of alert and readiness that allows for fast response to any threats that might cause surprise. Operations should be centered around patrolling as the active measure of defense, not as much as digging in. Pick the coil up and move it to another patch of dirt the next night, and so on. I think this can fit portions of the Afghanistan terrain fairly well, and can be sustained indefinitely, regardless whether it is LAV, HMMWV, MRAp (ugh...) or dismounted based.
    I think that's only half the equation. Galula mentioned "Mobile Forces" and "Static Forces" and the requirement for both. Having freedom to maneuver (the "Heat" principle of never getting involved with anything that you can't get away from in 5 minutes - that movie rocked) and being a roving death machine is cool, but it doesn't get you far with the population you are trying to "counterinsurge" when they know you'll be gone in 24 hours and the insurgent will be back with his knives out when you leave.

  3. #103
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    Okay, they are not the same, but please elaborate on the differences.
    The difference is essentially the nature of the purpose. Often you do not get a choice as to where to set up, if you are going to fulfil the mission the commander gives you. If your location is part of a lager effort, then that aim of that larger effort may be secondary to what is good ground to defend.
    If I need to access a road, a village, either physically and/or by observation, 24 hours a day, and even when the snows lies thick, I may have to settle for ground that does not offer the best tactical defence, but relies on other activities to ameliorate the disadvantage. - I knows it all pretty obvious, but real life rarely allows you just to pick the best spot to defend.
    C2 to the outside world, good fields of fire and observation, basic drainage and life support systems, and yes, a plan for supporting patrols, are requisites. They are not beyond the skill of a basically-trained infantry officer or mortar platoon leader though.
    Concur, but all those things are subject to compromises.
    Operations should be centered around patrolling as the active measure of defense, not as much as digging in. Pick the coil up and move it to another patch of dirt the next night, and so on.
    Again concur, but that may not fulfil the actual requirement for a village to a physical presence which the local population are demanding, and the formation commander wishes to address.

    All I am saying is that there are a hole host of conditions and contexts which may preclude you picking the ideal spot. I am not suggesting we forgive stupid things being done because folks clearly didn't think about it.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  4. #104
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    Default Duffer's Drift

    I’m somewhat surprised that in this whole discussion, the classic, The Defense of Duffer’s Drift has not been referenced. While the weapons have changed some of the tactical fundamentals, the whole exercise of thinking through a likely (or unlikely) enemy attack is relevant to this, or any defensive position.

    As JCustis states, it should be simple tactics in laying out a competent defensive position. While you might not be able to pick the ideal spot (up higher?) because it negates the purpose of the outpost itself, my memory of laying out tactical defenses is that a primary method is to get in places and observe from the enemy’s point of view and along his likely routes of approach. Its not just a simple case of fields of fire. In a form of “red teaming”, I’d have either my platoon sergeant or a good squad leader think up a plan to defeat the position, then use that information to improve it (of course back then we were worried more about mech, artillery and infantry combined).

    While I agree with Jon on the preference for mobile forces, as I put in an earlier post, and Infanteer also addresses, to protect the population and support legitimacy, there will have to be static positions and forces to defend them. Understanding that this is not a war of attrition, I am still interested to hear how we are combining the mobile and the static, when the enemy chooses to expose himself. These type of COP attacks should be to our advantage, and not just to pile on fires.

    I agree with Bing West’s propositions made elsewhere in SWJ that while we can’t always control the initiative in engaging the enemy, we should be doing better in preventing him from disengaging at will. This is not incumbent on our force in contact necessarily having better mobility (the gear-load issue), but by having a tactical construct that we can maneuver on that engaged enemy with other forces—using positional advantage from mutual support, or even using our wheeled or air mobility to place forces in position. This a fundamentally different approach from using a QRF to reinforce a unit in contact, or emerely to pile on fires at the point of contact.

    I’m waiting to hear that we are developing a “Pinkerton” capability—not Pinkerton as the reality of the somewhat bumbling detective agency, but Pinkerton from “Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid” who relentlessly pursue the outlaws (“Who are those guys?”). This is the type of capability that western nations have used successfully in the past. We don’t necessarily need to “out-Afghan” the Taliban, but use our material and mobility advantages to support a relentless pursuit. This takes resources, however, that cannot be doing other things and it takes dedication to stay on the trail over a significant amount of time.

    Phil Ridderhof

  5. #105
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by PhilR View Post
    As JCustis states, it should be simple tactics in laying out a competent defensive position.
    Sorry to quibble, but this highlights a key problem area. What is a competent defensive position?

    The Planning and Conduct of a defensive battle is very context dependant. Defending a COP is going to be very different from denying a river crossing to Combined Arms Battle Group, in almost every way.
    What works in regular warfare, may not read across to irregular, or vice versa.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Sorry to quibble, but this highlights a key problem area. What is a competent defensive position?

    The Planning and Conduct of a defensive battle is very context dependant. Defending a COP is going to be very different from denying a river crossing to Combined Arms Battle Group, in almost every way.
    What works in regular warfare, may not read across to irregular, or vice versa.
    You're correct, and I failed to make that distinction in my post. I'd add that laying out the COP itself is only one piece of the entire defensive battle, if it is conceived as such. I'd still assert that the COP specifically lends itself to some basic principles of fields of fire, observation, fortified postions, etc.

    However, as you state, the defensive plan must take into account the larger context and purpose. Its here that the Duffer's Drift approach of thinking through the entire situation, and thinking about how reaction forces and reinforcements are introduced into that battle, become critical aspects. The defensive battle is much more than the COP itself and planned correctly, sets the conditions for successful offensive action (counterattack and pursuit).
    s/f
    Phil Ridderhof

  7. #107
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    Again concur, but that may not fulfil the actual requirement for a village to a physical presence which the local population are demanding, and the formation commander wishes to address.
    I think this is the precise mindset that misses the point. Are we assuming that the local population wants/needs that physical presence? Have we asked them what they want, and how the siting of a COP might influence the various cultural or economic

    I'm not advocating being a Km away from the village one day, and then three villages over the next day. I'm thinking more along the lines of being on one side of the village one day, and then moving to the other side of the wadi that bisects it at dusk, and laagering on the other side during the coming night, all the while patrolling and making presence known during the witching hours.

    When the Jan '09 provincial elections where occuring in Ninevah Province, we were asked by the IA commander for the area to be visible, but stay out of the towns as much as possible and allow his forces to work the issue. It was easier and tactically more sound to position LAV platoons/sections in overwatch of specific villages, where they were able to pick up and shift with very short notice. That's a very fluid and mobile capacity that you don't get with a COP, because it requires manpower to hold it if a quick reaction force has to sally forth to respond to a threat. We could have maintained influence through more aggressive patrolling if the situation warranted it, but just the perception of our presence went a long way to influencing the people to get out and vote. We do not have the boots on the ground to be COP centric, methinks, even if we are close to the towns/villages and populated areas. I believe COPs cause a cocoon effect at the worst time, and it is an effect that is more difficult to shift out of once it sets in.

    Granted, this worked primarily because of the terrain that afforded good fields of fire with little effort, and the lack of a significant canal network to contend with. Infanteer and I have been exchanging PMs about his current experience in Afghanistan, since he is in a LAV-based unit as well, and things work differently for him due to the terrain. He and his troops has put the saddles away temporarily in favor of a more dismounted approach, and that works well because of many considerations he has to contend with.

    I will relent that COPs are more likely required for the perceived welfare of our coalition partners who don't have the logistics, institutional memory or training, or will to stay out afield for long stretches of time. And yes, with the IA general mentioned above, you could time our joint ops with certain regularity. About 1600ish, they were packing up their inner cordon and search elements and heading home, regardless of whether the operation was completed and the entire area searched effectively.

    Sorry to quibble, but this highlights a key problem area. What is a competent defensive position?

    The Planning and Conduct of a defensive battle is very context dependant. Defending a COP is going to be very different from denying a river crossing to Combined Arms Battle Group, in almost every way.
    What works in regular warfare, may not read across to irregular, or vice versa.
    We still have not submitted these matters to any sort of rigour here, as you would say...

    What are the differences? I'm still wondering, because all I see are similarities that are inherent with all defensive operations, minus perhaps the aspect of an entry control point and a less-permissive ROE, but that's it.

    And to answer the rhetorical of what a competent defensive position is, my definition is any defensive preparation made with a deliberate approach that considers the desired effects of friendly weapon systems and maneuver (CATK for example) and the desired counter to enemy weapon systems or maneuver. It can be based on a checklist or SOP, or a more elaborate staff planning process, but it all comes down to making the synergy of combined arms work so that the enemy is forced to abandon a particular course of action, or take on a course of action that actually supports friendly action (like squeezing him into a kill sack).

  8. #108
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    WTF?????


  9. #109
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Police adviser I think...

    Ain't he cute?

    Or were you addressing the RPG Magnet. That's what we called em in Veet Nam -- proving that we don't learn lessons well...

    P.S. Or he could be USAF...
    Last edited by Ken White; 02-07-2010 at 11:11 PM.

  10. #110
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    What are the differences? I'm still wondering, because all I see are similarities that are inherent with all defensive operations, minus perhaps the aspect of an entry control point and a less-permissive ROE, but that's it.
    There are similarities taken in the broadest sense of defence.
    However, I submit that with a COP and/or FOB, you have fixed site, and the enemy know where you are. Indeed they can have you under continuous observation. Routine may include base plate checks - something unique to a FOB/COP.
    More over the base has to serve the purpose for which it was intended.

    Defeating an enemy battle group is going to be done over several kilometres depth, and you will be trading ground to set up successive attacks on him. Under no circumstances are you going to sit in a fixed position, unless it is a very well dug-in and hidden hide, from where you will be cued into separate fire positions, to engage/ambush the enemy. If you are totally dismounted then the management and caching of stores and ammunition, also requires unique consideration, as does counter-attacking. Under no circumstances will you let the enemy detect you or sit still so he can dump the RAG on you.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Or were you addressing the RPG Magnet. That's what we called em in Veet Nam -- proving that we don't learn lessons well...
    The magnet. Nobody could possibly be dumb enough to think that jenga tower is providing overhead cover from anything other than rain and sunlight - or much cover in the way of direct fire. If it was constructed for the former reason, then who is the "work harder - not smarter" doofus who thought that the best way to get some shade was to fill umpteen sandbags and stack them up like that?

  12. #112
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Zis where I get to beat my "We are marginally trained" drum?

    Beats me -- what I cannot figure out is why any halfway decent Buck Sergeant tolerates that kind of 'structure.' Much less ANY of his superiors...

    Though perhaps they did a rotation through theNTC to learn how to 'do it right...'
    Last edited by Ken White; 10-27-2011 at 01:20 AM.

  13. #113
    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    Default Retroactive Judgement on Wanat

    Report: Silver Star recipient among officers reprimanded for mistakes at Wanat

    Stars and Stripes
    Mideast edition
    Saturday, March 13, 2010

    Three Army officers who were members of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team have received letters of reprimand for decisions made before the deadly Battle of Wanat, including one officer who received a Silver Star for his actions that day, according to a report by CBS News.

    CBS News identifies Silver Star recipient Capt. Matthew Myer, a company commander — and the senior officer on site for most of the battle — as one of the officers to be reprimanded. ABC News identified the other two officers as Col. Bill Ostlund, a former battalion commander, and Col. “Chip” Preysler, the former brigade commander.
    Although this engagement need not have happened, I couldn't blame the recipients of these letters of reprimand if they feel cynical. It's a bit like saying after the fact that instead of putting up with a bad situation they should have complained about it more. The remainder of the story can be read by clicking here.

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    I've long wondered what it takes to not get promoted to Major, other than ETS. I'll be curious to see if this truly is a "career-ender."

  15. #115
    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    Default Is this what General Sherman was talking about?

    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    ... it appears that Gen McChrystal has taken care of that with a directive that the AAFES oxygen-stealing largesse of chain restaurant crap in Afghanistan is bring terminated within the next 90 days.
    From The Times, London, March 30, 2010:

    No longer will the fighter pilots at Bagram or Kandahar airfields be able to ring Pizza Hut to deliver. Once General McChrystal has his way, the Whoppers will be off the menu: Burger Kings at both locations are to close. Even the newly opened TGI Friday’s on the boardwalk in Kandahar is to close its doors once its contract expires.

    “This is a war zone, not an amusement park,” wrote Command Sergeant-Major Michael T. Hall in a military blog.
    To read the entire article click here.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Pete View Post
    From The Times, London, March 30, 2010:



    To read the entire article click here.
    I don't follow the logic here. Why should military men in a war zone not have access to some good old junk food and the odd beer at the appropriate time? Any fool can be and make others uncomfortable. I would ask these people to provide three or even one good reason why this has a negative impact on military performance. We came back to a warm shower, a beer and a plate for hot food. Now if we had the choice as to whether we wanted a burger or whatever it would have made it a whole lot better.

  17. #117
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    I don't follow the logic here. Why should military men in a war zone not have access to some good old junk food and the odd beer at the appropriate time? Any fool can be and make others uncomfortable. I would ask these people to provide three or even one good reason why this has a negative impact on military performance. We came back to a warm shower, a beer and a plate for hot food. Now if we had the choice as to whether we wanted a burger or whatever it would have made it a whole lot better.
    Personnel were getting ridiculously fat as a result, and we were wasting too many resources on the amenity.

    Our tooth-to-tail ratio in Iraq was out of whack, and it showed when you could get 31 flavors of ice cream. Troops are not being denied a decent meal and sustenance, but the rest of the stuff McCrystal is trying to weed out was just over the top in the first place.

  18. #118
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Agreed, Jon.

    I also agree you don't have to practice being miserable but we've gone about fifty paces past that. It's okay to take care of the troops; Westmorleand did it well -- perhaps too well -- in Viet Nam. I always figured he knew he was in a no win situation and decided to take as good care of people as he could under the circumstances but we over did it there and in Desert Storm and in these two we've definitely gone too far, way too far. Though I believe at least part of that is the due to the same sort of logic; we ain't gonna win but we'll make it comfortable for you...

    Troops in the base camps don't need to live as rough as Joe the Grunt -- but they don't need to live like they're not at war either. That is every bit as inimical (if not more so) to decent performance and morale for both the REMFs and the grunts as no amenities at all.

  19. #119
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    ... they don't need to live like they're not at war either. That is every bit as inimical (if not more so) to decent performance and morale for both the REMFs and the grunts as no amenities at all.
    That is treading very close to Schmedlap Truth number 2: The morale value of a reward or luxury is inversely proportional to the amount of planning and organization necessary to provide it.

    According to this guy, these changes are only about 5 years overdue...

    Small units of soldiers and Marines in Iraq are working around the clock to capture or kill our enemies while safeguarding civilians and infrastructure. These are the people whom we tend to envision when we think of veterans, yet they represent a minority of the troops in Iraq. On our larger base camps, much larger numbers of soldiers, airmen, and Marines are working the same 9 to 5 duty hours that they work back home... While our troops who patrol the streets of Iraqi cities are more lethal, suffer fewer casualties, and cause fewer civilian casualties and collateral damage than in wars past, the troops in secure areas are becoming exponentially less efficient, turning our base camps into money pits into which our tax dollars quickly disappear. Peruse the publications put out by the military Public Affairs Offices in Iraq and you will see countless examples of our defense budget and manpower being put to gratuitous waste... There are radio stations, restaurants, coffee shops, beauty salons, massage parlors, and even post exchanges that sell lingerie, condoms, cologne, and perfume. On some base camps, most notably Camp Liberty, Camp Victory, and Logistics Support Area Anaconda, civilian attire is nearly as common as the starched military uniforms -- even among the troops -- and the pool, volleyball courts, and basketball courts are packed all day long... Contrary to the sacrifices and hardships that most Americans envision our troops to be making, most of our troops are being only slightly inconvenienced by their tour in Iraq.
    Some of the links in the quoted text are now defunct, the ones that still work are a hoot. For some that don't work - you can see in the url the title, which itself is hilarious "US Troops Living Large in Iraq".

    On a slight tangent, I can't help but notice that the author seemed to "get COIN" (protect the populace, avoid damage to infrastructure, etc) even though that article was written in 2005, before 3-24 allegedly revealed new truths to us.
    Last edited by Schmedlap; 04-02-2010 at 01:09 AM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    Personnel were getting ridiculously fat as a result, and we were wasting too many resources on the amenity.

    Our tooth-to-tail ratio in Iraq was out of whack, and it showed when you could get 31 flavors of ice cream. Troops are not being denied a decent meal and sustenance, but the rest of the stuff McCrystal is trying to weed out was just over the top in the first place.
    Getting too fat? For a soldier on active service how is that possible in the first place. Today we dig out those old company photos from the 1970s to proven that grandad did once have a 32" waist.

    Maybe the hardworking troops are being penalised because the staff, admin and logisitcs types who live in the operations area losing it? If you live and work in a place where you can have a row of junk food outlets then you can have a gym and you can have fitness tests and send the failures home in disgrace.

    So I say again when we were extracted after a big combat operation if we able to give the troops a pizza or a burger and let him wash that down with a choice of 31 flavours of ice cream and later a few beers that would have been perfect. There were many times in the 100 degree plus dry heat of the Zambezi Valley that I dreamed of a milkshake. Odd occasion we had cold cokes delivered with a 7 day rat resupply (at least they were cold when they left base) we enjoyed that and buried the bottles afterwards. (Its the little things that mean so much you know)

    Honestly I think the first step to fixing the overweight problem would have been to let a handful of fire blowing sgt majors ( sergeants-major) loose in these bases to clean them out. A sgt major in the US is still allowed to blow fire?

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